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CREDIT DERIVATIVES ARE NOT “INSURANCE” 
 
M. Todd Henderson∗ 
 
*** 
 
This article explores whether credit derivatives should be regulated as 
insurance and offers an alternative form of regulation for these financial 
instruments.  The largely unregulated credit derivates market has been 
cited as a cause of the recent collapse of the housing market and resulting 
credit crunch.  The article explores the possibility that the credit 
derivatives market should be regulated as insurance.  It shows that the 
argument that some credit derivatives help banks and other providers of 
debt share risk with other investors is not sufficient for credit derivative 
contracts in general to be deemed “insurance.”  It concludes that 
insurance regulation is not suitable for the credit derivatives market, while 
conceding that some sort of regulation may be necessary.  The first section 
provides an overview of the basics of credit derivatives.  The second 
section presents the argument for regulating credit derivatives as 
insurance.  Section III describes why, although credit derivatives contracts 
can result in risk sharing or transfer, they are not within insurance law.  
The final section describes what one form of regulation of credit 
derivatives could look like and contrasts this with insurance regulation. 
 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The collapse of the housing bubble and the resulting credit crunch 
has caused untold harm to the economy and the lives of millions by 
destroying trillions of dollars in global wealth. The search for causes and 
remedies has begun in earnest, and chief among these is the largely 
unregulated credit derivatives market. Regulation of one form or another is 
the proposed solution in many quarters, and one of the prominent proposals 
is insurance regulation. At the very least, the analogy between credit 
derivatives and insurance is often made, and this faulty comparison may 
lead regulators astray, regardless of the mode of regulation ultimately 
                                                                                                                 
∗  University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to the George J. Phocas Fund for 
research support. 
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chosen. This Essay explores the suitability of insurance regulation to the 
credit derivatives market, concluding that it is a bad fit along many 
dimensions. Regulation of some sort may indeed be needed to remedy 
some fairly obvious market failures,1 but insurance regulation and 
regulators have little if any role to play in any new regulatory regime.  
The most basic form of credit derivative, known as a “credit 
default swap” (CDS), is simply a contract through which a lender can 
protect against the risk of default by paying premiums to a third party who 
agrees to make the lender whole in the event of default by the underlying 
borrower. The surficial similarity to typical insurance products, like 
property or life insurance, has caused some politicians and pundits to argue 
that credit derivatives are a form of insurance and should be regulated as 
such.2 The former director of the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC), which regulates most derivative products, declared: 
“A credit default swap . . . is an insurance contract, but [the industry has] 
been very careful not to call it that because if it were insurance, it would be 
                                                                                                                 
 1  One market failure was the lack of a centralized clearinghouse to manage 
and reduce counterparty risk in credit derivative transactions. The Federal Reserve 
and Treasury are encouraging exchanges, like the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 
to handle these transactions. See USA Exchanges: Geithner Pushes for Derivatives 
Shake-Up, FINREG21, July 11, 2009, http://www.finreg21.com/news/usa-
exchanges-geithner-pushes-derivatives-shake-up. 
 2  As shown in supra note 1, numerous politicians and observers have made 
the linkage. It has also crept casually into numerous media accounts. For example, 
in an account of the AIG catastrophe, an author for The New Republic calls credit 
derivatives insurance: “Between March, when Greenberg left AIG, and the end of 
2005, Cassano's division issued more than $40 billion in credit-default swaps 
(essentially insurance) for portfolios of securities backed by subprime mortgages. 
This was more than half of all the insurance of this type the company had on its 
books.” Noam Scheiber, A New Theory of the AIG Catastrophe, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, Apr. 15, 2009, at 10, 11.  Legal scholars believe this too. See Robert F. 
Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, 
Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation, 12 FORDAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 181 
(2007) (arguing that certain credit derivative contracts have “general form and 
function reflect[ing] many basic insurance arrangements.”); William K. Sjostrom, 
Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (“A CDS 
certainly appears to fall within this definition given that the protection seller 
contractually agrees to compensate the protection buyer following the occurrence 
of a credit event.”), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1346552. 
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regulated.”3 New York State went even further. On September 22, 2008, 
Governor David Patterson announced plans to regulate credit derivatives as 
insurance under the auspices of the state’s insurance department.4 New 
York State Insurance Commissioner Eric Dinallo then testified before a 
House Committee investigating credit derivatives: “the insurance regulator 
for New York is a relevant authority on credit default swaps,” because 
“[w]e believe . . . [they are] insurance.”5 Although New York has delayed 
its regulatory plans pending a federal review of credit derivative 
regulation,6 the question of whether credit derivatives are insurance 
remains an open and much bandied about one that needs to be analyzed. 
                                                                                                                 
3  60 Minutes: Wall Street’s Shadow Market; Credit default swaps (CBS 
television broadcast Oct. 5, 2008), available at http://www.cbsnews.com 
/stories/2008/10/05/60minutes/main4502454_page1.shtml.  Dr. Greenberger 
argued that the industry was able to avoid regulation by simply using the word 
“swap” instead of “insurance” to describe the transaction. See id. (“So they use a 
magic substitute word called a 'swap,' which by federal law is deregulated.”). 
Swaps were specifically excluded from regulation by the CFTC by the 
Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000. 
It is true that a typical CDS transaction does not involve a “swap” in the same 
way that an interest rate swap does. In the latter case, two parties agree to swap 
risks: the holder of a fixed-rate note agrees to swap that income stream with the 
holder of a variable-rate note. But while the term swap is not technically accurate, 
it is difficult to imagine that insurance or other regulators would be fooled by the 
label. 
4  Press Release, Governor Patterson Announces Plan to Limit Harm to 
Markets from Credit Derivatives (Sept. 22, 2008) (on file with Errol Cockfield) 
available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/press/2008/p0809224.pdf.  See also Danny 
Hakim, New York to Regulate Financial Tool Behind the Credit Crisis, N.Y.,” NY 
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at C10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09 
/23/business/23swap.html?ref=business  (“The governor said the state’s insurance 
department would begin regulating credit-default swaps as insurance products in 
cases where the buyer of the swap also owns the underlying bond it is meant to 
back.”). 
5  Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy: 
Hearing before the H. Comm. on Agriculture Committee, 110th Cong. (2008) 
[hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Eric Dinallo, Ins. Comm’r, N.Y. State), 
available at http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/110/h91120/Dinallo.pdf. 
6  See id. (“Based on the developments reported on by the President’s Working 
Group, it is clear they are committed to comprehensive and effective federal 
oversight of credit default swaps. . . . . Accordingly, New York will delay 
indefinitely our plan to regulate part of this market.”). It is clear from Dinallo’s 
testimony that New York is using the threat of insurance regulation as a weapon to 
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This Essay argues that it makes little or no sense to regulate credit 
derivatives as or like “insurance,” regardless of whether they are used as 
insurance, that is, to reduce risk for one party. The instinct to call credit 
derivatives “insurance” is sensible enough – the lender buying credit 
protection looks much like an insured and the party selling credit protection 
looks much like an insurer, at least where the protection seller is in privity 
with holders of notes of indebtedness.7 The analogy is obvious: in a plain-
vanilla CDS, the bank making an original loan pays a premium to a third 
party that in turn agrees to make the bank whole in the event of a future 
liability, that is, a default on the underlying loan or bond. This transaction 
resembles a typical insurance contract, where the insured pays a premium 
to a third party (an insurance company) in return for a promise to make the 
insured whole in the event of a loss.  
But observing that something resembles or provides insurance 
against loss is not enough to warrant regulating it as “insurance.” Many 
contracts that are not called insurance or regulated as insurance imbed 
some component of insurance or risk sharing. For instance, when a farmer 
enters into a contract that allows the farmer to sell wheat at a fixed price in 
the future – a forward contract called a put option – the farmer is in effect 
insuring against a drop in the price of wheat. On the other side of this 
transaction, there may be a baker who enters into a forward contract that 
allows the baker to insure against an increase in the price of wheat. Both 
parties are buying price insurance from each other, likely with a 
middleman, known as a market maker, standing between and reducing the 
counterparty risk in the transaction. But these contracts, and all similar 
hedging contracts entered into by regular consumers and sophisticated 
financial entities, are not regulated as insurance contracts.8 The point can 
                                                                                                                          
encourage more comprehensive federal regulation. (“Based on the developments 
reported on by the President’s Working Group, it is clear they are committed to 
comprehensive and effective federal oversight of credit default swaps. . . . 
Accordingly, New York will delay indefinitely our plan to regulate part of this 
market.”).  
7  New York State has proposed regulating only these credit derivatives – 
about one-fifth of the total market – because the argument that the parties are 
engaged in an insurance transaction is more difficult in cases where they are 
simply wagering on the default without an actual interest in the underlying debt 
instrument. See id. 
8  Option contracts generally trade on exchanges, like the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange, and as such are regulated by the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC).   
2009] CREDIT DERIVATIVES ARE NOT “INSURANCE” 5 
 
be made more bluntly: it would be fanciful to argue that every contract in 
which a party could be said to be reducing its risk and another party was 
willing to take on some of that risk is or should be called insurance. If this 
were the case, state insurance regulators would be involved in regulating 
hedge funds, commodities, options, swaps, and countless other contracts 
entered into by consumers and firms. In fact, every contract assigns, shares, 
and apportions some sort of risk. No one seriously advocates this scope for 
insurance regulation. Simply providing some risk sharing is not enough to 
be regulated by state insurance commissioners. 
The reason insurance regulation does not extend to every contract 
that involves some element of insuring risk has to do with the purpose of 
insurance regulation, as opposed to other types of regulation. There are 
broadly two justifications for a special law of insurance: first, the peculiar 
governance problems associated with insurance firms; and second, worries 
about unsophisticated consumers being duped by complicated and essential 
products. This Essay will show that neither of these justifications obtains or 
makes sense for the regulation of credit derivatives.  
Governance problems arise because insurance companies have an 
inverted production cycle and do not generally have concentrated creditors 
like non-insurance firms. This means that two crucial constraints on the 
potential misuse of investment resources are missing: the feedback to the 
firm provided by product and other markets is missing given the fact that 
the insurance company produces its product (that is, payment of claims) 
many years after the consumers pay for it; and when things go badly for the 
insurance company, there is no concentrated interest to keep the firm from 
adopting an excessively risky strategy (from the perspective of creditors 
[that is, policy holders]).  
Insurance law is designed to prevent the risk that insurers 
competing for policyholders, but unconstrained by normal forces, will 
charge too little for their products. This happens because of the continuous 
nature of insurance company inflows and outflows, coupled with a 
delinkage between the time of pricing a risk and the time of paying out the 
loss from the risk. In other words, insurance can look a bit like a Ponzi 
scheme, where new creditors of the firm are paying off the liabilities to old 
creditors. And, just as in a Ponzi scheme, when things go badly for the firm 
(that is, when actuarial estimates of liability turn out to be wrong), there is 
a natural tendency to offer new investors an attractive return to increase 
cash flows to pay for higher-than-estimated outflows.  
The second part of the governance problem – the lack of 
concentrated creditors – exacerbates this problem, since there is no 
sophisticated entity with bargaining power that can keep the firm from 
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adopting a shareholder-friendly, go-to-Vegas strategy in the event liability 
estimates were erroneous. Without these governance constraints, initial 
misestimates and mistakes can fester and lead to large losses. This Essay 
shows how the counterparties in credit derivative contracts do not have this 
continuous investment problem or these governance problems, unless, of 
course, they are insurance companies, and how insurance regulation would 
be futile in any event.  
Consumer problems arise because the consumers of insurance 
company products (and as such creditors of the insurance company) are 
average individuals without the expertise or sophisticated judgment to 
assess what they are buying in insurance products. The consumer-centric 
element of insurance regulation consists of three commonly recited 
justifications: to make sure insurers don’t charge too much; to regulate the 
substance and terms of policies; and to regulate service and coverage 
issues. This basis for regulation is, to be sure, driven by a rather dim view 
of the philosophy of caveat emptor, the wisdom and skill of the average 
consumer, and the power of a small number of informed individuals to set 
market prices for others. This Essay does not take on the soundness of 
these consumer issues for insurance products, but simply compares their 
rationale with what is known about the participants in credit derivative 
contracts. Unlike the average consumer of insurance, the average 
participant in credit derivative markets is large, sophisticated, and capable 
of bearing losses. There is simply no basis for transferring the paternalistic 
impulses of insurance to this market. 
This Essay shows that neither the governance problem nor the 
consumer abuse problem obtain in significant ways in the context of the 
credit derivatives market. Section I introduces the basics of credit 
derivatives. Section II presents the argument for regulating credit 
derivatives as insurance based on the rough analogy describe above. 
Section III then shows why the simple fact that credit derivatives 
sometimes result in risk sharing or transfer does not justify bringing these 
contracts and the parties to them within the ambit of insurance law. Section 
IV concludes by briefly sketching out what a sensible regulation of credit 
derivatives might look like, contrasting this with the approach of insurance 
regulation.  
 
II. A PRIMER ON CREDIT DERIVATIVES 
 
Credit derivatives exist in many forms and flavors, but the essence 
is simple: it may be more efficient for different entities to handle the 
various aspects of lending. A typical loan has many parts, including: 
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origination, servicing, monitoring, and funding or risk bearing. In a world 
without risk-sharing mechanisms, all of these are contained within one 
entity, that is, a bank. The bank has the relationships (origination), scale in 
the back office (servicing), experience (monitoring), and cash from 
depositors (funding). But the bank might not want to do all these things. It 
might want to become an arranger rather than a lender. One reason is 
because federal regulations designed to protect depositors require the bank 
to hold cash on hand to offset risk in loans.9  
Another reason is that other potential lenders may be shut out of 
the corporate lending market, say because they do not have relationships 
with borrowers, but would provide a cheaper source of funding or be more 
efficient holders of particular aspects of corporate borrowing risk. Smaller 
regional banks and insurance companies come to mind here.  
A final reason is that the bank may not be the most efficient 
monitor of firm conduct. The bank has experience with monitoring in 
general and (likely) with the specific borrower, but these advantages come 
with costs too. The relationships that led to the loan may corrupt the 
monitoring function—a sort of monitor capture by the borrower. Fees 
earned by banks for workouts and new loans may also distort incentives. So 
too might the fact that the workout group for a loan may be comprised of 
only a few individuals, who are subject to biases and shortcomings that a 
larger, market-based monitoring mechanism might be able to overcome. In 
short, there are many reasons why banks might prefer to decouple the 
bundle of loan features, but cannot without financial contracts that allow 
default risk to be shared. Credit derivatives, although much maligned as a 
result of current events, can help investors of various sorts allocate the 
lending market to its most efficient participants.  
There are many variations of credit derivatives, but to answer the 
threshold question of whether credit derivatives in general can be 
considered “insurance”, it makes sense to consider the two most generic 
versions: the credit default swap (CDS) and the collateralized debt 
obligation (CDO). 
 
A. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
 
A CDS is a contract in which credit risk (that is, the expected 
losses arising from defaults) is transferred from one party to another. A 
                                                                                                                 
9  Capital reserves required by the Basle Accords are non-productive, and 
therefore reduce a bank’s return. 
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bank makes a loan to a borrower. There is some risk that the borrower will 
default on the loan, causing losses to the bank.10 Naturally, the bank wants 
to minimize these losses. The bank can do this through ex ante selection 
(that is, due diligence during the underwriting process), through ongoing 
monitoring of the borrower, and through effective ex post workout 
procedures. The bank can also contract with a third party to make the bank 
whole in the event the borrower defaults.  
Consider a simple example: Bank holds on its balance sheet a $100 
note for a loan made to Borrower. Bank may want to shift some of the risk 
that Borrower will not repay the loan, say because of costly federal capital 
adequacy requirements that require Bank to hold some percentage of the 
loan’s outstanding balance in cash reserves.11 For a period of (normally) 
five years, Investor, who wants to hold risk of Borrower, agrees to make 
Bank whole in the event of default, thus assuming the risk of default,12 in 
return for a stream of periodic payments from Bank. Voilà, the risk of the 
loan to Borrower has been swapped from Bank to Investor. The premium 
paid by the Bank is expressed as a risk spread in basis points, say 100 basis 
points or 1 percent. For a $100 loan, this would mean the bank would make 
quarterly payments of $0.25 to buy protection on the note. (The spread, 
which expresses the risk of default during the five-year term of protection, 
varies over time, allowing information about the quality of the debtor to be 
revealed and allowing investors unrelated to the loan contract to speculate 
on changing credit quality for profit.) In the event of “default,”13 Bank 
delivers the underlying credit instrument, in this case the loan, to Investor, 
and Investor makes a payment to Bank that puts Bank in the position it 
would have been in if Borrower had not defaulted. 
                                                                                                                 
10  The default risk is only one of many risks embedded in a loan. Lenders 
(and borrowers) face interest rate risks, volatility risk, currency risks, and so on. 
The significance of credit derivatives (CDSs) is the ability to unpack and isolate 
credit risk, and allowed it to be transferred to others who may be more efficient 
holders of it.  
11  In general, US banks are subjected to the capital adequacy requirements of 
the so-called Basle Accords, implemented by the Bank of International 
Settlements. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, July 1998, available 
at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.htm. 
12  Default risk is only one of many types of risk. Others include: interest rate 
risk, counterparty risk, currency risk, and so on. 
13  As described below, see infra p. 7, the issue of when a credit derivative 
contract triggers payment is a complicated and tricky issue.  
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These contracts constitute the primary market for credit derivatives 
since the parties to the transaction interact with the underlying debt 
instrument: the lender writes and initially holds the instrument, while the 
counterparty ends up holding the instrument in the event of default, and, in 
any event, one of the two parties to the contract will hold the underlying 
debt at the termination of the CDS contract. The participants in this market 
are large commercial banks, as risk sellers, and insurance companies, hedge 
funds, pension funds, mutual funds, and a mix of investment banks, 
commercial banks, and smaller regional banks, as risk buyers.14 In this 
way, CDS contracts resemble other risk-sharing arrangements, like the 
syndication of credit or the sale of loans by banks. Most large loans are 
shared between a lead lender and other banks with which it contracts to 
share the risk of default, and there is a large and robust market for the sale 
of all or parts of loans to other banks. (Although risk sharing contracts, 
these are not considered or regulated as insurance.)  
Returning to the example above, Bank will want to reduce the $100 
risk by getting other investors to participate, both to reduce its own risk and 
also to comply with capital adequacy rules. Bank could sell the loan, but 
this might mean giving up its relationship with Borrower, something 
neither party might want.15 Shifting the risk using a CDS preserves this 
relationship – in fact, Borrower may not even know the risk has been 
shifted – while also allowing conservative investors, like insurance 
companies and pension funds, to participate in the credit market.16 A small 
regional bank in Germany, an insurance company in Indonesia, and a 
pension fund in California are thus able to achieve desired risk-return 
investments in new ways. 
                                                                                                                 
14  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: CONFIRMATION 
BACKLOGS INCREASED DEALERS’ OPERATIONAL RISK, BUT WERE SUCCESSFULLY 
ADDRESSED AFTER JOINT REGULATORY ACTION, GAO-07-716, p.6 n.8 (2007), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07716.pdf (“The top five end-users of 
credit derivatives are banks and broker-dealers (44 percent), hedge funds (32 
percent), insurers (17 percent), pension funds (4 percent), and mutual funds (3 
percent).”). 
15  Borrower might not want Bank to sell the loan, since this may signal 
something bad about Borrower. The positive signal derived from having Bank be a 
creditor and monitor of Borrower may be quite valuable and for this reason, loan 
agreements often include no-sale clauses. 
16  Conservatism here may derive internally, that is, from managers and 
shareholders, or from regulation.  
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The risk is not just swapped between two parties. In a typical CDS 
contract, the risk can be swapped many times, so that there are numerous 
parties in the risk-sharing chain. For instance, A, a manufacturing firm may 
borrow from B, a commercial bank. B, not wanting to hold the risk, may 
pay a premium to C, a dealer in CDS contracts, in return from a promise to 
be made whole if A defaults. (C, like all protection sellers, will be required 
to post some collateral with B to ensure payment on this obligation.) Since 
C is a dealer, it will look for a buyer willing to provide the ultimate risk-
bearing function. D, an insurance company, agrees to make C whole in the 
event of a default by A in return for premium payments by C. Then E, a 
different commercial bank, wants exposure to A’s credit risk, so it may 
agree to make D whole in the event of a default by A, in return for the 
payment of premiums by D. And on and on and on. There is no limit on the 
number of links in the risk-sharing chain, and, in practice, credit risk is 
often transferred dozens of times after its original creation. A typical credit 
derivative contract has hundreds of investors selling protection for 
hundreds of lenders and even more underlying borrowers. In the mortgage 
securitization market, for example, one of the problems in the collapse of 
US house prices was figuring out who actually held the risk of mortgage 
default so that workouts or foreclosures could happen efficiently.17 
As discussed below, although C, D, E, and parties on down the 
chain could be said to be providing risk-sharing contracts in this example, it 
would be a dramatic expansion of the concept of insurance regulation to 
call them insurance companies. These entities might be individuals, banks, 
hedge funds, university endowments, or any other pool of investment 
money looking for return. In addition, the kind of insurance they are 
providing is not dissimilar from the insurance provided by nearly every 
contract that involves risk sharing (that is, every contract), and therefore 
raises irresolvable line drawing problems. The closest entity to an insurance 
company is, C the original CDS dealer. But, as discussed below, these are 
brokers who are regulated by numerous securities and banking laws, and 
subject to the oversight of numerous federal regulators.   
CDS contracts do have characteristics similar to typical insurance 
contracts. Specifically, risk sharing and information asymmetries inevitably 
give rise to problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Bank knows 
more about default risk of Borrower than the counterparties, and therefore 
                                                                                                                 
17  See, e.g., Mike McIntire, “Tracking Loans Through a Firm That Holds 
Millions,” N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/04/24 /business/ 24mers.html. 
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the latter may be unwilling to sell protection on the notes Bank brings to 
the market, since the counterparties may believe these are the debtors most 
likely to default. Another problem is that the existence of credit protection 
may make Bank less diligent in its monitoring role, thereby increasing the 
risk of default as a result of the risk-sharing contract. In theory and 
practice, there are steps that can be taken to mitigate these risks. Bank can 
hold back a portion of the risk of default, perhaps the first-loss position, 
thereby giving it incentives to monitor. This is analogous to a deductible in 
insurance contracts, and it can address both the moral hazard and adverse 
selection problem. (As it turns out, however, the nature of the securitization 
process made these first-loss tranches more valuable, on a risk-adjusted 
basis, than their price, while more senior tranches were less valuable.) 
These problems and the steps taken to mitigate them are discussed below. 
There is also a rich secondary market in which the risk of default of 
a particular borrower (known as a “reference entity”) is traded among 
parties that have no contact with or affiliation with either the borrower or 
the lender. For instance, auto parts maker Delphi had $2 billion in bonds 
outstanding at the time it declared bankruptcy, but there were over $25 
billion in credit derivative bets outstanding on whether or not Delphi would 
default on those bonds.18 The term “bet” is chosen deliberately, since these 
contracts are nothing more than wagers on whether Delphi would default. 
(As a side note, we do not regulate these bets as gambling for the same 
reason that the secondary market in stocks, that is, the New York Stock 
Exchange, is not regulated as gambling, even though it is. The reason is 
that the gambling is socially useful.) This large ratio of secondary to 
primary market is common across companies used as reference entities. 
After all, there is nothing (other than perhaps gambling law) that prevents 
two parties from writing a contract that replicates the payoffs from the 
payment or default of any debt instrument entered into anywhere. These 
contracts are called “synthetic,” since they do not involve any physical 
obligations to deliver on the underlying debt instrument.  
The proposals to date to regulate credit derivatives have focused 
entirely on the primary market, specifically disclaiming any authority over 
the secondary market. As discussed below, this has something to do with 
what insurance experts call “insurable interest,” which is a requirement that 
the party allegedly doing the insuring has to pay only when the party that is 
                                                                                                                 
18  The Ballooning Credit Derivatives Market: Easing Risk or Making It 
Worse?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Nov. 2, 2005, http://knowledge.wharton. 
upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1303. 
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allegedly insured actually suffers a harm unrelated to the insurance 
contract. But once regulators limit control over one part of the market, the 
fungibility of financial products will allow investors to move to other 
unregulated products that give them the same mix of risk and return. This is 
discussed further below. 
 
B. COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS 
 
The other type of basic credit derivative is a collateralized debt 
obligation (CDO). A CDO is, at its core, the same as a CDS contract.19 As 
in a CDS contract, the parties to a CDO contract are shifting the risk of an 
underlying debt instrument from lender to investor, but instead of doing so 
for a corporate loan or bond issuance from a single borrower they do so for 
a series of loans or bonds from many borrowers. In this way, some 
portfolio theory-based diversification is achieved, since the risk for any 
investor of any one buyer defaulting is absorbed by gains on other debtors 
that do not default.  
Here is a cartoon of how the basic, plain-vanilla CDO is formed. A 
CDO manager, usually an investor specializing in these products from a 
large investment house like Goldman Sachs, forms a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV), basically a stand-alone, bankruptcy-remote firm, and then 
chooses loans or bonds or mortgages from many borrowers to put into the 
SPV. The SPV then sells interests in the cash flows it will generate from 
these debt contracts to numerous investors. The SPV generates cash from 
the instruments it holds as the borrowers pay back the debts. This cash is 
then distributed to the investors according to the terms of their investment. 
So far, the SPV creating the CDO looks like any firm selling a service or 
product. The SPV raises money from investors, uses this money to invest in 
assets (in this case, debt instruments), manages the assets, and then 
distributes the profits it earns to the investors.  
SPVs investing in credit derivatives have two somewhat unique 
features that enable them to be attractive risk-sharing mechanisms: 
tranching and  securitization. The concepts are quite simple.  
In a normal debt investment, a group of investors share a vertical 
slice of the expected payouts from a debtor. Three investors funding a $100 
loan to a firm each bear exactly the same risk if the borrower defaults – as 
the recovery on the loan falls from $100 to, say, $80, each investor suffers 
                                                                                                                 
19  In the nomenclature, if the underlying is a bond, the instrument is called a 
CDO, while if it is a loan, it is called a CLO. 
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a 20 percent loss. In a securitized debt investment, by contrast, the same 
three investors can slice the risk horizontally, instead of vertically, allowing 
them to assign different payouts, called “tranches,” based on the amount of 
recovery. For example, the investments could be structured such that the 
first investor bears the first $10 in losses, the second the next $10, and the 
third investor the remaining $70. In that case, if the $100 loan falls in value 
to $80, the first two investors would suffer complete losses, while the third 
investor would suffer none (although its risk would increase, since any 
additional diminution in value would impair its position). This approach 
can dramatically reduce the probability of default for a particular tranche, 
and thus make even risky debt investment attractive for conservative 
investors. For example, the third investor reduces the riskiness of its 
investment by investing in the second type of vehicle. Insurance 
companies, which traditionally invest in only relatively safe instruments, 
used this approach to expand the types of investments they made. 
The sharing and recategorization of risk can be enhanced by 
pooling together many risks through a process called securitization. This 
can be seen through a simple example. Consider two banks loaning to two 
companies in different and uncorrelated industries. The loans both pay 
$100 in the good state of the world and $0 in the bad state of the world, 
with a probability of default of 10 percent. If the banks take vertical 
positions, the expected value of the loans for each bank is $90. Each faces 
the identical risks. 
If instead, the cash flows from the two loans are pooled and 
tranched in a CDO, the 10 percent risk of default can be reduced for one of 
the investors. If one of the banks bears the first $100 in losses and the 
second loses only if both borrowers default (and assuming the defaults are 
not correlated), the risk of default for the senior bank falls from 10 percent 
to 1 percent.20 The expected value for the two banks is thus $90 for the 
junior bank and $99 for the senior bank. The process can be extended 
indefinitely, with each additional risk added to the pool further reducing the 
risk up the tranching scheme. For instance, adding a third investor and a 
third uncorrelated loan to the pool reduces the risk for the most senior 
bank, which suffers only if all three firms fail, to 0.1 percent.21  
                                                                                                                 
20  The loss for the senior bank is the probability of firm one defaulting (10 
percent) times the probability of firm two defaulting (10 percent).  
21  Correlation of risks is obviously the key assumption in the creation of a 
CDO. If the risks in the three-bond case are perfectly correlated (that is, the failure 
of one firm means all three firms will fail), then the probability of loss for all three 
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Even when considering the role of tranching and securitization, the 
structure of a CDO is roughly the same as any firm in any business – they 
are nothing new under the sun. Tranching is just a fancy way of saying that 
the SPV replicates the priority of liquidation claims created by bankruptcy 
law and contracts for other firms. When a firm liquidates, equity interests 
lose first, and because of the absolute priority rule in bankruptcy, more 
junior interests, like unsecured creditors, lose only after equity interests are 
wiped out. This is true whether the firm is a donut maker or SPV holding 
debt instruments in a CDO structure. In addition, as discussed below, the 
shareholders investing in a traditional firm are selling insurance to the 
firm’s debt holders, managers, and other stakeholders in the same way that 
the protection sellers are for the original bank in a credit derivative 
contract. Equity provides a downside cushion, since no payments are 
legally due equity holders, and thus provides risk sharing on favorable 
terms for holders of fixed claims on a firm’s balance sheet.  
Unlike regular firms, however, SPVs holding credit derivatives 
generally have only a single investment period. Whereas an insurance 
company is constantly adding new policy holders, SPVs are typically 
formed, buy debt instruments, raise money to fund the risk of these 
instruments, and then make payouts according to the terms of the credit 
derivative contracts. As mentioned above and discussed more fully below, 
this distinction is a crucial factor in the appropriateness of insurance 
regulation.  
Before moving to the merits of the arguments for and against 
regulating credit derivatives as insurance, it is important to point out a few 
other features of credit derivative markets. First, the CDO market is at least 
two times larger than the CDS market. At the height of these markets in 
2007, the single-name CDS market (that is, an entity selling protection to a 
bank for a loan to a single company) had a notional value of about $20 
trillion, while the total credit derivatives market was about $60 trillion in 
notional value.22 This means that the CDO market, which makes up the rest 
of the market, was about $40 trillion, or twice as big as the single-name 
CDS market. 
Second, there are numerous index products and more complicated 
CDO products (such as the CDO2) that allow individual investors to buy 
                                                                                                                          
investors is the same 10 percent. Thus, there are no credit reduction benefits from 
securitization.   
22  See Posting of Tyler Durden to, Some More Facts about How CDS Market, 
http://zerohedge.blogspot.com/2009/02/ (Feb. 1, 2009, 10:31 EST). 
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exposure to a portfolio of credit derivative investments. For instance, in the 
single-name CDS world, there are several indexes, like the Dow Jones 
“Investment Grade CDX” and the “High Yield CDX,” that consist of over 
100 borrowing firms of different credit quality. Investors can buy securities 
that track these indices in the same way they can invest in the S&P 500 or 
Wilshire 5000 equity indices. (As discussed below, investments in these 
indices are no more providing insurance to the underlying participants in 
the borrowing transaction than a regular firm selling equity, since both 
provide mechanisms of risk sharing.) Moreover, firms or investors seeking 
exposure to these credit default risks often hold a portfolio of risks or an 
index product for a few months or less, rolling the investments on a fairly 
constant basis to meet the investors’ or firms’ balance sheet needs.23 As 
such, the investors in credit derivative indexes are not generally exposed to 
the possibility of actually having to pay for any losses on the original debt, 
but rather are susceptible to the change in the price of the indexed securities 
depending on the changing nature of the credit quality of the underlying 
borrower. 
A CDO2 (and more exotic credit derivative products) basically 
achieves the same result for portfolio products. A CDO2 is simply a two-
pool portfolio of tranched and securitized loans in which investors face 
exposure to both pools. If the credit risks are not perfectly correlated, this 
structure allows investors to lower their overall risk to something less than 
they would have from investing in both pools separately. These products 
also allow investors to invest in funds of CDO products, in which the 
exposure becomes more and more attenuated from any individual 
underlying borrower and starts to look more like generic risk exposure to 
the debt markets or even the market in general. As the case of CDS 
indexes, the investors in these products can now be thought of as merely 
identifying a unique risk-return investment as opposed to making bets 
about the credit quality of individual borrowers or pools of borrowers. 
 
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR REGULATING CREDIT 
DERIVATIVES AS INSURANCE 
 
At first blush, the similarity between property (or other) insurance 
and credit derivative contracts makes the call for insurance regulation of 
the latter seem reasonable. But a better case than that must be made, 
                                                                                                                 
23  Interview with executive at insurance company responsible for credit 
derivative transactions, on Mar. 21, 2009.   
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because deeming something “insurance” brings with it a special set of laws 
and rules administered by state insurance departments. This would mean 
significant increases in the cost of using credit derivatives, and, on the 
margin, less use of them. This might be fine, but we need to believe that 
insurance regulation brings us something worth the price. The benefits of 
the regulation, therefore, must be well calibrated to the particular risks 
involved, lest otherwise socially beneficial transactions be deterred. This 
Part fleshes out the analogy between insurance and credit derivatives, while 
the next section shows how this analysis is highly misleading by looking 
behind the analogy to the purposes and justifications for calling something 
“insurance.” 
The standard definition of “insurance” is an “agreement in which 
one party (the insurer), in exchange for consideration provide by the other 
party (the insured), assumes the other party’s risk and distributes it across a 
group of similarly situated persons, each of whose risk has been assumed in 
a similar transaction.”24 There are two parts of this definition – (1) risk 
transfer; and (2) risk pooling. The insurer assumes not only the risk of loss, 
but distributes the risk across many other similarly situated individuals or 
entities, so as to reduce unpredictable events into a more predictable cash 
flow stream. In technical jargon, insurance companies try to pool risk by 
attracting a sufficiently large number of diverse policyholders such that the 
law of large numbers will reduce the aggregate variance of claims. 
The credit derivative contracts discussed above have many 
characteristics that seem to fit well within the scope of at least the first part 
of this definition. As in a typical insurance contract, a CDS contract 
involves a party with an asset (the loan)25 with a risk of loss (default by the 
borrower), paying a reoccurring premium to a counterparty, which in turn 
agrees to make the first party whole in the event there is a loss. To 
analogize, just as a homeowner that pays a monthly premium to an 
insurance carrier in return for a promise to make the homeowner whole in 
the event of a loss related to the home, so too does the lender pay a monthly 
                                                                                                                 
24  ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW § 10(d) (4th ed. 2007). But see THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN 
DICTIONARY 881 (Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank Abate eds., 2001) (defines 
“insurance” is as “a practice or arrangement by which a company . . . provides a 
guarantee of compensation for specified loss . . . in return for payment of a 
premium.”). This definition misses a key component of insurance – the pooling of 
risk. 
25  The underlying credit instrument need not be a loan, but could be any debt 
instrument, such as a mortgage, bond, note or any other form of indebtedness.  
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premium to a third party in return for a promise to make the bank whole in 
the event of a loss related to the loan. If this analogy holds, the lender is the 
“insured” and the counterparty is the “insurer.” And, the insurance law of 
the fifty states would then regulate the insurer and the content of contracts 
it enters into with insureds. 
Building on the apparent similarity between typical insurance 
contracts (regulated by state insurance agencies) and credit derivatives, 
New York State recently proposed deeming credit derivatives  “insurance.” 
The chief state regulator, Eric Dinallo, offered the rationale during 
testimony before a congressional committee: “With [plain-vanilla CDS 
contracts], if the issuer of a bond defaults, then the owner of the bond has 
suffered a loss and the [CDS] provides some recovery for that loss.”26 
Dinallo limited the reach of the proposed regulations of credit derivatives, 
however, by asserting the state’s jurisdiction covers  only cases where the 
credit derivative contract is between an original lender and a third-party 
investor, that is, single-name CDS contracts in which an individual or 
entity sells protection to an originating bank.27 These are so-called 
“covered” transactions (as opposed to “naked” ones), since there is privity 
between the insured and the underlying debt instrument. The reason for this 
limited scope for insurance regulation is based on a generally accepted 
argument that the party being insured has  an “insurable interest” in the 
underlying amount at risk under the contract. In other words, a contract is 
“insurance” only if the insuring party pays when the insured party actually 
suffers a harm unrelated to the insurance contract.  
This concept can be illustrated by comparing the primary and 
secondary credit derivative markets. Where a bank issues a loan and then 
buys credit protection on that loan that pays off if the loan defaults, the 
argument is that the buyer of credit protection has an insurable interest in 
the loan, and that the protection acts as insurance against this loss. In the 
secondary market, by contrast, two parties unrelated to the issuance of the 
loan (and without the knowledge of the bank making the loan, the borrower 
                                                                                                                 
26  Hearing, supra note 5, at 3 (testimony of Eric Dinallo, Ins. Comm’r, N.Y. 
State). 
27  Id. (“We believe that the first type of swap, let’s call it the covered swap, is 
insurance. The essence of an insurance contract is that the buyer has to have a 
material interest in the asset or obligation that is the subject of the contract. That 
means the buyer owns property or a security and can suffer a loss from damage to 
or the loss of value of that property. With insurance, the buyer only has a claim 
after actually suffering a loss.”).  
18 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
 
taking out the loan, and any parties contracting with either of them), bet on 
whether or not the borrower will repay the loan. According to the 
conventional wisdom of insurance regulation, this bet is not insurance. The 
reason for this concession is that otherwise “insurance” would include far 
too much and things far beyond the ken, expertise, or conceivable reach of 
state insurance regulators. 
The concession is manifest in the findings of insurance regulators. 
For instance, in 2000 after Congress exempted “swaps” and other 
derivatives from certain regulation,28 the New York Insurance Department 
was asked whether credit derivatives were in fact insurance, which would 
be subject to state regulation. The question it was asked by federal 
regulators was: “Does a credit default swap transaction, wherein the seller 
will make payment to the buyer upon the happening of a negative credit 
event and such payment is not dependent upon the buyer having suffered a 
loss, constitute a contract of insurance under the insurance law?”29 This 
question is aimed at the secondary market, and was answered in the 
negative for reasons of a lack of privity with the loss on the part of the 
entities engaging in the derivative transaction. In his testimony before the 
House, Commissioner Dinallo distinguished this prior finding of the New 
York State Insurance Commission that credit derivatives were not 
insurance, by pointing out that the question asked was focused only on non-
privity cases or “naked” credit derivatives.30 From this, Dinallo concluded 
that a different result could obtain in the privity case (that is, CDS 
contracts), since the protection seller was insuring a real loss outside of the 
context of the contract. The analogy described above was thus sufficient for 
him to conclude that, with privity and a real potential loss, credit 
derivatives of the plain-vanilla CDS variety are insurance products.  
The argument is not preposterous on its face. Insurance is about 
risk sharing, and in that sense credit derivatives, which are fundamentally 
risk-sharing contracts, are akin to insurance. But, as shown below, the fact 
that credit derivative contracts are providing an insuring or risk-hedging 
                                                                                                                 
28  See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 or [CFMA], H.R. 
5660, 106th Cong. §§ 103, 105, 407 (2000); CFMA of 2000, S. 3283, 106th Cong. 
§§ 103, 105, 407 (2000); see also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [GLBA] (Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1393-
94 (1999). 
29  Hearing, supra note 5, at 4-5 (testimony of Eric Dinallo, Ins. Comm’r, 
N.Y. State). 
30  Id. (“So at the same time, in 2000, the New York Insurance Department 
was asked a very carefully crafted question.”). 
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function does not mean that it is sensible or efficient to regulate them as 
insurance. There are lots of contracts in which one party is effectively 
offering insurance as part of the deal, and yet none of these are regulated by 
state insurance commissioners. The reason is the underlying policy 
justifications for having a separate body of insurance law do not reach 
these contracts, and thus applying that law would raise the costs of the 
contracts without any likely benefit. Another reason is that the second part 
of the definition of insurance – risk pooling – is absent in many of these 
transactions, as it is in most CDS contracts. In fact, if there is any risk 
pooling by protection sellers (the alleged insurers), it occurs in CDO 
contracts or secondary-market CDSs, exactly the place where New York 
claims its regulatory reach does not extend. These arguments are made in 
the next Part. 
A few other features shared by insurance and credit derivatives 
provide some support for the analogy to insurance. The first similarity 
between insurance and credit derivatives is the incomplete nature of the 
risk transfer. The insured (either the homeowner or the lender) swaps the 
risk of loss with respect to the underlying asset (either the home or the 
loan) for the risk that the insurer will not be able to make the insured 
whole. This latter risk is called “counterparty risk,” and it is a central 
justification for insurance regulation. An individual who takes out an 
automobile insurance policy is swapping the risk of loss from an auto 
accident for the risk of loss that the insurance company will not be around 
to pay the claim. Capital adequacy rules, investment restrictions, and other 
aspects of insurance regulation exist to decrease this counterparty risk. 
Although CDSs and other credit derivatives share this similar feature, as 
discussed below, this alone does not justify regulating them as insurance as 
there are many other ways of reducing the counterparty risk problem that 
do not involve the full panoply of insurance regulations. 
The second similarity between insurance and credit derivatives is 
the presence of moral hazard. Whenever risk is transferred, there is the 
possibility of misbehavior on the part of the transferor or the transferee. If 
the transferor (that is, the bank) has an obligation to prevent the loss from 
occurring, say by monitoring the conduct of the borrower, the transfer of 
risk reduces the incentive to do this on the margin. In addition to shirking, 
protection buyers may act deliberately to force the debtor into bankruptcy, 
say by withholding lending that would otherwise be efficient or by 
invoking covenants outside the normal usage in the industry. These 
examples of destroying value to simply collect on a CDS contract can 
obtain in both the primary and secondary markets – nothing prevents the 
holder of synthetic protection, say a hedge fund, from taking steps to harm 
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the borrower in order to collect on its bet. Although plausible, this facial 
similarity does not justify treating credit derivatives as insurance. As 
discussed below, this argument proves too much. Numerous opportunities 
exist for similar moral hazard problems outside of the insurance context, 
there already exist mechanisms (both market and from industry trade 
groups) to ameliorate any moral hazard, and there is nothing about 
insurance law that makes it a good fit for further reducing these potential 
harms, if they are substantial. 
An additional argument for regulating credit derivatives as 
insurance is the absence of any existing regulation by other federal or state 
agencies, especially of certain players in the market, like hedge funds and 
other private pools of money. Many experts and pundits blame the lack of 
regulation of the credit derivatives market as contributing to the credit 
crisis. The argument goes like this: credit derivatives are not traded on an 
exchange, but rather through individualized contracts, known as the over-
the-counter market, and the lack of regulation, either directly or indirectly 
through regulation of the exchanges on which securities trade, allowed 
private parties to externalize systemic risk costs onto society. The lack of 
regulation thus generated an inefficient number or type of these 
transactions from a social welfare standpoint.  
There may be something to the premise of this argument, that is, 
that the lack of regulation exacerbated the risk that private parties would 
act in ways that would be privately optimal but increase the risk of a global 
financial meltdown. The premise is debatable, but even if it is true, this 
Essay shows that insurance regulation is not the only way in which these 
systemic costs can be internalized by firms. Most obviously, direct 
regulation of the credit derivatives market by existing federal departments 
responsible for derivatives and markets, such as requiring derivatives to be 
traded on an exchange, is possible under current law.  
In fact, it seems from the public statements of New York officials 
that the purpose of the characterization of credit derivatives as insurance is 
intended to stoke federal regulators to act, more than a firm belief that 
credit derivatives are insurance. After all, if they are insurance, then there 
should in fact be no need for or call for federal regulation. In testimony 
before Congress and other public comments, New York State’s insurance 
officials “stopped short of endorsing comprehensive state-level regulation 
of this privately negotiated market” and agreed to delay its plan to regulate 
credit derivatives based on the indication that federal regulators are 
“committed to comprehensive and effective federal oversight of credit 
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default swaps.”31 The fact that Commissioner Dinallo’s testimony outlined 
a proposed regulatory agenda for federal agencies also supports the threat-
of-regulation-as-leverage claim.32 
A final argument for state-based insurance regulation is the fact 
that numerous insurance companies were involved in the credit derivatives 
markets as buyers and sellers of protection, as well as acting as brokers and 
speculators in secondary markets. According to one estimate, insurance 
companies represented about 20 percent of end users of credit derivatives.33 
For instance, insurance giant AIG, invested heavily in credit derivatives of 
various kinds – its portfolio of CDSs reached $526 billion at its height.34 
And it is widely viewed that the losses on these credit derivatives – over 
$30 billion in 2007 and 2008 alone – were the cause of the failure of AIG 
and the need for the massive government bailout.35 The logic of regulation 
would thus be that these products were misused by insurance companies, 
among others, and this justifies regulating them as insurance. President 
Obama seemed to endorse this view when he described the situation as 
follows: "You've got a company, AIG, which used to be just a regular old 
insurance company. ... Then they decided--some smart person decided--
                                                                                                                 
31  Id. at 7.  
32  Dinallo testified that : 
Effective regulation of credit default swaps should include the 
following provisions: All sellers must maintain adequate capital 
and post sufficient trading margins to minimize counterparty 
risk; A guaranty fund should be created that ensures that a failure 
of one seller will not create a cascade of failures in the market; 
There must be clear and inclusive dispute resolution 
mechanisms; To ensure transparency and permit monitoring, 
comprehensive market data should be collected and made 
available to regulatory authorities; The market must have 
comprehensive regulatory oversight, and regulation cannot be 
voluntary.  Id. 
33  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 14, at 6 n.8 (“The top five end-
users of credit derivatives are banks and broker-dealers (44 percent), hedge funds 
(32 percent), insurers (17 percent), pension funds (4 percent), and mutual funds (3 
percent).”).. 
34  Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 40 (“A CDS certainly appears to fall within this 
definition given that the protection seller contractually agrees to compensate the 
protection buyer following the occurrence of a credit event.”).  
35  Id. at 26. 
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let's put a hedge fund on top of the insurance company and let's sell these 
derivative products to banks all around the world."36 
As discussed below, this argument proves too much, as many other 
entities, like banks, hedge funds, pension funds, and so on, used credit 
derivatives too, often disastrously but just as often fantastically, and 
therefore there is nothing special about the end users that justifies treating 
them as insurance. If anything, the fact that some insurance companies 
were harmed by them justifies different regulation on insurance companies.  
 
IV. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST REGULATING CREDIT 
DERIVATIVES AS INSURANCE 
 
This Part presents several conceptual and practical reasons why 
credit derivatives should not be regulated as insurance products or why 
sellers of credit protection should not be regulated as insurance companies. 
Notwithstanding the superficial appeal of the analogy between insurance 
contracts and credit derivative contracts, the policy justifications for special 
rules regulating insurance carriers and contracts do not obtain in the credit 
derivative context. Examining the rationale for insurance law and the 
important differences with credit derivatives will show this. 
The two primary reasons for having a separate body of insurance 
law are the particular governance problems associated with insurance 
companies and the fact that insureds are typically unsophisticated 
individuals for whom insurance is essential and may be difficult to obtain 
in the event of certain individual characteristics. (These two justifications 
correspond with the two major features of insurance law – the regulation of 
insurance company investments and the regulation of sales to individuals.) 
Neither of these reasons justifies applying insurance law to credit 
derivatives. 
Before addressing these reasons for insurance law, this Part 
addresses the reasons why policy arguments are needed in the first place. 
The primary reason insurance contracts are treated differently than other 
contracts (and “insurance law” is a separate body of law) is not because of 
their nature as “insurance” but rather because they are issued by insurance 
companies. This conclusion is evident from numerous problems that would 
                                                                                                                 
36  See “President Barack Obama on ‘The Tonight Show with Jay Leno,” N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/us 
/politics/ 20obama.text.html. 
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arise in extending the reach of insurance regulation to all contracts 
providing some kind of insurance. 
 
A.  PROVIDING INSURANCE IS NOT ENOUGH  
 
1. Line-Drawing Problems 
 
It could not be enough for a contract that insures against risk to be 
regulated as insurance or to bring the seller of that insurance within the 
ambit of (state-based) insurance regulation. Every contract has a degree of 
insurance embedded in it, and options and derivatives of all sorts, which 
are not considered insurance or regulated as such, are mostly about insuring 
or hedging against risk. If insurance law covered all contracts that are 
partially or completely about insurance, the line drawing problems about 
what is insurance would likely broaden the scope of insurance law to cover 
vastly more than it currently does. The result would be to add regulatory 
costs and uncertainty to a vast swath of the economy, with little or no 
expected benefit. 
Consider a simple options contract, known as a forward contract: 
Farmer agrees to sell wheat in six months at a given price (a put option) 
and Baker agrees to buy wheat in six months at a given price (a call 
option). Both Farmer and Baker are purchasing price insurance from each 
other – insurance against a price rise (for Baker) and against a price drop 
(for Farmer) – by locking in a set price in advance. The contract is not 
regulated as insurance, and neither Farmer nor Baker are currently 
regulated as insurance companies, even though each may be providing 
insurance to the other. There are several reasons for this result. Both parties 
are presumably somewhat sophisticated, since they went in search of 
derivative hedging tools, or are intermediated by market professionals. 
These gatekeepers compete in competitive markets and are regulated by 
other laws and exchange-based rules to ensure fidelity to their clients’ 
interests and a suitability between client needs and products sold to them. 
In addition, the derivative contracts are likely made either on a competitive 
derivatives exchange or as the result of arms’-length negotiation.37  
                                                                                                                 
37  Nor is the result different if a third party sells the insurance to Farmer or 
Baker. For instance, an individual unconnected with the farming or baking 
business may believe that wheat prices will rise/fall in six months based on 
predictions about weather, changes in supply or demand, or other factors. This 
individual can enter into a forward contract with Farmer or Baker either directly or 
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There are innumerable contracts that provide the same type of 
insurance as a forward contract does and that are not regulated as 
insurance. Any hedging contract has an element of insurance. For instance, 
an investor who is long a particular security, commodity, or investment 
might want to reduce the risk of the position by entering into another 
investment or contract with a third party that moves the other way. The 
third party might be thought of as providing some insurance for the 
investor, but this is not how the contract is thought of or regulated. As 
discussed below, contracts like these have many purposes, and trying to 
sort contracts along this dimension is likely to be costly and highly 
imperfect, especially if done in ex post litigation, where litigant 
opportunism and hindsight bias will be problematic, or by regulators, who 
will face inevitable public choice problems in their definitional exercises. 
One can imagine trying to sort between these two categories of 
contracts by inquiring into the minds of the contracting parties to see 
whether the contract was about insurance or something else. As noted 
above, this would require the mind of the parties to every contract to be 
examined to determine whether they are providing or seeking “insurance.” 
Regulators would need to know whether the investor was entering into the 
contract for insurance or hedging purposes. This is not generally the 
inquiry regulators make, perhaps because the question of knowledge is 
malleable and costly to enforce, especially given imperfect courts and a 
costly litigation system. Another dividing line could be the intent of the 
investor, but this too is an unhelpful and costly line to draw. It may be 
significantly over-inclusive, and it is susceptible to similar proof problems 
as knowledge. There may be mixed motives for all investments – return, 
hedging, speculation, and so on – that will be difficult to unpack accurately 
and without being subject to ex post bias, power grabs by regulators, and 
rent seeking by stakeholders of the firms in question.  
Rather, some contracts tend to be primarily about insurance, while 
others have multiple functions, some of which might be about risk sharing. 
The former might fall within the ambit of insurance regulation, while the 
latter never do. But where is this line? Consider, for instance, equity 
investments in run-of-the-mill firms. As discussed above, any equity 
investment in any firm could be thought of as insurance in the same way 
                                                                                                                          
through an options exchange, such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. These 
exchanges are populated with relatively sophisticated parties and are covered by 
alternative regulatory regimes, including licensing requirements for brokers and 
dealers. 
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that credit derivatives are. After all, when a firm issues equity interests to 
investors, it is entering into a risk-sharing contract (on behalf of managers, 
creditors, and other stakeholders) with these investors. Equity holders, 
unlike debt holders, have no fixed claim on a firm’s assets, and therefore 
provide a source of funding that is less sensitive to downturns in 
performance than debt. A firm that has more equity on its balance sheet is, 
all else being equal, less risky than a firm that has less. So we could re-
characterize a firm’s decision to issue equity (to lower its debt to equity 
ratio) as buying insurance (against a downturn in the firm’s affairs) and the 
investors buying the equity as selling insurance to the firm. Of course, no 
one thinks of equity in this way. But equity is as much about insurance as 
credit derivatives are.  
One reason securities are not regulated as insurance is the fact that 
equity investments are regulated by a separate body of law – securities law 
– specifically designed to address the policy challenges of issuing and 
investing in securities. When Congress passed the securities laws in the 
1930s, it could have simply called equity investments insurance and 
delegated regulation to state insurance law under the same theories as those 
calling for this treatment of credit derivatives. But this would have been a 
reach – although arguably insurance, equity securities are sufficiently 
different along numerous dimensions to justify a separate body of 
regulatory law.  
Another reason equity might not be regulated as insurance is 
because of the particular characteristics of the contracts in question. As 
noted above, typical credit derivative contracts look like typical insurance 
contracts: one party makes periodic payments to another in return for a 
make-whole promise in the event of a future occurrence. This similarity is 
only a surficial one, however, since there are many other aspects of credit 
derivative contracts that are quite different. For instance, payments may not 
turn on actual losses, there may be no pooling of risk, the make-whole 
promise may be purely synthetic, and so on. In addition, it is hard to 
imagine regulatory treatment turning solely on the question of whether 
risk-sharing payments are made on a periodic basis (as in insurance 
contracts) or a lump sum basis (as in equity investments, forward contracts, 
and so on). This would elevate form over substance in an arbitrary way not 
anticipated by the parties, and would provide an easy roadmap to avoiding 
any regulation. 
Finally, few if any investors making an equity investment think 
they are providing insurance. Rather, the investment is made for a whole 
host of reasons, including pure investment, speculation, hedging, and so 
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forth. Credit derivatives are used for these multiple reasons too, and this 
cuts strongly against trying to narrowly pigeonhole them as insurance. 
 
2.  Credit Derivatives Are Not Just About Reducing Risk 
 
Another problem with regulating credit derivatives as insurance is 
that they are not just (or, even, primarily) used for “insurance” purposes. 
As noted above, a common use, but only about one-fifth of the current 
market, is the buying and selling of credit protection on loans, bonds, and 
other sources of indebtedness. It is doubtful that this use fits squarely 
within the regulatory definition of insurance or that insurance regulation 
would be beneficial to these markets, but importantly for definitional 
purposes swapping credit risk is only one of the many uses of these 
financial products. 
Credit derivatives can be used to hedge risks independent of and 
unrelated to the original loan or bond being used as a reference entity. For 
example, a hedge fund that wants to reduce its exposure on, say, Russian 
wheat futures, may find a corporate bond risk whose risk offsets its 
commodity position favorably, and thus enter into a contract with a third 
party, who might be hedging Texas oil prices, who is willing to pay in the 
event the bond defaults. This transaction has nothing to do with the 
underlying bonds, since it only uses them as a reference for calculating a 
stream of payments. The transaction is akin to two individuals in China 
betting on whether I will crash my car. Neither of them is insuring me, but 
rather they are simply using the probability of me crashing my car (and the 
amount of damage that will result) as a reference for assigning risk among 
them. (The original debtor in credit derivative contracts is called a 
“reference entity,” a description that well captures this concept.) These bets 
are not considered insurance, because there is no privity with party 
suffering a loss (that is, the lenders in the case of a default by the borrower 
on the bond or me in the case I crash my car) and furthermore no proof 
required that an actual loss be suffered. Even if these bets were considered 
insurance, it would be impossible to regulate all of them in this way. 
Detecting them would be difficult and costly, and, even if possible, would 
simply direct the parties into transactions of similar risk-return 
combinations but other designs. In other words, if regulators deem one 
class of credit derivatives “insurance,” and thereby impose increased 
regulatory costs on that class, and deem another class of credit derivative 
contracts as “not insurance,” parties will naturally structure their 
transactions as the not-insurance kind. More on this later.  
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Credit derivatives are also used for speculation about credit risk. 
Investors can use credit derivative contracts to speculate on the default 
probability of a particular borrower. In general, there are no insurance 
contracts like this. Participants in insurance markets do not wager on 
whether an individual’s probability of dying or crashing a car is rising or 
falling on a daily basis, as they do with firm risk in credit derivative 
markets. Insurance is based on probabilities at the macro level and across 
large numbers based on actuarial science, and, when it is based on 
individuals characteristics, it is done only at the point of origination and not 
for speculation purposes. But this is exactly what is done with credit 
derivative contracts. For example, an investor who believes that General 
Electric’s credit quality is likely to worsen over the next few years can buy 
protection against default by GE on its debt. If the credit quality does 
deteriorate, the cost of protection will rise, and the investor will earn a 
profit. Similarly, if an investor believes that GE’s credit quality is likely to 
improve, it can sell protection against default by GE. If the credit quality 
does improve, the cost of protection will fall, and the investor will earn a 
profit. Before credit derivatives this kind of speculation was extremely 
difficult, as it is practically impossible to short bonds or loans. The credit 
derivative market thus allows for information about debt quality to be 
processed in a market, perhaps with large gains to capital allocation 
efficiency. Like the hedging examples above, these transactions are not 
insurance in any meaningful sense. Nothing about the speculation contract 
requires that it be held for any period of time. An investor can buy or sell 
protection and hold it for an hour, a day, a year, or five years (the typical 
maximum length), depending on the profit that can be made from buying or 
selling at a particular time. The contract does nothing more than offer an 
opportunity to buy or sell later at a higher or lower price. In this way, credit 
derivatives can be, and are largely, about investment, not insurance.38 In 
fact, they resemble secondary market transactions in equities, since they 
involve market-based trades about the fundamental value of a third party 
unrelated to the transaction in question. 
A final (non-insurance) use of credit derivatives is arbitrage, of 
either the pure or regulatory variety. Pure arbitrage possibilities arise when 
there is temporary mispricing in markets that allows investors to engage in 
                                                                                                                 
38  Life insurance could be used for investment in a way, but this is not its 
primary purpose or the way it is typically used. Moreover, state insurance 
regulators are not really concerned about regulating investment decisions by 
sophisticated parties. 
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paired transactions that earn sure profits, and thus eliminate the mispricing. 
Mispricing in debt securities might arise because the primary and 
secondary markets are traded on different markets: a firm’s bonds might be 
trading on a bond market, while protection on those bonds might be trading 
on over-the-counter markets that are not perfectly correlated with the 
public bond markets. This difference might generate opportunities for an 
investor to buy/sell the underlying security in one market, while 
simultaneously buying/selling protection on it in the over-the-counter 
market using a credit derivative in a way that allows it to earn a return that 
is independent of the credit risk of the borrower. This kind of arbitrage 
opportunity has no insurance-like characteristics, and it is potentially quite 
useful in accurately pricing credit risk by removing temporary market 
inefficiencies. Participants in credit derivative markets, at hedge funds, 
insurance companies, and other large financial entities, describe this as a 
major driver of their transactions in credit derivative markets.39 
The other type of arbitrage – regulatory arbitrage – is related to 
insurance, since it is one of the main reasons insurance companies are 
involved in the credit derivatives markets. But the lesson here runs counter 
to any regulatory story – in fact, it is a product of regulation itself.  
Regulatory arbitrage works like this. Banks are often the most 
efficient originators of loans, since they have relationships with lenders and 
the back office to underwrite and process loans. However, they are not 
always the most efficient holders of loans because of regulations that make 
holding risk more costly for them and regulations that make investing in 
credit risk difficult for insurance companies and other risk-sensitive 
investors. In other words, smaller banks, individual investors, insurance 
companies, pension funds, university endowments, foreign governments, 
and a whole host of other investors would like to participate in corporate 
debt markets, but cannot do so in the absence of financial instruments that 
allow large commercial banks to sell the risk, especially in ways, like 
securitization discussed above, that recharacterize the risk in ways that 
make individual investments in it appear less risky. If insurance companies, 
pension funds, or endowments can only invest in corporate debt rated 
AAA, banks, who are required to hold cash reserves on corporate debt 
rated below AAA will find a way of repackaging the debt so that some of 
the sub-AAA debt can become AAA debt – this is the securitization and 
tranching process described above. 
                                                                                                                 
39  Interview with executive at insurance company, supra note 23. 
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The first set of regulations – capital adequacy rules in the Basle 
banking accords – require banks to hold a certain amount of cash in reserve 
for each dollar lent out. In short, banks have to hold cash, while other 
investors do not, which makes them inefficient holders of risk. The reason 
for this rule is because banks have average individuals as creditors through 
deposit taking, and given the moral hazard problems created by federal 
deposit insurance, banks would otherwise engage in socially inefficient risk 
taking. This cash, historically about 8 percent of the total value at risk, is 
not productive from the standpoint of the bank’s investors, so it would be 
more efficient for them to loan out the money, earn the fees on the 
origination, and then offload the risk, in whole or part, to other investors so 
that more of the bank’s cash can be put to use for its shareholders.  
The reason insurance companies were involved heavily in these 
markets (primarily as protection sellers to banks that had originated loans), 
is because state law insurance regulations limit the kinds of investments 
that insurance companies can make. For instance, insurance companies are 
often restricted to investing in credits rated AAA by credit rating agencies. 
These credit rating agencies were in turn paid by the managers of credit 
derivative SPVs to rate the risks of investments in those SPVs, often to get 
a slice of them to be rated AAA to attract the monies held by insurance 
companies. As such, insurance companies became one of the largest 
investors in credit derivatives. For example, AIG (through its financial 
products business) invested nearly $400 billion in providing various 
European financial institutions with “regulatory capital relief” through 
credit derivatives.  
Credit derivatives help complete these markets by allowing the 
bank to offload the risk to investors who can more efficiently bear it, while 
still having the ability to earn fees from origination. A bank that makes a 
loan with a customer can now package the credit risk of that loan in a new 
entity, which then uses securitization to create risk slices that will be 
attractive to new classes of investors, and then sells off interests in the new 
entity. To be sure, the original bank could be thought of as buying 
insurance, since it is offloading to or sharing risk with others. But that 
description of the activity is a cartoon representation of the transaction. The 
bank is really engaging in regulatory arbitrage, but this redefinition is only 
superficial. The important point is that looking at what the bank is doing is 
only part of the story about whether regulation makes sense.  
In addition, as discussed above, those buying interests in the bank’s 
credit risk are no different than investors in any firm. A CDO is just a 
business plan in which the proceeds from hundreds of credit risks from 
various lenders are pooled together to generate a series of cash flows. The 
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firm (or SPV) holding the interests in these future cash flows is not 
conceptually different from a firm that sells anything else, be it iPods, 
consulting services, or what have you, and then sells interests in the cash 
flows these sales generate. When a firm raises money from shareholders, it 
is buying insurance in the same way that a bank transfers some risk through 
a credit derivative contract. Although equity holders are not liable to make 
the seller of the risk whole in the event of some specific default, the equity 
investors are providing the firm with an opportunity to reduce its risk. 
Equity, like insurance, provides a cushion against a downturn. Of course, 
no one thinks of regulating securities as insurance despite the similarity 
along this dimension.  
There are at least two important differences between these two 
types of risk-sharing mechanisms. First, on average the sellers of equity to 
regular firms are much less sophisticated than the sellers of risk protection 
to lenders. This, of course, cuts the other way from regulating credit 
derivatives as insurance. Second, the structure of the standard insurance 
contract (and the typical credit derivative contract) is different than the 
shareholder contract. Whereas in a credit derivative or insurance contract 
the party assuming the risk receives periodic payments in return for a 
promise to make the party selling the risk whole, in the shareholder 
contract, the sequence of payments is reversed: the party assuming the risk 
of default pays the money up front, while agreeing to receive future cash 
flows in the form of dividends, capital appreciation, or liquidation value at 
some time in the future. This alternative structure has important 
implications, which are discussed below, but it does not necessarily 
undermine the attempted analogy to insurance. After all, if insurance is 
defined as a contract in which risk is moved from one party to the other, the 
structure and terms of the contract are, all else being equal, irrelevant to 
whether risk is in fact being swapped. 
The lesson to be learned from this use, which is also only 
superficially similar to classic insurance, is that any regulation of insurance 
company participation in credit derivative markets should focus on how 
insurance companies invest in credit derivatives. This is especially true 
since insurance companies are only a small fraction of the entire market in 
credit derivatives. 
 
3.  The Pooling Mismatch 
 
Another reason insurance regulation is a bad fit for credit 
derivatives is that there is a conceptual difference in the function of 
insurance and that of credit derivatives. The premise of insurance is risk 
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pooling. Insurance companies try to spread or pool risk by attracting a 
sufficiently large number of diverse policyholders such that the law of large 
numbers will reduce the aggregate variance of claims. In this way, the total 
amount of risk can be shared by many and thus reducing its impact on any 
individual in the pool. Counterparties to derivative contracts do not usually 
do this.  
In a single-name CDS contract, there are only two parties, so there 
is no pooling of risk. When a hedge fund sells protection to bank, it does 
not act like an insurance company that sells protection to an individual 
property owner. While the insurance company puts together a diversified 
portfolio of property owners to generate an actuarially predictable stream 
of liabilities, the hedge fund does not do this. Hedge funds may try to offset 
the risk of a particular CDS with other assets and liabilities in their 
portfolio, but they do not pool risk by writing protection on hundreds or 
thousands of firms based on predictions about default risk and correlation 
of risks. Or, to be more precise, they do not always and necessarily do this. 
These counterparties may be hedging risks and trying to reduce their 
overall risk exposure, but they are not doing so by pooling a lot of 
independent risks. Thus, the insurance component of the transaction looks 
more like simple hedging, which is not regulated as insurance. 
The lack of pooling is a conceptual difference, but it may have a 
practical consequence.  Insurance regulation requires insurance companies 
to hold significant capital reserves in part because if one insurance 
company fails, a significant amount of beneficiaries will lose. (Importantly, 
many of these beneficiaries will be average and unsophisticated citizens 
who are unable to bear the losses. This is the consumer protection angle of 
insurance regulation discussed below.) The same problem does not exist for 
credit derivatives generally, unless a single entity, like AIG or 
Countrywide, makes a multitude of credit derivative bets (that do not 
cancel or net out the risk of the sum) and the bets made are so large that it 
threatens the entity and its policy holders or depositors. Note, however, that 
in the rare cases in which this did or is likely to happen, the independent 
regulation of the insurance company or bank making the bets exists to 
ensure that the risks taken by the entity are not excessive. In other words, if 
the problem is that an insurance company, like AIG, took on excessive 
risks in credit derivative contracts, then the rules about what investments 
insurance companies can make should be reformed.  
In more complicated credit derivative transactions, such as CDOs, 
there are multiple parties, and arguably more risk pooling. As discussed 
above, in a CDO, a new firm (an SPV) is created to sell protection to 
multiple lending banks, and numerous investors own shares in the newly 
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created SPV. In this case, the analogy to insurance pooling is more apt. 
One could view the multiple lending banks whose notes are pooled together 
in the SPV as the policyholders, while the SPV and its investors are the 
“insurance company.” While this analogy has more surficial appeal than 
the case of plain-vanilla CDS’, as discussed below, the policy arguments 
for insurance-like regulation do not obtain. So even in the case where there 
is risk pooling – a necessary conceptual component of insurance – there is 
no policy justification for insurance regulation. This is discussed below. 
Even insurance commissioners admit that CDOs are not insurance 
for this reason.40 There is a deep irony here. There is generally no risk 
pooling – an essential component of “insurance” – in CDS contracts, but 
these are the contracts that state insurance regulators and pundits consider 
insurance. In contrast, there is at least some risk pooling in more complex 
CDO contracts, but there is often no insurable interest in these transactions, 
so insurance regulators disavow any regulatory oversight of them. The 
reason for the line drawn by insurance regulators has to do with experience 
and thus expertise. Insurance regulators are used to dealing with entities 
that pool risk, are responsible for ensuring an adequate income stream to 
pay for future liabilities, and are contracting with every-day consumers 
who rely on the insurance company to make them whole in the event of 
large personal losses. This experience is obviously not transferable to a 
market in which none of these traditional aspects of insurance exists, nor 
are the key regulatory questions. This is explored in greater detail below. 
 
4.  Limits on the Reach of Regulation  
 
The artificial distinction drawn by regulators between plain-vanilla 
CDS’ and more complicated credit derivative contracts points out a bigger 
problem with any attempt to regulate credit derivatives using an insurance 
framework. If (insurance) regulation is limited to cases where there is an 
insurable interest, the contract is not one of simple hedging, arbitrage, or 
speculation, and there is risk pooling, then this class of cases is like an 
empty set. If the set of regulated cases is limited, as regulators assert, to 
cases in which there is privity, there is no risk pooling. Conversely, if the 
set of cases is limited to where there is risk pooling, there is no privity, and 
thus the significant line-drawing problems discussed above arise. 
More importantly, from a welfare and efficiency perspective, any 
regulation of one part of the market that does not cover the entire market 
                                                                                                                 
40  See infra note 47 and accompanying text.  
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will simply redirect market activity to the unregulated market. Regulation 
means additional costs, and investors will try to avoid these costs if they 
can do so while achieving the same returns. The fact that credit derivative 
contracts are simply ways of creating a specific risk-return profile means 
that the same risk-return profile can be achieved in numerous ways that fall 
outside of any product (as opposed to institution-based) regulation. For 
example, if new insurance regulations cover only plain-vanilla CDS 
contracts, as proposed, investors can replicate the returns they would have 
achieved with a single-name, real-interest CDS by using a synthetic credit 
derivative contract that is by the regulators admission, unregulated. In a 
synthetic CDS contract, the parties do not actually interact with the 
borrower or lender and do not use the underlying debt instrument as 
anything more than a probability machine that determines future payoffs 
between the parties. There is simply no difference between a real and a 
synthetic CDS contract from the standpoint of these investors, and 
increased cost on the former will simply mean more of the latter. This fact 
poses a significant problem for regulators, since there are literally an 
infinite number of potential contracts and contract forms that can be used 
by investors to share and transfer credit risk. 
Once one form of credit derivative is regulated, other forms will 
sprout up that will match exactly the same risk-return profile, but these new 
forms will be unregulated for one reason or another. As discussed below, a 
more sensible regulatory approach is to: (1) identify investors who are 
likely to make bad investment decisions on average for one reason or 
another, (2) ban them from particular forms of investment, (3) and require 
them to receive special disclosures or protections, or other paternalistic 
regulation. Lack of sophistication, for instance, provides a central 
justification for securities regulation, while market failures that may arise 
out of governance concerns provides the justification for insurance 
regulation. Both of these, however, are focused largely on the impact on 
particular investors, as opposed to the nature of the products being sold. 
There is a case where synthetic derivative contracts may be used to 
reduce real risk, and therefore are more like insurance. If the original 
lending bank enters into a synthetic contract to hedge its risk, it is the same 
as if the bank enters into a standard credit derivative contract with a 
protection seller, since the bank is reducing its risk of loss on the default of 
the original debt. The bank in both cases is seeking regulatory relief from 
its capital adequacy requirements. But although this type of contract 
resembles a case where there is an insurable interest more closely, the party 
on the other side, (the one betting that the borrower will repay the loan) 
may not know that it is providing insurance of a sort; and even if it did, it 
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would still make more sense to regulate this contract as a matter of banking 
law. After all, the bank is engaging in regulatory arbitrage, which may be 
normatively good or bad from the perspective of banking policy. Banks 
hedging risk reduces the probability that they will default, and thus 
jeopardize the claims of depositors. On the other hand, it is possible that 
some banks used credit derivative contracts not to hedge risks but to 
increase profits by repackaging loans, moving them off of the bank’s 
balance sheet, receiving regulatory relief, and then bringing the risk back 
onto the bank’s balance sheet through mechanisms that were not 
transparent to regulators. Again, these issues are largely about banking law 
– that is, capital adequacy requirements, rules about relief from these 
requirements, banking oversight, compensation of bank executives, and so 
on.  
 
5.  Moral Hazard Problems and Solutions 
 
One argument in favor of insurance regulation for credit 
derivatives is based on the fact that both insurance and credit derivative 
contracts are subject to moral hazard concerns. But the mere existence of 
moral hazard problems does not justify insurance regulation per se. Moral 
hazard arises in many contracts and situations that are not deemed 
insurance. In addition, there are alternative ways of reducing moral hazard 
short of full insurance regulation. For instance, regulation by other 
administrative agencies or resolving issues between parties by acting 
collectively through trade associations. As it turns out, contractual 
innovation and self-regulatory norms are already being deployed by the 
International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA) to remedy some of the 
moral hazard problems inherent in credit derivative markets. As discussed 
below, there remain some market failures, but none of them are especially 
redressable by insurance regulation alone. 
Moral hazard problems arise whenever any risk is intermediated. 
Just as one is less likely to take care while driving if one has good 
insurance (especially with a low deductible), so too is a bank less likely to 
commit to an efficient level of due diligence or otherwise monitor a 
borrower if it is going to sell the risk to someone else (and not retain a first-
loss position). In equilibrium, investors in the borrowers’ credit risk have 
an incentive to price this potential shirking, and therefore the arrangers of 
the SPV would have an incentive to choose the credit risks to put in it 
wisely, lest they be required to offer greater returns to investors. In a 
frictionless world, in other words, the amount of due diligence would be 
priced by the market. The credit crunch revealed significant mispricing in 
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credit markets, but nothing that calls this equilibrium solution into doubt. 
With learning from the recent collapse, it is likely that this discipline will 
return to the market. 
Even if it does not, there is not much that insurance regulation is 
likely to add to solve the problem. No regulators or private actors were 
aware of the mispricing problem, despite the fact that there were numerous 
regulators, including insurance regulators (AIG is an insurance company 
after all!) monitoring these markets closely, and despite the fact that 
investors were betting billions of dollars of their own money on these 
instruments. To simply declare that more regulation, and in particular more 
insurance regulation, is needed, is to simply declare the debate over. 
Another type of moral hazard is the potential that the parties to 
credit derivative contracts might act in ways that destroy social value but 
increase the private value to the party. For instance, a buyer of protection, 
like a bank, might have incentives to force a borrower to default on a debt 
in order to collect on the credit derivative contract; even if it is not 
otherwise efficient for it to do so. This problem arises only because there 
may be technical defaults that would otherwise not lead to bankruptcy, but 
the bank buying protection could insist upon enforcing covenants against 
them now that its downside is limited by its purchase of protection. (The 
analogy to insurance here is that the buyer of insurance might willingly 
destroy an otherwise valuable asset to collect on an insurance premium in 
cases in which the asset has value but this value is less than the value of the 
insurance policy.) While this is possible, there are at least three things that 
limit its practical effect.  
The first of these is the fact that private contracts take this problem 
into account, without the need for regulatory mandate. This is not to say 
that there are not market failures, but simply that this particular problem is 
not unknown or unremedied in credit derivative markets. As in insurance, 
where the problem exists too, buyers of protection voluntarily reduce the 
risk they will shirk because of the moral hazard problem by agreeing to 
bear some of the first losses that may arise from a default by the original 
borrower. In insurance, this is called a deductible, and the theory is that it 
reduces on the margin the incentive of the insured to engage in socially 
destructive behavior. Credit derivative contracts try to reduce this conduct 
too – the buyers of credit derivative protection routinely hold the first-loss 
position so as to signal to sellers of protection that the bank buying 
protection has some skin the game and will not engage in this kind of 
destructive behavior. A deductible, being less than 100 percent of the risk, 
however, can never fully offset this risk, so there remains some moral 
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hazard problem. Part of this can be priced by the market, but industry 
norms can try to reduce it too. This is the next solution. 
The second way moral hazard is reduced is through the fact that 
self-regulatory bodies, like the ISDA, are already aware of this possibility 
and are structuring industry norms and boilerplate contracts to mitigate 
these potential problems. The moral hazard issue arose for the first time in 
the case of credit derivative contracts written on the financial services and 
insurance firm Conseco. Credit derivative contracts at that time required a 
payment from the seller to the buyer of protection in the event that the 
underlying reference entity—in this case, Conseco—suffered a “credit 
event,” which included a restructuring of the reference entity’s bank loans. 
In 2000, Conseco’s credit quality deteriorated and began to suffer liquidity 
problems, so it went to its borrowers in search of a restructuring agreement. 
The lenders agreed, including an extension of maturity, increased interest 
rates, and new covenants. The restructuring triggered payment under the 
existing credit derivative contracts. 
This fact created a serious moral hazard problem. The original 
lenders to Conseco, who had purchased protection against a credit event, 
were the ones who got to decide whether to restructure Conseco’s debt, and 
thus whether a restructuring event transpired.41 The lenders could trigger 
payment simply by agreeing to extend the maturity of the loan or make 
other trivial changes to the loan that would cost them little (and would be 
readily agreed to by the borrower) and yet trigger potentially large 
payments from the sellers of protection. In fact, the situation under the 
then-prevailing boilerplate terms was much worse than that. Under the 
ISDA’s 1999 version of the boilerplate terms (called the “Definitions”), the 
buyers of protection could deliver any debt instrument of the same kind as 
that on which the lender or other party bought protection. Since Conseco 
had a number of outstanding debt instruments of varying maturity, the bank 
triggering a restructuring credit event could choose the cheapest of these 
outstanding debt instruments, thereby making large profits on its self-
triggering claim. Specifically, Conseco had short-term bonds that were 
trading at about 90 percent of face value, while its long-term bonds were 
trading at about 60 percent of face value. This meant the original lender 
could declare default, and then buy long-term bonds at 60 cents to settle out 
its much more expensive short-term bonds. This exposed the sellers of 
                                                                                                                 
41  SATYAJIT DAS, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: CDOS AND STRUCTURED CREDIT 
PRODUCTS 101-103 (3d ed. 2005).  
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protection to large losses. The same result obtained in the restructuring of 
Xerox Corporation in 2002.42 
There were two reactions to the moral hazard issues raised by the 
Conseco and Xerox cases, both private. The market price of credit 
derivative contracts quickly adjusted to account for the increased risk of 
contracts including restructuring events as credit events. The contracts 
“including restructuring as a credit event was 10 to 20 [basis points per 
year] higher than for credit default swaps without the restructuring credit 
event.”43 
The other reaction was a modification of the boilerplate credit 
default swap documentation by ISDA. One possibility was that ISDA could 
simply eliminate restructuring as a credit event, but this was foreclosed by 
a decision of the Federal Reserve that protection from the risk of 
restructuring was essential to the transfer of credit risk essential to 
receiving regulatory relief under the Basle accords.44 ISDA therefore issued 
a “Restructuring Supplement” that provided restructuring would not be a 
credit event in cases where there were fewer than four holders of the debt 
in question or where less than a super-majority of unaffiliated holders 
approved the restructuring.45 In addition, the amendments to the boilerplate 
tried to reduce the potential arbitrage inherent in delivery options for debts 
with different maturities by requiring any settlement of credit derivative 
contracts to be made with debt contracts within 30 months of the 
restructured facility. Further changes to the boilerplate were made in 2003 
to address market developments.46 The idea with these changes was to 
reduce the moral hazard problems by contract. 
The third non-regulatory way moral hazard is reduced is the 
presence of countervailing interests on the other side of the transaction that 
generate behaviors that may cancel out any possibility of abuse. Just as the 
buyer of protection has incentives to act in a socially inefficient way by 
                                                                                                                 
42  See Viktor Hjort, The Xerox Debt Restructuring – A Moral Hazard Issue?, 
Morgan Stanley, Fixed Income Research (July 19, 2002).   
43  DAS, supra note 41, at 103.  
44  See William Rhode, Fed Says No To Credit Restructuring, DERIVATIVES 
STRATEGY, Dec. 2000, http://www.derivativesstrategy.com/magazine 
/archive/2001/1200shrt.asp. 
45  See Restructuring Supplement to the 1999 ISDA Credit Derivatives 
Definitions, ISDA (2001); see also Donald A. Bendernagel & Oussama Nasr, 
Legal Documentation and the Restructuring Debate, CREDIT DERIVATIVES ISSUES 
AND OPPORTUNITIES, 2001, at 21.  
46  DAS, supra note 41, at 105.   
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destroying value to cash in on a credit-derivative contract, the seller of 
protection has incentives to act in exactly the opposite way. More 
specifically, if the original lender that bought protection refuses to make a 
loan that would increase the value of the debtor in order to cash in on a 
credit protection contract, the hedge fund that sold protection has the 
incentive to make the loan so not to have pay on the contract. These 
offsetting incentives only work under two conditions: both parties have 
sufficient access to capital to provide the loans necessary, and there are 
relatively symmetric incentives to act; otherwise there may be a socially 
inefficient level of lending (either too much or too little). Even if the other 
party to the transaction does not act to deliberately counteract the action, it 
will be well positioned to detect it and report any misconduct to the market 
(to impose reputational penalties) or the government (to impose civil or 
perhaps criminal penalties). (As a side note, insofar as antitrust-based 
uncertainties preclude collective action on the part of numerous sellers of 
protection, these rules should be rethought in this light.) 
The more generic version of this moral hazard concern is the risk 
of sabotage. Individuals and entities that are not insurance companies 
(meaning: not regulated by insurance law) are not permitted to write certain 
insurance contracts, say, on an individual’s life, out of concern that one of 
the parties will try to sabotage the contract. Or, to look at another way, 
where there is no symmetry or where the attack and defense would simply 
result in an arm’s race of dead weight costs, the risk created by insurance 
contracts outweighs any gains. This is especially true when the value of the 
asset that is the subject of the contract is particularly valuable or difficult to 
value.  
Although this logic might make sense for individuals and contracts 
like life insurance, the risk of sabotage is overstated in the world of credit 
derivatives. First, in this $60 trillion industry, there has never been a 
reported case in which one party to a contract acted to deliberately sabotage 
an underlying borrower in order to cash in on a credit derivative contract. 
Second, the gains from sabotage are as great or greater in equity markets, 
currency markets, and a whole host of other markets where third parties are 
able to make large bets on economic outcomes. For instance, a malicious 
investor could take a large short position in Firm X, and then destroy an 
asset of Firm X, say by not loaning it money, blowing it up, spreading 
rumors about it, or any number of activities. This risk is real, but it is 
uncommon because other laws (for example, criminal law, tort law, and 
securities laws banning market manipulation) and norms restrain 
individuals from making socially destructive (but privately beneficial) 
decisions. However, market participants, observers, and regulators should 
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always keep a look out for the possibility of sabotage, since reporting it to 
the market and prosecutors is likely to provide sufficient deterrence. 
 
* * * 
As this section has showed, regulators are likely to find it very 
difficult to draw sensible lines or regulate financial products in a coherent 
and efficient manner under the rubric of insurance regulation. This means 
that regulation might more sensibly focus on investors instead of 
investments. Insurance law is based less on regulating insurance than on 
regulating insurance companies. In other words, we do not regulate 
insurance companies because they sell insurance, but rather regulate 
insurance contracts because they are sold by insurance companies. The 
right question to ask is not whether credit derivatives are “insurance,” but 
rather if they are sold or issued by “insurance companies.” This, of course, 
begs the question of what should count as an insurance company. 
The next Part tries to answer this question by looking at the policy 
reasons for having a separate body of insurance law to regulate insurance 
companies. The policy reasons are uniquely applicable to insurance 
companies, not all firms that participate in credit derivative markets, and 
thus there is no good policy reason for applying insurance regulation. 
 
B.  THE POLICY REASONS FOR INSURANCE LAW DO NOT OBTAIN 
 
Given the problems of defining what “insurance” is, it must be the 
case that the scope of insurance law is either quite arbitrary or based on 
other considerations. In fact, insurance regulation exists not to regulate 
insurance contracts per se, but rather to regulate contracts issued by 
insurance companies. For sophisticated or semi-sophisticate parties, the 
insurance companies are the problem, not the insurance.47 Insurance 
companies are regulated differently than companies producing other 
products because of the unique governance problems associated with their 
production cycle and unique governance structure. Let us consider these in 
turn.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
47  There is another justification for insurance regulation that has to do with the 
consumer-facing nature of some insurance contracts. See infra p. 32.  
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1. Inverted Production Cycle  
 
The first unique feature of insurance companies is the fact that they 
sell their products long before they are delivered to customers. This means 
the normal production cycle is inverted. The typical (that is, non-insurance) 
firm produces products and then sells them in return for cash. Payment and 
delivery are linked closely in time and there is an immediate feedback from 
customers. Insurance companies, however, have a much different 
production cycle that causes unique governance problems. An insurance 
company’s customers are policyholders, who pay (in the form of premium 
payments) in advance for products (payments on claims) that come many 
years later, if at all.48 This is important because the discipline on how cash 
can be spent that comes with having to sell valuable products or services in 
the market is missing or attenuated. Payments are made based on promises 
alone, and there is thus the risk that the cash reserves given in advance to 
the insurance company will be squandered on risky investments, and thus 
unavailable to pay off claims when they come due. This is the Ponzi-
scheme problem discussed above. When there is continuous solicitation of 
investment by outsiders and a mismatched payment scheme (current 
investments pay liabilities of previous investors), there is a risk that 
managers will engage in too much risk when the liabilities that arise are 
greater than predicted. In these bad states of the world, insurance company 
managers have incentives to attract more capital on irrational terms to pay 
current liabilities owed to prior investors. 
The inverted production cycle of insurance companies has another 
problem where there are competitive markets for insurance services. In an 
unregulated market, insurance companies are bound to compete heavily on 
price, and this may lead to under reserves such that future liabilities will 
not be covered by sufficient assets. There are two parts of this claim, so it is 
worth unpacking it.  
First, competition among insurance companies is likely to focus 
primarily and perhaps excessively, on price. This is because the quality of 
the products insurance companies are selling (the other thing on which they 
compete) is identical or unobservable. The repayment of losses less the 
deductible is the same regardless of the insurer. There is some risk that the 
insurer will fail and be unable to repay the liabilities, but this is something 
that is, by its very nature, unobservable by the insureds. Reputation and 
longevity may be correlated with this risk, but these factors coupled with 
                                                                                                                 
48  The payout for life insurance policies may obviously be decades away. 
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the governance problems noted above may simply lead to more risky 
investment choices by the insurer in the next period. Another unobservable 
component of potential competition is service quality – that is, the 
timeliness of payments, the cost of the claims process, the quality of 
customer service, and so on. Like the risk of default, these will be 
unobservable by the insureds in the period when they make their 
investment decision, since they happen only many years later and after 
premiums have already been collected. For these reasons, price is likely the 
primary way in which insurance companies would compete in an 
unregulated market. 
Second, price competition for insurance products is different from 
price competition for non-insurance products, and, if unregulated, may lead 
to pricing at below marginal cost. Non-insurance firms have no incentive to 
price below marginal cost, since, as a consequence, every sale would lose 
the firm money. Insurance companies, however, have inverted production 
cycles, which translates that the costs of the product being sold are felt long 
after the cash is collected by the firm for the sale. This means myopic 
managers, hubristic managers, over-confident managers, or desperate 
managers may charge too little for new insurance premiums. Insurance 
involves extensive long-range forecasting and the potential for costs, which 
are realized only after sales, to be much higher than expected. Absent the 
immediate feedback loop of typical production cycles, the possibility of 
competition leading to destructive price wars is greater than for normal 
firms.  
It is true that credit derivative contracts are somewhat based on 
future results and forecasting problems may arise. But this is concern is 
ameliorated by several factors. Credit derivative contracts are generally 
much shorter in term than insurance contracts, lasting a maximum of five 
years, and very often held for much shorter than that. So although make-
whole payments under the contract may occur in the future, the potential 
for error is reduced by the fact that forecasting need be made over a much 
shorter period. The risk is also priced much more frequently, since 
payments made by protection buyers are due quarterly. For most credit 
derivative contracts, the prices of buying and selling production are 
adjusted quarterly depending on the financial condition of the underlying 
borrower, and this generates the kind of frequent pricing data that is 
common in regular product markets. Even where it is not, the continuous 
pricing of the same debt in the market allows holders of risk to engage in 
pairwise transactions that allow them to rebalance their portfolio on short 
time horizons. In addition, the parties on both sides are highly sophisticated 
financial institutions (and their investors), and it is unlikely that any 
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outsider, like a regulator, could do a better job at estimating the future cash 
flows from particular debt instruments so as to improve pricing.   
The pricing problem for insurance companies is exacerbated by the 
weak governance structure described below, which may encourage overly 
risky actions when policy payouts exceed expectations. In short, the 
managers of an insurance firm that charges too little, for whatever reason, 
and finds itself unable to meet claims as they come due, may be less 
constrained by creditors in the kind of response it will take. The managers 
may simply try to sell more policies to pay off existing claims from other 
policyholders with the hope of someday righting the ship. This potential 
that arises from price competition may turn an insurance company into a 
sort of Ponzi scheme.  
This super risk preference situation is unlikely to arise in the case 
of non-insurance firms because of the discipline of product markets and 
because of the discipline of creditors when times are bad. For credit 
derivative firms (that is, SPVs holding the rights to the cash flows from 
various debt instruments), the probability of this arising is even lower. This 
is because investment by the SPV managers happens before any investment 
is made by shareholders in the SPV. A pot of cash is created and then sold, 
with an implicit promise that no more assets will be added that that 
particular pot. The possibility of super risk preferring managers is thus 
extremely unlikely.  
 
2.  Weak Governance Structure 
 
The second unique feature of insurance companies is the weak 
corporate governance structure that is inherent in the insurance company 
model. Non-insurance firms are generally funded by a large number of 
diffuse shareholders and a small number of concentrated creditors, 
typically banks or other lenders. In this governance model, the shareholders 
are the residual claimants of firm value, and in good times it is in their 
interest that the managers operate the firm.49 The diffuse nature of the 
holdings of equity, coupled with the business judgment rule, means that 
firms have a lot of slack in the risk they take during good times. When 
things turn for the worse, however, the interests of the shareholders are set 
aside and the concentrated interests of banks and other lenders take over 
                                                                                                                 
49  Assuming, of course, the managers aren’t acting in their own interest.  
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the decision-making process.50 Loan covenants are enforced, contracts are 
rewritten by the lenders, managers are replaced, and a restructuring of the 
firm is undertaken. The reason creditors take effective control long before 
bankruptcy is because in the absence of these control rights, shareholders 
(and their agents, the managers) would have incentives to act ever more 
risky as the value of shares drops. Consolidated creditors can help preserve 
going concern value and reduce dangerous risk taking in near final periods. 
(It is, of course, irrelevant whether this concentration of creditors takes 
place when debt is issued (when times are good) or when it is consolidated 
(when times are bad), since concentration is less likely in insurance 
companies in either case because the creditors of the firm are its policy 
holders.) 
Unlike non-insurance firms (but like banks), insurance firms are 
structured with both weak equity holders and weak creditors. Insurance 
firms (and banks) have shareholders that are indistinguishable from other 
firms, but their creditors are as diffuse and disinterested as their 
shareholders. An insurance company’s creditors are its policyholders. Their 
large number makes coordination difficult, either for monitoring or action, 
and information costly and very unlikely to be obtained. In addition, policy 
holders are not investors (like many shareholders are), and therefore likely 
to be unaware of and unsophisticated about matters of corporate 
governance and finance. And unlike diffuse creditors of non-insurance 
firms (e.g., bondholders), the claims of policyholders cannot be and are not 
consolidated or concentrated in periods of distress. This means an increased 
threat of excessively risky decision making in bad times because the 
insurance company’s creditors are diffuse instead of concentrated. Both in 
insurance and banking, where depositors are substituted for policy holders, 
this suggests the need for a prudential regulator to effectively consolidate 
the diffuse policyholders into a bank-like consolidated creditor to deal with 
the insurance company in bad times.  
This governance problem is not present consistently, if ever, in 
credit derivative transactions. To see this, consider the simplest case of a 
plain-vanilla CDS. Remembering the analogy with insurance set forth 
above, the bank that lent the money to the borrower is the insured, and thus 
analogous to the policyholder in an insurance contract. In a single-name 
CDS contract, there is no pooling and therefore no diffusion of interest 
                                                                                                                 
50  See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the 
Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1209-11 
(2006). 
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among the alleged insurer’s “policy holders.” In addition, banks that buy 
credit protection are nothing like individuals that buy auto or life insurance 
policies. Banks are sophisticated, repeat players, represented by counsel, 
capable of processing information about the riskiness of their counterparty, 
and have tremendous bargaining power.  
It is possible for a protection seller to write many CDS contracts, 
and thus put any individual buyer of credit protection into the position of 
holding a small claim against the firm, say insurance company or hedge 
fund. Although this would not change the nature of the protection buyer 
and the ability of it to fend for itself, it does raise potential concerns about 
the management of the protection seller. But this just then puts the inquiry 
about governance back at that level, and tied to the nature of the seller of 
protection. If the protection seller has a weak governance model, like that 
of a bank or an insurance company, then it may be susceptible to this 
problem, but if it is an entity with strong governance in bad times, then the 
concern about too much risk on the part of managers (on behalf of 
shareholders) is much lower. Hedge funds, for instance, must return to the 
market frequently for capital (that is, they do not have capital lock in) and 
are funded by extremely sophisticated investors. They are decidedly not 
subject to this concern. In short, insurance companies with weak 
governance should be subject to regulation to avoid the social inefficiency 
that might arise from their governance structure, while non-insurance 
companies, with strong governance, are less worrisome.   
The same result obtains even when we consider a more 
complicated credit derivative contract. The parties buying protection that 
have their default risk pooled into a CDO structure are large financial 
entities with much greater sophistication and risk-bearing ability than 
individuals buying typical insurance products. The risk that the sellers of 
protection will “pull a fast one” on them is much lower given this 
sophistication. In addition, the investors in the SPV holding the default risk 
(the analogous insurance company) are likewise large financial entities 
capable of making risk assessments, demanding and processing 
information, pricing risk, and wielding their bargaining power in the event 
a bad future state arises.  
Moreover, the nature of the typical CDO structure is effectively a 
one-time game, in which credit risks are pooled and the cash flows sold off 
to investors. The sponsor and manager of the SPV does not continue to sell 
protection based on a pool of funds provided by investors (as in an 
insurance company), but rather makes the investments first (by choosing 
risks to pool), then goes to the market to sell cash flow rights to investors. 
This means that managers of the SPV do not really do much or can do 
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much in terms of risk alteration of the SPV once it has raised money from 
investors. The future course of the SPV is set, and the payouts are what 
they are. No future investments are made, no additional investors are 
brought in, and there can be no change in strategy for the firm. Therefore, 
there is less chance for abuse in the event the SPV payouts are less than 
expected. Governance quality is largely irrelevant in this model firm.  
Applying this governance model to the insurance company model, 
it is as if the insurance company wrote all of its policies before raising 
money in the market. In that case, investors would worry less about the 
governance of the insurance company, since its job would simply be to 
process claims from the policies it had written – it would not take on new 
policies (and a new source of cash) on terms likely to be unfavorable to 
existing investors. There would still be some governance risk, however, 
since the decisions on what policies to pay out on, how much to 
compensate executives, and other firm costs still have to be made. In some 
of these, managerial interests may be aligned with those of investors, while 
in others they may diverge. Importantly, however, this residual governance 
risk is not present in the CDO case, since all of these decisions are made 
before the investment in the firm (for example, management fees) or are 
automated (for example, the amount of payouts). In short, any governance 
problems simply do not obtain in the typical structure of credit derivative 
contracts. 
 
3.  Consumer Protection 
 
The third policy reason for a separate body of insurance law is the 
need for strong consumer protection. While the concern with the inverted-
production-cycle and governance problems was basically insurance firms 
not charging insureds enough, the consumer protection concern is that 
insurance firms will charge too much. As mentioned above, the concern is 
based on the following syllogism: insurance is a critical product for most 
individuals; individuals are not sophisticated about insurance products or 
contracts; and therefore insurance companies will take advantage of 
customers by overcharging them. Accordingly, (the bulk of) state insurance 
law regulates the substance and terms of insurance policies (to make them 
simpler to understand and compare across firms), as well as regulating 
service and coverage issues (to make sure insurance firms do not back 
away from promises to pay). In other words, insurance is sometimes 
regulated as a specialty consumer product in which informational and 
bargaining power asymmetries are sufficiently large that social losses may 
be generated from an unregulated market.  
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The credit derivatives market described above has none of these 
characteristics or concerns. The parties to credit derivative transactions are 
all large financial institutions or other sophisticated investors with access to 
information, the ability to understand and process the information, 
bargaining power, and the ability to bear losses. This is in sharp contrast 
with insurance contracts entered into by average consumers, who have 
none of these attributes. It may be sensible for insurance regulators to try to 
reduce informational and bargaining power asymmetries between insurance 
companies and consumers, to provide oversight of claims management and 
customer service, to provide standardized contract terms that allow 
comparison shopping, and to even regulate rates, but these policies are 
unnecessary where the buyers and sellers of “insurance” are large financial 
institutions. In fact, if anything, the sellers of protection (the alleged 
insurance companies) may often be less sophisticated than the buyers of 
protection (the alleged insureds). For example, a small hedge fund run by a 
few investors may enter into a contract to sell protection to a large 
commercial bank. In this case, it is not at all clear where insurance-law-like 
consumer protection duties should run. After all, existing law will treat 
both the hedge fund and the bank as not needing the protection of the 
securities laws or other regulations.  
In addition, as discussed above, standard-setting groups, like the 
International Swap Dealers Association, are already doing much of the 
work for credit derivative markets that insurance regulators do to protect 
average consumers. ISDA provides, among other things, standard form 
contracts (which innovate to respond to changes in the market), dispute 
resolution mechanisms and guidance, information, educational services, 
and so on.  
 
C. INSURANCE LAW DOESN’T WORK WELL AND WON’T 
UNIQUELY ADD MUCH 
 
A final argument against treating credit derivative contracts as 
insurance is a practical one having to do with the value that insurance 
regulation, as currently constituted, might add to the market. In short, 
insurance law and its generation and enforcement regime is generally 
considered to be inefficient and in need of dramatic reforms, and is 
therefore not the most appropriate locus of authority for a regulation of a 
new financial innovation that spans numerous types of institutions and 
serves innumerable purposes, most of which have nothing to do with 
insuring against risk as it is commonly understood. 
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1. Jurisdictional Issues 
 
As discussed above, insurance regulation is state based, meaning 
there are at least fifty different regulators and models of regulation. The 
state-based model is largely premised on the consumer-protection function 
of insurance regulation, since it is the state police power to protect citizens 
from abuse that justifies a local approach. While the merits of this model 
are debatable when it comes to providing efficient insurance services for 
health care or automobile risk, the global nature of modern financial 
markets makes the local argument much more difficult to make for credit 
derivatives. Do citizens of New Jersey need different protection in credit 
derivative markets than citizens of New York? In fact, insurance companies 
seemed to exploit this regulatory fracture by dividing up their businesses 
into discrete components that were regulated piecemeal by various state 
regulators. Given the ease of capital flows, the ability of firms to 
incorporate anywhere around the globe, and the fact that even transactions 
in the Cayman Islands can impact investors around the world, the idea of 
insurance regulators in a particular state controlling the global market 
seems fanciful. New York regulators, for instance, had authority over less 
than 10 percent of AIG’s operations, because of the corporate structure of 
AIG.51 As a result, one of world’s biggest insurers was, under the current 
system, able to be largely below the radar screen of its primary insurance 
regulators. Applying this dysfunctional model (which is based primarily on 
consumer issues, also which are the least applicable to this market) to new 
financial products makes little sense.  
The choice of regulator, be it a question of a particular entity or a 
general jurisdictional choice (like federal or state), is based on regulatory 
expertise, incentives, and the expected consequences of the regulatory 
model on the ability to minimize the decision costs and error costs of 
regulation. State-based regulation might make sense if jurisdictional 
competition is likely to lead to the efficient regulation (that is, the race-to-
the-top theory of state-based corporate law). But this is not the basis for 
state-based insurance law. State insurance law is not based solely on the 
state of incorporation of the insurance company, but rather the locus of 
policy holders. In any event, this model will probably not work for a 
market like credit derivatives. Financial markets are generally regulated by 
                                                                                                                 
51  See This American Life #382: The Watchmen (Chicago Public Radio 
broadcast Jun. 5, 2009), available at http://www.thislife.org/extras/radio/ 
382_transcript.pdf. 
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federal agencies (or perhaps in the future by international ones) because 
financial products are sold in a global market, and any state-based regime 
could be avoided by simply opting into offshore regulatory regimes. If the 
goal of regulation is to encourage credit derivatives to be traded on 
exchanges as opposed to in over-the-counter markets, as argued below, 
having a single regulator to choose from is crucial to creating 
commodifiable products. If credit derivative-holding SPVs could opt into 
one set of regulations through choice, this might provide some federalism-
esque benefits, but this is not the way insurance law operates. 
Another factor influencing the choice of regulator is expertise. 
Here too, there is nothing about state insurance regulators that seems 
special or unique. State insurance regulators are used to dealing with 
insurance companies and insurance contracts, which, as described above, 
deal with issues of risk pooling, governance problems, consumer-facing 
contract issues, and the like. None of these obtain in credit derivative 
markets. Insurance commissioners are also generally concerned with 
counterparty risk—a real concern in credit derivative markets—but this is 
something bank regulators (like the FDIC, Federal Reserve, and Treasury), 
derivative regulators (like the CFTC), and securities regulators (like the 
SEC) are also especially concerned with. In addition, these latter regulators 
do not have the state overlap problem described above.  
 
2. Substantive Law 
 
Deeming credit derivatives to be “insurance” (or credit protection 
sellers “insurance companies”) would, under current law, have several 
consequences, none of which is likely to improve the efficiency of credit 
derivative markets.  
 
i. Licensing 
 
First, entities could not sell protection unless the seller was a 
licensed insurance company. All fifty states require a state-issued license 
before a firm may issue an insurance policy.52 Such a pre-screening 
requirement might make some sense as part of trading on a credit 
                                                                                                                 
52  See N.Y. INS. LAW. § 1102(a) (2006). “No person, firm, association, 
corporation or joint-stock company shall do  an  insurance   business  in this state 
unless authorized by a license in force pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, or 
exempted by the provisions of this  chapter  from  such  requirement.” Id. 
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derivatives exchange, say by requiring those buying or selling on the 
exchange to meet certain criteria, like margin requirements. However, 
certifications based on other factors unrelated to the exchange’s risk of 
default would add costs without any offsetting benefits, and would merely 
open up the possibility that regulators could extract rents from firms 
wanting to participate in these markets. As discussed below in the context 
of capital requirements, the licensing scheme for insurance companies is 
doable in part because there are only a handful of firms providing insurance 
in each state. In contrast, there are literally tens of thousands of investment 
funds that have sold or could sell credit protection in credit derivative 
markets, and this would make any licensing scheme prohibitive or 
meaningless for state regulators. It would also impose potentially large 
costs on funds who do not sell protection as a normal part of their 
investment strategy, but might find it efficient and sensible to do so in 
limited cases. Regulatory costs would therefore deter these funds from 
participating in the market, without any proof that the funds have imposed 
any costs on others. 
 
ii. Duties 
 
Second, the buyer and seller of protection would be subject to a 
duty to act with the utmost good faith, that is, something beyond the 
“morals of the marketplace.” This might make some sense for markets in 
which buyers and sellers are of widely differing sophistication, have access 
to different information, and have different bargaining power, but it makes 
much less sense when the parties on both sides of a transaction are similar 
giant financial institutions. In fact, the trend in the market is for large 
investors to opt out of these kinds of disclosure requirements and the like 
using waivers known as “Big Boy” letters. To impose fiduciary duties or 
other litigation-generating obligations on parties without the potential for 
opt out will increase uncertainty and costs without any obvious benefit 
from ex post judicial determinations of what were and were not good deals. 
 
iii. Capital Reserves 
 
Third, protection sellers would be required to maintain a certain 
amount of capital based on the risk inherent in its “insurance-based” 
business.53 For instance, state insurance regulation requires every insurer to 
                                                                                                                 
53  See N.Y. INS. LAW. §§ 1322, 1324 (2006 & 2009). 
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maintain certain specified amounts of capital on hand to reduce 
counterparty risk and to submit its risk-based capital levels to regulators on 
an annual basis.54 The amounts of capital required vary by jurisdiction and 
entity, depending on the riskiness of the insurance company.55 
In the abstract, capital reserves are unobjectionable, since they are 
about reducing counterparty risk, and therefore about increasing the 
number of socially beneficial transactions. After all, these requirements are 
a common element of banking law and other areas where counterparty risk 
and the problem of runs and systemic risk are present. The question is then 
how much capital should be required, what is the best way to reduce 
counterparty risk, and which regulator has the incentive to figure these 
things out. There are several reasons why insurance regulators are not 
obviously the best candidate to fulfill this mission, and why the solution of 
requiring credit derivatives to be exchange-traded is a more elegant 
solution, albeit one fraught with problems too. 
There are several problems with insurance regulators imposing this 
requirement on the credit derivative markets. For one, the number of 
entities and individuals writing protection on indebtedness is enormous, 
making any pre-screening regulation extremely costly. For example, there 
are over 15,000 hedge funds in the United States alone, each of which 
could be a participant in these markets.56 The magnitude and complexity of 
the job of simply tracking each of these hedge funds—only one type of 
protection seller—would be beyond the capacity of any existing state 
                                                                                                                 
54  See N.Y. INS. LAW. § 1402(a) (2006). “Before investing its funds in any 
other  investments,  every  domestic insurer shall invest and maintain an amount 
equal to the  greater of the minimum capital required by law or the minimum 
surplus to policyholders required to be maintained by  law  for  a  domestic  stock 
corporation  authorized to transact the same kinds of insurance, only in investments 
of the types specified in this  section  which  are  not  in default  as  to  principal  or  
interest.” Id. 
55  The Model Insurance Act, for instance, provides for three “risk-based 
capital” levels: (i) mandatory control level risk-based capital (measured at .7 times 
authorized control level risk-based capital), (ii) regulatory action level risk-based 
capital (measured at 1.5 times authorized control level risk-based capital), and (iii) 
company action level risk-based capital (measured at 2.0 times authorized control 
level risk-based capital). NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, MODEL LAWS, 
REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES vol. III (2009). 
56  See Number of Hedge Funds up by Two Thirds in Two Years, Concludes 
PerTrac Study, THE TRADE NEWS, Mar. 5, 2007, available at 
http://www.thetradenews.com/hedge-funds/prime-brokerage/613. 
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regulators. The job would be made even more overwhelming since selling 
protection is not necessarily a full-time job. Hedge funds and other sellers 
may hold the default risk for a very short time (a few months or less) and 
may engage in transactions only periodically or on a one-off basis. Unlike 
insurance companies that exist to provide risk sharing services, protection 
sellers are not necessarily in the business of holding debt risk. The fluid 
nature of market participants would make any licensing or ex-ante 
regulatory regime incredibly costly and drive many participants out of the 
market.  
 In addition, capital requirements did not work well if at all in 
preventing insurance companies, such as AIG, from investing aggressively 
and, as it turns out, dangerously in credit derivative markets. The state-
based model was manipulated by AIG and others, and this possibility could 
only be expected to be worse if every credit derivative protection seller 
becomes a ward of insurance regulators. In other words, the job of 
regulation would get much more difficult without any obvious way of 
increasing the capabilities of regulators. This point is made even clearer by 
reiterating the point made above about how insurance regulators are not 
experts in financial markets in which most protection sellers participate. If 
insurance companies can avoid insurance regulation, it is very likely that 
hedge funds and other sophisticated and fast-moving private money funds 
will also be able to do so.  
Moreover, capital adequacy requirements imposed by regulators 
(as opposed to margin requirements required by exchanges) generated the 
incentive for regulatory arbitrage described above. Firms subjected to these 
requirements had incentives to hold higher quality debt risk, which 
received lower capital charges, and to move debt risk off of their balance 
sheets and into bankruptcy-remote SPVs. Although this type of arbitrage is 
likely inevitable at some level, the current regulatory model for insurance 
proved ineffectual at preventing arbitrage that imposed systemic risk 
externalities on society.  
Finally, insurance regulators are not experts about the amount, 
type, and structuring of capital requirements to reduce counterparty risk in 
non-insurance financial transactions. It is arguable that insurance 
regulators, representing the state, have incentives to determine the amount 
of social cost from the failure of an insurance company, since many of the 
social harms that would result would be paid for by a state-funded social 
safety net or would otherwise result in state-based harms. But the failure of 
a hedge fund or foreign bank or other protection seller may generate no 
social losses, because gains from bets on one side cancel out losses from 
bets on the other side, or are ones that are not clearly within the purview or 
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concern of state regulators. Systemic risk is something not felt completely 
or even directly by one state, and therefore a collective action problem may 
generate insufficient incentives to get the regulation to the efficient level.  
It is important to note that, as proposed below, trading credit 
derivatives on an exchange would likely require some financial assurances 
akin to capital adequacy requirements on market participants, through 
margin requirements, and on the exchange, which would be the ultimate 
bearer of counterparty risk. For the reasons discussed below, the concerns 
here are much less than through regulatory capital reserve requirements. 
For one, exchanges, which act as a centralized counterparty, bear the entire 
risk of loss if a trading party defaults, and therefore have the best incentives 
in terms of setting up rules to ensure that traders are likely to pay for their 
losses. 
 
iv. Disclosure 
 
Fourth, being an insurance company would trigger a detailed 
disclosure requirement of any insurance business to state regulators. The 
state-based requirements track roughly those firms with publicly traded 
securities. Audited reports of the insurance company’s financial and 
accounting situation must be made quarterly and annually.57 These include 
disclosure of routine data, like the firm’s balance sheet, income statement, 
and statement of cash flows, as well as more detailed information than 
generally required by securities laws, like a list of every asset owned by the 
firm, every asset acquired or sold during the relevant period, a report of all 
derivative transactions, and so on. 
Although disclosure of the assets and risks of hedge funds and 
other private wealth pools may indeed be a socially valuable regulation, 
there is no obvious reason why this should be tied to a regulatory apparatus 
that is about only a very small part of what a hedge fund may be doing or 
may have done. As noted above, there are potentially tens of thousands of 
separate legal entities participating in credit derivative markets at any time, 
and requiring each of them to make disclosures to insurance regulators 
upon engaging in such activity is highly problematic.  
As a basic principle, disclosure regulation should be implemented 
and monitored by regulators that cover the primary activity of the regulated 
entity. It is for this reason that the SEC is the agency responsible for the 
                                                                                                                 
57  See N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 307(a), 308 (2006) (requirements for filing an annual 
financial statement and a quarterly financial statement). 
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disclosure by firms issuing securities and by brokers and dealers that buy 
and sell securities, and the reason that insurance regulators are responsible 
for the disclosure by insurance firms. To require an investment fund to 
make disclosures to insurance regulators solely because it engaged in a 
credit derivative transaction will impose potentially large costs on funds 
based on potentially a single or small number of transactions. If the 
disclosure rules are tied instead to how often a fund trades or how many 
trades it makes in these markets, the funds will inevitably try to avoid these 
costs by making the decisions on whether to sell protection based in part on 
the arbitrary triggers. For example, if ten incidents of protection selling 
trigger a disclosure obligation, we shouldn’t be surprised to see funds 
selling protection nine times.  
If the reason for insurance-based disclosure rules is because of the 
lack of disclosure to other regulators – hedge funds have little or no 
disclosure obligations under the securities laws – this is not an argument 
for disclosure to insurance regulators, it is an argument for a securities law 
disclosure regime. The regulator that can best calibrate what kinds of 
disclosure are cost justified, what form disclosures should be made in, and 
what to do with the disclosed information, if anything, is the regulator that 
should require and monitor disclosure. For one, it is not clear what 
insurance regulators would do with the disclosures, especially if the bulk or 
almost all of it is about activities that are unquestionably not insurance. 
 
v. Contract Regulation 
 
Fifth, state law generally requires insurance companies to submit 
insurance contracts, known as “policies,” to state regulators for pre-
approval before any policies can be sold using the contract. For example, in 
New York, contracts for life, accident, and health insurance are subject to 
prior regulatory approval.58 This requirement would layer possible fifty 
different state law requirements on top of existing private contracting in the 
over-the-counter credit derivative markets. There are several problems with 
such a requirement. 
Most obviously, as noted above, there is already a quasi-regulator, 
the ISDA, that provides industry-wide boilerplate contracts for credit 
derivative transactions. As the Conseco and Xerox examples above 
                                                                                                                 
58  Under New York law, life, accident and health and annuity policy forms are 
subject to prior regulatory approval. Compare N.Y. INS. LAW. § 1102(a), with N.Y. 
INS. LAW § 1108(a) (2006). 
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illustrate, ISDA is already incorporating best practices into these standard 
contracts, as well as modifying terms that cause problems regulators would 
be concerned about, such as manipulation, externalities, and contractual 
unfairness that may have arisen from any bargaining power asymmetries, 
mistakes, or the like. As such, contract regulation is likely redundant, and 
would in any event be replacing a highly knowledgeable set of regulators 
with one without any experience with credit derivatives.  
Paternalistic contract regulation to protect one party or the other is 
also unnecessary because of the sophistication of the parties to these 
contracts. There is no obvious systematic bias in favor of one party or the 
other in these contracts, and the typical arguments that may justify contract 
form and substance regulation – for example, information or bargaining 
power asymmetries – do not obtain or point always in one direction.  
A final point has to do with the fact that the parties to credit 
derivative contracts are not tied to physical locations in the way that 
insureds are, and therefore any state-based regime will inevitably invite 
avoidance through incorporation choice or choice of law provisions. This 
may be viewed as normatively good or bad (the old race to the top versus 
race to the bottom debate), but even where it might be thought of as 
generating efficient contract forms that private parties would choose in any 
event, it would take us simply to the current ISDA model. After all, if there 
were a more efficient set of contracts that could be written – that is, the one 
that parties freely choosing would choose anyway – it would exist or will 
exist under the current quasi-regulatory regime. 
 
vi. Price Control 
 
Finally, states impose substantive restrictions on the prices that can 
be charged by insurance companies. Regulation of prices varies widely by 
state and by the type of insurance, but a few common themes are apparent. 
There are generally three types of regulation: pre-approval, “file and use,” 
and “use and file,” with the strictness of the regulation decreasing 
accordingly. For example, New York law requires prices for workers’ 
compensation and automobile insurance to be approved in advance by 
regulators, while rates for property and casualty insurance are subject only 
to a pre-issuance filing policy.59 The general regulatory touchstone is that 
rates shall not be too high, too low, discriminatory, or anticompetitive.60 
                                                                                                                 
59  Compare N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 2305(b), 2310(a), 2344 (2006), and N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11 §§ 161.1-161.12 (2009), and N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 
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Whatever sense price regulation makes for contracts written by 
insurance companies, it makes much less sense for credit derivative 
products. Price regulation of insurance contracts is premised on the pooling 
of large numbers of individuals and on the governance problems described 
above. In contrast, credit derivative prices are based on the idiosyncratic 
risk associated with particular firms. This is something that is difficult to 
price in the abstract or to know when prices are too high, too low, 
discriminatory, or the like. In addition, because the price of risk is traded in 
markets, the idea of using regulators, especially ones without any expertise 
or experience in this area, to set prices is nonsensical.  
There is one area where the pricing of credit derivatives was 
erroneous. As shown in recent research, price models used ubiquitously by 
buyers, sellers, credit rating agencies, and other participants in the markets 
systematically mispriced various tranches of risk.61 It turns out that highly 
rated tranches were underpriced, meaning they were riskier than buyers and 
sellers thought, and unrated tranches were underpriced, meaning they were 
less risky than thought.62 Importantly, however, no one was aware of this 
problem, even though everyone had strong incentives to be so. In addition, 
this kind of error is now known, and parties to these contracts do not need 
regulators to inform them about these errors. Other pricing issues might 
arise in the future, but market participants have incentives to identify such 
issues. The problem was not that the market for setting prices was biased in 
one way or the other, but rather simply a mistake in assumptions. 
Regulators are not well positioned to remedy these kinds of problems 
absent a crystal ball that no one believes they possess.  
Moreover, if various states are competing with each other to offer 
market participants pricing regulations that fit their needs, the jurisdictional 
choice point made above will obtain – contracts will migrate to those states 
that offer the pricing rules that the parties would have come to anyway. 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                          
2303, 3231(d) (2006). 
60  Compare N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 2305(b), 2310(a), 2344 (2006), and N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11 §§ 161.1-161.12 (2009), and N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 
2303, 3231(d). 
61  See Joshua D. Coval, et al., Economic Catastrophe Bonds, 99 AM. ECON. 
REV. 628 (2009) (showing how AAA-rated tranches contained very little to no 
idiosyncratic risk, but large and underappreciated amounts of systematic risk). 
62  See id. 
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V. AN ALTERNATIVE TO INSURANCE REGULATION 
 
It is understandable why people mistakenly analogize credit 
derivatives to insurance: insurance is about risk sharing and diversification, 
and this is what credit derivatives are about as well. Insurance companies 
were also big players in credit derivative markets. But other contracts are 
about these things as well, and there were many other types of entities that 
participated in these markets. In addition, credit derivatives are about many 
other things than risk sharing. In fact, as shown above, credit derivatives 
may have started as a risk-sharing or risk-transferring mechanism, but their 
primary use was and is speculation, hedging, and other non-insurance-like 
functions. Moreover, even where the insurance analogy is most apt, it does 
not follow that the current insurance regulatory regime is the best available 
for credit derivatives, assuming additional regulation is needed. 
There may be a case for more regulation, premised on the failure of 
the market to adequately address counterparty risk issues, but insurance law 
has little to add. A simple rule requiring derivative contracts to be traded on 
an exchange in most cases will do most of the work required. 
As noted above, a credit derivative does not eliminate risk for the 
original bearer of it, but simply trades default risk for counterparty risk. In 
other words, the risk in a loan that the borrower will not repay is traded for 
the risk that the seller of default protection will not pay in the event the 
borrower does not. This counterparty risk was bigger than anyone thought; 
firms no one thought would fail, like AIG, failed by taking on too much 
risk. This led to a cascade of failures of brokers, like Lehman Brothers, and 
other intermediaries, which in turn led to huge collateral calls and a general 
constriction of credit flows. Quite simply, the mispricing of and realization 
of counterparty risk caused the credit crunch.63 
Fortunately there is a somewhat simple solution to reducing 
counterparty risk – an exchange. Using a centralized exchange, like the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, eliminates the counterparty risk, replacing it 
with the risk of default of the exchange. If A and B have a contract that 
exposes A to a net of $100 in risk to B, this risk can be eliminated if A and 
B both trade through a centralized clearinghouse or exchange. A will now 
have a $100 liability to the clearinghouse, while B will have a $100 credit 
                                                                                                                 
63  See JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 
AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS (Hoover Inst. Press 2009) (showing how the credit crunch was not caused 
by a liquidity shortage but by an increase in counterparty risk). 
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with the same. If A defaults on its ability to pay B, B can still be paid by 
the clearinghouse. As long as the clearinghouse is solvent, the counterparty 
risk for B is eliminated.  
The risk-reducing qualities of an exchange can be seen more 
clearly when the number of trading parties increases. Consider the case 
where A is owed $100 by B, B is owed $90 by C, and C is owed $80 by A. 
In this case, A has a net risk exposure of $180 to B and C, since if they 
both default, A is owed $100 from B and owes $80 to C. If these three 
liabilities are managed through an exchange, however, A’s risk exposure to 
B and C is reduced to zero. In this scenario, A is owed $20 from the 
exchange, and B and C each owe the exchange $10. Thus, A’s risk to B and 
C has been eliminated, and the netting of liabilities has reduced the 
magnitude of the overall amounts owed to much more manageable sums. 
So long as the exchange can ensure, say through margin requirements, that 
B and C can make good on their $10 (about 10% of the total bets), the 
market stays together. 
It is for this reason that the clearinghouse model is used for other 
derivative markets, like commodities markets, futures markets, and 
currency markets. Of course, the clearinghouse must be solvent and for this 
it needs sufficient scale of operations and the ability to impose rules on 
trading parties that help reduce the risk that they will not be able to make 
due on their contracts. This last point is precisely about the locus of 
regulatory authority – who knows better how to regulate the leverage or 
other characteristics of market participants? Since the clearinghouse, 
typically a for-profit enterprise, stands to lose personally and dramatically 
in the event of a failure, it has arguably better incentives along this 
dimension than government regulators, who are not betting their own 
money and who, perversely and ironically, may see increased funding from 
any failures. 
Given these benefits, the question is why the exchange did not 
arise as a natural part of the market. One answer might be that an exchange 
has some elements of a public good, since it reduces the potential for 
systemic risk by decreasing the likelihood of a credit crunch from the 
failure of a single firm, and public goods are chronically under supplied by 
the market. But the story here is more complicated, because the analysis 
above suggests that it is in each individual firm’s interest to reduce risk in 
this way. Moreover, the collective action problems that typically cause the 
market to under supply public goods do not obtain in this context, since 
there were only about eight major intermediary market makers, and they 
were all located in New York City.  
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There must be, therefore, some benefit to writing contracts off 
exchange that exceeded any benefits from counterparty risk reduction, at 
least in expectation before the actual counterparty risks, like the failure of 
AIG, were known. One possibility is that the brokerage houses arranging 
over-the-counter credit default contracts are able to earn higher profits for 
writing specialized contracts than they could for simply dealing in 
standardized contracts, as typically required for exchange-traded contracts. 
There is less pricing transparency in over-the-counter contracts, since they 
are written for a specific buyer and seller in a one-off fashion, and there is 
also more work that arguably goes into writing these contracts. And, 
private firms do not bear the full costs of the over-the-counter system, since 
bankruptcy law limits the downside risk to any investor to what they 
invested. Under this view, brokerage firms are able to capture the private 
benefits of idiosyncratic, over-the-counter contracts, while externalizing the 
risks of systemic meltdown of the entire system.  
In this way, the government’s initial efforts to encourage the 
trading of credit derivatives on an exchange is a sensible reform. Firms 
have resisted this to date,64 because nothing has changed the private 
incentives with respect to systemic risk – in fact, the rash of bailouts of 
private firms have arguably exacerbated the problem. In addition, there are 
multiple competing exchanges, including the CME and ICE exchanges, and 
academics have shown that exchanges need a great amount of scale to be 
able to adequately reduce counterparty risk.65 The government may be 
rightfully worried about choosing one exchange as the preferred or 
exclusive exchange, but the need for scale may force some collective 
choice to be made.  
As noted above, the virtue of the exchange model is that it bakes 
into a private-ordering system many of the laudable aspects of the 
insurance law regime. Specifically, capital requirements, disclosure, pricing 
transparency, and general oversight of risk are all functions that exchanges 
provide, since exchanges are on the hook for losses arising from the failure 
                                                                                                                 
64  See Jacob Bunge, NY Fed Examines Slow Progress in CDS Clearing, 
WALL ST. J. MARKETWATCH, Apr. 1, 2009, available at 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ny-fed-examines-slow-progress-cds.  
65  See Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty 
Reduce Counterparty Risk? (Rock Center for Corporate Governance, Working 
Paper No. 46; Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus. Research, Paper No. 2022, 2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1348343 (showing 
how reductions in counterparty risk is highly correlated with scale and the ability 
to net with other derivative contracts). 
2009] CREDIT DERIVATIVES ARE NOT “INSURANCE” 59 
 
of any of the market participants. Moreover, insofar as there are multiple 
exchanges competing to act as a clearinghouse, there will be competition in 
law making, which will increase the chances of efficient rules being 
created. In the private model, there is also less chance of regulatory capture 
or a public choice distortion, because rival exchanges can always arise to 
offer market participants alternatives. This assumes, however, that entry is 
relatively unrestricted, something that is not necessarily true in a world 
where scale is so important and perhaps difficult to achieve quickly. Insofar 
as this is true, some oversight of the exchange(s) may be required to simply 
ensure that they are not subject to these shortcomings. A first guess at a 
sensible regulator of the exchange(s) would be one of the existing 
regulatory bodies that deals with exchanges (e.g., the SEC or CFTC) or the 
regulators that deal with banks and systemic risk (e.g., the Federal Reserve 
or the Treasury Department). 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This Essay has shown that the simple argument that some credit 
derivatives help banks and other providers of debt share risk with other 
investors is not sufficient for credit derivative contracts in general to be 
deemed “insurance.” A separate body of insurance law exists not because 
the underlying contracts are insurance, but rather because typical insurance 
contracts are sold by insurance companies. It has also shown that the policy 
justifications for regulation of insurance companies—an inverted 
production cycle, weak corporate governance in bad times, and 
unsophisticated insureds—do not obtain in the context of credit derivative 
markets or apply to parties to credit derivative contracts. Finally, it has 
shown how an exchange for credit derivative contracts can provide most if 
not all of the substantive regulation insurance regulators can provide, at 
lower cost and in a more efficient manner. There remain unsolved 
problems with the exchange solution, including issues of scale and bilateral 
netting, but this is a subject for another day. 
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THE ROAD FROM “TWIN PEAKS” – 
AND THE WAY BACK 
 
Michael W. Taylor * 
 
*** 
 
This article explores the fragmented regulatory structure of financial 
markets in the United States in light of the current financial crisis.  Two 
approaches for regulatory reform that originated in the United Kingdom 
are presented.  The first approach is the creation of a unified regulatory 
agency responsible for regulating all the main segments of the financial 
services industry.  The second, also known as the “Twin Peaks” approach, 
is to structure regulation around two agencies, one responsible for the 
safety and soundness of all financial firms and the other for regulating 
their sales practices.  This article describes the debate in the UK prior to 
the creation of one unified regulatory agency, the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA).  Next, it explores justifications for a single regulator, such 
as the FSA, followed by a discussion of the rejection of the “Twin Peaks” 
approach in the UK.  Subsequently, the debate regarding the role of a 
central bank, like the Bank of England in the UK, is discussed.  Then US 
regulatory reform is reviewed in terms of the lessons of the British 
experience of creating a single regulatory agency.  Finally, the concluding 
section describes how some variation of the “Twin Peaks” alternative 
would prove to be more successful than the single regulator approach. 
 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Global Financial Crisis has put the spotlight on the United 
States’ complex and fragmented regulatory structure as an issue of global 
systemic importance.  The failure of large investment banks like Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers has put into question the adequacy of the 
regulation of large non-bank financial intermediaries.  The lack of 
consolidated supervision of the AIG group, with its Financial Products 
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Division falling under the authority of the Office of Thrift Supervision 
(OTS) while the insurance company was regulated at State level, further 
illustrates the systemic problems created by regulatory fragmentation.  
Finally, the Commodities Futures Modernization Act, which deliberately 
excluded the regulatory authority of both the SEC and the CFTC from the 
Credit Default Swaps market, resulted in a failure to ensure adequate 
regulation of that market with implications for the global financial system.  
In a message clearly directed to US policy-makers, the Group of 
Thirty, a think tank comprising some of the most distinguished figures 
from international finance, has recommended in its report on Financial 
Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability: “Countries should reevaluate 
their regulatory structures with a view to eliminating unnecessary overlaps 
and gaps in coverage and complexity, removing the potential for regulatory 
arbitrage, and improving regulatory coordination.”1  This reevaluation has 
now begun, with the structure of US regulation being seriously re-
examined for the first time in over a generation.  Although the 1999 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act dismantled the structural barriers between 
commercial and investment banking and between banking and insurance, it 
did not result in significant structural change to the complex and over-
lapping authorities of US regulatory agencies.2  However, in March 2008, 
the Bush administration unveiled a plan for a major structural reform of 
regulation,3 while more recently the Obama administration has proposed a 
similar, but less radical reform, to Congress.4     
The U.S. debate on regulatory structure has lagged behind in other 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) by over a decade.5  By the end of the last century many of these 
                                                                                                                 
1  GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 10 (2009), available at http://www.group30.org/pubs/recommend 
ations.pdf. 
2  Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, United Kingdom and United 
States Responses to the Regulatory Challenges of Modern Financial Markets, 38 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 317, 327-29 (2003). 
3  U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008), 
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf. 
4  U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009) 
available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
5  Schooner & Taylor, supra note 2, at 320.  For a discussion of reform 
elsewhere in the OECD, see id. at 340-44.  
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countries had already embarked on major reorganizations of their 
institutional structures of financial regulation.6  These reform initiatives 
were presented as a response to the challenge of regulating today’s 
increasingly integrated financial markets in which the traditional 
distinctions between banking, securities, and insurance had become 
blurred.7  Moreover, with the dismantling of the structural regulations that 
had previously segmented the financial industry, diversified financial 
conglomerates had emerged, necessitating a group-wide perspective to 
ensure their effective regulation.8    
Two broad approaches emerged in response to these challenges.9  
The first, and most high profile, was the approach adopted in the United 
Kingdom that created a unified regulatory agency responsible for 
regulating all three of the main segments of the financial services industry 
for both financial soundness and consumer protection purposes.10  The 
alternative approach, which had originated in the U.K. but was not adopted 
there, was to structure regulation around two agencies, one responsible for 
the safety and soundness of all financial firms and the other for regulating 
their sales practices.11  This “Twin Peaks” approach was adopted first in 
Australia and later in the Netherlands.12  Variations of it are also to be 
found in Spain, France and Canada. 
This essay attempts to distil some lessons for the United States 
from the U.K.’s reforms and especially the factors that led to the creation of 
a single, unified regulatory agency, the Financial Services Authority 
                                                                                                                 
6  Id. at 340-44. 
7  Id. at 340. 
8  Id. at 323. 
9  See Richard K. Abrams & Michael W. Taylor, Issues in the Unification of 
Financial Sector Supervision 22-23 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 
00/213, 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/ 
wp00213.pdf.  Within these two broad forms there is also scope for substantial 
variation.  See id. at 21-24. 
10  For a general review of the background to the U.K.’s reforms, see Eilìs 
Ferran, Examining the United Kingdom’s Experience in Adopting the Single 
Regulator Model, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 257 (2003).  
11  MICHAEL TAYLOR, “TWIN PEAKS”: A REGULATORY STRUCTURE FOR THE 
NEW CENTURY 10-11 (Ctr. for the Study of Financial Innovation) (1995). 
12  SELECT COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, BANKING SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION, 2008-9, H.L. 101-I, at 34. 
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(FSA).13  The radicalism of the U.K.’s approach should not be 
underestimated.  Not only did it involve the merger of nine pre-existing 
regulatory agencies14 into one but, most controversially, it involved the 
decision to remove the responsibility for bank regulation from the Bank of 
England, the U.K.’s central bank, and to transfer it to the FSA.15  Although 
unified regulators had been previously created elsewhere, most notably in 
Scandinavia, none had involved the removal of bank regulation authority 
from the central bank.16   
Critics of the U.K.’s arrangements at the time of the FSA’s creation 
charged that the separation of bank regulation from the central bank’s 
lender of last resort (LoLR) responsibilities was highly risky. It was argued 
that without the detailed institutional knowledge that derives from bank 
regulatory authority, the Bank of England would be unable to perform its 
LoLR responsibilities adequately.  The subsequent experience of the run on 
the British mortgage bank Northern Rock in September 2007 seemed to 
confirm these critics.  However, as this essay will argue, this conclusion 
overlooks the range of possible alternatives to the U.K.’s reforms, and 
particularly the Twin Peaks model.  A “Twin Peaks” separation of 
prudential (safety and soundness) and consumer protection regulation 
would have offered a number of advantages over the FSA, including in 
relation to crisis management arrangements.  The essay concludes by 
                                                                                                                 
13  For an assessment of the FSA more generally, see Howell E. Jackson, An 
American Perspective on the U.K. Financial Services Authority: Politics, Goals & 
Regulatory Intensity (Harvard, John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., 
Discussion Paper No. 522, 2005), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/ 
programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/ Jackson_522.pdf.   
14  Clive Briault, The Rationale for a Single National Financial Services 
Regulator 6 (Fin. Servs. Auth., Occasional Paper No. 2, 1999), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ occpapers/OP02.pdf.  These agencies include the 
Securities and Investments Board, the Personal Investment Authority, the 
Investment Management Regulatory Organisation, the Securities and Futures 
Authority, the Supervision and Surveillance Division of the Bank of England, the 
Building Societies Commission, the Insurance Directorate of the Department of 
Trade and Industry, the Friendly Societies Commission, and the Registrar of 
Friendly Societies.  Id. at 6 n.1.  
15  Id. at 7. 
16  See Michael Taylor & Alex Fleming, Integrated Financial Supervision: 
Lessons from Northern European Experience 17 (World Bank, Working Paper 
2223, 1999), available at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/ 
50180/TaylorFleming_1999.pdf. 
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drawing some conclusions from the British experience that might be 
considered by policy-makers in the U.S.17 
 
II. THE DEBATE IN THE UK PRIOR TO THE FSA 
 
What is striking about the policy debate within the U.K. prior to 
the formation of what became the FSA, is just how little attention was 
given to the possibility of creating a single integrated financial regulator.  
For several years prior to the election of a new Labour government in May 
1997, there had been discussion of the need to reform the U.K.’s regulatory 
system, but the ideas being debated stopped short of proposing to create a 
single regulatory agency with a mandate that covered the entire banking, 
insurance and investment industries.18  The concept only came to 
prominence on May 20, 1997 with an announcement to the House of 
Commons by the new Chancellor of the Exchequer that the government 
intended to create a single regulatory authority for the banking and 
securities industries.  The announcement itself came as a surprise to many 
observers and showed signs of having been rapidly prepared.  This 
impression arose not only because the statement was vague concerning 
matters of detail, but also because it did not address some more 
fundamental issues, such as whether the prudential regulation of insurance 
companies would be included in the scope of the new regulator.19    
Prior to this announcement, the British regulatory system combined 
institutional and functional regulation, similar to the system created by the 
                                                                                                                 
17  For further discussion regarding the Twin Peaks model in a U.S. context, 
see Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Risk Not Function, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 
441 (1998); Howell E. Jackson, A Pragmatic Approach to the Phased 
Consolidation of Financial Regulation in the United States, (Harvard Law Sch., 
Working Paper No. 09-19, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1300431; 
Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein, The Fed’s New Model of Supervision for “Large 
Complex Banking Organizations”: Coordinated Risk-Based Supervision of 
Financial Multinationals for International Financial Stability (Boston College 
Law Sch. Research Paper No. 89, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=882474. 
18  Schooner & Taylor, supra note 2, at 320. 
19  Ensuring the solvency of insurance companies had been the responsibility 
of the Department of Trade and Industry although it was briefly transferred to HM 
Treasury before the FSA was established.  In July 1997, i.e. two months after the 
original announcement, the government confirmed that this function would also 
form part of the responsibilities of the new agency.  
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Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in the United States.20  Banks were regulated by 
the Bank of England under the Banking Act 198721 with respect to their 
safety and soundness, while insurance companies were subject to solvency 
regulation under the Insurance Companies Act of 198222 by a department 
of the Treasury (a function which was previously discharged by the 
Department of Trade and Industry).  Sales practice (“conduct of business”) 
regulation was in the hands of a network of self-regulating organisations 
(SROs) which were also responsible for the safety and soundness 
regulation of non-bank financial intermediaries such as securities brokers 
and dealers and investment managers.   
The SRO system was established by the Financial Services Act 
198623 which had been described as “self-regulation within a statutory 
framework” both by its chief architect24 and the Conservative government 
that enacted it.  This system had been designed to provide an all-
encompassing investor protection regime for securities, mutual funds, and 
other forms of collective investment through a number of “Self-Regulating 
Organizations” overseen by a quasi-governmental body, the Securities and 
Investments Board (SIB).25   The SROs administered the sales practice 
regime and were responsible for ensuring that the users of financial 
services (generally speaking, securities brokering and dealing; futures 
brokering and dealing; investment management; financial advice; and sales 
practices relating to collective investment schemes like personal pensions 
and life insurance) were subject to appropriate levels of consumer 
protection. This system applied a functional approach to the regulation of 
investment services, products, and advice. If a service or product was being 
offered, it needed to be regulated by the relevant SRO, no matter what the 
nature of the firm offering the service. 
The Financial Services Act was initially administered by no fewer 
than five separate SROs:  The Securities Association (TSA) for Stock 
                                                                                                                 
20  Schooner & Taylor, supra note 2, at 324-25. 
21  Banking Act, 1987, c. 22, § 1 (Eng.) (repealed 2001). 
22  Insurance Companies Act, 1982, c. 50, § 3 (Eng.) (repealed 2001). 
23  Financial Services Act, 1986, c. 60, § 8 (Eng.) (repealed 2001). 
24  L.C.B. Gower, “Big Bang” and City Regulation, 51 MOD. L. REV. 1, 11 
(1988). 
25  The SIB exercised powers that were transferred to it under the Financial 
Services Act by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (a government 
minister).  However, the SIB itself was in the unusual position of being a company 
limited by guarantee and not a department of government.  A similar structure was 
subsequently adopted for the Financial Services Authority. 
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Exchange brokers and dealers; the Association of Futures Brokers and 
Dealers (AFBD) for dealers in futures and options; the Investment 
Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO) for asset management and 
mutual funds; the Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organisation 
(LAUTRO) for collective investment schemes marketed by insurance 
companies; and the Financial Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers 
Regulatory Association (FIMBRA) for independent financial advisers, 
many of whom acted as agents of the insurance companies.26  During the 
later years of the self-regulatory system’s existence some streamlining took 
place: the TSA and AFBD merged, as did LAUTRO and FIMBRA, thus 
reducing the number of SROs to three.  Nonetheless the system was 
criticized for its complexity and opacity to the consumer, especially as it 
gave rise to what was described as an “ ‘alphabet soup’ of regulatory 
agencies.”27  At the same time, the financial services industry criticised the 
system for not being genuinely self-regulatory, and for imposing an 
inappropriate regulatory burden on the interprofessional (“wholesale”) 
money and capital markets.  The SIB developed its own rulebook and 
required the SROs to adopt “equivalent” standards.  This resulted in a 
lesser role for practitioner input and greater uniformity in the SRO 
rulebooks than had originally been intended.28 
However, the SRO system was most thoroughly discredited in the 
eyes of opposition lawmakers by what became known as the “pensions 
mis-selling scandal.”29   It had been the policy of the Conservative 
government in the mid-1980s to encourage more personal provision for 
retirement, rather than relying on occupational or state-provided schemes.  
Approximately eight million personal pensions were sold in the UK 
between 1988 and 1995.30  The SRO system was intended in part to provide 
protection for individuals who entered into one of these personal savings 
schemes;  in the words of John Major (then a junior minister but later 
                                                                                                                 
26  See the account given by DAVID F. LOMAX, LONDON MARKETS AFTER THE 
FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 78 (1987). 
27  Taylor, supra note 11, at 7. 
28  These criticisms were recognized in a report issued by Andrew Large when 
he assumed the Chairmanship of the SIB in 1993.  ANDREW LARGE, FINANCIAL 
SERVICES REGULATION: MAKING THE TWO TIER SYSTEM WORK (London: 
Securities and Investments Board, 1993). 
29  PETER CARTWRIGHT, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 152 
(1999). 
30  Michael Taylor, The Policy Background in BLACKSTONE’S GUIDE TO THE 
FINANCIAL SERVICES. & MARKETS ACT OF 2000 14 (Michael Blair ed., 2000). 
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Prime Minister) the Financial Services Act would “safeguard people 
against the unscrupulous overselling of personal pensions.”31 
Personal pension plans were mainly offered by insurance 
companies (regulated by LAUTRO) which employed a sales staff with a 
large commission element in their remuneration.  By 1993 it had emerged 
that a significant number of public sector employees, including teachers, 
nurses and the employees of former state-owned industries such as coal 
mining, had been encouraged by these salespeople to switch from their 
occupational schemes to personal pension plans.  As the employer-
provided plans were defined benefit, whereas the personal plans were 
defined contribution, this arguably placed these individuals at a potentially 
serious financial disadvantage.32  A report commissioned by the SIB 
suggested that as many as 1.5 million pensions had been mis-sold with 
compensation costs amounting to some ₤4 billion.  Many of those affected 
were a core constituency of the Labour party – public sector workers – and 
hence the issue became highly politicised with the opposition party using it 
as a stick with which to beat the government.33 
Before winning the 1997 General Election Labour, party 
spokesmen had committed the party to end what they termed “City self-
regulation.”34  One of the few definite policy commitments to emerge from 
their pledge was the intention, once in government, to abolish the two-tier 
system of SIB and SROs.35 In its place they undertook to establish a single, 
statutory regulatory agency for securities and investments.  Thus the 
commitment to end City self-regulation might be narrowly construed as the 
commitment to replace the system created by the Financial Services Act. 
At the same time, however, there were indications that the Labour 
party also considered the Bank of England to be part of the City’s “self-
regulatory” system, even though its powers to regulate banks derived from 
                                                                                                                 
31  Michael Taylor, Fin. Svcs..& Mkts. Act: The Policy Background-II, 31 
AMICUS CURIAE 4, 6 (2000). 
32  Whether the individuals were disadvantaged and to what extent depended 
on a number of actuarial assumptions and assumptions about investment returns.  
The intricacies of these issues were, however, drowned out in the subsequent 
political debate. 
33  See, e.g., 318, PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1998) 716, 718. (It continued to 
be used by Labour ministers against their Conservative opposite numbers even 
after the change of government). 
34  Mike O’Brien, Labour's Proposals for Regulation into the 21st Century, 5 
J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 115, 115-17 (1997). 
35  LABOUR PARTY, LABOUR’S BUSINESS MANIFESTO (1997). 
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a separate statute (the Banking Act 1987) and even though, unlike the 
SROs, it was a government agency.   Labour suspicion of Britain’s central 
bank ran deep, with some commentators suggesting that it can be traced to 
the Bank’s role in the sterling crisis of 1931 that had helped to bring down 
a minority Labour administration headed by Ramsay Macdonald. 36   This 
fuelled Labour suspicions that the Bank of England was too closely aligned 
with the Conservative party, in which the financial interests of the City of 
London had a major influence.  Thus when the British government 
considered the introduction of statute-based bank regulation in the mid-
1970s some members of the governing Labour party proposed establishing 
a banking commission independent of the Bank of England to exercise 
regulatory powers.   These proposals were rejected by the Cabinet after the 
then Governor of the Bank of England fought a rearguard action to ensure 
that it became the bank regulator.37  Nonetheless, in subsequent years the 
Bank was to show itself a reluctant regulator which above all wished to 
maintain its traditional, informal relationship with the leading financial 
institutions in the City.  Against this background it was possible to present 
it as part of the City’s “self-regulating” system and as merely the chief 
spokesman for a “cosy club.” 
Nonetheless, it is doubtful whether the Bank of England’s 
responsibility for regulating the banking sector would have come under 
renewed scrutiny had it not been for two incidents in the first half of the 
1990s.   The first was the failure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI), which went into insolvent liquidation once it became 
clear that it had been a vehicle for a massive fraud.38   Although the bank 
only had branches in the U.K. (its holding company was registered in 
Luxembourg), the group’s “mind and management” had been in London 
and hence there was a case for the Bank of England having taken the lead 
in ensuring that the group as a whole was subject to consolidated 
supervision.  In a subsequent investigation conducted by Sir Thomas (later 
Lord Justice) Bingham, a senior judge, the Bank was found to have adopted 
                                                                                                                 
36  MICHAEL MORAN, THE POLITICS OF BANKING: THE STRANGE CASE OF 
COMPETITION & CREDIT CONTROL 120 (2d ed., 1986). 
37  Id.  
38  H.M. STATIONARY OFFICE, INQUIRY INTO THE SUPERVISION OF THE BANK 
OF CREDIT & COMMERCE INT’L. (1992). 
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an excessively narrow interpretation of its powers and, partly for that 
reason, it had not been sufficiently proactive in regulating BCCI.39 
In BCCI’s case, the Bank of England could argue in its defence 
that it was a bank regulator not a fraud investigator.   No such defence was 
available in relation to the second episode – the failure of Barings merchant 
bank in early 1995.40  Barings had been part of the City of London’s 
“aristocracy,” a centuries old merchant bank that had for generations been 
at the heart of the City’s establishment to the extent of providing several 
Governors of the Bank of England.  Barings had failed once before, in 
1890, as the result of speculation in railroad construction in South 
America.41   It had been then bailed out by the Bank of England, at that 
time still a privately owned corporation.42  One hundred and five years 
later, Barings failed again, this time due to the poorly controlled activities 
of a futures trader based in Singapore who took large unhedged positions in 
the Singapore and Osaka futures exchanges.43  This was the first of several 
episodes involving what came to be called “rogue traders” in the years that 
followed.44   The episode was damaging to the Bank of England since it 
appeared that Barings had enjoyed a relatively light touch regulatory 
regime and thus provided an illustration of the operation of a so-called 
“self-regulatory system,” at least as far as it applied to members of the 
City’s establishment.45 
                                                                                                                 
39  212 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1992) 575.  According to a statement 
given to the House of Commons by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman 
Lamont, the Bingham report “argues that the Bank was slow to impose on BCCI 
an appropriate supervisory regime, and concludes that the Bank continued for too 
long to rely on the Luxembourg authorities to play the leading role.” Id. 
40  H.M. STATIONARY OFFICE, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF BANKING 
SUPERVISION INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS 
(1995). 
41  See JOHN GAPPER & NICHOLAS DENTON, ALL THAT GLITTERS: THE FALL 
OF BARINGS 2 (1996). 
42  Id. 
43  Id. at 28-29. 
44  A phrase that was originally coined to describe the Barings trader, Nick 
Leeson, which he used as the title of his subsequent book: NICK LEESON & 
EDWARD WHITLEY, ROGUE TRADER: HOW I BROUGHT DOWN BARINGS BANK AND 
SHOOK THE FINANCIAL WORLD (1996). 
45  See Gordon Brown, Ch. of the Exch., Statement to the H.C. on the Bank of 
Eng. (May 20, 1997), (“SIB will become the single regulator underpinned by 
statute. The current system of self-regulation will be replaced by a new and fully 
statutory system, which will put the public interest first, and increase public 
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Despite these episodes, Labour entered office in 1997 without a 
clear commitment to removing the Bank of England’s responsibility for 
bank regulation.   Nor was there any indication of the possibility that a 
single financial regulator was on the policy agenda.    What changed this 
situation was the new government’s announcement in its first few days in 
office that it would grant the Bank of England independence to set interest 
rates.  Although this policy was not featured in the Labour party’s 
manifesto, central bank independence had been debated extensively in 
Britain since the early part of the decade.46   On occasion in this debate the 
question of the central bank’s regulatory powers had arisen without, 
however, any definitive conclusion being reached.  Nonetheless, once the 
decision was taken to create an independent central bank, a new Bank of 
England Act was required and this seems to have provided the pretext for a 
re-examination of the Bank’s role as bank supervisor.47 
The decision to remove banking supervision from the Bank of 
England appears to have been taken opportunistically.   Before the start of 
each parliamentary year in Britain, each government department must put 
in “bids” for parliamentary time for the passage of legislation that it 
considers essential.  The successful bids are then included in the 
government’s annual legislative program announced to parliament in the 
“Queen’s Speech.”   In 1997 Treasury ministers wished to introduce two 
major bills – one to grant the Bank of England its independence, the other 
to abolish the “two tier” system of SIB and SROs created by the Financial 
Services Act.   However, the new government had an ambitious policy 
agenda and a crowded legislative timetable, resulting in the Treasury being 
granted the time for only one major bill.   According to the director of the 
Association of British Insurers, speaking the year after the event: 
 
The Treasury team had failed to secure in the first Queen’s 
Speech legislation to abolish the two tier system under the 
Financial Services Act and Markets Act.  However, a 
separate decision had been taken to give the Bank of 
England independence in respect of conducting monetary 
                                                                                                                          
confidence in the system.” (From the context it appeared that he considered the 
Bank of England to be part of the self-regulatory system).  Id. 
46  See Michael Taylor, Central Bank Independence.: The Policy Background, 
in BLACKSTONE’S GUIDE TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT OF 2000 
at 10 (Michael Blair ed., 1998). 
47  See Ferran, supra note 10, at 271-72. 
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policy and this did require legislation.  It seems that an 
opportunist decision was taken at this stage to move 
towards a single regulator because the legislation to give 
the Bank of England independence in respect of monetary 
policy could be used for any other purpose relevant to the 
Bank of England.48 
 
One of these “other purposes” was the transfer of responsibility for 
bank regulation from the Bank of England to the SIB, which then became 
the nucleus of the FSA.  In other words, the parliamentary timetable rather 
than a reasoned policy debate seems to have triggered the decision to move 
to a single regulator.  This also would have been consistent with an 
apparent about-turn in government policy after the Governor of the Bank of 
England apparently had been assured there were no immediate plans to 
strip the Bank of its bank regulatory function. 
There have also been allegations that the concept of a single 
financial regulator had been developed within the Treasury before the 
change of government and had been inspired as much by Treasury rivalry 
with the Bank as by any policy considerations.49   It was certainly the case 
that government ministers saw a single financial services regulator as an 
alternative centre of power to the Bank and hoped that the FSA would 
assume the Bank’s role as overseer of the City’s interests.  Since the 
government was committed to establishing Bank of England independence 
in respect of monetary policy, it is also possible that removing its banking 
supervision function was seen as a way of preventing it from becoming “an 
over-mighty subject.”  Whatever the exact motivation, it is clear that the 
momentous implications of an opportunistic and essentially political 
decision may not have been fully appreciated by government ministers who 
were still new to power after their party’s unusually long period out of 
office.50   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
48  See Ferran, supra note 10, at 271. 
49  See SIR MARTIN JACOMB, RE-EMPOWER THE BANK OF ENG. 2-4 (Centre for 
Policy Stud.) (2009) available at http://www.cps.org.uk/cps_catalog/Re-
empower%20the %20Bank%20of%20England.pdf. 
50  It is important in this regard that the Labour party had been out of power 
for 18 years and few of its lawmakers had experience of government. 
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III. JUSTIFYING THE SINGLE REGULATOR 
 
The decision to create a single financial regulator had to be 
justified after the fact.   Government ministers and the FSA itself put 
forward a series of justifications for the creation of a single regulator.  They 
fell into two broad categories: those relating to market developments and 
those relating to the purported effectiveness and efficiency of a single 
regulatory agency. 
The argument that market developments justified a single financial 
regulator became known as the “blurring the boundaries” argument.  In his 
statement to the House of Commons on May 20, 1997, Britain’s Chancellor 
of the Exchequer argued that: 
 
At the same time, it is clear that the distinctions 
between different types of financial institution--banks, 
securities firms and insurance companies--are becoming 
increasingly blurred. Many of today's financial institutions 
are regulated by a plethora of different supervisors. This 
increases the cost and reduces the effectiveness of the 
supervision.  
There is therefore a strong case in principle for 
bringing the regulation of banking, securities and insurance 
together under one roof. Firms now organise and manage 
their businesses on a group-wide basis. Regulators need to 
look at them in a consistent way. That would bring the 
regulatory structure closer into line with today's 
increasingly integrated financial markets. It would deliver 
more effective and efficient supervision, giving both firms 
and customers better value for money, and would improve 
the competitiveness of the sector and create a regulatory 
regime to genuinely meet the challenges of the 21st 
century.51 
 
The argument was further developed in a document issued by the 
Treasury the following year: 
 
The existing arrangements for financial regulation involve 
a large number of regulators, each responsible for different 
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parts of the industry. In recent years there has been a 
blurring of the distinctions between different kinds of 
financial services business: banks, building societies, 
investment firms, insurance companies and others. This 
has added further to the complexity of financial regulation. 
The Government believes the current system is costly, 
inefficient and confusing for both regulated firms and their 
customers. It is not delivering a standard of supervision 
and investor protection that the public has a right to expect. 
We are therefore establishing a single, statutory regulator 
for the UK financial services industry with clearly defined 
regulatory objectives and a single set of coherent functions 
and powers.52 
 
However, it was left to the FSA itself to provide the most extensive 
justification for its own existence.  While the FSA was still under 
construction, it published a paper written by one of its own officials, Clive 
Briault, who set out to defend the single regulator concept.53  He did so by 
first invoking the “blurring of boundaries” argument: 
 
The securitisation of traditional forms of credit 
(including mortgages, credit card outstandings and 
commercial loans) and, with the growth of options, 
increasingly elaborate ways of unbundling, repackaging 
and trading risks, have weakened the distinction between 
equity, debt and loans, and even between banking and 
insurance business (where, for example, credit derivatives 
bear many of the characteristics of an insurance product 
and insurance companies offer short-term deposit-like 
products).54 
 
This development, Briault explained, had an important consumer protection 
dimension in that the disappearance of a neat conjunction between a 
particular type of firm and a limited range of products being supplied by 
that firm means that it is difficult to regulate on a functional basis, since the 
                                                                                                                 
52  H.M. STATIONARY OFFICE, FIN. SVCS. & MKTS. BILL: A CONSULTATION 
DOCUMENT, pt. 1 (1998). 
53  See Briault, supra note 14. 
54  Id. at 13-14. 
2009] ROAD FROM “TWIN PEAKS” 75 
 
traditional functional approach no longer matches the structure of either 
firms or markets.55 
Accordingly, a single financial regulator was essential to provide 
adequate consumer protection when financial products could no longer be 
neatly slotted into the traditional contractual forms which have underpinned 
the functional approach to regulation.56  Trying to regulate the sale and 
marketing of products on a functional basis would result in inadequate 
consumer protection, either because similar products would become subject 
to different levels of consumer protection or the regulatory agencies 
disputed jurisdiction over certain types of product.57 
The blurring the boundaries argument also related to the formation 
of financial conglomerate groups.  The emergence of financial 
conglomerates (usually defined as a group which undertakes at least two of 
the activities of banking, securities or insurance) resulted from mergers and 
acquisitions that occurred most frequently between banks and securities 
firms and between banks and insurance companies.58  In some cases they 
also involved the purchase of fund managers by banks and by insurance 
companies.59  These combinations were permitted as the result of the 
dismantling of structural barriers – which in the U.K. had been mainly 
informal and non-statute based – in the course of the 1980s.60   In response 
to these and similar developments elsewhere in the G10, the Tripartite 
Group of banking, securities, and insurance supervisors argued in a 1995 
report that a “group-wide” perspective was required to obtain an adequate 
supervisory overview of these financial conglomerates.61 Nonetheless, as 
long as regulation remained structured along traditional 
institutional/functional lines, obtaining such a group-wide perspective 
would be difficult. 
The British solution was to adopt the lead regulator concept.62 The 
lead regulator would be responsible for taking a consolidated view of the 
                                                                                                                 
55  Id. at 14. 
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57  See id. 
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59  Briault, supra, note 14, at 13. 
60  TRIPARTITE GROUP OF BANK SEC. & INS. REG., THE SUPERVISION OF FIN. 
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capital adequacy and liquidity of the consolidated group; taking a similarly 
group-wide view of more qualitative factors such as the calibre of senior 
management and the high-level systems and controls of the financial 
conglomerate; and co-ordinating and encouraging the exchange of 
information among the relevant regulatory bodies, both routinely and in the 
event of an emergency. Typically, since most such groups were headed by 
a bank, the Bank of England usually assumed this responsibility ,which was 
similar to the Fed’s umbrella supervisor role created by Gramm-Leach-
Bliley.63  In contrast to the U.S. arrangements, however, the Bank of 
England’s role was largely extra-statutory and was the result of a 
framework of Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) between the Bank 
of England and the functional regulators. 
Although Briault claimed that the lead regulator concept had 
worked well, he nonetheless stressed that countries that had moved towards 
a single regulator had “done so in part because, with the growth in the 
number of multiple-function firms, the need for communication, co-
ordination, co-operation and consistency across specialist regulatory bodies 
had become increasingly acute and increasingly difficult to manage 
efficiently.”64  If such firms were the rule rather than the exception (in 
contrast to the situation in the past) then new institutional arrangements 
were required to ensure that that they were subject to more efficient 
oversight.  Briault cited statistics to show that many firms were now subject 
to multiple regulators: eight firms (including HSBC, Halifax, Abbey 
National and the Royal Bank of Scotland) were authorised to conduct all 
five of the main regulated activities (“deposit-taking, insurance, securities 
and corporate finance, fund management, and advising on or selling 
investment products to retail customers”).65 A further 13 firms were 
authorised to conduct four of these activities, and more than 50 other firms 
were authorised for three of these five functions.66 
The efficient supervision of financial conglomerates was only one 
dimension of the superior efficiency claimed for the single regulator.  It 
was also argued that it would allow scarce supervisory resources to be 
deployed more effectively; an example concerned the development of 
specialist teams to review firms’ internal risk management models that had 
become an integral part of regulation during the 1990s.  In the pre-FSA 
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system, several different regulators had needed to build their own specialist 
model review teams, but individuals with the requisite skills were in high 
demand which made it difficult for regulatory agencies to recruit them in 
sufficient numbers.67  By centralizing the available resources, a single 
regulator seemed to offer a way out of this impasse.   Similarly, it was also 
argued that the creation of a single support infrastructure (e.g. IT system) 
would lead to significant cost savings as the duplication and overlap 
resulting from the nine pre-existing regulators was eliminated.  The 
argument that a single regulator would be more cost effective was vital in 
selling the concept to the financial industry.  It was therefore not surprising 
that Briault made much of this argument: 
 
Economies of scale and scope should arise because a single 
regulator can take advantage of a single set of central 
support services (human resources, information services, 
financial control, premises etc); introduce a unified 
statistical reporting system for regulated firms; operate a 
single database for the authorisation of firms and the 
approval/registration of individuals; avoid unnecessary 
duplication or underlap across multiple specialised 
regulators; introduce a consolidated set of rules and 
guidance; tackle problems of co-ordination, co-operation 
and communication more effectively within a single entity 
and under a unified management structure than might be 
possible across separate specialist entities; offer a single 
point of contact to both regulated firms and to consumers 
(through a single complaints handling regime and a single 
compensation scheme); and adopt a more effective and 
focused approach to areas of common interest to most 
regulated financial activities (for example, handling Year 
2000 issues and turbulence in international financial 
markets).68 
 
These arguments – consumer protection arrangements that were 
better suited to the characteristics of new financial instruments, improved 
oversight of financial conglomerate groups, and cost savings and 
efficiencies from a common regulatory platform – were at the heart of the 
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case constructed for the single financial regulator.  The difficulty was that 
exactly these same arguments had been made in favor of an alternative 
regulatory structure – the so-called Twin Peaks model.  It was therefore 
also necessary for the defenders of the single regulator to explain why this 
structure would be superior to the Twin Peaks alternative. 
 
IV. THE REJECTION OF THE TWIN PEAKS ALTERNATIVE 
 
Unlike the single regulator, a Twin Peaks structure had been 
actively debated in the U.K. prior to the 1997 reform, and it had attracted 
support from a number of influential figures both in the industry and in 
regulation.69  It was, however, strongly opposed by the Bank of England 
which regarded the proposals as primarily an attempt to divest it of its 
regulatory responsibilities. 
Twin Peaks proposed that, instead of being structured around the 
traditional tripartite distinction of banking, securities and insurance, the 
institutional structure of regulation should in future comprise two 
regulatory agencies, a Financial Stability Commission and a Consumer 
Protection Commission.70   The first would be responsible for ensuring the 
stability of the financial system as a whole, mainly through the application 
of prudential regulations.71  The second would be charged with ensuring 
that firms deal with their (retail) customers in a fair and transparent 
manner.72   The two Commissions would be responsible for discharging 
their mandate irrespective of the legal form of the firms that they 
regulated.73 
The source of the “blurring the boundaries” argument can be traced 
to the Twin Peaks proposals, which also placed heavy emphasis on the 
need to ensure proper group-wide supervision of financial conglomerates.74  
                                                                                                                 
69  See Jill Treanor, Regulators Back Taylor’s Twin Peaks Theory, THE INDEP., 
Oct. 29, 1996, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/ 
regulators-back-taylors-twinpeaks-theory-1360780.html. 
70  Taylor, supra note 11, at 1. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. 
73  See id. 
74  Id. at 4.  However, the earliest occurrence of this argument is to be found in 
a working paper published the year before Twin Peaks.  See Claudio E.V. Borrio & 
Renata Filosa, The Changing Borders of Banking: Trends and Implications, 3, 16 
(Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 23, 1994), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/ work23.pdf?noframes=1. 
2009] ROAD FROM “TWIN PEAKS” 79 
 
The case for Twin Peaks also invoked the economies of scale that would 
result from (the admittedly more limited) regulatory consolidation that it 
also involved.  Thus, because the arguments for a single regulator and for 
Twin Peaks were almost identical, it was necessary for the FSA’s defenders 
to show that theirs was the superior solution.   The crux of the argument 
concerned the separation of prudential and conduct of business regulation 
that was the main feature of the Twin Peaks model; the defenders of a 
single regulator argued that the separation was not so clear cut as the Twin 
Peaks model presupposed.75 
The first strand of this argument was to contest the claim, central to 
the Twin Peaks analysis, that there were two relatively, clearly 
distinguishable regulatory objectives – financial stability on the one hand 
and consumer protection on the other.  This case for treating these two 
objectives as interlinked is well summarized by Davies and Green: 
 
The ultimate argument for financially sound and 
prudentially well regulated financial institutions is that they 
are then able to provide financial services and investment 
opportunities to consumer and businesses which those 
customers may use with confidence.  A breakdown in 
consumer protection, whether in banking, investment or 
insurance products, may itself precipitate a wider loss of 
confidence in types of product or firms.  There is therefore 
no necessary conflict between the two aims of regulation.  In 
the long run they are aligned.76  
 
Closely related to this was the claim further claim that, in practice, 
prudential and conduct of business (sales practice) regulation required 
examination of very similar issues, and therefore that there would be 
significant overlap between the Twin Peaks agencies.77  Briault put the 
point with characteristic clarity: 
 
[T]here is a considerable overlap – both 
conceptually and in practice – between prudential and 
conduct of business regulation. Both have a close and 
                                                                                                                 
75  See Briault, supra note 14, at 25. 
76  HOWARD DAVIES & DAVID GREEN, GLOBAL FIN. REGULATION: THE 
ESSENTIAL GUIDE 192 (2008). 
77  Briault, supra note 14, at 25. 
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legitimate interest in the senior management of any 
financial institution subject to both of these types of 
regulation, in particular because of the crucial roles of 
senior management in setting the “compliance culture” of a 
firm, in ensuring that management responsibilities are 
properly allocated and cover comprehensively the business 
of the firm, and in ensuring that other internal systems and 
controls are in place. The detail of some of these systems 
and controls may indeed be specific to either prudential or 
conduct of business considerations, but many of them will 
be more general.78 
 
In short, a single regulator was superior to a Twin Peaks structure 
because many of the same supervisory judgments would arise in 
considering prudential and sales practice regulation.  There seemed little 
point in having two regulators reaching essentially duplicate judgments of 
broadly similar matters.  Since there is substantial overlap between the two 
regulatory objectives and, in practice, prudential and conduct of business 
regulation will focus on the same fundamental issues, they were best 
administered by a single regulatory agency. 
The Global Financial Crisis has created a very different perspective 
on this argument.  The British Government’s own White Paper on 
regulatory reform after the crisis has concluded that the system places too 
much weight on “ensuring that systems and processes were correctly 
defined rather than on challenging business models and strategies” and on 
“conduct of business regulation of the banking sector rather than prudential 
regulation of banking institutions.”79  Even the FSA’s senior management 
has acknowledged that the agency neglected prudential supervision.80  In 
the words of the report on the banking crisis produced by the FSA’s current 
chairman, Lord Turner, the agency’s regulatory practices resulted in “[a] 
balance between conduct of business and prudential regulation which, with 
the benefit of hindsight, now appears biased towards the former.”81  Turner 
repeated this admission to a committee of the British House of Lords which 
                                                                                                                 
78  Id. 
79  H.M. TREASURY, REFORMING FINANCIAL MARKETS, 2009, Cm. 7667, at 56. 
80  See FIN. SERV. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE 
TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 87 (2009), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ other/ turner_review.pdf. 
81  Id.   
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referred in its final report to the “widely held perception that, in recent 
years, the FSA has emphasized conduct-of-business supervision at the 
expense of prudential supervision.”82   
This situation was especially apparent in the FSA’s supervision of 
the mortgage bank Northern Rock which was the first British casualty of 
the crisis.83   The bank had received numerous contacts from the FSA 
concerning a consumer protection initiative (“treating customers fairly”), 
but supervision of capital and liquidity had been deficient and the bank had 
been placed in a category that subjected it to one major prudential meeting 
once every three years.  The FSA’s own report on Northern Rock stated 
that “some of the fundamentals of work on assessing risks in firms (notably 
some of the core elements related to prudential supervision, such as 
liquidity) have been squeezed out.”84  
The House of Lords Committee thought it could identify the reason 
why the FSA had failed to give sufficient attention to prudential regulation: 
 
Conduct-of-business is important and politically sensitive, 
and its results are easy to measure. In contrast, prudential 
supervision, while arguably more important, is conducted 
privately; its success is less easily measured, and, most of 
the time, it has a lower political impact than conduct-of-
business supervision though in times of crisis such as the 
present its political impact, its effect on businesses, 
individuals and the economy, is very much greater than 
conduct-of-business supervision. It is natural and rational 
for a supervisor with responsibility for both activities to 
concentrate on the one with the greater immediate political 
sensitivity.85 
 
In other words, the argument that there were synergies between prudential 
and conduct of business regulation overlooked the distinct possibility that 
                                                                                                                 
82  SELECT COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, BANKING SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION, 2008-09, H.L. 101-I, at 33. 
83  FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE SUPERVISION OF NORTHERN ROCK: 
A LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW ¶¶ 8, 27 (2008), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ 
pubs/other/ nr_report.pdf. 
84  Id. at ¶ 36.  
85  SELECT COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, BANKING SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION, 2008-09, H.L. 101-I, at 33. 
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one type of regulation would come to dominate within a single regulator 
and that this would likely to be consumer protection given the realities of 
the political process.86 Twin Peaks had predicted that this outcome was 
likely, and used it as one of the arguments against creating a single 
regulatory agency.87   
Thus the argument that there was a natural synergy between 
prudential and consumer protection regulation has been discredited by 
events both before and during the crisis.   If the purported synergies were 
really as strong as was claimed, then the multiple reviews of Northern 
Rock’s systems for handling consumer issues should have thrown out 
evidence that the bank’s business strategy was dangerously flawed.   They 
did not.  Nor is this outcome really surprising.  Although there may be 
some overlap of the relevant judgments at the margin, they ultimately 
involve quite fundamentally different matters.   Weaknesses of internal 
control systems for dealing with consumer issues may be indicative of 
more general weaknesses in internal control within the institution as a 
whole, and this could indeed raise matters of prudential concern.  But it is 
doubtful that these kinds of findings will demonstrate that the bank’s 
management is following a deeply flawed and highly risky business 
strategy which is likely to end in failure.   To reach this conclusion it is 
necessary to ask different questions to those a consumer protection 
regulator might ask.  
 
V. THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK 
 
One dimension of the Twin Peaks structure that had been actively 
debated before the decision to create the FSA was the role of the central 
bank.   In a number of speeches and articles, the Bank of England’s senior 
management defended the Bank’s role as a bank regulator against the 
proposed Twin Peaks structure.88  The central bank, it was argued, needed 
to be concerned with the financial condition of the banking system, as this 
was the conduit through which its monetary policy was transmitted to the 
wider economy.   As Governor Eddie George argued in a speech given in 
1994, before the Twin Peaks debate began, the soundness of banks and the 
central bank’s ability to conduct monetary policy were intimately related: 
                                                                                                                 
86  See id. 
87  Taylor, supra note 11, at 15. 
88  Howard Davies, Financial Regulation: Why, How and By Whom, in BANK 
OF ENG. Q’LY BULL. 107, 111 (1997). 
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Monetary and financial stability are inter-related. It 
is inconceivable that the monetary authorities could quietly 
pursue their stability-oriented monetary policy objectives if 
the financial system through which policy is carried on – 
and which provides the link with the real economy – were 
collapsing around their ears. The liabilities of banks in 
particular are money, and you cannot be concerned with 
preserving the value of money without being concerned 
also with preserving public confidence in money in this 
broader sense. Equally though, the financial system is 
much less likely to be collapsing around the ears of the 
monetary authorities in an environment of macro-economic 
stability than in one of exaggerated boom and bust and 
volatile asset values.  This inter-relationship means that, 
whatever the precise institutional arrangements for 
financial regulation and supervision, central banks 
necessarily have a vital interest in the soundness of the 
financial system.89 
 
Moreover, banks were a “special” type of financial intermediary:  
as Sir Howard Davies, at that time still the Deputy Governor of the Bank of 
England,90 said in early 1997 “in our view, there is still a reasonably clear 
distinction to be made between banks and other financial institutions, and 
their prudential soundness, or lack of it, can have rather different 
implications for the rest of the market.”   As a result, he continued, 
 
Of course it may be argued that the distinctive 
characteristics of banks, and their potential to create 
systemic risk—which central banks can counteract—does 
not necessarily mean that the central bank should act as 
their regulator. I agree. But there are significant synergies 
to be had from maintaining an institutional link between 
the two functions, and the burden of proof rests, I think, 
                                                                                                                 
89  E. A. J. George, Governor, Bank of England, The Bank of England – 
Objectives and Activities, The Capital Market Research Institute, Frankfurt, 
Germany (Dec. 5, 1994). 
90  Shortly afterwards he was appointed the first Chairman and Chief 
Executive of the FSA.  His views on the specialness of banks underwent a 
subsequent change. 
84 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
 
with those who wish to make the case for disturbing that 
relationship.91 
 
The main “synergy” that arose from retaining banking supervision within 
the central bank was with the Bank’s role as lender of last resort (LoLR). It 
was argued that the information acquired in the capacity of the bank 
supervisor was essential to the central bank performing the lender of last 
resort function, and that therefore the best arrangement was for LoLR and 
banking supervision to be located in the same institution.  Following the 
Northern Rock experience, a number of commentators have reached the 
conclusion that this argument was correct.  As Professor Willem Buiter 
argued in evidence to the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee: 
 
The notion that the institution that has the 
knowledge of the individual banks that may or may not be 
in trouble would be a different institution from the one that 
has the money, the resources, to act upon the observation 
that a particular bank needs lender of last resort support is 
risky. It is possible, if you are lucky, to manage it, but it is 
an invitation to disaster, to delay, and to wrong decisions. 
The key implication of that is that the same institution—it 
could be the FSA or it could be the Bank of England—
should have both the individual, specific information and 
the money to do something about it.92 
 
Against these arguments, proponents of separation argued that 
theoretical considerations and empirical evidence indicated that central 
banks with banking supervisory responsibilities tended to err on the side of 
laxity in monetary policy; as Goodhart and Schoenmaker argued in a 
widely cited paper, monetary policy aimed to be countercyclical, whereas 
regulatory policy was pro-cyclical.93  Concerns were also expressed that 
banking supervision “failures” – which it was generally accepted were 
                                                                                                                 
91  DAVIES, supra note 88, at 110. 
92  Id.  
93  C. A. E. Goodhart & D. Schoenmaker, The Institutional Separation 
Between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies, in THE CENTRAL BANK AND THE 
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almost inevitable – would damage the reputation and credibility of the 
central bank as a monetary policy institution.94   
Twin Peaks further argued that “[a]s the once-clear demarcation 
lines between types of financial markets and institutions are broken down, 
the Bank’s role appears increasingly anomalous.”95  In other words, owing 
to the changing nature of the financial system, banks could no longer be 
considered the unique source of systemic risk that traditionalists insisted 
that they remain.  In consequence of these developments, it became 
increasingly difficult to argue that banks were “special” in the sense that 
they were uniquely, systemically important.96   Many large non-banks were 
now “too interconnected to fail,” a phrase that was coined when Bear 
Stearns teetered on the brink of failure in March 2008.97  On the traditional 
view, Bear Stearns would not have been considered systemically important; 
however, the episode confirmed the argument of Twin Peaks that “the rise 
of the OTC markets means that we must extend our concept of what 
constitutes a systemically important firm.”98   
Yet if the concept of a systemically important firm was extended in 
this way, it was by no means obvious that the central bank was the right 
institution to regulate these firms.   Twin Peaks acknowledged the 
possibility that the functions of the FSC could be performed by the central 
bank and that LoLR was an important issue.99  However, on balance it 
rejected the case for the central bank also performing the role of prudential 
regulator of the new, broader category of systemically important firms.100   
In the first place, a broader concept of systemically important firms meant 
that the central bank would need to interact with various institutions that 
were not its traditional counterparties (a prediction that has come to pass 
following the Federal Reserve’s expansion of its facilities in the wake of 
the financial crisis).101  Secondly, the expertise necessary to regulate 
investment banks and insurance companies does not naturally reside in 
central banks.102   As Twin Peaks identified, a major problem for central 
banks is in finding a place for such regulatory specialists in organizations 
                                                                                                                 
94  Id. at 341 
95  Taylor, supra note 11, at 13-14. 
96  Id. at 4. 
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98  Id. at 5. 
99  Id. at 14. 
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where they will have few opportunities for career progression.103   
Nonetheless, Twin Peaks also recognized that close links would be needed 
between the central bank and the FSC.104  Although it was comparatively 
sketchy about the nature of those links, apart from proposing overlapping 
board membership, the need for close coordination between the central 
bank and the prudential regulator was an important component of the Twin 
Peaks structure.105 
The FSA’s relationship with the Bank of England was, in theory, 
also to be a close one.106  Yet when the FSA was established, very little 
attention was given to the need for institutional linkages between the 
regulator and the central bank.107   Instead, given the prominent role played 
by ex-Bank of England staff in the FSA, the professional relationships 
between former colleagues were supposed to guarantee cooperation 
between the two institutions.  However, once this generation of officials 
had either retired or left the FSA, there was no institutional mechanism to 
ensure close collaboration between the two institutions.  More recently, the 
British government has announced the formation of a Financial Stability 
Council which can be seen as a belated attempt to build the stronger 
institutional linkages between the Bank and the FSA that were required 
from the outset. 
Briault acknowledged that in the “multi-faceted” relationship 
between Bank and FSA, close cooperation and regular information flows 
would be essential.  These would need to occur both routinely for those 
aspects of financial stability in which the central bank has an interest for 
the setting of monetary policy, and in exceptional circumstances for more 
specific and detailed information relating to the position of financial 
institutions for whom support operations are being considered (where the 
fiscal authority is also likely to have a close interest). “The UK 
Memorandum of Understanding… provides an important underpinning to 
the necessary exchange of such information under the new arrangements in 
the UK.”108 
The Memorandum of Understanding to which Briault refers was 
between the Treasury, Bank of England, and FSA and it supposedly created 
                                                                                                                 
103  Id. at 12. 
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107  Taylor, supra note 11, at 13. 
108  Briault, supra note 14, at 33. 
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the framework for both information exchange and for crisis management.109  
These are referred to under the MoU as the “Tripartite Authorities” and the 
Bank of England’s responsibilities are summarised as contributing “to the 
maintenance of the stability of the financial system as a whole.”110 The 
FSA has the responsibility of authorising and supervising individual 
banks.111  HM Treasury has responsibility for the institutional structure of 
the financial regulatory system, and the legislation behind it.112  In a crisis, 
the Financial Services Authority would, according to the Memorandum of 
Understanding, be responsible for monitoring “the health of institutions 
that fall within its regulatory remit” and for ensuring, “as far as is 
appropriate in the circumstances, continuing compliance with regulatory 
standards.”113 However, the Bank of England would remain in charge of 
“official financial operations … in order to limit the risk of problems in or 
affecting particular institutions spreading to other parts of the financial 
system”.114 
The MoU also established a Joint Crisis Management Committee, 
chaired by the Chancellor, for dealing with what the MoU referred to 
generically as “support operations.”115  It did not, however, clearly 
distinguish between those operations that relate to emergency liquidity 
assistance and those that would involve solvency support.116  In both cases 
the Treasury sat at the apex of a pyramid with both the Bank and FSA in 
subordinate roles.117  This contrasts with the practice of most other 
countries in crisis management, which is to ensure that as long as the issue 
remains one of liquidity the central bank will be in the lead.118  It alone has 
(or should have) the information and the ability to react sufficiently 
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promptly to emerging problems.119  In this case the FSA’s role would be 
clearly established as that of a handmaiden to the Bank, under an explicit 
obligation to provide it with any and all information required by for the 
discharge of its duties.120   Only in the event that the issue becomes one of 
providing solvency support should the Treasury have taken the lead, with 
both the Bank and the FSA in supporting roles.121  The subordinate role to 
which the Bank was assigned in the MoU provides support to those who 
argue that the post-1997 arrangements were designed to reduce the Bank’s 
status.  
In practice, however, the arrangements envisaged by the MoU were 
rarely tried in practice and the Joint Crisis Management Committee rarely 
met.  The House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, in reviewing the 
Northern Rock experience, concluded that “in terms of information 
exchange between the Tripartite authorities, the system might have ensured 
that all the Tripartite authorities were fully informed. However, for a run on 
a bank to have occurred in the United Kingdom is unacceptable, and 
represents a significant failure of the Tripartite system.”122 
 
VI. LESSONS OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE FOR UNITED 
STATES REGULATORY REFORM 
 
Reviewing the lessons of the British experience, and considering 
the current regulatory reform debate in the United States, I offer the 
following conclusions: 
 
A. THE CONCEPT OF A SINGLE REGULATOR HAS NOT BEEN 
DISCREDITED, BUT ITS LIMITATIONS HAVE BEEN EXPOSED 
 
The U.K. was not the first country to establish a unified regulatory 
agency outside the central bank: that honor belongs to the Scandinavian 
countries, with Norway (1986) as the pioneer followed by Denmark (1988) 
and Sweden (1991).123   In these countries an important consideration was 
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the “economies of scale” argument.124   As relatively small countries with 
financial systems dominated by a small number of financial conglomerate 
groups, combining all regulatory functions within a single agency appeared 
to offer numerous efficiency benefits.125   Moreover, since the central bank 
was not involved in banking supervision in any of these countries, the 
powerful – and sometimes emotive – issue of the central bank’s powers did 
not arise.126 
There continues to be a case for single regulatory agencies in 
comparatively small countries where the economies of scale gains are 
significant.127   It is expensive to establish regulatory agencies with their 
associated support services and infrastructure, and therefore minimizing 
overhead costs is a worthwhile ambition.   However, in larger countries, 
especially those with a large and complex financial system, any potential 
efficiency gains are far outweighed by the inefficiencies of combining too 
many regulatory functions in a single agency.  As noted above, the FSA has 
struggled with the combination of prudential and conduct of business 
regulation and its past performance suggests that it was simply tasked with 
too many functions to perform all of them adequately. 
 
B. PRUDENTIAL AND CONDUCT OF BUSINESS REGULATION DON’T 
MIX 
 
Despite the claims of the FSA’s supporters that there are 
substantial synergies between prudential and conduct of business 
regulation, the crisis has shown the limits of these synergies.  While some 
of the relevant supervisory judgements do overlap, especially on such 
matters as internal controls and the probity of management, prudential 
regulation needs a different focus.   The factors influencing the financial 
soundness of an institution and the likelihood that it might fail go far 
beyond those of concern to a consumer protection regulator.  Moreover, as 
the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs observed,  
 
There is also a cultural difference between conduct-of-
business and prudential supervision. Conduct-of business 
supervision is often performed by lawyers. Prudential 
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supervision is largely an economic activity, particularly at 
the macro level. It seems likely that either a lawyerly or an 
economic approach would dominate in a supervisory body 
that performed both prudential and conduct of business 
supervision, and that this dominance would reduce the 
effectiveness of the dominated half of the organisation.128 
 
The function that receives the greatest emphasis will be that having 
the greatest political saliency: this means that in normal times, when bank 
failures are rare, consumer protection regulation is likely to be the main 
focus of agency attention.  Although the FSA has now increased the 
resources it devotes to prudential regulation,129 the above analysis suggests 
that this is likely to be a relatively short term development, remaining in 
place only as long as political attention is focused on the fall-out from the 
crisis. 
  
C. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVE A BALANCE BETWEEN THE 
FINANCIAL STABILITY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
OBJECTIVES 
 
Because of the circumstances in which the U.K.’s regulatory 
reforms took place – as a reaction to perceived regulatory failures in 
consumer protection – it was perhaps inevitable that this aspect of 
regulation should have been their main focus.   The overarching desire on 
the part of the FSA’s architects was to establish a strong consumer 
protection regulator that would be independent of the industry.130  
However, one consequence of the consumer protection focus was that the 
financial stability objective did not receive the attention that it either 
warranted or deserved.131   Fortunately, the Northern Rock episode has 
provided the impetus to restore some balance to the post-1997 
arrangements.  The Bank of England has now been given both formal 
statutory responsibility for financial stability and for handling bank 
resolutions under a new legislative framework, the Banking Act 2009.132   
                                                                                                                 
128  SELECT COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, BANKING SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION, 2008-09, H.L. 101-I, at 33. 
129  Id. at 32. 
130  Id. at 30, 32, 52-53. 
131  Id. at 31-32. 
132  Id. at 30-31. 
2009] ROAD FROM “TWIN PEAKS” 91 
 
However, as noted earlier, there are still a number of aspects of the 
“Tripartite system” where reforms are still needed.  In addition, although 
charged with the formal statutory responsibility for maintaining financial 
stability the Bank of England lacks most of the policy tools it needs for this 
task.  Hence, even now, the rebalancing is only partly finished. 
A second dimension of the financial stability focus concerns what 
is now termed “macroprudential” regulation.  When the U.K.’s 
arrangements were put in place, prudential regulation was conceptualized 
in terms of ensuring the soundness of individual institutions.  As the 
financial crisis has made clear, however, ensuring the soundness of 
individual firms is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for ensuring 
financial stability.  While in one respect the comparative neglect of 
financial stability issues under the U.K.’s post-1997 arrangements was due 
to an oversight, it also reflected the fact that what is now called the macro-
prudential perspective had not at the time gained the prominence that it 
now enjoys.  As noted above, an unfinished aspect of the U.K’s attempt to 
re-balance its regulatory system concerns the additional macroprudential 
powers that should be assigned to the Bank of England. 
 
D. POLITICALLY MOTIVATED REFORMS OR THOSE MOTIVATED BY 
A DESIRE TO “PUNISH” THE CENTRAL BANK ARE 
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE 
 
There is at least some circumstantial evidence for concluding that 
part of the motivation for the U.K.’s reforms was to “punish” the central 
bank or to “cut it down to size.”133  However, as the subsequent British 
experience shows, there is no plausible alternative to having a central bank 
with an extensive mandate and the ability to intervene to mitigate a crisis.  
The FSA’s architects appear to have believed that it would be possible to 
create a rival center of power to the Bank, without realizing the reality that 
without significant financial muscle of its own, the FSA was destined to 
play a subsidiary role in any crisis.  Only the central bank has the ability to 
play the role of LoLR and this fact means that it must play a unique role in 
any financial safety net arrangement.   The members of the U.S. Congress 
who have recently criticized the Federal Reserve for its actions in 
stemming the crisis need to reflect on whether there are any viable 
alternatives.  The British experience suggests that there are not. 
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E. SOME “OVERLAP” AND “DUPLICATION” OF REGULATORY 
FUNCTIONS IS UNAVOIDABLE 
 
As should now be apparent, the U.K.’s regulatory reforms were 
inspired, to a very large extent, by the desire to eliminate the perceived 
duplication and overlap of regulatory authority resulting from the Financial 
Services Act system in particular.  While the Act had indeed created a 
system that was excessively complex – especially from the point of view of 
the individual consumer – this factor arguably received too much attention 
in the resulting reforms.   
A particularly clear example was the decision not to give the Bank 
of England its own powers to gather information from the financial sector 
(banks in particular).  It was therefore reliant on the FSA to provide it with 
the data it required to perform its “financial stability” function.134  The 
thinking appeared to be that if the FSA was to be the banking supervisor, 
the Bank of England should have only a general role in relation to overall 
financial stability, and did not require the ability to gather institution-
specific information. 135  Because one stated objective of the 1997 reforms 
was to reduce regulatory duplication and overlap – a major selling point 
with the industry – only the FSA was given information-gathering powers.  
This decision ignored the experience of many other countries 
where the central bank was not itself the prudential regulator, and indeed 
the Bank of England’s own history before it assumed the statutory 
responsibility for bank regulation in 1979.136  In its role as lender of last 
resort it had been able to exert significant moral suasion over the banking 
sector, and the Discount Office was able to obtain information from banks 
on a purely informal basis.137  Other central banks also enjoy substantial 
information gathering powers of their own.138  For example, the Bank of 
Japan’s information-gathering ability includes the power to conduct bank 
examinations, notwithstanding that this duplicates the function of the 
Financial Services Agency.  These precedents should have shown that even 
without the formal statutory responsibility for banking supervision, the 
                                                                                                                 
134  BROWN, supra note 109, at ¶ 8. 
135  Id. at ¶ 6. 
136  See Schooner & Taylor, supra note 2, at 629-32.  
137  Id. at 614-15. 
138  INSTITUTE FOR MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, FUNCTIONS AND 
OPERATIONS OF THE BANK OF JAPAN 80 (2004), available at 
www.boj.or.jp/en/type/exp/about/data/ foboj01.pdf 
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central bank still needed to have access to substantial amounts of 
institution-specific information and ideally its own capacity to go about 
gathering that information. 
 
F. CRISIS MANAGEMENT PREPAREDNESS MATTERS 
 
Finally, insufficient attention was given to crisis management 
arrangements.  For at least two decades prior to the formation of the FSA, 
the U.K. had not experienced any episodes of serious financial distress.  
This may have bred a certain degree of complacency about the need for 
adequacy crisis management preparedness and planning.  Although the 
Memorandum of Understanding was drawn up between the Treasury, Bank 
of England, and FSA, the arrangements envisaged were rarely tried in 
practice and the Joint Crisis Management Committee rarely met.  The 
arrangements also assumed that the Treasury would be the glue that held 
this system together, thus involving it in the minutiae of crisis management 
decision-making – a role that it was ill-equipped to perform and one that 
hampered the ability to reach quick decisions in an environment where time 
was of the essence.139  It is therefore necessary to ensure that the central 
bank’s freedom of manoeuvre is not excessively constrained by any 
arrangements that are put in place. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION:  THE RETURN TO “TWIN PEAKS” 
 
In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis there has been a 
revival of interest in the Twin Peaks model.  The experience of the U.K. 
during the financial crisis has strengthened the arguments of the FSA’s 
critics who challenged the viability of a single regulatory agency in a 
financial centre as large and diverse as the U.K.   The British Conservative 
party, which at the time of writing is still in opposition but is expected to 
win the election due in 2010, has now adopted the policy of abolishing the 
FSA and introducing a division between prudential and conduct of business 
regulation with the former being returned to the Bank of England.140  
Similarly, in the U.S., the Twin Peaks concept has received attention in 
                                                                                                                 
139  Peter Hayward “The Financial Sector – The Responsibilities of Public 
Agencies” in CHARLES ENOCH et al, supra note 118. 
140  George Osborne, Foreword, in FROM CRISIS TO CONFIDENCE: PLAN FOR 
SOUND BANKING (2009). 
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evidence given to Congressional committees141 and as a major source of the 
Bush administration’s proposals of 2008. 
As can be seen from the above analysis, when Britain adopted its 
single regulator structure in 1997, it did not do so due to a conscious 
rejection of the Twin Peaks alternative.  Rather, the British government’s 
decision seems to have owed more to the legislative timetable and the 
apparent simplicity of the single regulator in avoiding some of the 
complexity, duplication and opacity which had been a focus of the 
criticisms of the previous system.   The single regulator’s very simplicity 
may well have been a factor in its favour; but the apparent simplicity of the 
structure was deceptive as it resulted in some of the complexities of 
financial regulation and crisis management being neglected. 
The Twin Peaks alternative might, arguably, have avoided some of 
the design flaws of the post-1997 arrangements.  In particular, it would 
have avoided trying to set up a rival center of power to the Bank of 
England, thereby creating crisis management arrangements that were far 
too unwieldy.  Because the Bank and the FSA were assigned equal status in 
the Tripartite arrangements, the active role of the Treasury was essential to 
hold the ring and to ensure a cooperative relationship between the two 
agencies. By contrast, a specialist prudential regulator might have been 
established more clearly under the Bank of England’s wing, and as a result 
could have enjoyed much closer links with the central bank than did the 
FSA.   There are a variety of precedents for this possible arrangement:  the 
relationship between the Bank of France and the Commission Bancaire, or 
between the Finnish Central Bank and that country’s Financial Supervision 
Agency could have been potential models.142  In these structures, although 
the regulatory agencies are governed by boards separate from those of the 
central bank, their staff are central bank employees and extensive use is 
made of shared facilities, information technology platforms and databases.   
Nonetheless, although Twin Peaks has its attractions, it is 
necessary to be cautious about trying to introduce too much neatness and 
tidiness into regulatory structures.   The objectives of financial regulation 
can be neatly packaged into two, but the range of regulatory functions is far 
more diverse.  At least six (or possibly seven) regulatory functions can be 
                                                                                                                 
141  See Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation Of Securities 
Markets: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 11th 
Cong. 36-39 (2009) (testimony of Mr. John Coffee, Professor, Columbia Law 
School).  
142  See Abrams & Taylor, supra note 9, at 23-24. 
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identified:   financial system stability; crisis management; the prudential 
regulation of systemically important firms; the prudential regulation of  
firms that are not systemically important; sales practice regulation; and 
market conduct regulation.143  (Competition policy is a possible seventh 
regulatory function although it applies in many sectors other than financial 
services.)  At its most basic, the problem of designing a regulatory structure 
is one of deciding which of these functions belong together in the same 
agency.   The single regulator concept tried to combine most of these 
functions within one agency.  That has been shown to be a step too far.  But 
there are many possible configurations between this option and the current 
highly fragemented regulatory system in the United States. 
 
  
                                                                                                                 
143  See C. A. E. GOODHART ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION:  HOW, WHO AND 
WHERE NOW? (1998). 
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WHITHER THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH IN 
UK INSURANCE CONTRACTS  
 
John Lowry∗ 
 
*** 
 
This article explores the current state of the law in the United Kingdom 
concerning the duty of good faith in insurance contracts.  Recent case law 
provides that the duty of disclosure by insureds is constantly being refined.  
It argues that due to the current fragmentation of the law, future reform 
should be focused on creating a consistent regime for insurance contracts.  
Such regime should be flexible enough to encompass both consumer and 
commercial insurance, while demonstrating certain and clear objectives.  
The first part examines the duty of disclosure by an insured as formulated 
by Lord Mansfield CJ.  The second part analyzes the case law that followed 
Carter v. Bohem, which developed the notion of good faith and expanded it 
into a duty of utmost good faith.  Third, the discomfort of the UK courts 
and UK law reform agencies over the severity of the insured’s duty along 
with the injustices that result when insurers avoid a policy for non-
disclosure is explored.  Fourth, recent judicial opinions that attempt to 
alleviate the position of the insured are assessed.  The fifth and concluding 
part of this article briefly examines the 2009 [UK] Consumer Insurance 
(Disclosure and Representations) Bill published by the English and 
Scottish Law Commissions in December 2009.  It constructs an alternative 
model which takes account of recent developments in Australian law.  It is 
argued that the focus should be on balancing the economic costs of reform 
with the benefits of a more balanced regime which does not create a 
distinction between consumer and business insureds. 
 
*** 
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of gratitude to the anonymous referees for their helpful comments.  Liability for 
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Insurance contracts are highly unusual in that they are founded 
upon the doctrine of uberrimae fidei.1  The consequence is that the general 
contractual duty borne by parties to avoid misrepresentation is extended 
and reinforced by the additional obligation to disclose all material facts that 
would induce the insurers to underwrite the risk.  This was first laid down 
by Lord Mansfield C.J. in Carter v. Boehm,2 and his formulation of the 
disclosure duty is partially codified in the Marine Insurance Act 1906.3  
Lord Mansfield was at the time attempting to import into English 
commercial law the civil law notion of good faith, but this ultimately 
proved unsuccessful and only survived for a very limited class of 
transactions, including insurance.4   
The effect of non-disclosure by the insured entitles the insurer to 
avoid the contract ab initio, notwithstanding the absence of any fraudulent 
intent.  The economic consequences are severe and disproportionately 
harsh.  The policy becomes valueless so that the insured loses the financial 
safeguard that the policy was designed to provide should the losses caused 
by the insured risks come to pass.5  This is not to say that the rationale 
underlying the disclosure duty and the remedy for its breach is in any way 
obscure.  The role of underwriters is to assess risk and if there are material 
factors known only to the insured, then the insured must disclose them.  
The reason for the duty is clear where the underwriter is not in a position to 
                                                                                                                 
1  For the common law position governing the general law of contracts see, 
e.g., Keates v. Cadogan, (1851) 138 Eng. Rep. 234.  For a review of the policy 
considerations underlying the general contractual position see J. BEATSON, 
ANSON’S LAW OF CONTRACT 263-64 (28th ed. 2002). 
2  (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1162, 1165. 
3  See Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, §§ 17-20 (Eng.). 
4  See Lord Mustill’s speech in Pan Atl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Pine Top Ins. Co., 
[1994] 1 A.C. 501 (H.L.), and Lord Hobhouse’s speech in Manifest Shipping Co. 
Ltd. v. Uni-Polaris Shipping Co. Ltd., [2003] 1 A.C. 469.  See also Potter L.J.’s 
observations in James Spencer & Co. Ltd. v. Tame Valey Padding Co. Ltd., 
QBENI 97/1118 CMS1 (A.C. April 8, 1998) (Smith Bernal Reporting Ltd. for 
Lawtel).  It is noteworthy that Lord Mansfield was familiar with the civilian 
tradition (see Sir WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, 5 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 147 
(1966)).  This is not to suggest that there is a universal view among civilian 
jurisdictions on the meaning and scope of good faith.  See R. ZIMMERMANN & S. 
WHITTAKER, GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (Cambridge, CUP, 
2000).  See also M. Bridge, Doubting Good Faith, NEW ZEALAND BUSINESS LAW 
QUARTERLY, 2005, at 426. 
5  HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] UKHL 6 
(statement of Lord Hobhouse). 
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discover for himself or herself the circumstances that may impact upon the 
risk.  For example, one case would be where the insured seeks to take out a 
life policy having received a death threat.  Or a vessel the underwriter is 
asked to insure may be on the high seas and, therefore, not available for 
inspection.6  In such circumstances there can be no quarrel with the fairness 
of the insured’s duty of good faith.  But in the case law subsequent to 
Carter v. Boehm, the boundaries of the insured’s duty were expanded 
beyond, it is suggested, what Lord Mansfield originally envisaged.  For 
example, it has been held that the failure of an insured to disclose criminal 
convictions and his precarious financial position when applying for fire 
insurance will enable the insurer to avoid the policy following a fire caused 
by an electrical fault.7 
In practical terms, the issue which pervades the duty of good faith 
can be reduced to the following question: how can the ordinary insured, 
whether acting in a private or commercial capacity, untutored in the 
niceties of insurance law, be expected to know what particular 
circumstances are material and would, therefore, influence the prudent 
underwriter?8  The sheer breadth of the insured’s duty together with the all-
or-nothing consequence of avoidance, therefore, rightly gives rise to 
legitimate concern. In a series of recent cases, decided over the last ten 
years or so, the English courts have been steadily refining the disclosure 
duty while, at the same time, laying considerable emphasis on the mutuality 
of the requirement of good faith by giving content to that borne by insurers.  
This process is a rebalancing exercise.9  As such, it involves a tacit 
                                                                                                                 
6  See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, No. 46: SOME INS. LAW PROBLEMS 2 
(1998). 
7  Quinby Enter. Ltd. v. Gen. Accident Ltd. [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 736.  But cf. 
Waller L.J.’s reasoning in North Star Shipping Ltd. v. Sphere Drake Ins. plc [2006] 
EWCA (Civ) 378; see also Doheny v. New India Assurance Co. [2004] EWCA 
Civ. 1705;  O’Kane v. Jones [2003] EWHC 3470 (Comm.); James v. CGU Ins. plc, 
[2002] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 206;  March Cabaret Club & Casino Ltd. v. London 
Assurance, [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 169. 
8  See Lord Mansfield’s formulation of the duty and the Marine Insurance Act, 
1906, 6 Edw. 7, c.41, § 18. 
9  Indeed, this is in line with various calls for reform which have long gone 
unheeded by the legislature.  See infra note 15.  That said, the UK Financial 
Ombudsman Service (FOS) has sought to mitigate the harshness of the duty, at 
least in so far as it applies to consumer insureds and small businesses with a group 
annual  turnover of less than £1 million.  For commercial insureds, however, who 
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unraveling of case law spanning over a century in which the courts had 
adopted an unequivocal stance in permitting avoidance for non-disclosure 
across the range of insurance, both consumer and commercial, without 
regard to notions of fairness, proportionality, or whether there was actual 
inducement.10  Admittedly the anxiety of modern judges has generally been 
directed towards relieving the position of the consumer or private insured, 
but the limits of this shift of emphasis are not entirely clear.  It begs the 
question whether commercial insurance is also being targeted.  Such doubt 
carries the danger of undermining the very certainty that should represent 
the cornerstone of commercial law in this respect and the economic 
implications are potentially significant.   
Taken in the round, it is possible to distill several strands of 
reasoning from the modern case law.  First, focusing solely upon the 
content of the insured’s pre-contractual duty of disclosure, the courts have 
sought to limit its scope by refining the conditions, most notably the 
requirement of inducement, that must be met before the insurer may 
justifiably avoid the policy for non-disclosure.  Further, in relation to 
avoidance, it is noteworthy that in recent times some judges have had 
recourse to notions of good faith, conscience, and fairness when assessing 
whether insurers may exercise the remedy.  But judicial thinking in this 
respect is not entirely consistent for it has been suggested that, as with the 
remedy of rescission for misrepresentation, the rights of insurers are 
unfettered by such considerations.11  Another strand of reasoning that has 
emerged has been directed towards the contours of waiver.  An insurer has 
every opportunity to ask specific questions of the applicant for insurance in 
the proposal form.  Typically, those questions will be directed towards 
claims history or health where the application relates to life or sickness 
insurance.  Nonetheless, even where such questions are raised, the insured 
is not relieved from his or her duty to volunteer any further material 
circumstances that fall outside the scope of them.  Any defense that an 
insured might seek to raise based on waiver is, in the orthodox view, 
doomed to failure.12  However, this has been challenged recently in a 
                                                                                                                          
are outwith the FOS jurisdiction, it has been left to the courts to alleviate their 
position.   
10  See, e.g., the judgments in Lambert v. Co-operative Ins. Soc’y, [1975] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 485.  See also infra notes 82-91. 
11  See the judgment of Mance L.J. in Brotherton v. Aseguradora Colseguros 
S.A. [2003] EWCA Civ. 705.  See infra note 197. 
12  See, e.g., Roselodge, Ltd. v. Castle, [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 113, 132. 
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powerful dissent delivered by Rix L.J., whose reasoning may portend 
future developments.13  In this regard, considerable emphasis is now being 
paid to the importance of the presentation of risk.  The modern view is that 
insurers should not be content to play a passive role during the disclosure 
process but should be prepared to make necessary enquiries about the risk 
to be underwritten.14  Finally, the question of whether or not the insured’s 
duty of good faith continues post-contractually and again triggers at the 
claims stage has also attracted considerable judicial scrutiny of late. 
This article is in five parts.  It first examines the scope of the 
insured’s duty of disclosure originally formulated by Lord Mansfield C.J..  
Secondly, it considers the case law subsequent to Carter v. Boehm in which 
the notion of good faith was developed and expanded into a duty of so-
called utmost good faith.  The third part will outline the unease expressed 
by the courts and by the law reform agencies, over the harshness of the 
insured’s duty and the injustices that result when insurers avoid a policy for 
non-disclosure.15  The fourth part will assess recent judicial inroads into the 
orthodox position that appear to be aimed at alleviating the position of the 
insured.  In this respect, the starting point will be Pan Atlantic Insurance 
Co. v. Pine Top Insurance Co.16  Although the House of Lords took the 
opportunity to settle the legal position relating to the insured’s duty of 
disclosure, it did not quell the debate surrounding the perceived iniquities 
of the insurer’s remedy.  Finally, against the backdrop of modern English 
case law, together with key developments in Australia, a model will be 
                                                                                                                 
13  See WISE Ltd. v. Grupo Nacional Provincial S.A. [2004] EWCA Civ. 962.  
See infra note 168-87. 
14  This is not a novel development but reflects the view expressed by Lord 
Mansfield C.J. in Carter v. Boehm, (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1162.  However, by the 
mid-nineteenth century, the point seems have faded from judicial thinking when 
addressing the scope of the disclosure duty. 
15  See, e.g., LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, CONDITIONS AND EXCEPTIONS IN 
INSURANCE POLICIES, 1957, Cmnd. 62;  THE LAW COMMISSION, INSURANCE LAW – 
NON-DISCLOSURE AND BREACH OF WARRANTY, 1980, Cmnd. 8064;  JOHN BIRDS, 
NAT’L CONSUMER COUNCIL, INSURANCE LAW REFORM: THE CONSUMER CASE FOR 
A REVIEW OF INSURANCE LAW (1997).  Although the UK Department of Trade and 
Industry (now renamed the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
(DBIS)) issued a draft Insurance Bill following the Law Commission’s report in 
1980, nothing came of it, the government of the day being satisfied that the 
industry’s response via the Association of British Insurers’ Statement of Practice 
struck the appropriate balance for the consumer-insured. 
16  [1995] 1 A.C. 501 (H.L.). 
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proposed that might serve to inform the English and Scottish Law 
Commissions’ current re-examinations of insurance law that identifies non-
disclosure as a key issue.17  It will be seen that the current state of the law is 
fragmented and complicated and that future reform should be directed 
towards constructing a coherent regime for insurance contracts that meets 
the objectives of certainty and clarity, while being sufficiently flexible to 
encompass both consumer and commercial insurance. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE DISCLOSURE DUTY AND ITS 
STATUTORY CODIFICATION 
 
A. CARTER V. BOEHM 
 
An enduring legacy of the Seven Years War is that it left us with a 
landmark decision which contains the most quoted passage in U.K. 
insurance law.  In Carter v. Boehm, the issue of non-disclosure came to 
court as a result of the Governor of Sumatra, George Carter, effecting a 
policy of insurance on Fort Marlborough, a trading fort, against the 
likelihood of a French attack.18  His decision to insure was vindicated 
when, in April 1760, the fort was seized by the French.19  The Governor’s 
claim was disputed by the underwriter and in 1766, Lord Mansfield C.J., 
                                                                                                                 
17  The English and Scottish Law Commissions are statutory independent 
bodies created by the [UK] Law Commissions Act 1965 c. 22, to keep the law 
under review and to recommend reform where it is needed.  The insurance contract 
law reform project was announced on 14 October 2005, the first “issues paper” on 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure was published at the end of September 2006.  
See The Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law, Misrepresentation and Non-
Disclosure (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/insurance_ 
contact_law_issues_paper_1.  See infra notes 305-11.  On December 15 2009 the 
Law Commissions published their joint report and draft Bill to reform the law on 
what a consumer-insured must disclose to the insurers prior to the conclusion of 
the policy; see CONSUMER INSURANCE LAW: PRE-CONTRACT DISCLOSURE AND 
REPRESENTATION, 2009, Cm 7758, discussed infra note 307 et seq..   
18  Carter, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1163.  Park notes that Carter is a seminal case  
(“. . . . from it may be collected all the general principles which the doctrine of 
concealments, in matters of insurance, is founded, as well as all the exceptions. . . . 
”).  JAMES ALLAN PARK, A SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF MARINE INSURANCES 193 
(Thomas & Andrews 1800) (1787).   
19  Carter, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1163. 
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presiding at Guildhall, heard the consequent action.20  The underwriters had 
sought to avoid the contract on the basis that the Governor had failed to 
disclose the fort’s weakness and its vulnerability to an attack by the 
French.21  Their defence failed, but Lord Mansfield took the opportunity to 
formulate the duty of good faith which has come to represent a cornerstone 
of English insurance law: 
 
The special facts, upon which the contingent 
chance is to be computed, lie most commonly in the 
knowledge of the insured only; the under-writer trusts to 
his representation, and proceeds upon confidence that he 
does not keep back any circumstance in his knowledge, to 
mislead the under-writer into a belief that the circumstance 
does not exist, and to induce him to estimate the risqué, as 
if it did not exist. 
The keeping back such circumstance is a fraud, 
and therefore the policy is void.  Although the suppression 
should happen through mistake, without any fraudulent 
intention; yet still the under-writer is deceived, and the 
policy is void; because the risque run is really different 
from the risque understood and intended to be run at the 
time of the agreement. 
  . . . .  
Good faith forbids either party by concealing what 
he privately knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from 
his ignorance of that fact, and his believing the contrary. 
But either party may be innocently silent, as to 
grounds open to both, to exercise their judgment upon.  
Aliud est celare; aliud, tacere; neque enim id est celare 
quicquid reticeas; sed cum quod tuscias, id ignorare 
emolumenti tui causa velis eos, quorum intersit id scire.22 
 
This formulation begs the question as to why insurance contracts 
are exceptional in requiring a positive duty of disclosure.  Although the 
disparity of knowledge between the parties has been proffered as the 
explanation, this is hardly a satisfactory rationale in itself given that in 
                                                                                                                 
20  Id. at 1162-63. 
21  Id. at 1163. 
22  Carter, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1164.   
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other common contracting situations, the parties similarly lack equality of 
information.  The explanation for this exceptional feature of insurance 
must, therefore, lie elsewhere.  The investigation begins by considering 
Lord Mansfield’s reasoning.  It then goes on to review the jurisprudence 
surrounding the good faith requirement and how it evolved into a duty of 
so-called utmost good faith.   
 
B. THE RATIONALE 
 
Lord Mansfield explained that the policy considerations underlying 
the duty are the prevention of fraud and the furtherance of good faith: it 
therefore fulfils a prophylactic role.23  He based it upon the concept of 
“concealment,” but over time this developed beyond deliberate 
concealment so as to encompass all non-disclosure, however innocent, of a 
material fact.  In Carter v. Boehm, the underwriter had argued that the 
insured had been fraudulent in failing to disclose the fort’s vulnerability to 
attack.24  This contention was unsuccessful, it being held that the 
underwriter must be taken to have realised that the Governor, by insuring, 
obviously apprehended the possibility of an attack.25  By underwriting the 
risk, the insurer thereby assumed knowledge of the state of the fort.26  It 
was stressed that the underwriter, sitting in London, was in a better position 
than the Governor to stay informed about the fortunes of the war and so it 
was not a matter within the private knowledge of the Governor only, but 
was, in fact, in the public domain.27  Lord Mansfield concluded that a 
verdict in favour of the underwriters would have had the effect of turning a 
rule against fraud into an instrument of fraud.28  He proceeded on the basis 
that good faith was a mutual duty, not an obligation borne solely by 
                                                                                                                 
23  This is a narrower view than that expressed over a century later by 
Channell J in Re Yager & Guardian Assurance Co., [1912] 108 L.T. 38 (K.B.), to 
the effect that the rationale underlying the disclosure duty is not the need to 
prevent harm to the insurer as such, but the need for a true and fair agreement 
whereby risk is transferred.  Id. at 44-45. 
24  Carter, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1163. 
25  Id. at 1167. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. at 1169. 
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insureds, and being mutual the problem of unfairness was shared between 
the parties.29   
Lord Mansfield also placed emphasis on the need for insurers to 
demonstrate reliance.  He explained that the underwriter “proceeds upon 
confidence that [the insured] does not keep back any circumstance in his 
knowledge, to mislead the under-writer into a belief that the circumstance 
does not exist, and to induce him to estimate the risque, as if it did not 
exist.”30  Herein we see the assimilation of non-disclosure with 
misrepresentation.  The good faith duty converts non-disclosure into 
misrepresentation because an insured who fails to disclose a material fact is 
effectively misrepresenting the true state of affairs.  Lord Mansfield’s 
choice of language is critical: it traverses the two vitiating factors and 
reliance and inducement lies at the heart of both.  For misrepresentation, 
the consequence is therefore the same as with pure non-disclosure, namely 
avoidance of the contract ab initio.31  
Both in Carter v. Boehm, and in subsequent cases, Lord Mansfield 
sought to limit the scope of the insured’s duty by, for example, stressing the 
need for underwriters to be proactive in ascertaining facts material to the 
                                                                                                                 
29  Indeed, Lord Mansfield was scathing in his condemnation of the 
underwriter’s defense:  
 
The underwriter, here, knowing the governor to be 
acquainted with the state of the place; knowing that he 
apprehended danger, and must have some ground for his 
apprehension; being told nothing of neither; signed this policy, 
without asking a question.  If the objection ‘that he was not told’ 
is sufficient to vacate it, he took the premium, knowing the 
policy to be void; in order to gain, if the alternative turned out 
one way; and to make no satisfaction, if it turned out the other: 
he drew the governor into a false confidence . . .  
 
. . .  If he thought that omission an objection at the time, 
he ought not to have signed the policy with a secret reserve in his 
own mind to make it void; if he dispensed with the information, 
and did not think this silence an objection then; he cannot take it 
up now, after the event.   
       
    Id. at 1169. 
30  Carter, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1164. 
31  The insurers remedy in this respect is codified by the Marine Insurance Act, 
1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, § 20 (Eng.). 
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risk.  In Noble v. Kennoway, the insured vessel had arrived safely at 
Labrador but prior to being unloaded, it was used for fishing.32  
Subsequently, the vessel was taken by privateers while it was unmanned.33  
The owners’ claim for the value of the cargo was met with the defence by 
the underwriters that they were not liable because of the delay in 
unloading.34  The insured argued that this was a trade usage in this 
particular port because of the lack of warehousing.35  Lord Mansfield, 
finding for the insured, reasoned that every underwriter was presumed to 
know the practices of the trade he insures and if he does not know then it is 
his duty to inform himself of it.36  He returned to the point in Mayne v. 
Walter, where the insured’s claim for the loss of supercargo seized by the 
French was met with the defence that he should have disclosed the 
existence of a French ordinance prohibiting Dutch ships carrying the 
supercargo of any country at war with France on pain of it being taken as 
prize.37  Lord Mansfield said that if both parties were ignorant of the 
relevant fact, “the underwriter must run all risks: and if the [underwriter] 
knew of such an edict, it was his duty to inquire, if such supercargo were 
on board.”38  He went on to note that “[i]t must be a fraudulent 
concealment of circumstances, that will vitiate a policy.”39  This has been 
termed the narrow Mansfield rule.40  Reflecting upon his original 
formulation, Lord Mansfield appears to have come around to the view that 
the duty is limited insofar as it must strike a balance between the parties so 
as to achieve some symmetry between them.  Indeed, by the early 
nineteenth century, emphasis was being placed on Lord Mansfield’s clear 
admonition that underwriters have a distinct investigative role to play in the 
disclosure process. For example, in Friere v. Woodhouse, a marine 
insurance case, Burrough J. said, “what is exclusively known to the assured 
ought to be communicated; but what the underwriter, by fair inquiry and 
due diligence, may learn from ordinary sources of information need not be 
                                                                                                                 
32  99 Eng. Rep. 326, 326-27. 
33  Id. at 326. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. at 327. 
37  Mayne v. Walter, (1782) 99 Eng. Rep. 548, 548-49.  PARK, supra note 18, 
at 196. 
38  PARK, supra note 18, at 196. 
39  Id. 
40  See R. A. Hasson, The Doctrine of Uberrima Fides in Insurance Law - A 
Critical Evaluation, 32 M.L.R. 615, 618 (1969).   
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disclosed.”41  The material information could have been discovered by the 
underwriter from Lloyd’s List.42   
It is striking that throughout his judgments on the issue of non-
disclosure Lord Mansfield avoided the terminology of “utmost” good faith.  
Yet section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, the preamble of which 
declares it to be a codifying statute, states that insurance is uberrimae 
fidei.43  It goes on to provide that a contract of insurance is a contract based 
upon the duty of utmost good faith which, if broken, entitles the other party 
to avoid the contract.44  Section 17 does not, therefore, precisely mirror the 
language of Lord Mansfield’s formulation which, as seen above, draws the 
distinction between deliberate concealment and misrepresentation (bad 
faith) and innocent (good faith) mistaken non-disclosure.  The provision 
must, therefore, be seen as synthesising not Lord Mansfield’s views, but 
rather the dominant view emerging from the case law decided during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century to the effect that the underwriter is a 
passive recipient of information supplied by the insured when presenting 
the risk.  As such, this loses sight of the more restrictive views expressed 
not only in Carter v. Boehm, but which was also in the judgments found in 
Noble v. Kennoway, Mayne v. Walter, and Friere v. Woodhouse.45  It was 
certainly not within the mandate of Sir Mackenzie Chalmers, who drafted 
the Digest upon which the 1906 Act was based, to correct the significant 
body of case law he sought to codify.46  The question that arises, therefore, 
                                                                                                                 
41  Friere v. Woodhouse, (1817) 171 Eng. Rep. 345, 345.  See also Gandy v. 
The Adelaide Marine Ins. Co., 6 Eng. Rep. 746, 757 (Q.B.). 
42  Friere, 171 Eng. Rep. at 345. 
43  It has long been settled that the Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7,  c. 
41, §§ 17-18 (Eng.) are of general application in insurance law.  See, e.g., P.C.W. 
Syndicates v. P.C.W. Reinsurers, (1996) 1 W.L.R. 1136, 1140 (A.C.); Australia 
and New Zealand Bank, Ltd. v. Colonial and Eagle Wharves Ltd., (1960) 2 
Lloyd’s L. Rep. 241, 251 (Q.B.D ); Cantiere Meccanico Brindisino v. Janson, 
(1912) 3 K.B. 452, 467.  More recent cases have also proceeded on the assumption 
that the provisions apply to all types of insurance. See Pan Atlantic Ins. Co. Ltd. v. 
Pine Top Ins. Co. Ltd., [1994] 1 A.C. 501, 518 (H.L.); Lambert v. Co-operative 
Ins. Soc’y, (1975) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 485, 487. 
44  Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, § 17 (emphasis supplied). 
45  Friere v. Woodhouse, (1817) 171 Eng. Rep. 345; Mayne v. Walter, (1782) 
99 Eng. Rep. 548; Noble v. Kennoway, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 326. See also Lord 
Ellenborough’s closely reasoned judgment delivered in Haywood v. Rodgers, 
(1804) 4 East 590. 
46  See note 45 infra for conflicting case law.  
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is when did the disclosure duty metamorphose into something requiring 
utmost good faith?   
 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF UBERRIMAE FIDEI 
 
In broad terms, a hallmark of much of the case law subsequent to 
Carter v. Boehm is the expansive approach that was taken towards Lord 
Mansfield’s formulation of the disclosure duty.  It is not proposed to 
examine the merits of this case law in terms of whether the scope of Lord 
Mansfield’s judgments were misconstrued,47 but, as commented above, it 
was such that by the end of the nineteenth century, synthesising it required 
section 17 of the 1906 Act to declare insurance contracts to be of “utmost” 
good faith.  Perhaps surprisingly, the suggestion that an insured must be of 
utmost honesty (as if there may be lower degrees of honesty) as represented 
in this statutory declaration was not seen as being particularly controversial 
or novel.  As Lord Herschell, who originally took charge of the Bill when it 
was introduced in the House of Lords in 1894, explained, its purpose was 
to reproduce as exactly as possible the state of the existing law.48 
Tracing the antecedents of “utmost” good faith is an intriguing 
exercise, for it has no equivalent in the civil law.49  Indeed, in Mutual and 
Federal Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Oudtshoorn Municipality,50 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal of South Africa, expressing the view that the effect of the 
Pre-Union Statute Revision Act 43 of 1977 was to make South African 
insurance law governed by Roman-Dutch law, was moved to observe that 
“uberrimare fides is an alien, vague, useless expression without any 
meaning in law…our law of insurance has no need for uberrimae fides and 
the time has come to jettison it.”51  Its origins can, however, be discerned in 
U.K. case law decided during the latter half of the nineteenth century.52  
For example, in Bates v. Hewitt, the court paid little heed to Lord 
                                                                                                                 
47  See Hasson, supra note 40. 
48  Durant v. Durant, I Haggard Eccl. Rep. 733. 
49  See M.A. Millner, Fraudulent Non-disclosure 74 S.A.L.J. 177, 188 (1957). 
50  Mut. and Fed. Ins. Co Ltd. v. Oudtshoorn Mun. 1985 (1) SA 419 (AD). 
51  Id. at 433F. 
52  See A. D. M. FORTE, Good Faith and Utmost Good Faith in A.D. M. Forte 
(ed), GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT AND PROPERTY LAW, (Hart Publishing 1999). 
Joubert J.A. cites Dalglish v. Jarvis, (1850) 2 Mac. & Gord. R. 231, as the decision 
in which the term uberrimae fides is first used in Mut. and Fed. Ins., (1) SA at 
431I. 
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Mansfield’s views expressed over a century earlier.53  The claimant had not 
informed the insurer that the insured vessel, the Georgia, had been a 
Confederate cruiser.54  The Georgia was well known to the British public, 
and when the ship came to Liverpool for breaking she attracted 
considerable interest in both the press and in the House of Commons.55  
The defendant underwriter admitted he had known of the ship’s history but 
that at the time of underwriting it was not present in his mind.56  The jury 
found that the underwriter was ignorant of the vessel’s notoriety at that 
particular time, although they did go on to express the view that when the 
risk was presented, he did have the means available for identifying the 
ship.57  The court held that the claimant was in breach of his duty of 
disclosure.58  Curiously, the judges in the case went to considerable lengths 
to explain that they were merely applying a long established principle.  
Lord Cockburn CJ stated that a proposer of insurance “is bound to 
communicate to the insurer all matters which will enable him to determine 
the extent of the risk against which he undertakes to guarantee the 
assured.”59  Shee J., while admitting that the underwriter might through his 
own investigations have discovered the material fact about the Georgia’s 
history, concluded, however, that he was under no duty to make such 
enquiries.60  This fails to sit with Lord Mansfield’s notion of an insurer’s 
constructive knowledge - a critical factor in his finding in Carter v. Boehm.  
It also fails to sit with Friere v. Woodhouse, in which it will be recalled, the 
court, applying Lord Mansfield’s formulation of the duty, had no hesitation 
in finding that underwriters had a pro-active role to play during the 
disclosure process.61  Nonetheless, towards the close of the nineteenth 
century, the consensus of judicial opinion was such that determining if the 
duty of disclosure has been discharged requires something more than 
merely exacting a duty of honesty from the insured.  This came to the fore 
in Life Association of Scotland v. Foster, in which the term “utmost good 
faith” is adopted by Lord President Inglis:  “Contracts of Insurance are in 
                                                                                                                 
53  Bates v. Hewitt, (1867) 2 L.R.Q.B. 595; 1867 WL 9866. 
54  Id. at 604. 
55  Id. at 595. 
56  Id. at 604. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. at 599. 
59  Bates, 2 L.R.Q.B. at 604-05. 
60  Id. at 611. 
61  Friere v. Woodhouse, (1817) 171 Eng. Rep. 345.  See also Noble v. 
Kennoway, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 326. 
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this, among other particulars, exceptional, in that they require on both sides 
uberrima fides.  Hence, without fraudulent intent, and even bona fides, the 
insured may fail in the duty of disclosure.”62 
This decision is followed soon after by Ionides v. Pender, in which 
Blackburn J. was moved to assimilate the prevailing view into the so-called 
“prudent insurer” test.63   While the judge accepted that “it would be too 
much to put on the assured the duty of disclosing everything which might 
influence the mind of an underwriter,” he nevertheless conceded that “a 
concealment of a material fact, though made without any fraudulent 
intention, vitiates the policy.”64  Blackburn J. concluded by stating that “all 
should be disclosed which would affect the judgment of a rational 
underwriter governing himself by the principles and calculations on which 
underwriters do in practice act.”65 
                                                                                                                 
62  (1873) 11 M. 351, 359.  It might be the case that this generation of judges 
was perhaps placing too much reliance on Park’s Law of Marine Insurance 
published in 1787, rather than tracing Lord Mansfield’s reasoning first hand.  For 
example, chapter 10 of Park’s treatise states that “the learned judges of our courts 
of law, feeling that the very essence of insurance consists in a rigid attention to the 
purest good faith, and the strictest integrity, have constantly held that it is vacated 
and annulled by any the least shadow of fraud or undue concealment.”  PARK, 
supra note 18, at 174 (emphasis supplied). 
63  (1874) 9 L.R.Q.B. 531.  This was incorporated by Chalmers into § 18(2) of 
the Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c.41 (Eng.), which provides, “[e]very 
circumstance is material which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer 
in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk.” 
64  Ionides, 9 L.R.Q.B. at 537, 539. 
65  Id. at 539.  A further opportunity to put forward his view on the scope of 
the duty of disclosure was taken by him, now Lord Blackburn, in Brownlie v. 
Campbell, (1880) 5 App. Cas. 925, in which he noted: 
 
… [i]n policies of insurance, whether marine insurance or life 
insurance, there is an understanding that the contract is uberrima 
fides, that if you know any circumstance at all that may influence 
the underwriter's opinion as to the risk he is incurring, and 
consequently as to whether he will take it, or what premium he 
will charge if he does take it, you will state what you know. 
There is an obligation there to disclose what you know; and the 
concealment of a material circumstance known to you, whether 
you thought it material or not, avoids the policy. 
 
Id. at 954.  Material facts are typically categorised as either those relating to 
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Blackburn J.’s formulation is encapsulated in sections 17 and 18(1) 
and (2) of the 1906 Marine Insurance Act.  More particularly, section 18(1) 
lays down the overriding pre-contractual duty of disclosure while section 
18(2), which provides that “every circumstance is material which would 
influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or 
determining whether he will take the risk,” gives content to the governing 
principle of utmost good faith declared by section 17.66  The view that 
insurance required nothing less than utmost good faith, or the idea of 
comparative degrees of honesty, thus became firmly entrenched in English 
insurance law.   
Shortly after the 1906 Act received Royal Assent, the opportunity 
to explore the insured’s duty of disclosure came before the Court of Appeal 
in Joel v. Law Union and Crown Insurance Company.67  As a means of 
overcoming the practical difficulties of proof which a duty based solely 
upon utmost good faith could give rise to,68 Fletcher Moulton L.J. 
superimposed a requirement of reasonableness.  The judge explained that: 
 
There is, therefore, something more than an obligation to 
treat the insurer honestly and frankly… There is the further 
duty that he should do it to the extent that a reasonable 
man would have done it; and, if he has fallen short of that 
by reason of his bona fide considering the matter not 
material, whereas the jury, as representing what a 
reasonable man would think, hold that it was material, he 
has failed in his duty, and the policy is avoided. This 
further duty is analogous to a duty to do an act which you 
undertake with reasonable care and skill, a failure to do 
which amounts to negligence, which is not atoned for by 
any amount of honesty or good intention. The disclosure 
must be of all you ought to have realized to be material, 
not of that only which you did in fact realize to be so.69 
                                                                                                                          
physical hazard or those relating to moral hazard.  See JOHN LOWRY & PHILIP 
RAWLINGS, INSURANCE LAW: DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES 93-99 (2d ed. 2005). 
66  Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7,  c. 41, § 18 (Eng.). 
67  [1908] 2 K.B. 863. 
68  See PETER MACDONALD EGGERS ET AL., GOOD FAITH AND INSURANCE 
CONTRACTS ¶ 3.10 (2004). 
69  Joel, [1908] 2 K.B. at 883-84 (emphasis added).  This passage occurs in a 
reserved judgment, and there is no indication that Vaughan Williams or Buckley 
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The insured is thus under a duty to disclose material facts, irrespective of 
whether he or she appreciated their materiality.70  This combined test can, 
and does give rise to unjust results.  For example, in Horne v. Poland, the 
insured’s policy was voidable due to his failure to disclose that he was an 
alien having come to this country at the age of twelve, and that he had 
changed his name from that of Euda Gedale to Harry Horne.71  Lush J., 
having noted that the applicable principle of law had been stated by 
Fletcher Moulton L.J. in Joel, added: 
 
If a reasonable person would know that underwriters would 
naturally be influenced, in deciding whether to accept the 
risk and what premiums to charge, by those circumstances 
[i.e., that he came from a country where his countrymen 
were not as careful and trustworthy as Englishmen], the 
fact that they were kept in ignorance of them and indeed 
were misled, is fatal to the plaintiff's claim.72 
 
Similarly, in Becker v. Marshall, Salter J., also applying the test laid down 
by Fletcher Moulton L.J., held on an issue of concealment as to foreign 
origin and change of name, that while the claimant: 
 
… in good faith did not realise that these were things 
material to be disclosed…the average business man, the 
average reasonable man, would not have taken that view, 
and…that a reasonable man, the average reasonable man, 
would have disclosed and would have known that it was 
necessary to disclose.73 
                                                                                                                          
L.J.J. dissented, although they base their concurring judgments on different 
grounds. 
70  See EGGERS ET AL., supra note 68, ¶¶ 3.10-3.11. 
71  [1922] 2 K.B. 364, 364. 
72  Id. at 367.  The decision must now be viewed as running counter to the 
Race Relations Act, 1976, c.74 (Eng.). 
73  (1922) 11 Lloyd’s List L.R. 114, 119 (K.B.).  Fletcher Moulton L.J.’s 
reasoning was further explained by Roskill J in Godfrey v. Britannic Assurance 
Co. Ltd., [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 515, 529 (Q.B.D.): 
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Curiously, for McNair J. in Roselodge v. Castle,74 Fletcher 
Moulton L.J.’s formulation represents nothing less than a pure application 
of Lord Mansfield’s rule.  The dispute arose out of the rejection by the 
insurers of the insured’s claim who, as diamond merchants, had insured 
diamonds against all risks.75  The insurers’ defence was founded upon the 
non-disclosure of two alleged material facts.  First, that the principal 
director of the insured company had been convicted of bribing a police 
officer in 1946 and second, that the insured’s sales manager had been 
convicted of smuggling diamonds into the United States in 1956.76  
According to one of the expert witnesses called by the insurer, a person 
who stole apples when aged 17 is much more likely to steal diamonds at 
the age of 67 even if he had led a blameless life for 50 years, than someone 
                                                                                                                          
 [T]here is a point here which often is not sufficiently kept in 
mind. The duty is a duty to disclose, and you cannot disclose 
what you do not know. The obligation to disclose, therefore, 
necessarily depends on the knowledge you possess. I must not be 
misunderstood. Your opinion of the materiality of that 
knowledge is of no moment. If a reasonable man would have 
recognized that it was material to disclose the knowledge in 
question, it is no excuse that you did not recognize it to be so. 
But the question always is, Was the knowledge you possessed 
such that you ought to have disclosed it?   
 
     Such was the momentum of this approach that the 2nd (Hailsham) edition 
of the Laws of England, Volume 18, prepared by Scott L.J., stated that:  
 
Materiality is a question of fact, not of belief or opinion. The 
assured does not therefore discharge his duty by a full and frank 
disclosure of what he honestly thinks to be material; he must go 
further and disclose every fact which a reasonable man would 
have thought material… If, however, the fact, though material, is 
one which he did not and could not in the particular 
circumstances have been expected to know, or if its materiality 
would not have been apparent to a reasonable man, his failure to 
disclose it is not a breach of duty. 
 
     Id. at 586(3).  This passage is repeated in the 3rd (Simonds) ed., vol. 22, 
360. 
74  [1966] 2 Lloyd’s List L.R. 113, 131-32 (QBD). 
75  Id. at 113. 
76  Id. 
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who had led a totally blameless life.77  This did not convince McNair J. 
who held that the 1946 conviction was not a material fact, having “no 
direct relation to trading as a diamond merchant.”78  Having examined the 
authorities, with particular emphasis being given to Horne v. Poland, the 
judge concluded: 
 
In my judgment, on this review of the authorities the 
judgment of Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton in Joel's case 
contains, if I may respectfully say so, a correct statement of 
the law on the topic. It has the merit…of emphasizing that 
even under the present practice of admitting expert 
evidence from underwriters as to materiality, the issue as to 
disclosability is one which has to be determined as it was 
in Lord Mansfield's day by the view of the Jury of 
reasonable men.79 
 
As conceded by Fletcher Moulton L.J., the duty does not require the 
insured to disclose that of which he or she is ignorant, unless the insured 
ought to have known of such circumstances in the ordinary course of 
business.80  But, nevertheless, from the insured’s perspective the disclosure 
duty laid down by the Marine Insurance Act of 1906, as explained by the 
subsequent case law, is particularly harsh and, it is suggested, represents an 
overly expanded view of Lord Mansfield’s original formulation which was 
premised upon the notion of “concealment.”  From a contemporary 
standpoint, it is hardly surprising that by the second half of the twentieth 
century both the courts and the law reform bodies were questioning 
whether such a strict approach was necessarily appropriate for all classes of 
insurance. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
77  Id. at 132. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. at 131. 
80  See also Lambert v. Co-operative Ins. Soc’y Ltd., [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
485, 490 (A.C.).  See infra notes 63-66.  The private insured will not, of course, be 
deemed to possess constructive knowledge.  See Economides v. Commercial 
Union Assurance Co. plc, [1998] Q.B. 587, 601-03 (Simon Brown, L.J.). 
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III. CRITICISMS OF THE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE AND THE 
REMEDY FOR BREACH 
 
Although modern judges inevitably follow the substantial line of 
case law on the Marine Insurance Act of 1906 §§ 17 and 18, they have not 
been timid in expressing their unease over the rigours of the disclosure 
duty.  For example, in Anglo-African Merchants Ltd. v. Bayley, Megaw J. 
queried whether the insured should be bound to disclose that which he does 
not appreciate to be material.81  Further, in Lambert v. Co-operative 
Insurance Society, Ltd., all three judges in the Court of Appeal took the 
opportunity to criticise the prudent insurer test.82  Lawton and Cairns L.J.J. 
went so far as to call for Parliamentary intervention to address the 
injustices caused by the harshness of the duty.83  Briefly, the facts 
concerned an insured, Mrs. Lambert, who claimed under a household “all 
risks” policy that she and her husband had held for some nine years.84  
Neither at the commencement of the policy nor on its subsequent renewals 
had the insurers asked whether they had any criminal convictions.85  When 
a claim was made for £311.00, representing the value of items of jewellery 
that had been lost, the insurers avoided liability on the basis that the 
criminal convictions of Mr. Lambert for, amongst other things, handling 
stolen cigarettes and stealing shirts, had not been disclosed.86  In fact he 
was in prison at the time of the claim and could not, therefore, have been 
responsible for the loss.87 
In the event, Mrs. Lambert’s appeal against the decision of the trial 
judge who found in favour of the insurers failed.88  MacKenna J., 
delivering the leading judgment in the Court of Appeal, took the law to be 
that stated by the Law Reform Committee in its 1957 report,89 namely that 
the “question in every case is whether the fact not disclosed was material to 
the risk, and not whether the insured, whether reasonably or otherwise, 
                                                                                                                 
81  [1970] 1 Q.B. 311, 319. 
82  [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 485, 491-93 (A.C.). 
83  Id. at 492-93. 
84  Id. at 486. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  Lambert, [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 491. 
89  LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, CONDITIONS AND EXCEPTIONS IN INSURANCE 
POLICIES, supra note 15. 
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believed or understood it to be so.”90  Nevertheless, the judge went on to 
express considerable sympathy for Mrs. Lambert and stated that he hoped 
the insurers “would act decently if, having established the point of 
principle, they were to pay her.  It might be thought a heartless thing if they 
did not, but that is their business, not mine.”91  As a matter of principle, the 
decision in Lambert is, of course, correct, although nowadays a consumer-
insured would be able to refer the issue to the UK Financial Ombudsman 
Service rather than the courts, which, as will be seen, does not follow the 
strict law.   
Considerable anxiety has also been expressed over the need for an 
insured to disclose allegations of dishonesty which, in fact, are false.  The 
conundrum which arises here was identified by Forbes J. in Reynolds and 
Anderson v. Phoenix Assurance Co. Ltd., who explained that the rule 
applied only to unfounded allegations.92  If the allegation was true, the 
insured was bound to disclose that he had committed the fraud and 
disclosure of the allegation added nothing.93  Forbes J. noted that “the only 
occasion on which the allegation as an allegation must be disclosed is when 
it is not true.  This appears to me to be a conclusion so devoid of any merit 
that I do not consider that a responsible insurer would adopt it and nor do 
I.”94 
However, against this, the view of Colman J. in Strive Shipping 
Corp. v. Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd.,95 reflects 
the orthodox approach taken towards the disclosure duty: 
 
If an allegation of criminal conduct has been made against 
an assured but is as yet unresolved at the time of placing 
the risk and the evidence is that the allegation would have 
influenced the judgment of a prudent insurer, the fact the 
                                                                                                                 
90  Lambert, [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 489.  MacKenna J. was particularly 
influenced by the opinion of the Privy Council in Mutual Life Insurance Co. of 
New York v. Ontario Metal Products Co. Ltd., [1925] A.C. 344, 351-52, to the 
effect that the test, as laid down in the Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 
41, § 18, is whether the non-disclosed fact would have influenced a reasonable 
insurer to decline the risk or to have stipulated for a higher premium. 
91  Lambert, [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 491.  
92  [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 440, 460 (Q.B.D.). 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  [2002] EWHC 203. 
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allegation is unfounded cannot divest the circumstances of 
the allegation of the attribute of materiality.96 
 
But, having held that the allegation was material, Colman J. nevertheless 
mitigated his finding by holding that for the insurers to persist at trial in 
taking the point, in the face of evidence that pointed to the suggested facts 
being totally false, would be contrary to their obligation of good faith.97  It 
is noteworthy that recently, the Court of Appeal in North Star Shipping Ltd. 
v. Sphere Drake Ins. plc expressed sympathy for Forbes J.’s views and 
urged the insured to argue that allegations of dishonesty which were 
unrelated to the risk were immaterial.98  Ultimately though, it felt 
constrained by authority to reject the contention which Waller L.J. stated he 
otherwise “might be tempted to follow.”99  However, on the issue of 
whether the impecuniosity of the insured was a material fact, Waller L.J. 
stated that, “the non-payment of premium is either material on its own or 
not, and since it seems to go to the owner’s credit risk, and not to the risk 
insured, I would have thought it was not material.”100  In so finding, Waller 
L.J. admitted that he was placing a significant limitation on section 18(2) of 
the 1906 Marine Insurance Act given that this was plainly a material fact 
which went to the decision of a prudent underwriter whether or not to 
underwrite the risk.101  
With respect to the insurers right of avoidance, the judiciary has 
also displayed considerable tenacity in its condemnation of the results 
which necessarily flow from the exercise of the remedy.  To take just one 
recent example, in Kausar v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. Ltd., Staughton L.J. 
stated: 
 
                                                                                                                 
96  Id.  In North Star Shipping Ltd. v. Sphere Drake Insurance plc, [2005] 
EWHC 665, Colman J. again took this view.  See also Brotherton v. Aseguradora 
Colseguros S.A. (No. 2) [2003] EWCA Civ. 705 (Mance, L.J.) (discussed infra 
notes 105 and 132); The Dora, [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69, 93-94 (Q.B.D.) (Phillips, 
J.); March Cabaret Club & Casino Ltd. v. London Assurance, [1975] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 169, 175-77 (Q.B.D.). Cf. Norwich Union Ins. Ltd. v. Meisels [2006] EWHC 
2811 (Q.B.) (taking a narrower view of materiality). 
97  Strive Shipping Corp. [2002] EWHC 203.  See infra note 193. 
98  [2006] EWCA (Civ.) 378.  
99  Id. 
100  Id. 
101  Id. 
118 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
 
Avoidance for non-disclosure is a drastic remedy. It 
enables the insurer to disclaim liability after, and not 
before, he has discovered that the risk turns out to be a bad 
one; it leaves the insured without the protection which he 
thought he had contracted and paid for...I do consider there 
should be some restraint in the operation of the doctrine.  
Avoidance for honest non-disclosure should be confined to 
plain cases.102 
  
However, the weight of the case law and the force of the 1906 Marine 
Insurance Act inevitably present considerable hurdles to judicial 
intervention.  Nevertheless, the subject of non-disclosure and the insurers’ 
remedy has not escaped the attention of law reform agencies. 
 
A.  LEGISLATIVE REFORM: A FALSE DAWN  
 
In 1978, the Law Commission was given the opportunity to review 
non-disclosure.103  This was to be carried out in the light of a proposed EEC 
Directive on the Co-ordination of Legislative, Statutory and Administrative 
Provisions relating to Insurance Contracts, the object of which was to 
harmonise the law in the Community.104  Of particular concern to the U.K. 
was the recommendation that the proportionality principle should be 
adopted.  Under French law, for example, an insurer is obliged to pay the 
proportion of the claim which the actual premium paid bears to the 
premium which would have been payable if the material facts had been 
disclosed.105  In this way, any additional risk and the loss attributable to that 
additional risk is, in effect, borne by the insured.  A more complex set of 
provisions was adopted in the proposed EEC Directive.  Article 3.3(c) of 
the Proposed Directive dealt with the insurer's right in respect of innocent 
non-disclosure.106  It adopted the principle of proportionality only where 
non-disclosure is due to fault (short of fraud) on the part of the insured.107  
                                                                                                                 
102  [1997] C.L.C. 129, 132-33. 
103  See THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 15, § 1.1. 
104  Id. § 1.2.  In fact, the Directive did not materialise. 
105  CODE DES ASSURANCES, art. L113-9.   
106  See THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 15, § 4.2. 
107  Id. § 4.3. 
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In a case where the non-disclosure is not due to fault, the insurer would 
remain liable for any loss.108 
The Law Commission concluded that proportionality was 
unworkable in England and Wales.109  It stated that the principle gives no 
guidance as to how the insured’s entitlement is to be computed if the 
insurer would have either declined the risk, imposed additional terms on 
the insured, narrowed the risk via exclusion clauses or imposed or 
increased “an excess.”110  Further, the Commission found that 
proportionality provides no solution where knowledge of the undisclosed 
facts would have led the insurer to decline the risk altogether.111  Whatever 
the merits of this strident dismissal, such hurdles have not prevented the 
Ombudsman importing the principle into the range of his remedies.112  That 
aside, the Law Commission did endorse the views expressed by way of 
obiter in Lambert to the effect that the law should be changed.113  It found 
that the insured’s duty of disclosure can give rise to grave injustice and 
there was, notwithstanding the protestations of the insurance industry, “a 
formidable case for reform.”114  In essence, the Commission recommended 
a substantially revised duty of disclosure that, had it been implemented, 
would have resulted in shifting the focus away from the “prudent insurer” 
as the determinative test of materiality.115  It proposed a modified duty of 
disclosure for both consumers and businesses whereby an insured would be 
required to disclose those facts that a reasonable person in the position of 
the applicant would disclose.116  However, an insured’s individual personal 
characteristics would not be taken into account.117 
Despite early optimism that legislative reform would follow the 
Law Commission’s recommendations, this soon petered out.  While there 
was an initial flurry of activity by the DTI (now DBIS), the impetus for 
                                                                                                                 
108  Id. 
109  Id.  
110  Id.  
111  Id. § 4.5-4.6. 
112  The Ombudsman has adopted proportionality for cases of unintentional 
non-disclosure and misrepresentation.  See the Ombudsman Report for 1989, para 
2.16-7) and the Annual Report for 1994, para 2.10.  See infra text accompanying 
note 121. 
113  THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 15, § 4.44. 
114  See id. § 3.23. 
115  Id. § 6.2.3. 
116  Id. § 4.47 
117  Id. 
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reform ground to a halt no doubt because of the intense lobbying by the 
insurance industry.  Some six years after the Report was laid before 
Parliament, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Mr. Channon, 
said, by way of a written response to a question asking for a progress report 
on the reforms, that he was convinced that self-regulation, through the 
Statements of Practice issued by the Association of British Insurers, would 
meet the need of protecting private insureds from the harsher aspects of the 
disclosure duty.118    
                                                                                                                 
118  Paul Channon, Secretary of State, Written Answers (Commons) of 21 
Feburary 1986, Insurance Contracts (Feb. 21, 1986) (transcript available at 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1986/feb/21/insurance-
contracts).  The Secretary of State said, 
 
The insurers have informed me that they are willing to 
strengthen the non-life and long-term statements of insurance 
practice on certain aspects proposed by the Department.  These 
concern the limitation of the duty of disclosure, warranties, 
disputes procedures and, in the case of the long-term statements, 
the payment of interest on life insurance claims. The statements 
apply to insurance taken out by private consumers…These 
changes are in the right direction.  I am well aware of the 
arguments, advanced amongst others by the representatives of 
consumers, in favour of legislation on non-disclosure and breach 
of warranty.  But I consider that on balance the case for 
legislation is out-weighed by the advantages of self-regulation so 
long as this is effective.  I look to all insurers, whether or not 
they belong to the Association of British Insurers which has 
promulgated the statements, to observe both their spirit and their 
letter.  In the light of the insurers' undertakings I do not consider 
there is any need for the moment to proceed with earlier 
proposals for a change in the law….   
 
      The Statements of Practice, first issued in 1977 (revised in 1986), covered 
General and Long Term Insurance.  The General Statement came to an end in 
January 2005 when it was incorporated into the Code of Business Conduct Rules 
(ICOB) by the Financial Services Authority.  The ICOB adopts the language of the 
ABI’s Statements.  In essence, rule 7.3.6 provides that except where there is 
evidence of fraud, an insurer should not avoid a claim by a retail customer on the 
ground of non-disclosure of a fact material to the risk that the customer could not 
reasonably be expected to have disclosed.  It is also noteworthy that in the field of 
motor insurance the right of insurers to avoid liability to a third party is 
substantially restricted by section 152 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.  The Long 
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The move towards self-regulation was reinforced by the industry 
establishing and financing the Insurance Ombudsman in 1981.  Rather than 
following the common law rules relating to avoidance, the Ombudsman 
seeks to reach a decision that he considers to be a “fair and reasonable” 
solution to a dispute.119  In reaching this objective, the criteria taken into 
account include whether the non-disclosure was deliberate or innocent.120  
He has also sought to mitigate the draconian consequences of “inadvertent” 
non-disclosure by, for example, requiring insurers to pay a proportion of a 
claim that the premium actually fixed bears to the premium that would 
have been charged had the fact been disclosed.121  The question remains, 
however, whether the general law should adopt the same approach, and if 
so, should the position of the consumer be separated out from that of the 
commercial insured.   
 Subsequent investigations have arrived at conclusions very similar 
to those of the Law Commission.  For example, in 1997 the National 
Consumer Council embarked on a thorough review of the disclosure duty 
among other areas of insurance law.  Its report, Insurance Law Reform:  
The Consumer Case for a Review of Insurance Law, written by Professor 
Birds, recommended that the consumer-insured’s duty of disclosure should 
be restricted to facts within his or her knowledge which either he or she 
knows to be relevant to the insurer's decision or which a reasonable person 
                                                                                                                          
Term Statement remains in place.  Long term insurance is governed by COB which 
has no equivalent provision to ICOB 7.3.6. 
119  See, e.g., INSURANCE OMBUDSMAN, ANNUAL REVIEW 1992/93, ¶¶ 6.48-
6.55 (1993).  The Insurance Ombudsman is now part of the Financial Ombudsman 
Service, regulated by Part XVI of the Financial Markets and Services Act, 2000, c. 
8, §§ 225-34.  The Association of British Insurers Statements will continue to 
inform the approach of the Ombudsman.  See Financial Ombudsman Service, Non-
Disclosure in Insurance Cases, OMBUDSMAN NEWS, May-June 2005, at 8, 
available at http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ombudsman-
news/46/46.pdf. 
120  Financial Ombudsman Service, supra note 119, at 8. 
121  See INSURANCE OMBUDSMAN, ANNUAL REVIEW 1988/89, ¶ 2.17.  See also 
Financial Ombudsman Service, Insurance Complaints Involving Non-Disclosure, 
OMBUDSMAN NEWS, Apr. 2003, at 9, available at http://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ombudsman-news/27/27.pdf.  See also JOHN 
LOWRY & PHILIP RAWLINGS, INSURANCE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 129-230 
(Hart Publishing 2004).  See also P.M. North, Law Reform: Processes and 
Problems, 101 L.Q.R. 338, 349 (July 1985); John Birds, The Reform of Insurance 
Law, 1982 J. BUS. L. 449, 450, 454 (Nov. 1982).   
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in the circumstances could be expected to know to be relevant.122  More 
recently, in January 2001, the British Insurance Law Association 
established a sub-committee to examine contentious areas of insurance law 
and to make recommendations to the Law Commission “as to the 
desirability of drafting a new Insurance Contracts Act.”123  Its report, 
Insurance Contract Law Reform, published in September 2002, also 
endorsed the reasonable insured test, for example, whether a reasonable 
insured would have considered the undisclosed matter to be material to a 
prudent insurer.124  As will be seen, the most recent report by the English 
and Scottish Law Commissions broadly follows this proposal.125 
Although the legislature has not responded to these calls for 
reform, the issue has not escaped the attention of the courts.  Recent case 
law suggests that there is a distinct shift in the judicial focus and that the 
attention of the judges is being channelled along several lines of 
investigation.  For example, particular attention is being directed towards 
the requirement of inducement as a determinant of non-disclosure together 
with a wider-visioned approach being adopted towards the role of the 
insurer during the disclosure process.126  As commented above, this may be 
seen as adding content to the insurers’ duty of good faith and in this regard, 
attention is now also being directed towards the exercise of the remedy of 
avoidance.   
 
IV.  JUDICIAL INTERVENTION: REDRESSING THE BALANCE 
 
The opportunity for an authoritative review of the insured’s duty of 
disclosure came before the House of Lords just over ten years ago in Pan 
Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pine Top Insurance Co.127  The defendant 
                                                                                                                 
122  John Birds Insurance Law Reform: the Consumer Case for a Review of 
Insurance Law, National Consumer Council, 1997.  
123  Id.  
124  British Insurance Law Association, Insurance Contract Law Reform (Sept. 
2002). 
125  See THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 17. 
126  [1995] 1 AC 501. 
127  Pan Atl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Pine Top Ins. Co. Ltd., [1995] 1 A.C. 501, 505.  
Both parties were insolvent by the time the case reached the appellate courts.  Id.  
However, it proceeded as a friendly action because of the perceived loss of 
business being suffered by the UK, and London in particular, as a result of the 
overly insurer-friendly approach being adopted in relation to non-disclosure.  Id.  It 
was hoped that the House of Lords would redress the balance.  Id.   
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reinsurers had written excess of loss policies for three years.128  Their 
defence to a claim arising out of losses suffered in the third year was based 
on the inadvertent failure to disclose the extent of losses occurring in the 
first two years.129  The issues were first, should materiality be measured by 
reference to whether its ‘influence’ on the prudent insurer's judgment was 
‘decisive’, or should some lesser degree of impact be sufficient?130  Second, 
where there has been non-disclosure of a material fact, must it induce the 
actual insurer to enter into the contract?131   
 With respect to the first issue Lord Mustill, with whom Lords Goff 
and Slynn concurred, could see no good reason for departing from the 
principle which had guided insurance law for more than 200 years.132  Lord 
Mustill stated that disclosure was not limited to matters which would have 
caused the prudent insurer to decline the risk or increase the premium but 
rather the insured’s duty to disclose “all matters which would have been 
taken into account by the underwriter when assessing the risk . . . which he 
was consenting to assume.”133  On the question of statutory interpretation, 
the majority view was that since Parliament had left the word “influence” 
in section 18(2) unadorned by phrases such as “decisively” or 
“conclusively,” it must bear its ordinary meaning.134  His Lordship stated 
that “. . . this expression clearly denotes an effect on the thought processes 
of the insurer in weighing up the risk, quite different from words which 
might have been used but were not, such as ‘influencing the insurer to take 
the risk.’”135   The majority decision therefore was to reject the “decisive 
influence” test.  The position remains that a circumstance is material and 
must be disclosed even though the prudent insurer, had he known of the 
fact, would have insured the risk on the same terms.136 
                                                                                                                 
128  Id. at 519. 
129  Id. at 520. 
130  Id. at 516-17 
131  Id. at 517-18. 
132  Id. at 536. 
133  Pan Atl. Ins. Co. Ltd., [1995] 1 A.C. at 538.  Lord Mustill thus rejected a 
test based upon the decisive influence of the non-disclosed/misrepresented fact: “I 
can see no room within [the principle] for a more lenient test expressed solely by 
reference to the decisive effect which the circumstance would have on the mind of 
the prudent underwriter.”  Id. at 536. 
134  Id. at 531. 
135  Id.  See also id. at 517 (speech of Lord Goff). 
136  It is noteworthy that Lord Lloyd, in a powerful dissent, agreed with the 
appellants' submission that there should be a twofold test under which the insurer 
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In relation to the second issue, however, the House of Lords 
unanimously held that in Pan Atlantic Insurance Company v. Pine Top 
Limited, the non-disclosure of a material fact, as with misrepresentation, 
must induce the particular insurer to enter into the contract.137  In reaching 
this conclusion, their Lordships were clearly influenced by the argument 
that the 1906 Act codified the common law, and given that inducement was 
a requirement under the general law which provides for rescission of a 
contract, the Act must be taken as having the same effect.138  In language 
that resonates with that of Lord Mansfield’s in so far as it traverses the 
terrain of misrepresentation and non-disclosure (and in so doing aligns the 
requirement of inducement with both vitiating factors), Lord Mustill stated 
that:  
 
I conclude that there is to be implied in the Act of 1906 a 
qualification that a material misrepresentation will not 
entitle the underwriter to avoid the policy unless the 
misrepresentation induced the making of the contract, 
using “induced” in the sense in which it is used in the 
general law of contract.139 
                                                                                                                          
must show that a prudent insurer, if aware of the undisclosed fact, would either 
have declined the risk or charged a higher premium and that the actual insurer 
would have declined the risk or required a higher premium.  Id. at 554.  See also 
John Birds & Norma J. Hird, Misrepresentation and Non-Disclosure in Insurance 
Law - Identical Twins or Separate Issues, 59 M.L.R. 285, 285 (1996). 
137  Pan Atl. Ins. Co., [1995] 1 A.C. at 551.  In essence, the House of Lords 
were injecting into the law on non-disclosure a requirement of causation analogous 
to the “but for” test familiar to tort lawyers.  See id. at 551 (Lord Mustill’s 
reference to causative effect).  In his reasoning, Lord Mustill gave prominence to 
the decision of Kerr J. in Berger v. Pollock, [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 442, in which 
the judge stated the principles in a way that suggested that the insurer could avoid 
the policy only if he had in fact been influenced by the non-disclosure.  Id. at 463. 
138  Pan Atl. Ins. Co., [1995] 1 A.C. at 549. 
139  Id.  Where there is a material misrepresentation, there is a rebuttable 
presumption of inducement.  See Redgrave v. Hurd, (1881) 20 Ch.D. 1, 21;  Smith 
v. Chadwick, (1884) 9 App. Cas. 187, 196.  Lord Mustill went on to add that, “As 
a matter of common sense however even where the underwriter is shown to have 
been careless in other respects the assured will have an uphill task in persuading 
the court that the witholding or mistatement of circumstances satifying the test of 
materiality has made no difference.”  Pan Atl. Ins. Co., [1995] 1 A.C. at 551.  See 
also Svenska Handelsbanken v. Sun Alliance & London Ins. plc, [1996] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 519. 
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 Lord Goff, concurring, thought that the need to show inducement 
on the part of the actual insurer addresses the criticisms directed against the 
harshness of the duty.140  He reasoned that it was the absence of this 
requirement that prompted the call for the test of materiality to “be 
hardened into the decisive influence test.”141  However, this concession 
must be measured against the view of Lord Mustill, vigorously opposed by 
Lord Lloyd, that there should be a presumption of inducement.142  In 
essence once objective materiality is established a presumption that the 
actual insurer was induced triggers.  On the facts, the House of Lords held 
that the non-disclosed losses were so obviously material that inducement 
could be inferred.143 
The presumption of inducement has had a chequered reception in 
the case law following Pan Atlantic.144  From the perspective of the 
insured, modern case law has sought to preserve the benefit of the 
requirement by limiting the scope of its presumption to exceptional cases 
only.  For example, in Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. Portman, Longmore J. 
suggested that unless there was good reason for the underwriter not to give 
evidence, the presumption would simply not arise.145  The judge stressed 
                                                                                                                 
140  Pan Atl. Ins. Co., [1995] 1 A.C. at 516-18. 
141  Id. at 518. 
142  Id. at 542, 571. 
143  Id. at 562. 
144  The only cases in which the presumption of inducement has been applied 
are those involving market subscriptions when one member of the following 
market has been unavailable to give evidence of his own state of mind.  See, e.g., 
Talbot Underwriting Ltd. v. Nausch, Hogan & Murray Inc. [2006] EWCA Civ. 
889, [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 195; Toomey v. Banco Vitalicio de Espana SA de 
Seguros y Reasseguros [2003] EWHC 1102, [2004] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 354; St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Co. (U.K.) Ltd. v. McConnell Dowell Constructors Ltd., [1996] 1 
All E.R. 96, [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 116.  See also Sirius Int’l Ins. Group Corp. v. 
Oriental Assurance Corp., [1999] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 699, [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. 
I.R. 343; Ins. Corp. of the Channel Islands v. Royal Hotel Ltd., [1998] Lloyd’s 
Rep. I.R. 151. 
145  [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 430.  See also Sirius Int’l Ins. Group Corp., [1999] 
1 All E.R. (Comm.) 699, where, in relation to misrepresentation, Longmore J. also 
stressed that it is for the insurer to prove inducement.  The judge did, however, 
recognize that the onus of proof is difficult to discharge.  Id.  In his Pat Saxton 
Memorial Lecture, “An Insurance Contracts Act for a New Century”, delivered on 
5 March 2001 to the British Insurance Law Association, Longmore J gave death as 
an example of a good reason for failing to give evidence.  Sir Andrew Longmore, 
Pat Saxton Memorial Lecture at the British Insurance Law Association: An 
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that in cases where the court is in doubt, the defence of non-disclosure 
should fail because “[a]t the end of the day it is for the insurer to prove that 
the non-disclosure did induce the writing of the risk....”146  Further, in 
Assicurazioni Generali SpA v. Arab Ins. Group, the Court of Appeal took 
the view that although the non-disclosed (or misrepresented) fact need not 
be the sole inducement operating on the insurer, it must cause the actual 
insurer to enter into the contract.147  Significantly, the majority of the court 
followed earlier decisions to the effect that the insurer must give evidence 
as to his state of mind.148  This, therefore, gives the insured the opportunity 
to cross-examine the insurer with a view to demonstrating that he was not 
induced by the non-disclosed fact but would have entered into the contract 
on the same terms had there had been full disclosure of all material facts.149  
If the underwriter fails to give evidence, without "good reason", 
inducement will not be made out.150  Clarke L.J. summarised the position as 
follows:  
 
1.  In order to be entitled to avoid a contract of insurance or 
reinsurance, an insurer… must prove on the balance of 
probabilities that he was induced to enter into the contract 
by a material non-disclosure or by a material 
misrepresentation. 
 
2.  There is no presumption of law that an insurer… is 
induced to enter in the contract by a material non-
disclosure or misrepresentation.  
 
3.  The facts may, however, be such that it is to be inferred 
that the particular insurer… was so induced even in the 
absence from evidence from him.  
 
                                                                                                                          
Insurance Contracts Act for a New Century? (Mar. 5, 2001), available at 
http://www.bila.org.uk/lecture_scripts/lectsaxt.asp. 
146  Marc Rich & Co., [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. at 442. 
147  [2002] EWCA Civ. 1642, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 577.  Following the decision in 
St. Paul’s Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McConnell Dowell Constructors Ltd., [1995] 
1 All E.R. 96, 104. 
148  Assicurazioni Generali SpA [2002] EWCA Civ. 1642. 
149  Id. 
150  Marc Rich & Co. AG, 1 Lloyd’s Rep.  at 442. 
2009] GOOD FAITH IN UK INSURANCE CONTRACTS 127 
 
4.  In order to prove inducement the insurer or reinsurer 
must show that the non-disclosure or misrepresentation 
was an effective cause of his entering into the contract on 
the terms on which he did.  He must therefore show at least 
that, but for the relevant non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation, he would not have entered into the 
contract on those terms.  On the other hand, he does not 
have to show that it was the sole effective cause of his 
doing so.151 
 
Insurers must, therefore, establish that the non-disclosed or misrepresented 
fact was an effective cause, although not necessarily the only cause, of their 
agreement to underwrite the risk.  The link between materiality and 
inducement has thus been severed.  Where the underwriter does give 
evidence, he will need to demonstrate a causal link between the 
presentation of the risk and its acceptance.      
Further inroads have recently been made into the notion of utmost 
good faith.  This has been done by first adopting a narrow, insured friendly 
approach towards the requirement of inducement, one incident of which 
has led to the courts to re-examine the defence of waiver; and second, by 
aligning the exercise of the remedy of avoidance for non-disclosure with 
the insurers’ duty of good faith.  In tandem with this process, the courts 
have also been examining the role of insurers as recipients of information 
during the disclosure process.  The effect is that the burden imposed by the 
duty is being recalibrated so as to strike some balance between the 
respective obligations of the parties especially at the stage when the risk is 
being presented for underwriting.  A further and significant recent 
development relates to the vexed question of whether the insured’s duty of 
good faith continues after the insurance contract has been concluded so that 
it again triggers when a claim is made under the policy.  
 
A.        REFINING INDUCEMENT  
 
The emphasis now being placed on the need to demonstrate 
inducement has been bolstered by the radical step taken by the court in 
Drake Insurance plc v. Provident Insurance plc, to the effect that, in 
deciding whether the non-disclosed fact had induced the insurer to enter the 
contract, it is necessary to examine what would have happened had full 
                                                                                                                 
151  [2003] 1 W.L.R. 577.  
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disclosure been made.152  In this case, the insurer sought to avoid the motor 
policy on the basis that it would have charged a higher premium had a 
speeding conviction been disclosed.153  The insured had disclosed an earlier 
fault accident, but failed to disclose before the present policy was 
concluded that it had been reclassified as a no-fault accident.154  The 
majority of the Court of Appeal held that, even if the conviction had been 
disclosed, information would have come to light that the earlier accident 
had not been the insured’s fault and this would have resulted in the 
proposal being accepted at a normal rate of premium.155  
Rix L.J., delivering the leading judgment,156 stated that the issue is 
not what actually happened, but what would have happened had the 
speeding conviction been declared.  To prove inducement, the insurer, 
Provident, would need to show that a higher premium would have 
resulted.157  This it could not do because it was common ground that it 
would not have increased the premium if the earlier accident had been no-
fault:  “So the question resolves itself into this: if the conviction had been 
mentioned, would the question of the status of the accident have been 
discussed?  It seems to me to be very likely that it would have been… .”158 
It is noteworthy that Rix L.J. went on to express the view that he 
could see no reason in principle why an insured should not be able to rely 
on facts which would have been material in his favour had they been 
disclosed.159  This, after all, is the case with insurers and the logic is, 
therefore, compelling.  Further, this reasoning marks a clear departure from 
the view expressed by Mance L.J. in Brotherton v. Aseguradora 
Colseguros SA,160 to the effect that an insured is not entitled to prove what 
the true position was at the time the contract was concluded as a means of 
proving that a particular fact was immaterial.161 
                                                                                                                 
152  [2003] EWCA Civ. 1834; [2004] Q.B. 601.  
153  Id. 
154  Id. 
155  Id. 
156  Id.  Clarke L.J. agreeing and Pill L.J. dissenting. 
157  Id. 
158  Drake Ins. [2003] EWCA Civ. 1834. 
159  Id. 
160  [2003] EWCA Civ. 705.  See also Malcolm Clarke, Non-disclosure and 
Avoidance: Lies, Damned Lies, and ”Intelligence” [2004] L.M.C.L.Q. 1. 
161  Brotherton [2003] EWCA Civ. 705 (rejecting the view of Colman J. in 
Strive Shipping Corp. v. Hellenic Mut. War Risks Ass’n (Bermuda) Ltd., (The 
Grecia Express), [2002] EWHC 203, 213, that “an insured is, if necessary, entitled 
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 Overall, the approach taken towards inducement by Rix L.J. has 
the effect of the court placing itself in the position of the underwriter.  The 
result is that the court is prepared to reopen the negotiations between the 
parties, certainly in relation to disclosure, and to speculate on their likely 
responses.162  In effect, the court is assessing what the underwriter’s most 
likely course of action would have been with full disclosure.  The onus is 
on the underwriter to prove that it would not have accepted the risk either 
at all or on the premium actually charged.  Given this proactive position 
being taken towards the issue, there seems no reason in principle why the 
judges should not also be able to apply the proportionality doctrine, long 
harnessed by the Ombudsman, rather than continue with the all or nothing 
approach of avoidance.  The approach adopted by Rix L.J. towards the 
determination of the particular risk in question thus renders the Law 
Commission’s reasoning, in its 1980 report rejecting the proportionality 
doctrine as "unworkable," less than compelling. 
 
B.         THE PRESENTATION OF THE RISK: A PRO-ACTIVE ROLE FOR 
INSURERS?  
 
This renewed focus on the requirement of inducement can be seen 
as part of the overarching anxiety that the presentation of the risk should be 
fair.  Here, the mutuality of the good faith duty has come to the fore and the 
judges have been directing their attention towards the content of the 
insurers’ obligation.  It will be recalled that in Carter v. Boehm, Lord 
Mansfield laid particular emphasis on both the need for a fair presentation 
of risk and the limits of the insured’s disclosure duty.163  In this respect, he 
excluded from the realms of the duty those facts which the insurer “waives 
being informed of” together with facts the insurer is presumed to know.164  
                                                                                                                          
to litigate the issue of the truth or falsity of known but undisclosed intelligence, in 
order to argue that, if it is shown to be incorrect, the insurer would be acting in bad 
faith or unconscionably in avoiding.") 
162  See R. Merkin, 16 Insurance Law Monthly (2004).  See also Bonner v. Cox 
Dedicated Corporate Member [2004] EWHC 2963 (Comm). 
163  Carter v. Boehm, (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1162, 1164-65. 
164  Id. at 1165.  Lord Mansfield explained that the insured need not disclose 
 
… what the underwriter knows ...what way soever he came 
to the knowledge.  The insured need not mention what the under-
writer ought to know; what he takes upon himself the knowledge 
of; or what he waives being informed of.  The underwriter needs 
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It will be recalled that Lord Mansfield returned to the role expected of 
underwriters during the disclosure process in Noble v. Kennoway, in which 
he held that the insurer was under a duty to inform himself of the practices 
of the trade he insures.165  Further, in Court v. Martineau, he was prepared 
to draw the inference that the insurer had waived the disclosure of certain 
facts by the large premium he charged for underwriting the risk in 
question.166   
Opportunities to consider the insurers’ duty of utmost good faith 
have been rare in modern times.  However, in Banque Keyser Ullman S.A. 
v. Skandia (U.K.) Insurance (C.A.), Slade L.J. said that the insurers’ duty of 
disclosure should 
 
… extend to disclosing facts known to him which are 
material either to the nature of the risk sought to be 
covered or the recoverability of a claim under the policy 
which a prudent insured would take into account in 
deciding whether to place the risk for which he seeks cover 
with that insurer.167   
 
The House of Lords approved Slade L.J.’s reasoning in this respect.  The 
only remedy available to the insured where the insurer is in breach of duty 
is avoidance ab initio.  In practice, this affords little or no benefit to 
insureds.  An insurer’s breach will come to light when the loss has been 
suffered – a time when an insured will want full recovery rather than a 
return of the premium. 
More recently, however, the issue has come to the fore in the 
context of determining the insurer’s role during the disclosure process 
                                                                                                                          
not be told what lessens the risque agreed and understood to be 
run by the express terms of the policy.  He needs not to be told 
general topics of speculation: as for instance - the under-writer is 
bound to know every cause which may occasion natural perils…. 
 
Id.  This particular element of the judgment was later codified, virtually verbatim, 
in the Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, § 18(3) (Eng.).   
165  (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 326.  See also Mayne v. Walter, (1782) 99 Eng. Rep. 
548. 
166  (1782) 99 Eng. Rep. 591.  See also Drake Ins. plc v. Provident Ins. plc, 
[2004] Q.B. 601 (reasoning of Rix L.J.).  
167  [1990] 1 Q.B. 665 (A.C.) at 772.  See also Aldrich v. Norwich Union Life 
Ins. Co. Ltd., [1999] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 707. 
2009] GOOD FAITH IN UK INSURANCE CONTRACTS 131 
 
where the insured has raised the defence of waiver.  Of significance in this 
respect are the views expressed by the Court of Appeal in WISE Ltd. v. 
Grupo Nacional Provincial SA.168  The issue arose in the context of 
commercial insurance.  The defendant, Mexican insurer GNP, appealed to 
the Court of Appeal against a decision of Simon J. that the claimants-
reinsurers WISE were entitled to avoid a reinsurance contract on the basis 
that the presence of high-value Rolex watches in the insured consignment 
of goods was not disclosed.169  This occurred as a result of a translation 
error in which the watches were described as clocks.170  It was held, by a 
majority, that GNP was entitled to recover.171  Although it was 
unanimously held that WISE had been induced by the presentation of the 
risk, Rix and Peter Gibson L.J.J. held that the reinsurers had affirmed the 
policy, notwithstanding the breach of the duty of disclosure, by giving 
notice of its cancellation.172  Such notice was inconsistent with any claim to 
avoid the policy ab initio.173  Both judges took the view that the trial judge 
had overlooked a vital email which showed that WISE were unequivocal in 
cancelling the policy.174   
With respect to the issue of waiver, the parties agreed that the law 
was accurately set out in MacGillivray on Insurance Law,175 which, citing 
CTI v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd.,176 states: 
 
The assured must perform his duty of disclosure properly 
by making a fair presentation of the risk proposed for 
insurance. If the insurers thereby receive information from 
the assured or his agent which, taken into conjunction with 
other facts known to them or which they are presumed to 
know, would naturally prompt a reasonably careful insurer 
to make further inquiries, then, if they omit to make the 
appropriate check or inquiry, assuming it can be made 
                                                                                                                 
168  [2004] EWCA Civ. 962. 
169  Id. 
170  Id. 
171  Id. 
172  Id. 
173  Id. 
174  WISE Ltd. [2004] EWCA Civ. 962.  Longmore L.J. dissented on the basis 
that the judge’s findings of fact could not be reversed.  Id. 
175  NICHOLAS LEIGH-JONES ET AL., MACGILLIVRAY ON INSURANCE LAW (10th 
ed. 2003). 
176  [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 476. 
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simply, they will be held to have waived disclosure of the 
material fact which that inquiry would necessarily have 
revealed. Waiver is not established by showing merely that 
the insurers were aware of the possibility of the existence 
of other material facts; they must be put fairly on inquiry 
about them.177 
 
Longmore L.J., with whom Peter Gibson L.J. agreed, took the view that 
since the carriage of Rolex watches was a material fact which was not 
disclosed, the presentation of the risk was unfair.178  The issue was, 
therefore, whether the facts that were disclosed would prompt a reasonably 
careful insurer to enquire whether watches were included in the shipment.  
As Longmore LJ explained, the issue came down to whether or not the 
insurer was “put on inquiry by the disclosure of facts which would raise in 
the mind of the reasonable insurer at least the suspicion that there were 
other circumstances which would or might vitiate the presentation.”179  On 
the facts he held that there was nothing in the presentation of the risk that 
could be said to have raised the suspicion that Rolex watches were to be 
included in the consignment.180   
 Of particular interest for present purposes is Rix L.J.’s dissenting 
judgment on this issue.  In finding that there had been waiver, he placed 
particular emphasis on the mutuality of the duty of utmost good faith, and 
stated that the only relevant question was whether the presentation was 
fair.181  This could not be judged in isolation, although an obviously unfair 
presentation would rarely leave room for waiver to operate.182  The 
insurers’ reaction and the issue of possible waiver had to be taken into 
account.183  The question is not whether an “unfair” presentation had been 
waived but whether, taking both sides into account, the presentation was 
unfair or, alternatively, it would be unfair of the insurers to avoid the 
contract on a ground on which they were put on inquiry and should have 
satisfied themselves by making appropriate enquiries.184  
                                                                                                                 
177  LEIGH-JONES ET AL., supra note 175, ¶¶ 17-83. 
178  WISE Ltd. [2004] EWCA Civ. 962. 
179  Id. 
180  Id. 
181  Id. 
182  Id. 
183  Id. 
184  WISE Ltd. [2004] EWCA Civ. 962. 
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Ultimately, it seems, the question is: Has the insurer been 
put fairly on inquiry about the existence of other material 
facts, which such inquiry would necessarily have revealed?  
The test has to be applied by reference to a reasonably 
careful insurer rather than the actual insurer, and not 
merely by reference to what such an insurer is told in the 
assured's actual presentation but also by reference to what 
he knows or ought to know, ie. his s 18(3)(b) [of the 1906 
Act] knowledge… Overriding all, however, is the notion of 
fairness, and that applies mutually to both parties, even if 
the presentation starts with the would-be assured.185 
 
Rix L.J. therefore concluded that a reasonably careful insurer would have 
been fairly put on inquiry given what he knew from GNP's presentation and 
his general, presumed knowledge.186  The question as to what types of 
clocks were being transported was one that should have been asked by the 
reinsurers.  He went on to state that: 
 
If the question is instead the overriding question:  Is the 
ultimate assessment of GNP's presentation that it is unfair, 
or would it be unfair to allow the reinsurers a remedy of 
avoidance in such a case?  I would answer that the 
presentation was fair, and that it would be unfair to allow 
reinsurers to take advantage of an error of translation in a 
case where, on the evidence, an exclusion of watches 
would seem to have been the obvious solution.187 
 
For Rix L.J., the duty of utmost good faith and, more particularly, its 
content insofar as it applies to insurers or reinsurers, requires them to play a 
pro-active role in the disclosure process rather than relying solely upon the 
insured’s presentation.188  In this respect, his approach resonates with that 
taken by Lord Mansfield in Noble v. Kennoway,189 and Court v. 
                                                                                                                 
185  Id. 
186  Id. 
187  Id.  
188  See Merkin, supra note 162. 
189  (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 326. 
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Martineau.190  Further, the clear implication seems to be that given that the 
insurers or reinsurers draft the policy terms; there is more than adequate 
opportunity for them to take the necessary steps to protect themselves in 
relation to the risks to be underwritten. 
C.         ALIGNING THE INSURER’S REMEDY OF AVOIDANCE WITH THE 
DUTY OF UTMOST GOOD FAITH  
 
We have seen that the consequence of non-disclosure is to render 
the insurance contract voidable, thereby entitling the insurer to avoid it ab 
initio.191  Any premium paid is returnable to the insured except in cases of 
fraud (unless the policy otherwise provides).192  Not surprisingly, as with 
the requirements of inducement and waiver, the conditions governing the 
exercise of the avoidance remedy have also attracted considerable judicial 
attention of late.  Again, the views expressed have not been entirely 
consistent.  In The Grecia Express, Colman J. suggested that the right to 
avoid is conditional upon the insurer acting with “duty of the utmost good 
faith.”193  He also reasoned, as commented above, that an insured is entitled 
to litigate the issue of the truth or falsity of material circumstances in order 
to argue that, if it is shown to be incorrect, the insurer would be acting in 
bad faith or unconscionably in avoiding the policy.194  In a similar vein, in 
Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Uni-Polaris Shipping Co. Ltd.,195 Lord 
Hobhouse, delivering the leading speech, identifies the need for some 
balance to be struck between the parties in the post-contract situation and 
suggests, as did Lord Mansfield in Carter v. Boehm, that the courts should 
guard against the danger of the good faith duty being turned into an 
                                                                                                                 
190  (1782) 99 Eng. Rep. 591. 
191  Abram Steamship Co. v. Westville Shipping Co., [1923] A.C. 773, 781.  
See also Glasgow Assurance Corp. v. Symondson & Co., (1911) 16 Com. Cas. 
109, 121 (Scrutton J., suggesting that the only remedy available for non-disclosure 
is avoidance of the contract). 
192  PARK, supra note 18, at 218.  The Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, 
c. 41, § 83(3)(a) (Eng.) provides, “Where the policy is void, or is avoided by the 
insurer, as from the commencement of the risk, the premium is returnable, 
provided that there has been no fraud or illegality on the part of the assured . . . .”   
193  Strive Shipping Corp. v. Hellenic Mut. War Risks Ass’n (Bermuda) Ltd. 
(The Grecia Express) [2002] EWHC 203. 
194  Id.  
195  [2003] 1 A.C. 469, 496-97. 
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instrument permitting unconscionable behaviour on the part of 
underwriters.  He wrote: 
 
The courts have consistently set their face against allowing 
the assured's duty of good faith to be used by the insurer as 
an instrument for enabling the insurer himself to act in bad 
faith.  An inevitable consequence in the post-contract 
situation is that the remedy of avoidance of the contract is 
in practical terms wholly one-sided.  It is a remedy of value 
to the insurer and, if the defendants’ argument is accepted, 
of disproportionate benefit to him; it enables him to escape 
retrospectively the liability to indemnify which he has 
previously and (on this hypothesis) validly undertaken.196 
 
Against this, a rather more rigid view was taken towards the exercise of the 
remedy in Brotherton v. Aseguradora Colseguros SA (No. 2).197  Mance 
L.J. explained that the right to avoid is a self-help remedy that is exercised 
without the court’s authorisation.198  He stated that avoidance for non-
disclosure is to be treated in the same way as rescission for 
misrepresentation under the general law of contract, which is “by act of the 
innocent party operating independently of the court.”199  In short, the court 
at trial cannot reverse a valid avoidance.  This affirms the orthodoxy that 
holds that an insurer has an unfettered discretion to avoid the contract in 
cases where there has been a breach of the duty of disclosure even where 
the facts relied on, which in this case concerned allegations going as to 
moral hazard, turn out to be unfounded.    
Notwithstanding this strict stance, the courts have continued to 
subject the conditions governing the right of avoidance to scrutiny and have 
suggested that the good faith duty triggers whenever underwriters seek to 
exercise the remedy.  In his far reaching judgment delivered in Drake 
Insurance plc v. Provident Insurance plc, Rix L.J. observed that the 
doctrine of good faith should be capable of limiting the insurer's right to 
                                                                                                                 
196  Id. at 497. 
197  [2003] EWCA Civ. 705.   
198  Id. 
199  Id.  Note the criticism of this reasoning by Malcolm Clarke, Rescission: 
Inducement and Good Faith, CAMBRIDGE L.J. 286, 287 (2004).  See generally 
Peter Macdonald Eggers, Remedies for the Failure to Observe the Utmost Good 
Faith, L.M.C.L.Q. 249, 262-71 (2003). 
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avoid in circumstances where that remedy, “which has been described in 
recent years as draconian,” would operate unfairly.200  He went on to note 
that in recent years, there has been a realisation that in certain respects 
English insurance law has developed too stringently.201  Citing Pan 
Atlantic, Rix L.J. stated that leading modern cases show that the courts are 
prepared to introduce safeguards and flexibility.202  Importantly, he said 
that it would not be in good faith to avoid a policy without first allowing 
the insured an opportunity to address the reason for the avoidance.203  He 
concluded by stressing that not all insurance contracts are made by those 
engaged in commerce and the widespread nature of consumer insurance 
presented new problems.204 “It may be necessary to give wider effect to the 
doctrine of good faith and recognize that its impact may demand that 
ultimately regard must be had to a concept of proportionality implicit in 
fair dealing.”205   
Turning to the mutuality of the duty of utmost good faith, the Court 
of Appeal sought to refine the insurer’s duty further.  Rix and Clarke L.J.J. 
took the view that if the insurer had actual knowledge or blind-eye 
knowledge of the fact that the accident was “no-fault,” it would have been 
a matter of bad faith had the insurer avoided the policy.206  Rix L.J. left the 
question open whether “something less than such knowledge would have 
been enough to qualify an unrestricted right to avoid.”207   Pill L.J., 
however, discusses blind-eye knowledge and points out that there must be a 
suspicion that relevant facts exist and a deliberate decision not to make an 
                                                                                                                 
200  [2003] EWCA Civ. 1834, [2004] Q.B. 601, 628.  For criticism of the 
court’s finding that the insurer’s right of avoidance was subject to good faith, see 
Neil Campbell, Good Faith: Lessons from Insurance Law, 11 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 479 
(2005).  It was, of course, inevitable that the Court of Appeal in North Star 
Shipping Ltd. v. Sphere Drake Ins. plc, [2006] EWCA Civ. 378, did not permit the 
amendment to the notice of appeal and, therefore, did not have the opportunity to 
comment on this aspect of Drake. 
201  Drake Ins. [2003] EWCA Civ. 1834. 
202  Id. 
203  Id., [2004] Q.B. at 628, 630. 
204  Id. at 629. 
205  Id. 
206  Id. 
207  Drake Ins., [2004] Q.B. at 630.  Clarke L.J., denied the existence of “a 
general principle that insurers must always give the insured an opportunity to 
address the reason why they are considering avoidance.” Id. at 642. 
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enquiry.208  He goes on to state, “failure to make any enquiry of the insured 
before taking the drastic step of avoiding the policy was in my judgment a 
breach by the insurer of the duty of good faith.”209   While he concluded 
that they did not have blind-eye knowledge, nevertheless, he took the view 
that they were under a duty of good faith to inform the insured of their 
intention to avoid the policy and to give him an opportunity to update them 
with respect to the accident.210 
It is noteworthy that the issue of the (re)insurer’s good faith duty 
has recently been considered in relation to express terms contained in the 
insurance policy.  In Gan Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tai Ping Insurance Co. 
Ltd., it was held that claims co-operation clauses are subject to a rationality 
test which owes its origins to the insurers’ duty of good faith.211  Although 
there was no implied term that approval of a settlement could not be 
unreasonably withheld, the right to withold approval was not unqualified.212  
It must be exercised in good faith.213  Thus, (re)insurers are under a duty of 
good faith in exercising their rights under a claims co-operation clause, and 
must not, therefore, arbitrarily refuse to approve a settlement. 
 
IV. REINING IN THE NOTION OF THE INSURED’S POST-
CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH DUTY 
 
The move away from the position permitting an unfettered right of 
avoidance must also be viewed against the wider landscape in which the 
nature and scope of the insured’s post-contractual duty of good faith has 
similarly been tested by the courts.  Until recently, the judicial consensus 
was that the insured’s duty of good faith revived in appropriate 
circumstances during the currency of the contract.214  In this regard the 
                                                                                                                 
208  Id. at 649. 
209  Id. 
210  Id. 
211  [2001] EWCA Civ. 1047 (Mance L.J.).  See also Eagle Star Ins. Co. Ltd. 
v. Cresswell [2004] EWCA Civ. 602. 
212  Gan Ins. Co. Ltd. [2001] EWCA 1047. 
213  Id. 
214  Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd.  v. Uni-Polaris Shipping. Co. Ltd. [2003] 1 
A.C. 469 (Leggatt L.J.) (approving the judgment of Rix J. in Royal Boskalis 
Westminster NV v. Mountain, [1999] Q.B. 674, in which the judge cited the 
following passage from MALCOLM A. CLARKE, THE LAW OF INSURANCE 
CONTRACTS 708 (2d ed. 1994):  
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position was stated Mathew L.J. in Boulton v. Houlder Bros. & Co., that it 
“is an essential condition of the policy of insurance that the underwriters 
shall be treated with good faith, not merely in reference to the inception of 
the risk, but in the steps taken to carry out the contract.”215  The underlying 
rationale for this view was explained by Hoffmann L.J. in Orakpo v. 
Barclays Ins. Services Co. Ltd.216  
 
I do not see why the duty of good faith on the part of the 
assured should expire when the contract has been made.  
The reasons for requiring good faith continue to exist.  Just 
as the nature of the risk will usually be within the peculiar 
knowledge of the insured, so will the circumstances of the 
casualty; it will rarely be within the knowledge of the 
insurance company.  I think that the insurance company 
should be able to trust the assured to put forward a claim in 
good faith.217 
 
Sir Roger Parker agreed with Hoffmann L.J..218  There the Court of Appeal 
held that a claim which is fraudulent entitles the insurer to avoid the contact 
ab initio irrespective of whether there is a term in the policy to that 
effect.219  However, Staughton L.J. differed.220  While he thought this 
                                                                                                                          
As regards insurance contracts, the duty of good faith 
continues throughout the contractual relationship at a level 
appropriate to the moment.  In particular, the duty of disclosure, 
most prominent prior to contract formation, revives whenever the 
insured has an express or implied duty to supply information to 
enable the insurer to make a decision.  Hence, it applies if cover 
is extended or renewed.  It also applies when the insured claims 
insurance money: he must make ‘full disclosure of the 
circumstances of the case’ [citing Shepherd v. Chewter, (1808) 1 
Camp. 274, 275 (Lord Ellenborough)]. 
 
215  [1904] 1 KB 784, 791-92.  See also Shepherd v. Chewter, (1808) 170 Eng. 
Rep. 955, 957. 
216  [1994] C.L.C. 373 (A.C.). 
217  Id. at 383. 
218  Id. at 384. 
219  See generally Id.  
220  Id.  
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should certainly be the case where the policy so provided,221 he was not 
convinced this should necessarily be the case in the absence of such term: 
 
I do not know of any other corner of the law where the 
plaintiff who has made a fraudulent claim is deprived even 
of that which he is lawfully entitled to… True, there is 
distinguished support for such a doctrine…  But we were 
not told of any authority which binds us to teach that 
conclusion.222 
 
It is settled that if the insured makes a fraudulent claim, he or she 
will not be able to recover.223  The consequence is that the insured will 
forfeit all rights under the policy.224  However, the question whether the 
policy can be avoided ab initio so that the insurer can recover any 
payments made with respect to an earlier loss, or whether the insurer 
should be restricted to recovering only from the date of the fraudulent 
claim, has received inconsistent responses by the courts.225  For example, in 
Black King Shipping Corp. v. Massie (The Litsion Pride), it was held that a 
fraudulent claim could amount to breach of section 17 of the 1906 Act, 
thereby entitling the insurer to avoid the contract ab initio.226  However, the 
courts have recently been retreating from this position by placing limits on 
the insureds’ post-contractual good faith duty.  In Orakpo, the majority of 
the Court of Appeal was of the view that where an insured’s claim is 
fraudulent to a “substantial extent,” it must fail.227  The meaning of 
“substantial” was considered by the Court of Appeal in Galloway v. 
                                                                                                                 
221  Albeit, subject to the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations. 
222  Orakpo, [1994] C.L.C. at 382-83 (citing, inter alia, Britton v. Royal Ins. 
Co., (1866) 176 Eng. Rep. 843; Black King Shipping Corp. v. Massie (The Litsion 
Pride), [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 437). 
223  Britton v. Royal Ins. Co., (1866) 176 Eng. Rep. 843, 844. 
224  Id.  
225  See, e.g., Gore Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bifford, [1987] 45 D.L.R (Ltd.) 763; Reid 
& Co., Ltd. v. Employers’ Accident & Livestock Ins. Co. Ltd., (1899) 1 F. 1031; 
The Litsion Pride, 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 437.  See also MALCOLM A. CLARKE, THE LAW 
OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 214, at 859; Malcolm A. Clarke, Lies, 
Damned Lies, and Insurance Claims: the Elements and Effect of Fraud, [2000] 
N.Z.L.R. 233, 251. 
226  The Litsion Pride, 1 Lloyd’s Rep. at 438. 
227  Orakpo, [1994] C.L.C. at 385 (Hoffman L.J., Sir Roger Parker).  This is 
merely the application of the de minimis rule. 
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Guardian Royal Exchange (U.K.) Ltd.228  The claimant’s premises were 
burgled and he claimed under a home contents policy some £16,133.94 (the 
probable true value of the loss) and an additional £2,000 for a computer.229  
In fact, there had been no loss of a computer and a receipt which the 
claimant produced as evidence of purchase was a forgery.230  Further, when 
completing the proposal form for this insurance some five months prior to 
the claim, he had failed to disclose a conviction for obtaining property by 
deception.231  Lord Woolf M.R., stressing that the policy of the law must be 
to deter the making of fraudulent claims, stated that the phrase 
“substantial:” 
 
is to be understood as indicating that, if there is some 
immaterial non-disclosure, then of course, even though that 
material non-disclosure was fraudulent dire consequences 
do not follow in relation to the claim as a whole; but if the 
fraud is material, it does have the effect that it taints the 
whole.232 
 
 For Lord Woolf M.R., the whole of the claim must be looked at in 
order to determine whether the fraud is material.233  On the facts of the 
case, the claim for £2,000 amounted to some 10 per cent of the whole.234  
This was an amount that was thought substantial and it therefore tainted the 
whole claim.235   
                                                                                                                 
228  [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 209, 213. 
229  Id. at 210. 
230  Id. 
231  Id. 
232  Id. at 213. 
233  Id. 
234  Galloway, [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. at 213-14. 
235  Id.  Millett L.J., however, disagreed with this reasoning.  He said that the 
determination of whether or not a claim is “substantially” fraudulent should not be 
tested by reference to the proportion it bears to the entire claim.  Id. at 214.  To do 
so “would lead to the absurd conclusion that the greater the genuine loss, the larger 
the fraudulent claim which may be made at the same time without penalty.”  Id.  In 
Millett L.J.’s view, the size of the genuine claim should not be taken into account.  
Id.  All that matters is that the insured is in breach of the duty of good faith which 
leaves him without cover.  As a matter of policy, he added that he would not 
support any dilution of the insured’s duty of good faith.  Id. 
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The need for certainty was finally addressed by the House of Lords 
decision in Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Uni-Polaris Ins. Co. Ltd. (The 
Star Sea).236  While the trial judge had doubted the independent application 
of utmost good faith to the claims process, the Court of Appeal, took the 
view that the duty of good faith binds both the insured and the insurer when 
a claim is made.237  Leggatt L.J. observed that “[i]t is less clear from the 
cases whether there is a duty to disclose co-extensive with that which exists 
before the contract of insurance is entered into, as opposed to a rather 
different obligation to make full disclosure of the circumstances of the 
claim.  But that distinction matters not.”238  Leggatt L.J. went on to state 
that that the insured’s duty of good faith requires that the claim should not 
be made fraudulently and that the duty “is coincident with the term to be 
implied by law, as forming part of a contract of insurance, that where fraud 
is proved in the making of a claim the insurer is discharged from all 
liability.”239  In conclusion, the judge stressed that given the draconian 
remedy available to insurers where a claim is made fraudulently, there 
should be no enlargement of the insured’s duty so as to encompass claims 
made “culpably.”240   
                                                                                                                 
236  [2001] UKHL 1, [2003] 1 A.C. 469, 508-09.  See also Sir Andrew 
Longmore, Good Faith and Breach of Warranty:  Are We Moving Forwards or 
Backwards?, 2004 L.M.C.L.Q. 158, 166-71. 
237  Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Uni-Polaris Ins. Co. Ltd., [1995] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 651, 667; aff’d, [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 360.  The judge held that even if it did 
operate there had to be at the very least recklessness by the insured and that the 
duty came to an end once legal proceedings had been commenced as after that date 
false statements were to be dealt with as part of the court’s processes rather than as 
part of the claim.  Id.  
238  Manifest Shipping Co., [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. at 371. 
239  Id.  See also Orakpo v. Barclays Ins. Servs., [1999] C.L.C. 373, 383 
(Hoffmann L.J. stated “[a]ny fraud in making the claim goes to the root of the 
contract and entitles the insurer to be discharged.”)  As has been seen in Galloway, 
the Court of Appeal held that the absence of an express condition providing that 
where there was a fraudulent claim the policy would be void made no difference 
for the duty of good faith continued long after the policy was effected and applied 
to the claims process.  Galloway, [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. I. R. at 211. 
240  Manifest Shipping Co., [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. at 372.  See also Diggens v. 
Sun Alliance and London Ins. plc, [1994] C.L.C. 1146 (the duty is not broken by 
an innocent or negligent non-disclosure).   
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The House of Lords, doubting the reasoning of Hirst J. in The 
Litsion Pride,241 accepted that the duty of good faith continued to apply 
after the conclusion of the insurance contract but held that the claim of 
fraud had not been proved.  As seen above, Lord Hobhouse, noting that the 
right to avoid under the Marine Insurance Act 1906, section 17 entitles the 
insurer to rescind the contract ab initio, thought that were this remedy to 
apply where the breach of duty occurs post-contractually, the effect would 
be effectively penal.242  In his reasoning in this regard, Lord Hobhouse 
could find no authority to support the notion that the duty of utmost good 
faith declared by section 17 continued to bind the insured post-
contractually: 
 
[The] authorities show that there is a clear distinction to be 
made between the pre-contract duty of disclosure and any 
duty of disclosure which may exist after the contract has 
been made.  It is not right to reason, . . . from the existence 
of an extensive duty pre-contract positively to disclose all 
material facts to the conclusion that post-contract there is a 
similarly extensive obligation to disclose all facts which 
the insurer has an interest in knowing and which might 
affect his conduct.243 
 
With respect to the majority view in Orakpo, Lord Hobhouse observed that 
the decision “cannot be treated as fully authoritative in view of the 
contractual analysis there adopted” with respect to the duty of good faith.244  
His Lordship, stressing that the duty of utmost good faith applies only up 
until the conclusion of the contract, noted that a duty to disclose 
information can nevertheless arise later, during the currency of the policy, 
as a result of an express or implied term.245 
Recently the issue again arose in K/S Merc-Scandia XXXXII v. 
Lloyd's Underwriters (The Mercandian Continent).246  The insured 
                                                                                                                 
241  Black King Shipping Corp. v. Massie (The Litsion Pride), [1985] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 437, 437.  See also Howard N. Bennett, Mapping the Doctrine of 
Utmost Good Faith in Insurance Contract Law, 1999 L.M.C.L.Q. 165. 
242  Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Uni-Polaris Ins. Co. Ltd. [2001] UKHL 1, 
[2003] 1 A.C. 469, 494. 
243  Id., [2003] 1 A.C. at 496-97. 
244  Id. at 501. 
245  Id. at 495.   
246  [2001] EWCA Civ. 1275, [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 563.   
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submitted a forged letter to his liability insurers to assist them in defending 
a claim that had been brought against the insured by a third party.247  The 
purpose was to show that the insured had not entered into a contract with 
the claimant third party conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the English 
courts.248  The letter was found to be immaterial and the insurers were 
therefore held liable.249  The Court of Appeal, aligning the duty of 
disclosure during the claims process with its pre-contract counterpart, took 
the view that the non-disclosed or misrepresented fact must be material and 
it must induce the insurer to pay the claim.250  With respect to the remedy 
available to the innocent party, Longmore L.J. explained that the right to 
avoid the contract with retrospective effect is only exercisable in 
circumstances where the innocent party would, in any event, be entitled to 
terminate the contract for breach.251  He went on to state that: 
 
[T]he giving of information, pursuant to an express or 
implied obligation to do so in the contract of insurance, is 
an occasion when good faith should be exercised.  Since, . . 
. the giving of information is essentially an obligation 
stemming from contract, the remedy for the insured 
fraudulently misinforming the insurer must be 
commensurate with the insurer's remedies for breach of 
contract.  The insurer will not, therefore, be able to avoid 
the contract of insurance with retrospective effect unless he 
can show that the fraud was relevant to his ultimate 
liability under the policy and was such as would entitle 
him to terminate the insurance contract.252 
 
Not surprisingingly, the issue continued to be litigated and the 
Court of Appeal was soon afforded another opportunity to settle the point, 
at least with some measure of clarity.  In Agapitos v. Agnew (The Aegeon), 
the question which Mance L.J. focused upon was whether a genuine claim 
could become fraudulent because it was made fraudulently and whether, in 
                                                                                                                 
247  Id., [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 567. 
248  Id. at 566-67. 
249  Id. at 576. 
250  Id. at 573. 
251  Id. at 575. 
252  The Mercandian Continent, [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 576. 
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consequence, the duty of utmost good faith was broken.253  Holding that the 
duty did not apply to fraudulent claims so that the policy could not be 
avoided ab initio, Mance L.J. went on to state the position with respect to 
fraudulent devices.254  He thought that an acceptable solution would be to 
"treat the use of a fraudulent device as a sub-species of making a fraudulent 
claim" and to treat as relevant for this purpose 
 
any lie, directly related to the claim to which the fraudulent 
device relates, which is intended to improve the insured's 
prospects of obtaining a settlement or winning the case, 
and which would, if believed, tend, objectively, prior to 
any final determination at trial of the parties' rights, to 
yield a not insignificant improvement in the insured's 
prospects - whether they be prospects of obtaining a 
settlement, or a better settlement, or of winning at trial.255 
 
The insurer is therefore discharged from liability in respect of such a 
claim.256  Concluding the point, it was held that the common law rules 
governing the making of a fraudulent claim (including the use of fraudulent 
device) fell outside the scope of section 17 of the 1906 Act.257  Further, the 
                                                                                                                 
253  [2003] Q.B. 556.  See also, H. Y. Yeo, Post-contractual good faith – 
change in judicial attitude?, 66 M.L.R. 425 (2003).   
254  Agapitos, [2003] Q.B. at 574-75. 
255  Id. at 575.  In Stemson v. AMP Gen. Ins. (NZ) Ltd. [2006] UKPC 30, the 
Privy Council endorsed this approach. 
256  The reasoning of Mance L.J. has recently been applied by Simon J. in 
Eagle Star Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Games Video Co. SA (The Game Boy), [2004] EWHC 
15.  See also Interpart Comerciao e Gestao SA v. Lexington Ins. Co., [2004] 
Lloyd’s Rep I.R. 690. 
257  See also Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Tyser & Co. [2006] EWCA Civ. 54, 
[2006] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 501, which held that any notion that the insured’s duty 
of good faith continues post-contractually cannot be divorced from the terms of the 
policy. The way in which such a continuing duty can arise is by implying a term 
into the contract, on the basis that it is necessary for business efficacy, which 
requires the insured to provide information in appropriate circumstances.  It 
therefore follows that there is no independent post-contractual good faith duty.  All 
post-contract issues are to be determined according to the terms of the policy and 
in this respect, the decision appears to accord with Staughton L.J.’s minority view 
in Orakpo v. Barclays Ins. Serv.’s, [1994] C.L.C. 373 (A.C.).  See also Bonner v. 
Cox Dedicated Corporate Member Ltd. [2004] EWHC 2963 (Comm.) (Morison 
J.).  Further, following Friends Provident Life & Pensions Ltd. v. Sirius Int’l. Ins. 
 
2009] GOOD FAITH IN UK INSURANCE CONTRACTS 145 
 
Court of Appeal also went on to hold that once litigation between the 
insurers and the insured has commenced, the consequences of making a 
fraudulent claim or promoting a claim with fraudulent devices are 
superseded by the procedural rules governing civil litigation.258   
Mance L.J. was again given the opportunity to revisit the issue in 
AXA General Insurance Ltd. v. Gottlieb.259  The issue was whether under 
the common law rule relating to fraudulent claims, an insurer could recover 
interim payments made prior to any fraud in respect of genuine losses 
incurred on the claim to which the subsequent fraud related.260  The judge 
rejected the submission of the insureds’ counsel to the effect that where a 
genuine right to indemnity has both arisen and been subject of a payment 
made prior to any fraud committed in respect of the same claim, there can 
be no conceptual basis for requiring the insured to repay the sums 
received.261  Mance L.J. stated that: 
 
If a later fraud forfeits a genuine claim which has already 
accrued but not been paid, the obvious conceptual basis is 
that the whole claim is forfeit… If the whole claim is 
forfeit, then the fact that sums have been advanced towards 
it is of itself no answer to their recovery.262 
 
The effect of counsel’s argument would be to result in the anomaly that 
forfeiture of the whole claim should be restricted to the whole of the 
outstanding claim only; in other words, to any part that remains unpaid as 
of the date of the fraud.  Mance L.J. explained that the rationale of the rule 
relating to fraudulent claims is that an insured should not expect that, 
                                                                                                                          
Co. [2005] EWCA Civ. 601, it will probably never be the case that breach of such 
a term is repudiatory of the policy as a whole. Waller L.J. expressed the 
unconvincing view that perhaps a series of breaches might be repudiatory so that, 
in effect, the notion of a continuing duty is dead and buried.  Id. 
258  See also Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Uni-Polaris Shipping Co. Ltd., 
[2001] UKHL 1, 481.  But see Eagle Star Ins. Co. Ltd. [2004] EWHC 15.  Simon J. 
explained that this could give rise to anomalous consequences: “After litigation has 
commenced an insured may advance false documentation and lie without the 
drastic consequences which follow if the deployment of false documentation and 
lies are less well timed.” Id. 
259  [2005] EWCA Civ. 112 (Keene and Pill L.J.J., concurring). 
260  Id. 
261  Id. 
262  Id. 
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should the fraud fail, he or she will lose nothing.263  The court should not, 
therefore, undermine the prophylactic policy of the common law rule by 
holding that forfeiture should not apply to a part of a claim that is otherwise 
honest.264  Accordingly, it was held that the effect of the common law is to 
forfeit the whole of the fraudulent claim so that the consideration for any 
interim payments made on that claim fails.265  Such sums are thus 
recoverable by the insurers irrespective of whether they were paid prior to 
the fraud.266   
The issue of fraudulent claims again came to the fore in Danepoint 
Ltd. v. Allied Underwriting Insurance Ltd., in which a block of some 
thirteen flats was damaged by a fire. 267  The insured lodged a number of 
exaggerated claims together with a fraudulent claim relating to loss of 
rent.268  Coulson J. subjected the authorities to thorough review.  He 
concluded that the duty of utmost good faith declared by section 17 of the 
1906 Act does not trigger during the claims process.269  An insurer cannot, 
therefore, avoid the policy ab initio on the ground of fraud.270  Where all or 
part of the claim is fraudulent, or where fraudulent devices are enlisted to 
promote a genuine claim, the insured will not be permitted to recover in 
respect of any part of the claim.271  Mere exaggeration will not, in itself, 
suffice to substantiate an allegation of fraud.272  But if the exaggeration is 
wilful, or is allied to misrepresentation or concealment, it will, in the 
judge’s view, probably be held to be fraudulent.  In this regard, an 
exaggeration is more excusable where the value of the particular claim or 
head of loss in question is unclear or is a matter of opinion.273   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
263  Id. 
264  Id. 
265  AXA Gen. Ins. Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ. 112. 
266  Id. 
267  [2005] EWHC 2318 (TCC).  See also J. Lowry and P. Rawlings, 
Fraudulent claims: framing the appropriate remedy, [2006] J. BUS. L. 339.  Cf. 
Stemson v. AMP Gen. Ins. (NZ) Ltd., [2006] UKPC 30. 
268  Danepoint Ltd. [2005] EWHC 2318. 
269  Id. 
270  Id. 
271  Id. at 432. 
272  Id. at 438. 
273  See, e.g., Orakpo v. Barclays Ins. Serv., [1994] C.L.C. 373 (A.C.). 
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V. THE FUTURE 
 
The reasoning expressed in the modern cases demonstrates a 
significant shift in the way the courts approach the good faith duty.  The 
process of recalibrating the insured’s pre-contractual duty of good faith 
seen in the case law over the last decade or so is not being done in isloation 
from other aspects of the insurance contract for the courts are also adding 
content to the duty of good faith which the insurer owes to the insured at 
the time the risk is presented, at the time when the remedy of avoidance is 
exercised and at the time when insurers assert the benefit of claims clauses.  
With respect to consumer insurance there is a considerable body of 
Ombudsman jurisprudence to be added to the burgeoning case law.  The 
result is that we now have two parallel regimes governing insurance 
contracts: one relating to commercial insurance and one relating to 
consumer insurance.  In terms of coherence, this is not satisfactory.  
However, the Scottish and English Law Commissions current re-
examination of insurance offers the potential for a thorough overhaul of the 
law, and in this regard it will be recalled that non-disclosure is identified as 
a key issue.  It was to be hoped that the exercise would seek to assimilate 
the developments seen in the modern decisions into a single scheme for 
both consumer and commercial insurance.  Admittedly, for other types of 
contracts the legislature has seen fit to distinguish between consumer and 
commercial transactions,274 but, as is pointed out by Professor Clarke, for 
insurance the distinction necessarily results in the adoption of arbitrary 
tests based on turnover.275  In any case, English judges have shown some 
reluctance in recognising such a dichotomy.  For example, in Cook v. 
Financial Insurance Co.,276 Lord Lloyd,277 considering the effect of a term 
contained in a policy for disability insurance effected by a self-employed 
builder, took the view that it “must be construed in the sense in which it 
would have been reasonably understood by him as the consumer….”278   
In framing a suitable model for the duty of good faith, an 
appropriate balance needs to be struck between the economic costs of 
reform and the benefits, including social benefits, which a more balanced 
regime will bring.  Such considerations must also be weighed against the 
                                                                                                                 
274  For example, in the realms of sales law and credit transactions. 
275   Clarke, supra note 199, at 288.  See supra text accompanying note 9. 
276  [1998] 1 W.L.R. 1765. 
277  Both Lord Steyn and Lord Hope agreed. 
278  Cook, [1998] 1 W.L.R. at 1768. 
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objective of improving the competitiveness of the insurance market.279  
This is not to under-estimate the difficulties of framing a solution.  Any 
such reform needs to avoid excessive interference with commercial 
practices and avoid introducing uncertainty into the law.280  Over twenty 
years ago, the Australian Law Reform Commission (hereafter, the ALRC) 
published its wide-ranging report on insurance law,281 which unlike the 
1980 report of its English counterpart, led to statutory reform by way of the 
Australian Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (hereafter, ICA 1984).282  The 
ALRC recommended a new test for the determination of the insured’s duty 
of disclosure, namely that the duty should be tested by what the insured 
knew, or what a reasonable person in the insured’s circumstances would 
have known, to be relevant to the assessment of the risk.283  The ALRC 
considered that this formulation of the duty was more consistent with the 
limits of the insured’s duty to exercise utmost good faith.284  It also thought 
that the formulation would achieve a fairer balance between insured and 
insurer than would the more objective test recommended by the English 
Law Commission in 1980.285   
 In reaching its conclusions, the ALRC took into account a number 
of factors which offer important lessons for the investigation now 
underway in the UK.  It found that fairness to the insured can only be 
achieved if both insurers and the law which regulates the insurance 
relationship are sensitive to the literacy, knowledge, experience, and 
                                                                                                                 
279  This objective informed the deliberations and recommendations put 
forward by the Australian Law Reform Commission. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM 
COMMISSION, INSURANCE CONTRACTS, Rep. No. 20, at xxi (1982).   
280  See report of the NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, supra note 6, ¶ 10. 
281  See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 279.  The Report 
is regarded as authoritative in the interpretation of the Insurance Contracts Act, 
1984 (Austl.).  See Ferrcom Pty. Ltd. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. of 
Austl. Ltd., (1993) 176 C.L.R. 332, 340.  By virtue of §§ 13-14 of the 1984 Act, 
utmost good faith is an implied term that applies to both parties to the contract.  
Thus, breach of the duty is a breach of contract giving rise to damages or to an 
estoppel and not to avoidance ab initio. 
282  Most of the 1984 Act’s provisions came into operation on 1 January 1986. 
283  See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 279, ¶ 24, at 
xxix.  See also ICA 1984, supra note 281, §§ 21 and 21A (as amended).  
284  AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 279, ¶ 328, at 202. 
285  Id. ¶ 182, at 110. 
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cultural background of insureds.286  More particularly, it was emphasised 
that the law should recognise the modern conditions in which insurance is 
marketed.287  Nowadays, insurance contracts are concluded with a 
minimum of formality and so, subject only to the principle of good faith, 
insurers should take individual members of the relevant market as they find 
them.  The ALRC found that the existing duty of disclosure imposes 
obligations which many prospective insureds, acting in the utmost good 
faith, are unable to discharge.288  Indeed, in the current market place 
marketing methods are adopted which increase the risk of non-disclosure, 
and where intermediaries are not involved, there is no one to bring to the 
insured's attention the breadth of the disclosure obligation.  For reasons of 
cost and competition, proposal forms are often kept to a minimum, 
especially so where direct marketing of insurance products is used whereby 
policies are purchased by means of computer-based communications 
systems.  Taken in the round, these developments increase the risk of 
innocent non-disclosure.  A modern regime should therefore take account 
not only of the various subjective factors affecting insureds, but also of the 
diverse methods enlisted by insurers to transact with their prospective 
customers.  A test of disclosure based on the twin attributes of the actual 
insured together with the reasonable insured strikes the optimum balance in 
maintaining a single test, albeit dual-limbed, for both consumer and 
                                                                                                                 
286  Perhaps surprisingly, these factors were specifically excluded by the Law 
Commission’s final report in 1980.  That said, it should be noted that the ICA 1984 
differs from the ALRC’s formulation of the duty.  Section 21(1)(b) refers to 
matters that “a reasonable person in the circumstances” could be expected to know 
(emphasis added).  Notwithstanding the pure objectivity of this statutory 
formulation, it has received positive endorsement beyond the shores of Australia.  
See, e.g., INSURANCE LAW REFORM: THE CONSUMER CASE FOR A REVIEW OF 
INSURANCE LAW, supra note 15; BRITISH INSURANCE LAW ASSOCIATION, REFORM 
OF INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW (2006); and more recently it has received broad 
support from the English and Scottish Law Commissions, supra note 17.  It has 
also been welcomed by the New Zealand courts.  For example, in State Insurance 
v. McHale, [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 399, 415, Richardson and Hardie Boys J.J. 
concluded that: “[t]he law in New Zealand as to materiality and the duty of 
disclosure is not satisfactory.  It can lead to uncertainty and injustice…. The test of 
the reasonable assured has much to commend it.  The Australian legislation 
adopting that test … could well be followed in this country.”  See also the remarks 
of Cooke P, [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 404.  See also Quinby Enter. Ltd. v. Gen. 
Accident Ltd., [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 736, 740. 
287  AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 279, ¶ 183, at 111.  
288  Id.  
150 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
 
commercial insurance.289  Although insurers often have exclusive recourse 
to data relevant to particular types of risks, they do not possess superior 
knowledge in relation to factors peculiar to the particular risk sought to be 
insured for this generally lies within the province of the insured.  
Therefore, an insured under this test would be required to prove the 
existence of any circumstances which he or she relies on to reduce the 
scope of the duty of disclosure. 
 As seen above, a particular feature of the modern English case law 
is the emphasis now being placed on the way in which insurers seek to 
exercise the remedy of avoidance.  It will be recalled that while insurers are 
entitled to avoid the contract ab initio, the judges have expressed 
considerable unease over the draconian consequences suffered by insureds.  
In Drake Insurance, Rix L.J. addressed the issue in wider terms than most 
in calling for regard to be had to the concept of proportionality.290  As noted 
above, the Law Commission’s 1980 report expressly rejected the 
proportionality doctrine on the basis that it was unworkable.291  It also 
rejected a “nexus test” whereby the insurers would be required to 
demonstrate that the undisclosed fact is in some way connected to the 
loss.292  In reaching this conclusion the Law Commission reasoned that: 
 
all considerations relating to non-disclosure must focus on 
the moment when a proposal for insurance is put forward 
and either accepted on certain terms or rejected, in either 
event by reference to what the insurer judges to be the 
quality of the risk. The technique - one might almost say 
the art - of good underwriting is to judge all the factors 
affecting an offered risk at this moment, when the 
underwriter must then and there assess its quality on the 
basis of his experience, as though he were considering the 
                                                                                                                 
289  Such a subjective/objective form is now the accepted test for determining 
the appropriate standard of care for directors.  See, e.g., Norman & Anor. v. 
Theodore Goddard & Ors., [1992] B.C.C. 14.  This appears in the statutory 
statement of directors’ duties contained in the Companies Act, 2006, c.46, § 174 
(Eng.). 
290  [2003] EWCA Civ. 1834, [2004] Q.B. at 628, 629. 
291  For the Law Commission’s reasoning in this regard, see supra text 
accompanying note 15. 
292  See THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 15, ¶¶ 4.91-4.97. 
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overall impression given by a “still photograph” of the risk 
at this point.293 
 
While the ALRC had some sympathy for the misgivings expressed 
by the Law Commission over the difficulties of proof in relation to 
proportionality and causation, it did not think these were insurmountable.  
The ALRC saw no reason why in most cases insurers would not be able to 
establish, “whether from rating guides, from its instructions to its agents or 
staff or from its prior conduct, the nature and extent of the loss which it had 
suffered.”294  While conceding that it would sometimes be difficult to 
establish how it would have reacted to additional moral, as distinct from 
statistical, risks the ALRC concluded, in a robust statement of principle, 
that: 
 
difficulties of proof cannot be avoided if a proper balance 
is to be reached between the interests of the insurer and 
those of the insured.  It is quite plainly contrary to the true 
principle of uberrima fides to impose on the insured a 
burden which far exceeds the harm which he has done.  
The insurer should not be entitled to any redress which 
exceeds the loss which it has in fact suffered.  That is the 
basic principle which lies behind the law of damages, both 
in contract and in tort.295   
 
It therefore recommended that the nature and extent of the insurer’s redress 
should depend on the nature and extent of the loss which it has suffered as 
a result of the insured’s conduct and that it should no longer be entitled to 
avoid a contract, and a heavy claim under that contract, merely because it 
has suffered a small loss as a result of non-disclosure.296  This certainly 
                                                                                                                 
293  Id. ¶ 4.94. 
294  AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 279, ¶ 194. 
295  Id. 
296  Id.  See Insurance Contracts Act, 1984, §§ 28–31 (Austl.) (as amended).  
See Advance (NSW) Ins. Agencies Pty. Ltd. v. Matthews, (1987) 4 ANZ Ins. Cas. 
60–813 (Young J.) (New South Wales Sup. Ct.); cf. Lindsay v. CIC Ins. Ltd., 
(1989) 16 N.S.W.L.R. 673; Ferrcom Pty. Ltd. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. 
of Austl. Ltd., (1989) 5 ANZ Ins. Cas. 60-907 (Giles J.) (New South Wales Sup. 
Ct.).  See also Alexander Stenhouse Ltd. v. Austcan Inv. Pty. Ltd., (1993) 112 
A.L.R. 353 (Mason C.J., Deane, Dawson, Toohey & McHugh J.J.). Section 31 of 
the ICA provides that a court may disregard an avoidance and order the insurers to 
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aligns the position in insurance with fundamental principles underpinning 
the law of damages both in contract and tort.  More particularly, it also 
reflects the approach taken in the general law of contract towards 
restricting the right to rescind a contract for innocent misrepresentation.297  
Accordingly, the ALRC took the view that the right of insurers to avoid a 
contract from its inception should be abolished except for cases of 
fraudulent non-disclosure on the basis that avoidance ab initio was wholly 
disproportionate to the harm caused by an insured’s non-fraudulent non-
disclosure.298  Rather, the insurer should be able to cancel the contract 
prospectively and be entitled to adjust a claim to take into account the loss 
actually suffered by it as a result of the insured’s breach of the disclosure 
duty.299  As to the question of assessing damages, the ALRC favoured the 
approach taken by the common law in claims for misrepresentation 
whereby damages for a breach of duty would depend upon what the insurer 
would have done had it known of the true facts.300  Any other remedies 
available to the insurer would depend on the response it would have made 
if it had known of the undisclosed material facts.  For example, if it would 
have declined the risk outright, the insurer’s loss is equivalent to the 
amount claimed against it.  If it would have accepted the risk albeit at a 
higher premium, its loss is the difference between the actual and notional 
premiums.  If it would have accepted the risk but on different terms, 
whether at the same premium or not, its loss is the difference between its 
liabilities under the actual and notional contracts.   
 Not surprisingly, modern English decisions such as Drake 
Insurance and Rix L.J.’s dissent in WISE Ltd. illustrate the anxiety of the 
modern judges to address unfair dealings, certainly with respect to the 
                                                                                                                          
pay some or all of a claim consistently with what is just and equitable in the 
circumstances.  It should be noted that the case law on sections 28-31 of the 1984 
Act is confusing.  The courts have developed their own principles on the 
assessment of damages. 
297  See Misrepresentation Act, 1967, c. 7, § 2(2) (Eng.).  It should be noted, 
however, that the Australian courts have frequently questioned whether the 
analogy between damages for breach of contract and damages for 
misrepresentation/non-disclosure is strictly correct. 
298  AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 279, § 194.  
299  Id.  The Australian Law Reform Commission recommended reforms along 
similar lines for the law relating to misrepresentation. 
300  Id. 
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exercise of avoidance by insurers.301  From the pre-contractual standpoint, 
we have also seen the courts aligning insurance law with general contract 
law in terms of the assimilation of non-disclosure with misrepresentation 
whereby the insurers must have been induced by the non-disclosed fact.302  
This process, an objective of which appears to be a rebalancing of the 
respective rights and obligations of the parties, is not restricted to the 
modern case law.  It should be viewed in tandem with the regulatory 
approach now being adopted by the UK’s Financial Services Authority 
through its Insurance: Conduct of Business (ICOB).  The ICOB, while less 
prescriptive in relation to commercial policies than it is for consumer 
contracts, nevertheless requires insurers to treat commercial customers 
“fairly” and not to unreasonably reject claims.303   
From the European perspective it is of interest to view these 
developments against the background of the Directive on Unfair 
Commercial Practices which was approved on 11 May 2005.304  The 
Directive is aimed at providing a uniform and comprehensive standard for 
prohibiting unfair commercial practices. Although it is aimed at the 
position of consumers, including those affected by unfair commercial 
practices of insurers, there seems no reason in principle why the objective 
of the Directive (taken with the emphasis placed on ‘fairness’ in the ICOB) 
together with the current judicial thinking on the content of the duty of 
good faith borne by both parties, should not underpin the Law 
Commissions’ current review of insurance law.  Indeed, in this respect, a 
degree of optimism is warranted.  In September 2006, the English and 
Scottish Law Commissions published an Issues Paper on Misrepresentation 
and Non-Disclosure which was intended to promote discussion and 
                                                                                                                 
301  Drake Ins. plc v. Provident Ins. plc [2003] EWCA Civ. 1834, [2004] Q.B. 
601; WISE Ltd. v. Grupo Nacional Provincial SA [2004] EWCA Civ. 962. 
302  Whether this is particularly novel is another question. Certainly, in Carter 
v. Boehm, (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1162, 1165, Lord Mansfield did not draw any sharp 
distinction between them.  As Professor Clarke has observed, “If I describe the 
shandy that I have just bought you as lemonade, is that non-disclosure of part, the 
beer, or misrepresentation of the whole?”  Clarke, supra note 199, at 288. 
303  Insurance: Conduct of Business Sourcebook, Financial Services Authority 
Handbook, Release No. 094, § 8.1.2 (Oct. 2009). 
304  Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Council Directive 2005/29, 2005 
O.J. (L 149) 22 (EC).  See Hugh Collins, The Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive, 1(4) EUR. REV. CONT. L. 417 (2005); and Hugh Collins, Harmonisation 
by Example: European Laws against Unfair Commercial Practices 17 M.L.R. 89 
(2010). 
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feedback.305  The current system is criticised as “incoherent and flawed” on 
the basis that insurers can avoid policies inappropriately; that consumers 
are “deprived of a genuine choice between the FOS and the courts;” and 
that it “requires the FOS to exercise undue discretion.”306   
The initial recommendation was that the duty of disclosure in 
consumer insurance should be abolished.  This proposal survived the 
various consultation exercises carried out by the Law Commissions and 
now forms the central plank of their proposals and draft Bill which was 
published in December 2009.307  Clause 2 of the Bill replaces the 
consumer-insured’s duty of disclosure with the duty “to take reasonable 
care not to make a misrepresentation.”  This therefore removes the 
consumer’s duty to volunteer information to the insurer.  Instead, 
consumers will be required to answer insurers’ questions honestly and to 
take reasonable care that their replies are accurate and complete.  If 
consumers do, however, provide insurers with information which was not 
asked for, they must also do so honestly and carefully.  The thinking here is 
that abolition of the disclosure duty would force insurers to ask the right 
questions in proposal forms.  The draft Bill does not require the insurer to 
ask specific questions.  However, clause 3(2) provides that in assessing the 
reasonableness of the consumer’s answer to a question, the court (or 
ombudsman) will take account “how clear, and how specific, the insurer’s 
questions were.”  Clause 10, amongst other things, goes on to prevent 
insurers from contracting out of the provisions of the Bill.  Thus, a policy 
term, or a term in any other contract, is rendered void to the extent that it 
would put the consumer in a worse position than under the draft Bill.   
The prudent underwriter test is thus replaced with a reasonable 
insured test.  Schedule 1 of the draft Bill goes on to lay down the insurers’ 
remedies for misrepresentation.  The applicable remedy should depend on 
the insured’s state of mind.  Where a consumer acts honestly and 
reasonably the insurer will be required to pay the claim.  In cases of fraud 
(termed a “deliberate or reckless” misrepresentation), the insurer will be 
entitled to refuse to pay the claim.  In such a case the insurer will need to 
prove on the balance of probabilities that the consumer knew (a) that the 
statement was untrue or misleading, or did not care whether it was or not, 
and (b) that the matter was relevant to the insurer, or did not care whether it 
                                                                                                                 
305  See The Law Commission, supra note 17. 
306  Id. § 5.24. 
307  CONSUMER INSURANCE LAW: PRE-CONTRACT DISCLOSURE AND 
REPRESENTATION, supra note 17. 
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was or not.  However, with respect to negligent misrepresentation, a 
scheme of apportionment will apply in that both parties should be put into 
the position they would have been in had the insurer known the true facts.  
For example, if the insurers would have charged a higher premium, the 
insured will be able to recover that proportion of his loss which 
corresponds to the proportion of the proper premium actually paid.308  For 
innocent misrepresentation, i.e. where the insured had reasonable grounds 
for believing the truth of what is stated, the insurer will have no remedy.   
The Law Commissions thus draw a distinction between consumer 
and non-consumer insurance contracts.  The received wisdom is that 
businesses require less protection in part because businesses use expert 
brokers, but also because the market for commercial insurance is 
competitive and businesses can generally negotiate with insurers in a way 
not available to consumers.  Overall, it is provisionally recommended that 
the duty of disclosure should continue to apply to non-consumer insurance 
but subject to a “reasonable insured” test for materiality.  This would also 
apply to misrepresentation.309  It is also proposed that the same remedies as 
recommended for consumer policies should be available for fraudulent, 
negligent and innocent misrepresentation, although a range of questions 
concerning negligent misrepresentation are put forward for discussion.  A 
policy statement on pre-contract disclosure and misrepresentation in 
business insurance is expected to be issued in 2010. 
It would be churlish not to welcome the Law Commissions’ 
proposals for reforming insurance contracts.  More particularly, a positive 
feature is that a number of their proposals resonate with those originally put 
forward by the ALRC in 1982.  However, perpetrating the distinction 
between consumer and business insureds is open to question.310  
Maintaining the division between the two does little to further the objective 
                                                                                                                 
308  For example, if an insurer only charged a premium of £1,000 but should 
have charged £1,500, the consumer will receive two thirds of the claim.  See the 
Explanatory Notes to the draft Bill, A.17(3), CONSUMER INSURANCE LAW: PRE-
CONTRACT DISCLOSURE AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 17. 
309  Such rules will be compulsory for business policies.  See Law 
Commission, Insurance Contract Law, Warranties (Nov. 2006), available at 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/Insurance_Contract_Law_Issues_Paper_2.pdf.  
See also, the Law Commissions’ Consultation Paper No 182; Discussion Paper No 
134, (July, 2007), Insurance Contract Law: Misrepresentation, Non-Disclosure 
and Breach of Warranty by the Insured. 
310  Regrettably, the Australian ICA 1984, § 21A also draws the distinction 
between private and business insureds.   
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of constructing a coherent regime for insurance.  On a more positive note, 
the recommendations relating to remedies are to be welcomed especially in 
so far as the Law Commissions now embrace a form of apportionment.  
Other issues still remain to be addressed, not least the question of whether 
or not the good faith duty continues to operate post-contractually.  As seen 
above, the case law has at last settled the point and no doubt the Law 
Commissions will assimilate this position in their final proposals.  Their 
work on this is expected to begin in 2010.311  Finally, in relation to claims 
there remains a significant question which the authorities have thus far 
failed to address.  Will a fraudulent claim bring the insurance contract to an 
end so that insurers can refuse to pay a legitimate claim that is made 
subsequent to that which is held to be fraudulent?  Although the issue has 
so far evaded judicial determination, the English and Scottish Law 
Commissions now have the opportunity to grasp the nettle. 
                                                                                                                 
311 See http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/insurance_contract.htm (accessed 11 
January 2010). 
  
RISK DATA IN INSURANCE INTERPRETATION 
 
Michelle Boardman∗ 
 
*** 
 
Insurance companies use facts about past risks—actuarial data—in 
essential ways.  The data are at the crux of creating the product and 
clearing regulatory hurdles to selling the product.  Given the centrality of 
the data in the drafting, pricing, and legitimizing of insurance policies, it is 
peculiar that courts, insurers, and policyholders tend to ignore it when the 
time comes to interpret and apply a policy in court.  This article imagines 
the shape its use would take and considers casual empirics on why it is not 
used more now. 
 
There are three ways for actuarial data to advance interpretation and 
construction.  The first is in proving or disproving insurer good faith.  
Actuarial data can show an insurer’s bona fides—countering the universal 
underlying assumption of the swindling insurer.  Comparing money taken 
in (the premium calculation) with money paid out (the risks covered) can 
confirm or deny a bait and switch scheme.  Second, the data can prove an 
otherwise abstract claim of actuarial purpose, providing the context that 
resolves a nascent ambiguity.  This is important because a finding of 
ambiguity is four-fifths of a finding that the policyholder wins.  Third, 
actuarial data can reveal insurer intent—not simply a lack of bad faith but 
a particular intent.  Recognizing this intent brings some surprising benefits 
to both consumers and insurers. 
 
In insurance, courts are often engaged in a project that is both more than 
and less than interpretation.  Courts are engaged in regulation of the 
insurance policy directly, dictating the clauses insurers can and cannot 
enforce.  Actuarial function provides the court intent on regulating the 
insurance field with the policy implications of a particular ruling.  The data 
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will allow a court engaging in regulation to consider policyholders other 
than the one momentarily before it. 
 
*** 
 
Insurance companies use facts about past risks—actuarial data—in 
essential ways.  The data are at the crux of creating the product (what risks 
to cover, at what cost) and clearing regulatory hurdles to selling the product 
(proving that they are charging enough but not too much).1  Given the 
centrality of the data in the drafting, pricing, and legitimizing of insurance 
policies, it is peculiar that courts, insurers, and policyholders tend to ignore 
it when the time comes to interpret and apply a policy in court.  This article 
imagines the shape its use would take and considers why it is not used 
more than sparingly now. 
Behind each insurance contract there lies a city of statistics.  Here 
you will find answers to when a risk becomes a loss, how many people will 
lose each year, and how much will be lost.  Following the hundreds of 
intertwining streets will lead you to the insurer’s ultimate question: how 
much one would have to be paid to take on the risk of all the losses 
together.   
These city streets are paved with data: raw data of yesterday’s 
losses and calculations of tomorrow’s.  (Those craving a more elaborate 
description of actuarial data can dash ahead to section I.)  From these data, 
insurers decide which risks to insure and which to omit.  An insurance 
policy can be thought of as the insurer’s attempt to explain this, to explain 
in words what the equation includes and excludes. 2  But just as describing 
a dance is not the dance itself, the contract language is not the underlying 
truth of what risks insurers have included and excluded from their premium 
and expected risk calculations.   
The preliminary question is why courts engaged in interpretation 
would care about this hidden city.  Its secrets may seem no more relevant to 
                                                                                                                 
1  See 1 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INS. §§ 2:27, 2:29, 
2:31 (3d ed. 2009).  See generally, Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in 
Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L. J. 107, 124-34 (2007). 
2  To whom the insurer offers its explanation is not an easy question.  From a 
contractual standpoint, the policyholder should be the audience.  For my 
explanation of why insurers might be more interested in communicating with the 
courts, see Michelle Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous 
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105 (2006).  
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the act of interpretation than the fact that the policy was issued on a 
Tuesday.  In insurance, however, courts are often engaged in a project that 
is both more than and less than interpretation.  Courts are engaged in 
regulation of the insurance policy directly, dictating the clauses insurers 
can and cannot enforce.  Actuarial data can directly address the 
construction and judicial regulation of insurance contracts.   
This article offers three main ways in which actuarial data can 
advance interpretation and construction.  The first is in proving or 
disproving insurer good faith, an area of heightened relevance in insurance 
because insurers have a near-fiduciary duty toward policyholders.  
Actuarial data can show an insurer’s bona fides—countering the universal 
underlying assumption of the swindling insurer.  Is an insurer arguing for a 
particular reading of a provision, not because the insurer “means it” in 
some sense, but because the insurer seeks to avoid paying for any loss, at 
any time, under any theory?  At times, actuarial data can answer this 
question.  Comparing money taken in (the premium calculation) with 
money paid out (the risks covered) can confirm or deny a bait and switch.  
Ultimately, the threat of this comparison will shrink the number of genuine 
swindlers by bringing the con to light.   
Second, the data use contains within it its own purpose.  It can 
prove an otherwise abstract claim of actuarial purpose, such as avoiding 
synchronized losses across many people or avoiding moral hazard.3  
Actuarial purpose supports a “reasonable reading” of a clause, perhaps 
providing the context that resolves a nascent ambiguity.  This is important 
because a finding of ambiguity is four-fifths of a finding that the 
policyholder wins.4 Actuarial purpose also provides the court intent on 
regulating the insurance field with the policy implications of a particular 
ruling.  Courts are accustomed to looking beyond (or over and around) the 
language of insurance policies to determine not just their written meaning, 
but the meaning the court is willing to enforce.  Kenneth Abraham’s central 
                                                                                                                 
3  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “moral hazard” as a “hazard that has its 
inception in mental attitudes,” such as the “risk that an insured will destroy 
property or allow it to be destroyed (usually by burning) in order to collect the 
insurance proceeds is a moral hazard.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 786 (9th ed. 
2009).  In modern insurance discussions, however, it is used to refer to the danger 
that a person may take less care in avoiding a hazard, knowing that insurance will 
cover part of the loss.  See generally, Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral 
Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996). 
4  See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 466 
(2003).    
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“A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation,” explores how several of the 
fundamental principles of insurance law “direct that under specific 
circumstances the meaning of even clear policy language must be 
disregarded, not interpreted.”5  Actuarial data will allow a court engaging 
in regulation to consider policyholders other than the one before 
momentarily before it.6 
Third, actuarial data can reveal insurer intent—not simply a lack of 
bad faith but a particular intent.  Courts do not ordinarily treasure the secret 
meaning a seller harbors in his heart when making an offer to a buyer.  But 
left with complex contract language and an amorphous buyer’s intent that 
does not mirror the seller’s, judges are hard pressed to turn away guidance.   
Intent has a few specific uses.  First, hewing more closely to 
insurer intent should decrease the cost of insurance.  Uncertainty about how 
courts will rule increases “contract risk,” which increases premiums.7  
Surveys “illustrate that uncertainty about losses and ambiguity about 
probability lead to higher prices.”8  Second, knowing the intent behind a 
                                                                                                                 
5  Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 531, 532 (1996) (Some of the doctrines “have nothing to do with 
‘interpretation’ as it is normally understood.”). 
6  For a modern defense of (limited) judicial regulation, see Daniel Schwarcz, 
A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007).  Schwarcz does not advocate the introduction 
of specific actuarial data but his framework requires courts to consider whether the 
policy causes “insurance harm” and to “ask whether the insurer has any legitimate 
underwriting purpose for not insuring against the specific loss that befell the 
insured.”  Id. at 1448 (emphasis added). 
7  See Tom Baker, Insuring Liability Risks, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 
128, 139-40 (2004).  
8  Howard Kunreuther, Robin Hogarth & Jacqueline Meszaros, Insurer 
Ambiguity and Market Failure, 7 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 71, 79 (1993).  
The 1993 Kunreuther et al. studies of insurer ambiguity presented the insurance 
actors with a set probability on which “all experts agree” and contrasted that with 
an ambiguous probability, defined as a “wide disagreement about the estimate of p 
[the probability of loss] and a high degree of uncertainty among the experts.”  Id. at 
72.  See also Howard Kunreuther et al., Ambiguity and Underwriter Decision 
Processes, 26 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG 337, 342-44 (1995).  Instead of a wide 
range in the probability that a loss will occur, here the issue is a wide range that a 
policy will be read to cover the loss. The surveys also found some evidence that 
the risk premium could be double-charged:  “To the extent that primary 
underwriters do not recognize that the prices of actuaries may already include 
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clause makes it possible to assess whether the clause could have been 
written more clearly.  Where the intent, while legitimate, is too complex to 
be conveyed well to consumers, courts must decide whether to effectuate 
the intent or forbid any similar clause.   
Courts adopt a regulatory view toward the health of the insurance 
industry and the interests of those policyholders not before the court.  If the 
purpose of the clause is insurer solvency, for example, a regulatory court 
may prefer to protect solvency over literal language interpretation or other 
values.  Courts most commonly regulate by mandating coverage and 
forbidding exclusions to coverage.  But regulating the substance of 
insurance clauses without access to the actuarial function of those clauses is 
looking left and leaping right.  Insurer purpose and intent do not need to 
control the outcome of a court’s decision to improve the outcome of its 
regulation. 
 
 
Three parties are in this game—policyholders, insurers, and courts.  
Each has incentives, the pursuit of which creates externalities.  Each has 
motives that can be described generously or with distrust; there is benefit to 
doing both.  There is a fourth major player, of course, in the public, but the 
public’s interest is ubiquitous.  The public’s needs are partially represented 
by courts (although their power to pursue policy aims is cabined), and 
partially represented by policyholders, in that most individuals are 
policyholders.  But a policyholder after a loss may pursue his individual 
compensation over a healthy insurance market and insurers can represent 
the interest of the many policyholders against the few (or the future 
policyholders against the demands of the present).9   
                                                                                                                          
adjustments for ambiguity and uncertainty, they may recommend a premium that 
reflects their concerns with these factors.”  Kunreuther, Hogarth & Meszaros at 75 
(emphasis added).  
9  “First, insurance looks at groups, at the socialization of risk through 
standard contracts sold to large numbers of similarly situated persons who face an 
uncertain risk. What is good for the group, as a whole, in face of uncertainty, may 
not be what is good for any individual when sued.”  Kent D. Syverud, What 
Professional Responsibility Scholars Should Know About Insurance, 4 CONN. INS. 
L.J. 17, 19 (1998).  “The needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few or the 
one.”  Spock’s dying words, with help from Captain Kirk.  STAR TREK II: THE 
WRATH OF KHAN (Paramount Pictures 1982).  
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In addition to being policyholders, the public’s interest in insurance 
can hardly be exaggerated.  (The public’s intellectual interest in insurance 
can, alas, readily be exaggerated.)  We are all potential tort victims, to be 
affected by a tortfeasor’s insurance coverage, and we are all safer or less 
safe as insurers create incentives to prevent their insureds from harming us 
as consumers.  We are also taxpayers, whose contribution to the public fisc 
may increase if government pays what insurance does not.  Who would 
benefit from the introduction of actuarial data in court?  The conflicting 
needs of the public will come into play in the normative question but the 
incentives of the three direct players will help answer the descriptive 
question first.   
Section one is optional reading; it presents a primer on actuarial 
data and premium calculation.  The core of the article lies in section two.  
Section three analyzes the limited ways courts already use actuarial data, in 
and outside of insurance.  The concluding section presents some casual 
empirics on why insurers—those with direct access to the data—do not 
bring it to court.   
The difficulty for both insurers and policyholders is that unless the 
courts are willing to adopt a rule that benefits one over the other, whether 
increased use of actuarial data will harm or hurt individual players is a 
factual question that can only be answered with certainty if the experiment 
takes place.  This article invites the experiment.  
 
I. ACTUARIAL DATA AND PREMIUM CALCULATION 
(OPTIONAL READING) 
 
Two basic types of data can be submitted to support actuarial 
claims.  First, the underlying statistical data used to price a category of risk, 
which would show what was being “counted” in a particular risk.  This is 
the actuarial data proper.  The second type is the application of the 
actuarial data to evaluation of a particular policyholder or risk, which is 
performed by an underwriter.  Either would need to be tied to the premium 
charged the policyholder (or the decision to offer the coverage at all) and 
the language in the policy.  For example, the additional premium charged 
for a hurricane endorsement would be linked to the data under the 
hurricane risk, the language of the endorsement, and highlighted by the fact 
that those without the endorsement pay less. 
Actuaries and underwriters create and analyze the relevant data.  
An actuary is a “statistician who determines the present effects of future 
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contingent events, esp[ecially], one who calculates insurance and pension 
rates on the basis of empirically based tables.”10  “Underwriter” and 
“underwriting” have their etymology in Lloyd’s Coffeehouse, where those 
willing to take part in the insuring of a ship’s outgoing cargo would write 
their names under a description of the ship, journey, and goods.11  Today, 
underwriters use the data compiled and created by actuaries to evaluate a 
specific risk seeking insurance.   
Taking the simple case of life insurance, “the actuary develops the 
mathematical models to be used to analyze the data, and the underwriter 
applies the findings of the” medical professionals and actuaries “into the 
underwriting decision made for a single proposed insured.”12  Doctors and 
medical researchers report the initial facts of death by cause and age.  
Actuaries collect and interpret that data, creating tables into which people 
of various ages with various traits and medical histories fall.  Underwriters 
then apply those tables, with judgment, to an individual applying for life 
insurance and recommend a certain place on the table or recommend 
rejection.  The price that corresponds to a place on the table will depend on 
the insurer—their costs, profit expectations, and more.   
How much to charge for an insurance policy is not simply a 
calculation of the expected risk of loss.  The premium charged includes the 
actuarial premium and the non-actuarial premium.13    Underwriters 
calculate the actuarial portion for a particular risk by applying “statistical 
data and judgment.  Probably in no case is either the sole basis for a rate; 
every conceivable combination of the two is found.”14     
                                                                                                                 
10  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 41 (9th ed. 2009).   
11  Hence the individual members of the Lloyds insurance market are called 
Names.  See PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY 
OF RISK 90-91 (1998).  
12  F. Daniel Perkins, Can “Sound Actuarial Principles” Be Found in Life 
Insurance Underwriting?, 38 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 125, 138 (2002).   
13  The actuarial portion may include “feature rating,” where “[d]ata collected 
over the years and intuitive hunches by insurers suggest which features are 
correlated with loss rates.”  “Experience rating,” which is coupled with feature 
rating, “uses the loss experience of the insured during one period to help set the 
premiums charged” in the next.  KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK:  
INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 72 (1986). 
14  Ralph H. Blanchard, The Basis of Premium Rates, J. OF AM. INS. (Feb. 
1928), reprinted in RALPH H. BLANCHARD, RISK AND INSURANCE AND OTHER 
PAPERS 159, 161 (1965).  What was true in 1928 is true today. 
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The non-actuarial premium covers costs and profits, broadly.  It 
may be calculated as a percentage of the actuarial premium, as a lump sum, 
or some combination of the two.15  This bifurcation does not affect the 
applicability of actuarial data in court; the question remains whether the 
insurer has made a calculation of the relevant loss or made a calculation 
that clearly excludes the loss.   
Imagine a 1% chance that your house will burn down in the next 
year, leading to a $100,000 insured loss.  The expected loss is $1,000 = 
($100,000)(.01).  For any one policyholder we can assume the insurer will 
not need $1000, but either $0 or $100,000.  An insurer worthy of the name 
will have spread the risk across a large pool of similarly situated 
policyholders and will need to be able to pay out $1000 per policyholder by 
the end of the policy year.  The risk being carried is therefore a $1000 risk.   
A premium calculation will (usually) include this computation, but 
what insurers want to determine is how much money it would take to meet 
the expected cost of the risk, allowing for administrative costs and profit.  
Even without cost and profit, however, the answer is not $1000.  The time 
value of money should allow an insurer to collect less than $1000 in 
January and have $1000 or more in December.16  Fluctuation in interest 
rates and the insurer’s access to investments must be predicted in order to 
calculate how much needs to be collected from the policyholder in 
January.17  
In short, insurers would not want to report, and courts would not 
want to hear, the entire premium calculation for a policy.  Nonetheless, the 
data for a particular clause or the actuarial function behind the structuring 
of a policy could be explained without excessive fuss.18 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
15  See NEIL A. DOHERTY, INSURANCE PRICING AND LOSS PREVENTION 16-21 
(1976).   
16  Come the start of 2009, some are laughing at this statement. 
17  The process gets more complex, of course.  On the surface, the timeline for 
loss payments in the Commercial General Liability context is often years if not 
decades after the collection of the original premium.  This puts a strain on even the 
most careful predictions of interest rates, taxes, loss amounts, and reserves for 
payment.   
18  This is not to say there are not questions the data will not answer.  There 
are many.  See infra text accompanying notes 73-74. 
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II. USING ACTUARIAL DATA IN INTERPRETATION 
 
Opinions in insurance cases, read collectively, have been compared 
to “a chapter out of Alice in Wonderland.”19  In some ways this is true; the 
policyholder does not have to read the policy, yet it is still the basis of the 
contract.  The policy language gets a lay reading except when it doesn’t.  
Worse, the individual words get a lay reading where there is no lay 
meaning to the string of the words put together.  The parties have no 
mutual intent in this contract of adhesion but their individual unshared 
intent might define the contract.  Indeed, the policyholder’s “reasonable 
expectation” of the policy might define coverage even if the expectations 
come from nowhere and would be dashed by a reading of the policy.  But 
the policy is incomprehensible and thus does not have to be read.20  “It 
takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.”21 
Still, there is reason in insurance policy interpretation and 
construction.22  Actuarial data may inject additional reason or at least cut 
off some of the whims of the Red Queen23.  There are holes in the existing 
paradigm of insurance policy interpretation into which the data fit.  Three 
main avenues for the useful introduction of actuarial data are explored here:  
faith, purpose, and intent. 
First, the data can show insurer faith—good faith or bad faith and 
potentially fraud.  In particular, it could offer evidence instead of 
conjecture in the otherwise presumed bait and switch scheme where the 
insurer attempts to sell big and deliver small.  The value here is to prove (or 
                                                                                                                 
19  EMERIC FISCHER, PETER NASH SWISHER, & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 
PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 90 (rev. 3rd ed. 2006). 
20  See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lamme, 425 P.2d 346, 347 (Nev. 1967) 
(policies are “complex instrument[s], unilaterally prepared [by the insurer], and 
seldom understood by the assured.”).   
21  So says The Red Queen.  LEWIS CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE: 
ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 210 
(New American Library ed. 1960).   
22  “The distinction [between interpretation and construction] is, for the most 
part, not dwelled upon by the courts, with the result that it is difficult to tell which 
process is being employed.”  JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS 165 (3rd ed. 1987).  The distinction will be partially honored here 
because the two approaches call for distinct uses of actuarial data. 
23  “Alice . . . explained, as well as she could, that she had lost her way.  ‘I 
don't know what you mean by your way,’ said the Queen: ‘all the ways about here 
belong to me.’”  CARROLL, supra note 21, at 206.   
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disprove) consistent behavior, consistent from drafting the policy to 
adjusting the claim and, finally, to taking a litigation position.  Inconsistent 
behavior, either sloppy or greedy, should decline as insurers realize courts 
now have insight into their inner workings.  
Second, actuarial data can reveal, astoundingly, the actuarial 
purpose of the structure of coverage or the actuarial pressure behind an 
exclusion.  Under several doctrines, courts reconstruct, misread, or refuse 
to enforce a clause because the court can either discern no meaning, no 
“reasonable reading,” or can discern only an illusory or devious meaning.  
In these cases, the court may be blameless, left adrift by poor insurer 
counsel, but the outcome is no less mistaken.24  A court with a good handle 
on the purpose of a clause may still reject it, of course, but often the court 
will find a purpose worth protecting.  Between an insurer and a lone 
policyholder in court, the lone policyholder’s needs cry out sharply.  
Actuarial purpose can show where those needs are misaligned with the 
needs of other policyholders. 
Third, the data can show substantive insurer intent, not just a 
consistent but a specific intent.  It might appear from a casual review of 
insurance cases that insurer intent has no relevance to courts but this is not 
so.  It can, should, and (sometimes) does matter to courts, regulators, and 
policyholders that an insurer has a specific intent for taking a particular 
action.  Where the courts have little to go on, insurer intent remains, even 
disfavored, one piece of the puzzle.  
This value of this piece is explored below to address the question 
whether “tangible property” includes information stored on computers.25  
Before the computer age, commercial general liability policies covered 
damage to tangible property but not intangible property.  What should 
courts have done in the first days of damage to electronically stored 
information?  It was an indeterminate question that could have had one 
clear input: insurers had not calculated or charged for the risk. 
Insurer intent and actuarial purpose can blend together at the edges 
but they are distinct.  To start, the proof may differ.  To show actual intent, 
in lieu of ex post excuses, courts could require an insurer to provide its own 
underwriting data—proof that the insurer did in fact apply the actuarial data 
                                                                                                                 
24  Of course, it is foolish to expect the sins of inadequate counsel to be 
remedied by asking that same counsel to present actuarial data.  Unless the insurer, 
the policyholder, or the court invokes the data, the lawyer who fails to explain the 
function of a clause will also fail to introduce the data behind it.   
25  See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. 
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available.  In some circumstances, an insurer will not be able to prove use.  
In others, an insurer will not want to submit its own underwriting data, 
thereby forgoing the intent argument.  Both could still submit general data 
on the actuarial purpose of a clause, thus giving the clause another 
plausible, legitimate meaning from which the court can choose.   
Actuarial purpose at times will be more appropriate than intent.  In 
the wake of September 11, insurers collectively stated that they would not 
seek to exclude coverage under their various war exclusions.26  If the 
attacks had been more widespread and even more destructive, insurers 
might not have taken that position.  But an insurer would have a hard time 
proving that its specific intent in drafting or including the war exclusion 
was to avoid losses from a large scale attack by a nongovernmental 
organization with whom the United States was not at war, declared or 
undeclared.  Where intent would fail, however, actuarial purpose might 
convince a court that the social purpose of war exclusions—insurer 
solvency—applied as equally to large scale terrorist attacks as to 
conventional war. 
Finally, those courts that see no slot in the interpretative equation 
for the input of insurer intent may still be open to the purpose of a clause.  
Courts adopt a regulatory view toward the health of the insurance industry 
and the interests of those policyholders not before the court.  If the purpose 
of the clause is insurer solvency, for example, a regulatory court may prefer 
to protect solvency over literal language interpretation or other values.   
But to judicially regulate an insurance clause without access to the 
actuarial function of the clause is to read a map while ignoring the road.  It 
only makes sense for a court to create coverage if it can accurately identify 
desired coverage that insurers have failed to perceive.  In litigation, a court 
can be confident that the policyholder before the court wants coverage—of 
flood damage from Katrina, for example.  And so do other similarly 
situated policyholders, at least ex post.  But non-losing current and future 
policyholders of the state might prefer a ruling that does not cause insurers 
                                                                                                                 
26  Under the ISO war exclusion, the insurer “will not pay for loss or damage 
caused directly or indirectly by . . . (1) war, including undeclared or civil war; (2) 
warlike action by a military force, including action in hindering or defending 
against an actual or expected attack, by any government, sovereign or other 
authority using military personnel or other agents; or (3) insurrection, rebellion, 
revolution, usurped power, or action taken by governmental authority in hindering 
or defending any of these.”  Insurance Services Office, Cause of Loss Special 
Form CP1030, available at http://www.vwcos.com/documents/ forms/CP1030-
0402.pdf.  
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to flee or prices to rise.27  The court faces a tradeoff, although it may not 
know or care to know. 
Let us assume that insurers fail to provide the best coverage the 
market will bear.  Policyholders as a group want and are willing to pay for 
a particular coverage, call it the happy clause. Should not judges simply 
award that coverage to the policyholder seeking redress in court?  Courts 
could read the happy clause into policies, perhaps under the reasonable 
expectations doctrine because policyholders reasonably expect it. 28  After 
all, if judges regularly award happy coverage, in theory insurers will soon 
sell what they are being forced to provide.  Sure, the premium will rise to 
reflect the cost of the new coverage but recall that in this example 
policyholders as a group are willing to pay.   
Still, policyholders in general may ask the court not to do them any 
favors.  The specific preference of a given policyholder after a loss can 
easily be at odds with the preference of policyholders generally.  Moreover, 
policyholders’ preferences are not simply cumulative.  Case by case, 
policyholders might approve of each of one thousand subtypes of coverage 
at various prices.  There are therefore one thousand “units” of coverage that 
Every Policyholder would be willing to buy at its market price.  However, 
the Policyholder is not willing to buy all thousand because he has a limit on 
how much he is willing to devote to insurance, say $1000 a year.   
If he can rank the units of coverage, his ideal policy will include 
unit 1 to unit 100, or wherever the premium reaches $1000.  If a third party 
(the courts, legislature, or regulators) instead requires that unit 20 be 
expanded or that unit 500 be added, he either will have to let unit 100 go or 
pay more than his maximum price.  Of course, the policyholder cannot go 
to the insurer in response to a court case and request the substitution; the 
insurer will decide for him.  If the insurer removes nothing, but adds in the 
court’s mandated coverage, the insurer will eventually charge more.   
Whatever insurers are selling today, we can be sure that Every 
Policyholder is not in fact receiving his perfect policy at his perfect price.  
The question is whether the terms that courts “add” are likely to make the 
policy better or worse.  To the extent courts are regulating insurance—
mandating coverage because policyholders deserve it or intractably expect 
                                                                                                                 
27  On fleeing insurers, see Daniel Hays, State Farm to Leave Florida 
Homeowners Insurance Market, NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Feb. 2, 
2009, at 7.  See also Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights and Insurance Regulation: 
From Federalism to Takings, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 293 (1999). 
28  See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
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it—that regulatory decision is poorly made if the court does not consider 
(or makes erroneous assumptions about) the actuarial facts behind 
coverage.   
   
A. INSURANCE INTERPRETATION WITHOUT ACTUARIAL DATA 
 
A full discussion of how a judge ought to approach the 
interpretation of an insurance policy is beyond the scope of this article.  
However, we can loosely assume that a judge will approach the policy as a 
contract and consider, in order: text, intent, purpose, and public policy.29  
 Differences across states and a general lack of a clear order for 
interpretive inputs makes a linear statement about the principles of 
insurance interpretation mostly fictional.30   
The components can be identified, however, even as the order and 
interaction of the components vary.  The components fall into (at least) 
three categories:  basic rules, overrides, and penchants.  These lists are 
illustrative, not comprehensive.  Do not read the lists horizontally; public 
policy is a general override, for example, not one specific to plain 
language. 
 
Basic rules  Overrides  Penchants 
Plain language   Public policy          Pro-coverage 
Mutual intent  Bad faith         Ambiguity Probable 
Purpose  Industry health        Pay tort victim  
Contra proferentem      Avoid moral hazard 
Reasonable expectations    Find adhesion 
                                                                                                                 
29  The text will be weighed in context with intent and purpose potentially 
providing part of the context.  It may be better to consider the policy’s purpose 
before the specific intent of the parties, as evidence of intent will be extrinsic and 
potentially less reliable than the self-evident purpose of a policy.  On the other 
hand, undue confidence in the “self-evident” purpose of particular clauses is one of 
the ripest areas for the introduction of actuarial data.   
30  Some of the best works on insurance interpretation are: ABRAHAM, supra 
note 13, at 101; Abraham, supra note 5; James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance 
Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995 (1992); Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and 
Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not be Construed Against the 
Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171 (1995); Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Interpretations 
of Insurance Contract Disputes: Toward a Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 57 
OHIO ST. L.J. 543 (1996).   
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Most of these concepts are familiar from ordinary contract 
interpretation.  Two basic rules bear elaboration.  As early as 1923, the 
Supreme Court applied contra proferentem in the insurance context: “The 
rule is settled that in case of ambiguity that construction of the policy will 
be adopted which is most favorable to the insured.”31  The rule takes on 
subtleties32 but this definition will do here.   
Next, the strong form of the reasonable expectations doctrine gives 
as “the rule that the reasonable expectations of the insured should be 
honored even if those expectations are unambiguously contradicted by fine-
print provisions in the policy.”33  After first being recognized by Robert 
Keeton in 1970, the doctrine has enjoyed a sharp upswing followed by a 
gradual relaxing of its application.34  Many courts trend toward the 
doctrine’s weak form, ruling that a policyholder’s intent cannot be 
reasonable if an ordinary reading of the policy would have corrected it.   
For one view of how these pieces work together, consider the 
“textual approach” and “modern contract theory” models proposed by the 
authors of “Insurance Coverage Litigation.”35   
 
The textual model starts with  
(1) the plain and ordinary meaning of the language,  
which if (2) patently ambiguous,  
triggers (3) contra proferentem,  
and/or (4) reasonable expectations,  
and/or (5) the admission of extrinsic evidence.36   
 
Note that this model sensibly does not attempt to claim a hierarchy for the 
treatments of ambiguity.   
If the language is not ambiguous on its face, the textual court may 
admit extrinsic evidence to determine (a) a latent ambiguity; (b) the intent 
                                                                                                                 
31  Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U.S. 167, 174 (1923). 
32  See Abraham, supra note 5, at 533. 
33  Abraham, supra note 5, at 532 (citing ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. 
WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW §§ 6.1(a)-(b), at 614-21 (Practitioner’s ed. 1988)). 
34  See infra Section II.C.  Keeton “introduced” the doctrine in Robert E. 
Keeton, Insurance Law at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 
(1970).   
35  ANDERSON ET AL., INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION § 2.01 (2nd ed. 2009 
& Supp. 2010). 
36  Id. 
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of the drafters; (c) any accepted usage in the industry; (d) if the 
policyholder’s interpretation is reasonable in light of the insurer’s; and (e) 
insurer bad faith.37  According to Anderson et al., if after this investigation 
the court finds the language ambiguous, it will construe it in favor of 
coverage.38  This is accurate as long as one understands that a finding of 
ambiguity after the total analysis is a legal conclusion that is the same as 
finding that the court will construe in favor of coverage. 
A formalist judge will start with the policy text and veer off-
document with reluctance.  Actuarial data could be viewed as extrinsic 
evidence but it can also be viewed as a contextual fact about the purpose of 
the document.  Purpose, text, and logic will help resolve a budding 
ambiguity or surface tension between two clauses.   
As with non-insurance contracts, the “modern contract theory” 
model does not completely supplant this textual approach.  The tools used 
are the same, but with a greater focus on reasonable expectations and the 
intended use and purpose of the policy.39  On the one hand, the contextual, 
functionalist approach should be less open to actuarial data because it 
rejects the idea of subjective mutual intent in the standardized adhesive 
contract.40  On the other hand, it also rejects a full obligation on the part of 
the policyholder to read the policy; as the policy language loses its use in 
determining the meaning of the contract, other sources, including insurer 
intent and actuarial purpose, become more useful.  Moreover, the actuarial 
purpose discussed below may be of greatest use to those courts taking a 
regulatory approach to policy language.  Regulating courts are more prone 
to be in the “modern” interpretative camp.   
That said, all judges behave somewhat curiously in the insurance 
realm.41  A functionalist or realist judge views a policy through its purpose 
but will focus on the public purpose; this judge will be more open to 
evidence about actuarial purpose than to an insurer’s specific intent.  He 
                                                                                                                 
37  Id. 
38  Id. §2.02 
39  Id. § 2.01. 
40  See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 
YALE L.J. 939, 943 (1967). 
41  Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Sonia Sotomayor provides one 
example of unexpected behavior in insurance cases.  On the lower bench, then 
Judge Sotomayor ruled “consistently, across the board in favor of insurers.”  
Andrea Ortega-Wells, Supreme Court Nominee Sotomayor Shows Record of 
Favoring Insurers, INSURANCE JOURNAL, June 1. 2009, 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2009/06/01/101001.htm.  
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may also be more inclined to construct than interpret a policy, reforming 
inequitable clauses or refusing to enforce “bait and switch” clauses.   
Both functionalist and formalist judges will be open to evidence of 
insurer faith, good or bad.  Formalist judges will “tend to focus less on the 
meaning of particular words and more on the organization of the policy, its 
history, and insuring intent and purpose—tactics that are more normally 
employed by functionalist judges.”42  Actuarial data address all of this.   
 
B. CONSISTENT INTENT 
 
To generalize, the bad or good faith of an insurer is the backdrop to 
many interpretive questions.  To over generalize, courts tend to assume 
insurer bad faith.  Although faith does not always fit neatly into the 
interpretation decision tree, actuarial data might make the most strides in 
demonstrating an insurer’s bona fides.  A leading treatise on insurance 
coverage litigation states the common view that “the insurance coverage 
that was promised at the time of purchase often disappears down the road 
when a policyholder submits a claim.”43  Sorting insurers whom this 
accurately describes from the rest will help the policyholders in court, those 
not in court, and honest insurers. 
The ability to show consistent intent is more important in insurance 
than elsewhere.  While the disappointed party to a contract may be able to 
claim bad faith, insurers have fiduciaryesque responsibilities toward their 
                                                                                                                 
42  FISCHER ET AL., supra note 19, at 95 n.10.  
43  ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 35 at xx.  See also Jarrett v. E.L. Harper & 
Son, 235 S.E.2d 362, 366 (W.Va. 1977).  The West Virginia Supreme Court wrote: 
Insurance is different from any other business.  If a man goes 
into a butcher shop, asks for two pounds of ground meat, and 
tenders $2.89 in payment, he will expect his meat to be 
forthcoming from the grinder.  Imagine the scene were the 
customer to ask for his meat, and be answered that the butcher 
has no intention to deliver the same.  ‘Where is my meat?’ the 
customer would reply, possibly in other than dulcet tones.  ‘I 
won't give you any meat,’ replies the butcher firmly.  ‘Then give 
me back my $2.89 and I shall go elsewhere,’ says the customer. 
‘I won't give you the $2.89 either,’ replies the butcher, ‘for you 
must bring a law suit to get it from me.’  Sock!  Pow!  Blam!  
And much property damage of a different sort. Id.  
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policyholders.44  A few courts go further, describing the insurer’s 
obligation as fully fiduciary.45  In general, however, an insurer has some 
level of duty to its policyholders, one that may “preclude the insurer from 
taking positions on the meaning of a contract term that would be available 
in an ordinary commercial setting.”46  Even in those jurisdictions where 
insurance policies are interpreted using ordinary contract principles, there 
is at least one “proviso”, that “the contract raises quasi-fiduciary 
obligations owed by the insurer to the insured […] [and a]s a result, the 
insurer has a common-law duty ‘not to unreasonably withhold payment of 
benefits it is obligated to make under the insurance contract.’”47   
The question of bad faith can go beyond contract interpretation.  
Numerous states allow a claim for bad faith breach, including for the denial 
of a claim, as an independent tort worthy of noneconomic and punitive 
damages.48  This can be true where the law does not allow the same claim 
to sound in tort for other contracts because “[i]nsurance is different.  Once 
an insured files a claim, the insurer has a strong incentive to conserve its 
financial resources balanced against the effect on its reputation.”49  If a 
jurisdiction does not allow the tort claim in insurance, policyholders may 
still be able to seek additional damages under a bad faith contract claim not 
permitted outside of the insurance context.50 
                                                                                                                 
44  See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES, § 
10.01 (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2005); see also William T. Barker, Paul E.B. Glad, 
and Steven M. Levy, Is an Insurer a Fiduciary to Its Insureds?, 25 TORT & INS. 
L.J. 1 (1989).   
45  See, e.g., Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Wash. 
1986); Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Minn. 1983).  
46  FISCHER ET AL., supra note 19, at 93.  Fischer et al. describe the “tension of 
sorts between [an insurer’s] duty to its shareholders or other investors (to make 
money) and duty to its policyholders (to pay money).”  Id.  One could add the 
tension with the duty to other policyholders to pay other money or money in the 
future.   
47  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kastner, 77 P.3d 1256, 1259-60 (Colo. 
2003) (quoting Farmers Group, Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419, 423 (Colo. 1991)). 
48  FISCHER ET AL., supra note 19, at 88. 
49  E.I. DePont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 447 (Del. 
1996). 
50  See, e.g., Tibbs v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 755 F.2d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(“[T]here is sufficient evidence to support a finding that Great American refused to 
defend Tibbs in bad faith and is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice,” triggering 
punitive damages). 
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In the right case, evidence of “faith” can be readily found in 
actuarial data.  Take an insurer’s premium calculation based on risks A + B 
but not risk C.  If the policyholder claims or the court suspects that the 
insurer sold C and is now trying to avoid paying for it, actuarial data can 
show whether or not C was indeed “sold”.  More concretely, if a premium 
calculation were based on wind damage + hurricane damage but not flood 
damage (and not flood damage during a hurricane), the insurer should be 
able to prove this to the court.   
This next example assumes the insurer can prove a premium 
calculation based on risks A + B but not risk C; this assumption sets up the 
question whether courts can ever find meaning in an insurer’s proof of a 
particular actuarial calculation.  First, imagine a duplicitous insurer.51  This 
first insurer will be the Tricky Insurer, to be compared to the Breaching 
Insurer down the road.  The Tricky Insurer intends to mislead consumers 
into believing they are purchasing A + B + C but when loss C occurs, it 
does not intend to provide coverage.  For some percentage of 
policyholders, when the C claim is denied, the policyholder will take no 
action and the insurer will have what they want: purchases based on the 
illusion of C without having to pay out C losses.   
But some (smaller) percentage of policyholders will sue for 
coverage C.  Assume one half wins and one half loses.  The insurer has to 
pay the cost of defense against all of these policyholders.  It also must pay 
coverage C for the winning half.  Even if the percentage of policyholders 
who sue is ten percent—a high number—the insurer has collected a 
premium based on A + B but not C and now has to pay litigation costs and 
coverage C for some percentage of policyholders.52  The insurer puts itself 
in this situation: 
 
Insurer pretends to cover:  A + B + C 
Insurer takes in premium charges:  A + B 
Insurer plans to cover:  A + B 
Insurer required to pay:  A + B + (.05)(C) + litigation costs of C 
 
                                                                                                                 
51  Most people report being able to do this with ease. 
52  Some speculate that insurers care not for litigation costs because the time 
value of the money being retained while the litigation progresses pays for itself, 
but this cannot be true in small cases.  See Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Breach of 
Contract by First-Party Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 413 (1996). 
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This arrangement should be profitable for few insurers, far fewer than 
courts assume can profit from the pretense of coverage.   
The sole potential benefit to the tricky type of duplicitous insurer is 
in an increase in clients.  It hasn’t increased its rates, after all.  To be a 
profitable ruse, the increase in sales from pretending to provide coverage C 
would have to outweigh the costs of litigating and the cost of covering 
some percentage of C risks.  Recall, no premium was charged for C.   
How does the insurer lure in new clients using risk C?  Given that 
most policyholders do not fully read or understand their policies, the 
creation of the expectation of coverage C would either have to come from 
(a) fraudulent advertising or (b) taking advantage of a pre-existing 
expectation of coverage.  Fraudulent advertising is a dicey proposition; it 
will invite the scrutiny of state insurance commissioners and the attention 
of class action lawyers.  On an individual basis, an ad that promises a 
particular type of coverage will solidly support the consumer’s claim of 
“reasonable expectations” in court.  The percentages of those who sue on C 
and win will rise, leading to a rise in the percentage of consumers who sue.  
This may explain why most insurance ads make vague promises of “good 
neighbors” with “good hands” in the “company you keep.”53   
In the second, more likely scenario, the insurer does not advertise 
but relies on expectations to ensure sales.  But an insurer will be hard-
pressed to increase sales based on the expectations of coverage C because 
the policyholder’s pre-existing expectations of coverage are not insurer 
specific—the policyholder will assume all policies include coverage for 
risk C.  Thus, a Tricky Insurer who does not charge more but only hopes to 
increase sales based on a universal assumption is not so tricky.  In other 
words, this scenario seems an unlikely one for swindling insurers, but this 
is an empirical question courts can investigate on their own using actuarial 
data.   
A more likely model for the swindling insurer is one who 
calculates and charges a premium based on risks A + B + C but, when C 
loss occurs, does not intend to provide coverage.  (This differs from the 
insurer above because the premium actually includes risk C here.)   
 
 
                                                                                                                 
53  State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company:  “Like a good 
neighbor, State Farm is there.”®  Allstate Insurance Company:  “You’re in Good 
Hands with Allstate.”®  New York Life Insurance Company:  “New York Life. 
The Company You Keep.”®   
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Insurer pretends to cover:  A + B + C 
Insurer takes in premium charges:  A + B + C 
Insurer plans to cover:  A + B 
 
The benefit here is obvious: collect money for C and keep it.  This 
Breaching Insurer may be similarly happy where policyholders either fail 
to claim the coverage or do not sue when denied.  If the pretense of 
providing for C is in the ether, not an ad or the policy language, the insurer 
can hope that many will not sue after a loss.  But if courts look to the 
actuarial data when the policyholder does sue, the court should be able to 
readily grant the C coverage paid for (assuming the policyholder has 
suffered C).   
This will be most straightforward where risk C falls within the 
general grant of coverage, say to a small guesthouse near the insured home, 
but is removed by an exclusion, such as if the guesthouse is used as an 
office part-time.54  Many homeowners policies “cover other structures on 
the ‘residence premises’ set apart from the dwelling by clear space,” but 
not “[o]ther structures from which any ‘business’ is conducted,” where 
“business” is defined as “[a] trade, profession or occupation engaged in on 
a full-time, part-time or occasional basis.”55  If the premium charged takes 
into account the loss data for all “other structures” but fails to exclude those 
losses where “business is conducted,” the consumer has been charged for 
and deserves compensation.   
Of course, the set-up need not be so formalized or consistently 
applied.  Many people and judges seem to believe that insurers randomly 
deny payment for losses that are covered, for which the policyholder has 
paid a premium.  Actuarial data should be able to give a clearer picture of 
how often this happens.  If courts regularly examine actuarial data, as time 
goes by insurers should become less and less willing to charge for coverage 
and then deny the claim. 
In addition to tricks and breach, there is a middle way.  An insurer 
may have created an expectation of coverage from past sales; all prior 
policies did cover risk C, at price P.  When a new day dawns, the insurer 
                                                                                                                 
54  INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INC., STANDARD HOMEOWNERS POLICY, 
HOMEOWNERS 3 – SPECIAL FORM HO 00 03 10 00 1, 3 (1999), quoting p. 3, 
Section I – Property Coverages, B.1. & B.2.c. and p. 1, Definitions, B.3.a, 
available at http://www.mypolicyforms.com/ho3/default2.aspx.  The definition of 
“business” contains other provisions not relevant here. 
55  Id. at 1, 3. 
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continues to charge P (or even slightly less than P) but removes risk C from 
the policy language and stops compensating for C loss.56  Behold the 
Tricky Breaching Insurer.  The marketing of the policy is unchanged, so 
applicants assume C coverage continues to exist.  If the coverage is sold at 
slightly less than P, it appears to the unsophisticated buyer to be a great 
bargain.   
What will the actuarial data show here?  The analysis parallels that 
of the Breaching Insurer if the premium fully includes the risk of C.  If the 
premium is the original P, discounted slightly, the analysis may be 
identical.  It depends on how the discount is taken.  If the actuarial data 
continues to include risk C but a slight discount is taken from the total 
premium calculation at the end, the court still easily sees that C has been 
charged for but denied.  Breach. If the C component of the premium is 
itself reduced by some percentage, as long as the basis is still C, breach is 
found again.   
This is not to say that the calculation cannot be too convoluted to 
prove breach.  Indeed, if actuarial data becomes widely used in court, some 
swindling insurers can be counted upon to re-master the premium 
calculations to increase convolution.  On the other hand, honest insurers 
who currently operate under a cloud of doubt may work to ensure their 
calculations show their honesty to its best advantage. 
Let us return for a moment to methods of misleading the consumer 
at the front end.  We can imagine either that the insurer actively attempts to 
provide the illusion of coverage C, as in the first example, or that the 
insurer simply takes advantage of a pre-existing consumer misconception 
about that type of coverage.  It would be easy for insurers to identify the 
many misconceptions policyholders have about their insurance coverage.  
A 2007 phone survey of policyholders found that 71% of Americans with 
homeowners insurance believed they had full coverage to rebuild after a 
natural disaster or fire and 72% believed their personal belongings were 
covered at the cost of replacement.57  Their actual coverage had caps below 
                                                                                                                 
56  This is a common marketing move in the grocery aisle.  You may 
sporadically find your cereal box is slightly thinner or has fewer flakes, although 
the price per box does not decrease.  See, e.g., Jessica Dickler, The Incredible 
Shrinking Cereal Box: The packaging may look the same but the amount inside has 
gone down, that’s how companies try to pass on food inflation, CNNMONEY.COM, 
Sept. 10, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/09/pf/food_downsizing/index.htm. 
57  Press Release, Metlife Auto & Home, Insurance Surprises: Survey Finds 
Many Americans Dramatically Overestimate the Level of Insurance Protection 
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full coverage and would cover the depreciated value of personal items, well 
below replacement cost.   
Do insurers take advantage of mistakes like this?  Oren Bar-Gill 
and Richard Epstein recently asked the more general question “do 
sophisticated sellers respond strategically to consumer misperception?  In 
particular, do sellers design their products, contracts, and pricing schemes 
in response to consumer misperception?” 58  They consider the answer in a 
debate between behavioral and neoclassical law and economics; Bar-Gill 
emphasizes that the answer is ultimately empirical.59  Contrary to courts’ 
assumptions, both conclude that it “is probably correct” that “mistakes 
about a standardized product are not sustainable.”60   
Insurance may be the exception.  Under a reasonable conception of 
standardization, homeowners insurance policies are a standardized product 
and consumer mistakes certainly persist.  Whether insurers are strategically 
taking advantage of these mistakes can be answered by actuarial data.  And 
while Bar-Gill is correct that the question is ultimately empirical, the 
analysis of premium calculation presented here can provide some initial 
answers even before the actuarial data is reviewed by courts.   
The point here is that if the insurer attempts to swindle 
policyholders by the second breaching method—charging for A+B+C but 
not covering C—actuarial data should reveal the C charge and confirm that 
policyholders are due C coverage.  The assumption here is not that there 
are only honest insurers, but that actuarial data can either keep insurers 
honest or at least allow courts to identify the dishonest ones. 61  
                                                                                                                          
They Have (July 10, 2007) (available at http://www.metlife.com/about/press-
room/us-press-releases/2007/index.html?compID=518). 
58  Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 749, 749 (2008); Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics 
of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803, 807 (2008). 
59  Bar-Gill, supra note 58, at 751. 
60  Id. at 750. 
61  On the flip side, when a policyholder is dishonest and commits fraud in 
applying for a policy, state law often requires the insurer to prove that the fraud 
was material; the insurer must be able to show that it would not have issued the 
policy or would have required different terms in the absence of the policyholder’s 
misrepresentation or concealment.  Actuarial data can inform this question too.  
See, e.g., Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 04-CV-0865-REB-CBS, 2006 WL 173693, 
at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 24, 2006) (Insurer “charged a premium based on the actuarial 
risk associated with a one-household [auto] policy,” and “[a]bsent the fraudulent 
misrepresentations and concealment” of the policyholders  “it would not have 
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C. SPECIFIC INTENT 
 
Policyholder intent has a settled place in insurance interpretation.  
The traditional form of the reasonable expectations doctrine gives as “the 
rule that the reasonable expectations of the insured should be honored even 
if those expectations are unambiguously contradicted by fine-print 
provisions in the policy.”62  Not all courts go so far, however.  Many courts 
are more likely to hold that a policyholder’s intent cannot be reasonable if a 
reading of the policy would have corrected it.   
Courts using the milder version of reasonable expectations 
recognize the “rule that the policy must receive a reasonable interpretation 
consistent with the parties’ object and intent.”63  Courts that are interested 
in insurer intent (and expectations64) will consider the intersection of 
policyholder and insurer intent, but insurers have two ongoing problems in 
proving intent.   
First, given the presumption of poor faith, courts are simply less 
likely to believe an insurer.  An insurer may be taking a litigation position 
or the insurer’s lawyer may simply be cleverly supporting whatever 
interpretation supports the insurer’s cause in this case.  By contrast, if a 
policyholder states that it expected or intended a particular coverage, or 
that it would have expected coverage had it read the policy language, courts 
are inclined to believe the policyholder if the claim is at all reasonable.   
Second, insurers tend to point to the language of the policy for 
proof of their intent.  This is a textbook contractual approach but it severely 
limits the insurer where the court finds the language confusing and 
inaccessible to the policyholder.  Moreover, it conflates what could be two 
separate thrusts for the insurer: one about the natural reading of the 
language and one about the value of its own intent.  Both of these problems 
could be solved with the introduction of actuarial data.  The data are a 
separate and different input for proof of the insurer’s intent.  More 
                                                                                                                          
issued and renewed the policy as it did.”). 
       62  See Abraham, supra note 5, at 532 (citing ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. 
WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW §§ 6.1(a)-(b), at 614-21 (Practitioner’s ed. 1988)). 
63  Brown v. Ind. Ins. Co., 184 S.W.3d 528, 540 (Ky. 2005) (quoting St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Powell-Walton-Milward, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 223, 226-27 
(Ky. 1994)). 
64  “Party expectations are a cousin of party intent.”  FISCHER ET AL., supra 
note 19, at 97.  
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importantly, the data are actual proof of intent; insurers would no longer 
have to rely on their mere claims of intent in the face of skeptical courts. 
If courts could be made more comfortable that an insurer’s 
representation of its intent was its actual intent, the question becomes what 
to do with the knowledge.  On the day the contract was formed, the insurer 
had a definite intent as to what the words meant; the (consumer or 
unsophisticated) policyholder had a general intent—cover my losses if my 
house is partially or totally destroyed.  Karl Llewellyn called a consumer’s 
intent in a standardized contract the “blanket assent . . . to any not 
unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on its form, which do 
not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.”65    In 
keeping with this, not all reasonable expectations options require the 
policyholder to have had an actual expectation before the loss occurred; 
many courts are content to ask what the policyholder would have expected 
had the question come to mind.  Indeed, the policyholder is rarely asked to 
explain, let alone prove, the source of his expectation. 
But what if the policyholder would not have had a particular 
expectation even had the question come to mind?  For example, does your 
homeowners policy provide coverage if the fence around your yard is 
damaged?66  Does it provide coverage for limited personal effects lost in 
hotel rooms while traveling?  (Yes, to some extent).67  If your spouse 
intentionally burns down your house, are you still covered for your half of 
the loss?  (It depends). 68  Does the pollution exclusion exclude coverage 
                                                                                                                 
65  KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION—DECIDING APPEALS 
370 (1960) (emphasis added); see also Swisher, supra note 30, at 570 n.77.   
66  Your homeowners policy may cover your neighbor’s fence—if you 
negligently set a fire in your backyard.  See Prather v. Audubon Ins. Co., 488 So. 
2d 383, 384-85 (La. Ct. App. 1986).  A homeowner was recently paid $25,000 for 
damage from Hurricane Katrina to a den and the fencing around his home.  
Although the plaintiff was not happy with the sum he received, a portion was 
attributed to the fence.  See Gustings v. Travelers & Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. 07-
4443, 2008 WL 4948837 at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 18, 2008). 
67  INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, supra note 54, at 3 (“We cover personal 
property owned or used by an ‘insured’ while it is anywhere in the world.”). 
68  See Rachel R. Watkins Schoenig, Note, Property Insurance and the 
Innocent Co-Insured: Was It All Pay and No Gain for the Innocent Co-Insured? 43 
DRAKE L. REV. 893, 895-96 (1995).  If the policy is jointly held between husband 
and wife, the non-arsonist has suffered an unintentional loss; whether that loss is 
covered depends on the contract and the state.  See Randall, supra note 1, at 144-
45. “Whether the intentional acts of a co-insured will defeat coverage for an 
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for the injury to people who inhaled fumes from floor cleaner?  (Depends 
on the jurisdiction).69 
If the policyholder would not have had a particular view, it could 
not be disappointed in a lack of coverage.  If the insurer has a particular 
intent, one acted upon in premium calculation, it has something to lose 
from an adverse interpretation.  There is always a decent chance that 
nonetheless a court will apply contra proferentem, construing the language 
in favor of coverage.  The undercurrent of contra proferentem is protection 
of the policyholder against a scheming insurer and “encouragement” to the 
insurer to draft more clearly.  In circumstances where neither of these 
motivations applies, courts that give lip service to valuing the insurer’s 
intent could pay up, with the aid of actuarial data.70 
For example, commercial general liability policies provide 
coverage for liability arising from damage to “tangible property.”71  Data 
stored on computers came along, quickly followed by possible liability 
arising from its destruction.  When policyholders first started seeking 
                                                                                                                          
innocent co-insured turns on the exclusionary language used in the policy.  A 
policy excluding losses caused by intentional acts of ‘any insured’ or ‘an insured’ 
creates a joint obligation among co-insureds and bars coverage for both the 
malefactor and innocent co-insureds. Where the policy uses the words, ‘the 
insured’, the obligation is several, and the exclusion applies only to the insured 
who intended the act and caused injury, not an innocent co-insured.”  Id.  See also 
N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Carney, No. 3:04-CV-2468, 2006 WL 2092571 at *3-4 
(M.D. Pa. July 26, 2006) (holding the intentional act of one insured excludes 
coverage for the innocent co-insured under the language “an insured” or “any 
insured”; but a wife’s arson does not stop her husband’s recovery when he is the 
sole owner). 
69  Compare Nav-Its, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 869 A.2d 929 (N.J. 
2005) (holding that the pollution exclusion in a Commercial General Liability 
policy applies only to traditional environmental pollution, not to indoor chemical 
use) with Fireman’s Ins. Co. v. Kline & Son Cement Repair, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 
799 (E.D. Va. 2007) (holding that fumes from floor sealant were “pollution” within 
the definition of the pollution exclusion). 
70  Some will say that the two animating factors behind contra proferentem 
always apply.  At a minimum, neither is at stake when older policy language is 
applied to emergent and new risks. 
71  The policyholder is covered for “property damage,” defined as “physical 
injury to tangible property . . . or loss of use of tangible property that is not 
physically injured.”  INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL 
LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM CG 00 01 10 01 15 (2000) available at http://www. 
certifiedriskmanagers.com/NewISOforms.htm. 
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coverage for damage to computer files, courts were at a loss.72  Consider 
how a court could attempt to answer the question. 
First, the language is not ambiguous as much as indeterminate.  
Some courts found ambiguity but most found the language unambiguously 
supported the judge’s individual sense of whether electronic data was 
tangible property; opinions were widely split, yea or nay.  Some courts had 
a better understanding than others of the physical space (however 
miniscule) electronic data occupy, and these courts found the data to be 
tangible property.  While reading the words and applying them accurately 
to a new context has some basis for support, it does require “tangible” to do 
work it was not selected to do; “tangible” property was meant to set apart 
intangible property, such as intellectual property.  Like threats to 
intellectual property, threats to electronic data come from different sources.  
These threats require different risk calculations than threats to tangible 
property.73 
Second, the courts could have turned to the reasonable expectations 
doctrine.  But, in the earlier years, the policyholders either did not have any 
expectation or would not have expected coverage.  (The earlier years were 
when the question was relevant; insurers eventually addressed the split 
between tangible property and electronic data with policy options.)  The 
actuarial data from these years would not have included the risk of loss to 
electronically stored data—an example of the lack of data providing 
definite information.   
Third, those courts finding the language ambiguous could have 
construed in favor of the policyholder, including electronic data in tangible 
property.  This is not necessarily a good policyholder outcome because the 
newly found coverage will cost future policyholders.  Again, however, 
many courts were not willing to find the language ambiguous.74   
                                                                                                                 
72  See, e.g., Computer Corner Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins., 46 P.3d 1264, 1266 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (electronically stored data is “tangible property”); Am. 
Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 207 F. Supp. 2d 459 (E.D. Va. 2002) 
(electronically stored data not “tangible property”). 
73  Of course, threats to physical property also threaten the physical storage of 
electronic data.  When fire destroys a computer, it destroys any data stored on that 
computer but electronic data are subject mainly to electronic threats.  
74  Try this experiment.  Show the policy language on tangible property to 
several friends and ask each one (a) if the clause covers electronically stored data 
and (b) if the question is close, i.e. if the language is ambiguous as applied to 
electronic data.  You will find that people vary in their answer to (a) but do not 
believe (b). 
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Fourth, courts could have considered the insurer’s intent, not as 
asserted but as shown by the actuarial data.  Insurers had not been counting 
electronic data in the tangible property loss statistics.  They were not 
charging for the risk of loss to electronically stored materials.  In other 
words, one of the parties had a specific intent about “tangible property” and 
relied on that intent in its initial performance under the contract.  Barring a 
public policy conclusion that insurers should have been on the loss for not 
addressing electronic data in the policy language at all, the evidence of this 
specific insurer intent would have provided useful, perhaps definitive, 
interpretive guidance. 
Insurer intent thus could have given courts a tool for solving the 
“tangible property” dilemma without resorting to individual judge’s 
happenstance first impressions.  But there is another benefit to construing 
language in keeping with insurer intent, at least some of the time.  Bringing 
the interpretation of a clause closer to the coverage intended when the 
policy was issued decreases what Tom Baker has called the “contract risk”. 
75  The contract risk is part of the insurers’ risk equation.  Baker defines it 
as “the risk relating to the drafting and interpretation of insurance 
policies.”76  Baker partitions the risk liability insurers take on into:  
 
(1) the baseline risk,  
(2) the developments risk (“relating to developments that change 
the rate or cost of loss”),  
(3) the contract risk, and  
(4) the financing risk.77     
 
As with the other three risks, the higher the contract risk, the more 
expensive it will be to cover and the more policyholders will have to pay.   
Another way to think about contract risk is as a species of 
ambiguity aversion for which insurers will charge a risk premium.  Surveys 
of actuaries, underwriters, and reinsurance underwriters suggest strong 
aversion to loss ambiguity.  These surveys “illustrate that uncertainty about 
                                                                                                                 
75  See Baker, supra note 7, at 139-40.  
76  Id. at 128, 130.  Kenneth Abraham calls this an “uncertainty tax.”  Kenneth 
S. Abraham, The Insurance Effects of Regulation by Litigation, in REGULATION 
THROUGH LITIGATION 212, 222-23 (W. Kip Viscusi ed. 2002). 
77  Baker, supra note 7, at 128-30. 
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losses and ambiguity about probability lead to higher prices.” 78  The 
research suggests that the risk premia for ambiguity is inefficient and 
results in higher prices to policyholders. 
There can be good reason for knowingly increasing contract risk.  
If a clause is avoidably unclear or misleading, for example, an insurer 
should bear the risk its confusion causes.79  Courts want to motivate 
insurers to decrease the level of contract risk the insurers cause 
themselves.80  Even clear language does not eviscerate contract risk; a 
clearly written clause may go unenforced because it is against public policy 
as applied to the particular facts at hand.  In other words, the optimum 
contract risk is not zero.  If the risk can be decreased appropriately, 
however, it will benefit all parties by lowering the price of insurance and 
decreasing unnecessary litigation.81   
 
D. ACTUARIAL PURPOSE 
 
A primary and simple reason to show actuarial purpose is to 
explain why an insurer includes a particular exclusion.  Courts often 
behave as though exclusions are mere traps for unwary policyholders, not a 
decision by an insurer (in keeping with other insurers) that a particular risk 
is uninsurable.  Actuarial data would be able to demonstrate the legitimate 
business purpose behind these “natural” exclusions. 
Other exclusions often fall into the categories of public policy 
exclusions or exclusions used by insurers to fight moral hazard.  Intentional 
act exclusions fall into both.  These exclusions bar coverage for harm that 
results from an intentional act of the policyholder, although whether both 
the act and its result must be intentioned differs among jurisdictions. 
In Arizona, for example, there is a wrinkle in the application of 
intentional act exclusions.  The Arizona courts have “abandoned” the 
contra proferentem approach, believing that “a finding of ambiguity is the 
easy way out since it permits the court to create its own version of the 
                                                                                                                 
78  Kunreuther, Hogarth & Meszaros, supra note 8, at 79.  See also sources 
cited supra note 8.  
79  Inflicting a high contract risk for unavoidably complex language is another 
story.  See Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language 
Defense, 95 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
80  But see Boardman, supra note 2, at 1112-17.     
81  As with any increase in litigation certainty, decreasing the contract risk 
should also increase the resolution of claims out of court.   
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contract and to find, or fail to find, ambiguity in order to justify an almost 
predetermined result.”82  Ambiguity cannot be willed away, however, so 
while the Arizona Supreme Court has cautioned against hunting for 
ambiguity, the courts need an approach to truly ambiguous clauses: the 
Arizona courts “determine the meaning of the clause . . . by examining the 
purpose of the exclusion [or clause] in question, the public policy 
considerations involved and the transaction as a whole.”83 
In Transamerica Insurance Group v. Meere, the policyholder 
injured a person when acting in self defense.84  The policy, like most, had 
an unambiguous exclusion for intentional acts; the act of self defense was 
intentional.  Should coverage be found to be excluded, giving policyholders 
some incentive to refrain from self defense?  After all, the moral hazard 
concern behind intentional act exclusions (and their common law parallel) 
applies weakly, if at all, to self defense.  
Consider the approaches a court could take: 
 
1.   Apply the clause as written.  The meaning is clear.  
→ no coverage for policyholder acting in self defense 
 
2.   Find the unambiguous clause ambiguous. 
                                                                                                                 
82  Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 939 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Ariz. 1997) 
(quoting Transamerica Ins. Group v. Meere, 694 P.2d 181, 185 (Ariz. 1984)). 
83  Id. at 1339 (emphasis added).  See also Cal. Cas. Ins. v. Am. Family Mut. 
Ins., 94 P.3d 616, 618 (Ariz. App. 2004).   
84  Transamerica Ins. Group v. Meere, 694 P.2d 181 (Ariz. 1984).   
On March 27, 1980, at about 12:30 a.m., Meere and a friend, 
Leon Ivey, were leaving Lindy’s, a bar in Florence, Arizona.  
Outside Lindy’s, Meere and Ivey were confronted by several off-
duty employees of the Arizona State Prison.  Meere alleges that 
he was quite apprehensive because he had been informed by a 
captain at Arizona State Prison that a rumor was circulating 
among the guards that Ivey and Meere, both ex-police officers, 
were undercover investigators of narcotics flow into the prison.  
One of the guards, Dennis Pruitt, approached Meere. Meere and 
Pruitt exchanged words.  Pruitt then struck Meere, knocking him 
to the ground; Meere put up his hands, said ‘I don’t want to 
fight,’ and was struck again by Pruitt.  The two then exchanged 
blows.  The fight ended when Meere knocked Pruitt to the 
ground and kicked Pruitt as he attempted to get up and come at 
Meere again.  Pruitt lost partial use of an eye as a result of this 
fight.  Id. at 183. 
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→ coverage without honor 
→ litigation increases because policyholders and their counsel 
conclude there is always an argument for ambiguity 
 
3.   Review the actuarial data and actuarial purpose of the clause. 
→ the actuarial purpose of the clause, which is to avoid  
creating a moral hazard of lowering a policyholder’s  
disincentive to cause harm, does not apply to true self  
defense 
→ the actuarial data would reflect this fact  
→ policyholder covered, in keeping with the insurer’s intent 
 
4.   Meere court: determine purpose of clause from case law, a  
treatise, and public policy  
→ coverage, in keeping with public policy  
→ route most courts haven’t taken 
 
Choices three and four may be equally good outcomes.  
Unfortunately, a number of courts to look at this issue have taken choices 
one and two, unnecessarily.85  Perhaps these courts felt uncomfortable 
making public policy openly dispositive86 and were unwilling to deny the 
policyholder at hand coverage while futilely recommending a future change 
to the state insurance commission.   
While the Meere court’s choice seems sufficient, the approach was 
not attractive enough to other courts. Use of actuarial data would have 
provided another avenue, a line of reasoning that could be substantiated, 
and that was fact-based and provable.  Moreover, an insurer aware that a 
court might consider the actuarial data and purpose of the clause would 
have been less likely to deny and litigate the claim in the first place.   
This case strikes some as silly—“it is not a serious question 
whether the policyholder should be covered for liability stemming from 
self defense.”  But it was (and is) a question in Arizona and elsewhere.  “In 
a majority of cases, courts have held that injury inflicted in self-defense is 
                                                                                                                 
85  See, e.g., Lockhart v. Allstate Ins. Co., 579 P.2d 1120, 1122-23 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1978); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 538 N.W.2d 106, 108-10 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1995); Grange Ins. Co. v. Brosseau, 776 P.2d 123, 126-27 (Wash. 1989). 
86  The dissent in Meere characterized the decision by the majority as one 
“based on policy to distribute the consequences of the loss on an insurance 
company.”  Meere, 694 P.2d at 190. 
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expected or intended under the intentional injury exclusion clause.”87  
Insurers fight these claims.  One benefit of even the potential use of 
actuarial data is that swindling or sloppy insurers should more readily pay 
claims for risks the insurer has calculated and charged.  Note that for this 
benefit, the policyholders do not need to be able to determine where the 
insurer is being inconsistent; the insurer’s self-knowledge is enough. 
Actuarial data should also be able to prove or disprove the 
existence of a “natural” exclusion.  In a typical Hurricane Katrina case, 
Tuepker v. State Farm, the court concluded that a combination of clauses 
was ambiguous and therefore to be construed against the insurer. 88  As in 
most homeowners policies, wind and rain damage were covered and water 
damage (flood, inundation by water) was excluded.  This policy also 
included a “hurricane deductible endorsement,” meaning that the 
policyholder had paid an additional premium for a type of hurricane 
coverage (with a deductible).89   
Finally, the policy excluded losses that were caused in part by a 
covered cause but would not have occurred without an excluded cause.90  
                                                                                                                 
87  ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW § 63C(c) (4th ed. 2007).  See, e.g., Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut. 
Ins. Co., 201 F. Supp. 647 (M.D.N.C. 1962) (coverage for intentional shooting and 
unintentional killing of persistent prowler excluded).  What is at stake in these 
cases is the insurer’s duty to defend, or pay for the defense, of the policyholder.  A 
policyholder who is found in a civil action to have acted properly in self-defense is 
not liable to his foe.  A policyholder whose claim of self-defense is rejected is 
liable to his foe but his intentional act and harm clearly falls within the intentional  
act exclusion.  See also John Dwight Ingram, The Expected or Intended Exclusion 
in Liability Insurance: What About Self-Defense?, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 123 
(2009).   
88  Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:05CV559 LTS-JMR, 2006 
WL 1442489 at *4-*5 (S.D. Miss., May 24, 2006). 
89  Id. at *4. 
90  STATE FARM HOME OWNERS POLICY 24100401-1 (2005), reprinted in 
Tuepker 2006 WL 1442489 at *2.  
We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which would 
not have occurred in the absence of one or more of the following 
events. We do not insure for such loss regardless of: (a) the cause 
of the excluded event; or (b) other causes of the excluded event; 
or (c) whether other causes acted concurrently or in any sequence 
with the excluded event to produce the loss; or (d) whether the 
event occurs suddenly or gradually, involves isolated or 
widespread damage, arises from natural or external forces, or 
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For these purposes, the policy would therefore exclude wind and rain 
damage (otherwise covered) if it would not have occurred but for the storm 
surge (excluded water damage).  If a house withstood the wind up until the 
storm surge knocked down a wall, for example, leading wind and rain to 
damage the inside of the house, all would be excluded.  On the other hand, 
if wind tore a hole in the roof, letting rain in to damage the second story, 
both would be covered whether or not the first floor was also flooded. 
This is a simple explanation of what is admittedly dense policy 
language.  Given that the court had to find some meaning in the language, 
however, it is a reasonable reading that does not torture or ignore any of the 
policy language.  However, the judge in Tuepker—a capable judge who 
handled many Katrina cases with some skill—found the addition of the 
hurricane endorsement to the rest of the policy (wind covered, flood 
excluded) ambiguous.91  The judge seemed to conclude that since the 
hurricane coverage must have meant something, and the policy already 
covered wind and rain damage, it must have meant that the “combined 
cause” exclusion did not apply during a hurricane.92 
This reading may be less reasonable than the one offered above or 
it may be an improvement; the point is that the actuarial data should have 
been able to answer the question.  The policyholder paid an additional 
premium for the hurricane endorsement.  Which risks did the insurer enter 
in calculating that premium?  Which risks are excluded?  In particular, the 
                                                                                                                          
occurs as a result of any combination [enumerated excluded 
causes].  Id. 
91  On the other hand, Former Senator Trent Lott’s home was destroyed during 
Hurricane Katrina, leaving nothing but a slab.  State Farm held that a “storm 
surge,” and not hurricane winds, caused the damage.  This meant that Lott’s 
insurance policy did not cover his damage.  See Bob Kemper, Senator who Lost his 
Home Sues Insurer, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Dec. 16, 2005, at C3.   
92  The court took this reading to avoid a finding that the hurricane coverage 
was illusory.  Insurance policies or clauses that are “illusory”—that would provide 
coverage under no circumstances—are fraudulent and unenforceable.  
Policyholders bringing suit against an illusory clause should be able to demonstrate 
that the insurer knew the clause to be illusory from the insurer’s calculations of 
expected loss.  Conversely, an insurer defending a legitimate clause from attack 
might be able to provide proof that it expected loss under certain circumstances 
and planned for it.  See, e.g., Frye v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins., 915 So. 2d 486, 491 
(Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (Policyholders seeking to prove “phantom” coverage 
attempted to discover “information relating to the historical make-up and design of 
the policy, as well as information relating to actuarial composition, loss reserves, 
claims experience of [the insurer’s] agents, and pure profit.”). 
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correlated losses from inundation by water, caused by hurricane or any 
other source, may be too high for insurers to offer solvent coverage.  If so, 
the court’s reading of the hurricane endorsement is flawed. 
Here, actuarial data could have made a clause sensible to a court; it 
could have shown not just a lack of fraud or decreased chance of deceit by 
the insurer but also an understanding of what the insurer was getting at with 
its language.  A circumlocutory or technical clause will not be transformed 
by data into a thing of beauty, but the court will no longer suspect the 
insurer of careless randomness.  Moreover, the court may see the public 
policy value behind the enforcement of a “natural” exclusion. 
Of course, judges sometimes mandate coverage for public policy 
reasons and some judges involved in the many Katrina cases clearly saw 
themselves in that role; thousands of people lost their homes and stingy 
insurers could be made to pay.  “Judges in insurance cases not only make 
insurance law; sometimes they also make insurance.” 93  A full explanation 
of why or how judges award uncontracted-for coverage is beyond this 
discussion.  Courts do it and will continue to do it; the point here is that 
courts engaging in the regulation of the insurance industry should not do so 
blindly.  They should be armed with a full understanding of the actuarial 
purpose behind the clauses to be regulated and the likely outcome of any 
regulation. 94 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
93  ABRAHAM, supra note 13 at 101.  Abraham is right that while “judicial 
techniques of interpretation frequently create insurance coverage where policies do 
not provide for it,” the total interpretation “practice turns out to be considerably 
more complicated” than courts simply handing money from wealthy insurers to 
policyholders.  Id. at 101-02. 
94  For example, state regulation can have disastrous results.  State Farm is 
currently withdrawing all homeowners insurance from the state of Florida.  The 
last straw for State Farm was not court action but the denial by the state Insurance 
Commissioner of State Farm’s request to raise rates 47.1 percent.  State Farm Can 
Go? But Not on Its own Terms, SUWANNEE DEMOCRAT, Feb. 19,2009 available at 
http://www.suwanneedemocrat.com/archivesearch/local_story_044133837.html.  
State Farm claims that Florida’s policies, such as required discounts to its 
customers “have further reduced needed revenues.  During the first three quarters 
of 2008 (a year with relatively modest catastrophe impact and no major hurricane), 
State Farm Florida saw its surplus reduced by $201 million.”  Hays, supra note 27, 
at 7. 
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1. Ambiguity  
 
A side note about ambiguity is called for here.  More than half of 
insurance disputes involve some claim of ambiguity. 95  If a court concludes 
that a clause (or collection of clauses) is ambiguous, it will be construed 
against the insurer and in favor of coverage under the doctrine of contra 
proferentem.  Actuarial data can help here too, although its role is more 
amorphous.   
In an opinion that is a favorite of insurance textbooks, a court 
found the phrase “occupied as Janitor’s residence” ambiguous.96  The 
question was whether a floor, a portion of which was used as a massage 
parlor, was “occupied as a janitor’s residence” because a janitor slept there 
on occasion.  The court attempted to consider the purpose of the clause 
from the insurer’s perspective but did so by guessing.  The court assumed 
the value of the janitor’s residence was to monitor for fire or trouble, and 
this may have been so.  On the other hand, the court also speculates that the 
insurer may have wanted the janitor to exclusively occupy the floor, 
keeping out more dangerous uses.97   
Actuarial data should have been provided or solicited to prove one 
of these purposes.  The kink here is that the data would not directly have 
addressed the question of whether the clause was ambiguous; either the 
clause is susceptible of two plausible interpretations, in context, or it isn’t.  
Appropriately or no, if one reasonable meaning of a clause is proven and 
sensible, courts are less likely to find ambiguity.  First, while courts often 
admonish themselves not to “seek” or “create” ambiguity for policy 
reasons, more factors go into the decision than the sheer ambiguity of the 
word at hand.  Second, once a plausible meaning is available, backed with 
proof of consistent intent, the mind is less willing to entertain a weaker 
alternative as proof of legitimate ambiguity.   
 
 
                                                                                                                 
95  See Rappaport, supra note 30, at 173. (“The ambiguity rule is probably the 
most important rule in insurance law.”). 
96  Vlastos v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 707 F.2d 775, 776 (3d Cir. 
1983) (warranty as to state of building on day policy issued).   
97  Id. at 779.  The court hypothesizes why having a janitor occupying the floor 
would be in the best interest of the insurance company, and states “[a] full-time 
resident janitor might also deter prowlers and vandals from entering the building,” 
among other reasons.  Id.   
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III. ACTUARIAL DATA ALREADY IN COURT  
 
This section addresses the concern that courts are ill-equipped to 
handle actuarial data.  Bottom line: courts have no choice.  Actuarial data 
are ubiquitous in modern decision making, too ubiquitous for courts to 
duck entirely.98  The Supreme Court has dealt with the data directly on 
several occasions, such as evaluating the use of gendered statistics in 
employee benefits.99  Despite controversy, its use is increasing in civil 
commitment and criminal sentencing.100  These cases often require expert 
analysis of the data but, as would be the case in interpretation, they do not 
require courts to undertake calculations or learn advanced statistics.  
Courts accept, on occasion demand, and use actuarial or 
underwriting data in limited insurance cases now.  While these 
circumstances do not usually involve the interpretation of insurance 
policies head on, they do indicate that courts have some facility with the 
data.  For example, courts expect insurers to use actuarial or underwriting 
data to prove materiality in a claim against a policyholder for 
misrepresentation.  A recent California opinion is a typical case: 
The insurer’s “senior underwriter testified to the 
misrepresentation’s materiality.  She explained joint ventures pose 
                                                                                                                 
98  See Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices, 22 
LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 771 (1988).   
Actuarial techniques play a central role in a proliferating set 
of social practices.  They are at the same time a regime of truth, a 
way of exercising power, and a method of ordering social life.  
Actuarial practices have not seemed very important nor attracted 
much interest from social observers in part because they are 
already so familiar, and in part because they fit so unobtrusively 
into various substantive projects (e.g., educating, hiring, 
premium setting) in which they are subordinated as a means to 
an end.  Id. at 772. 
99  See Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) 
(holding that requiring larger pension contributions from women than men violated 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, actuarial evidence of longer female life 
expectancy notwithstanding). 
100  See, e.g., Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of 
Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 409 (2001); Christopher Slobogin, 
Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1984); John W. Bagby, 
Book Review, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 213 (2006) (reviewing BERNARD E. 
HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN 
ACTUARIAL AGE (2006)). 
192 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
 
 
increased risks, require additional underwriting, and warrant charging ‘an 
additional premium’ before [the insurer] will cover them.  Thus, the 
misrepresentation is also material because it affected [the insurer’s] 
evaluation of risk and the amount of the premium charged.’” 101 
In a second example, if a policyholder is turned down for 
insurance, the policyholder may be able to seek redress for a violation of 
state law or regulation.102  The same is true when an existing policy is 
cancelled or not renewed.103  Courts in these cases evaluate the 
underwriting process but not for the purpose of interpreting policy 
language.104  Similarly, insurers can challenge a state insurance 
commissioner’s rejection of their language or rates, a dispute that will 
involve the insurer’s premium data.105 
Third, parties can point to actuarial theory or abstract fact without 
presenting numbers or calculations.106  For example, insurers can point to 
                                                                                                                 
101  LA Sound USA, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
917, 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).  See, e.g., Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 04-CV-
0865-REB-CBS, 2006 WL 173693, at *2 (D. Colo. 2006) (Insurer “charged a 
premium based on the actuarial risk associated with a one-household [auto] 
policy,” and “[a]bsent the fraudulent misrepresentations and concealment” of the 
policyholders  “it would not have issued and renewed the policy as it did.”).  In 
L.A. Sound, the court held that the insurer did not need to produce the specific 
underwriter who had processed the policyholder’s application.  L.A. Sound, 67 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 924.   
102  See CAL. INS. CODE § 791.10 (2006) (Adverse underwriting decisions; 
declination, cancellation or nonrenewal of enumerated policies; specific reasons 
for decision).  Discriminatory underwriting was treated under the McBride-
Grunsky Insurance Regulatory Act of 1947, but repealed by Prop 103.  CAL. INS. 
CODE § 1861.05 (2009). 
103  CAL. INS. CODE § 791.10 (2006). 
104  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Pac. Specialty Ins. Co., No. B193051, 2007 WL 
2005059 (Cal. Ct. App. July 12, 2007). 
105  See, e.g., Mass. Auto. Rating & Accident Prevention Bureau v. Comm’ r, 
453 N.E.2d 381 (Mass. 1983) (Action by insurers challenging the Massachusetts 
Insurance Commissioner’s establishment of automobile insurance rates).   
106  As with most forms of evidence or logical support, courts at times include 
a reference to the actuarial function of a clause or policy where the point is not 
outcome determinative but merely serves to buttress the court’s conclusion as 
doubly right.  The non-essential support for a legal outcome is not necessarily 
dictum but nor is it always as well-considered as the evidence upon which the 
court actively relies.  Current judicial use of abstract actuarial principles is more 
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the fact that a particular type of coverage can be had for an additional 
premium as proof that, in the absence of that premium, the loss is not 
covered.  Courts may but often do not require the insurer to demonstrate 
that the policyholder was aware of the additional coverage for sale.  Thus 
courts are at times willing to use “inside” insurer information to interpret a 
clause despite the information asymmetry between the parties.  (Focusing 
on a policyholder’s reasonable expectations, ignoring any insurer role in 
those expectations, is a more common example of courts using 
asymmetrical information, but to the policyholder’s benefit.) 
Some courts seem to be open to a more sophisticated use of 
actuarial data.  If deeds speak louder than words, however, it should be 
noted that encouraging language such as this often appears in an opinion 
that does not rely upon the data: 
If the primary goal is to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the 
insured, then there is no need to look at anything beyond the language of 
the policy itself.  If, on the other hand, the primary goal is to give insureds 
what they pay for, then we should, at the very least, be concerned with the 
actuarial methods used to arrive at the premium and should look behind the 
policy language itself.107 
It is an open question whether courts would ever use the same data 
to see that an insurer gives no more than he sells. 108 
Fourth, in the specific area of uninsured motorist coverage, some 
courts have been considering how premiums are calculated in policy 
interpretation.  In these cases courts look at the structure of the premiums 
charged rather than at specific actuarial calculations.  The question arises in 
                                                                                                                          
likely to fall into this category because a court need not expend much effort to 
evaluate these forms of support. 
107  Montano v. Allstate Indem. Co., 92 P.3d 1255, 1261-62 (N.M. 2004).  The 
court went on to “conclude that we need not resolve which rationale to give 
primary effect.”  Id. at 1262.  Other courts have agreed that the “actuarial methods 
used to arrive at the premiums [can be] considered to determine whether the 
insured gets what he pays for.”  Rehders v. Allstate Ins. Co., 135 P.3d 237, 248 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2006).   
108  In 1934, the Supreme Court expressed a similar sentiment:  “While it is 
highly important that ambiguous clauses should not be permitted to serve as traps 
for policyholders, it is equally important, to the insured as to the insurer, that the 
provisions of insurance policies which are clearly and definitely set forth in 
appropriate language, and upon which the calculations of the company are based, 
should be maintained unimpaired by loose and ill-considered interpretations.”  
Williams v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 170, 180 (1934) (emphasis added). 
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underinsured and uninsured motorist (UM) coverage, where one’s own 
auto policy provides coverage for losses from an accident caused by 
another driver who has insufficient or no insurance.  The premium for UM 
coverage is usually broken out, so that the driver can see how much is 
being charged for the UM portion of the policy.   
Imagine a judge faced with an auto policy that has a UM coverage 
limit of $50,000 and charges a UM premium per car.  For example, $20 per 
car, so that a one-car policy has a $20 UM premium and a three-car policy 
has a $60 UM premium.109  If the three-car policy owner gets into an 
accident with one of the cars, does he have $50,000 in coverage or 
$150,000?  Where policy language was ambiguous, courts tended to grant 
the greater coverage.110   
Insurers apparently had not meant to allow this “stacking” of 
limits; insurers rewrote the policies to charge a unified UM premium.  It 
might appear that this was an insurer sleight of hand.  The driver with three 
cars is financially indifferent to paying $60 once or $20 three times.  But 
most courts reviewing the change in premium calculation have concluded 
that with the new single premium, policyholders have “no reasonable 
expectation of aggregate coverage.”111   
One court referred to the new single premium as “actuarial and not 
based on the number of vehicles covered.”112  This is twice right and twice 
wrong: both calculations are actuarial ones and both take account of the 
number of cars.  The new single premium is probably more actuarially 
accurate (or specific) than taking the premium for one car and multiplying 
it, but it should still include the increased risk that comes from owning 
additional cars.  Assume a uni-car family with two drivers carries the risk 
of needing UM coverage, R.  Adding a second car to the family might 
                                                                                                                 
109  See Adkins v. Ky. Nat’l Ins. Co., 220 S.W.3d 296, 297 (Ky. Ct. App. 
2007).   
110  The endorsement page of the policy in Adkins read: “The limit of liability 
shown in the Declarations for each person for Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our 
maximum limit of liability for all damages ... sustained by any one person in any 
one accident....  This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of ... 
[v]ehicles shown in the Declarations....”  Adkins, 220 S.W.3d at 299.  See also 
Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 457 P.2d 34, 42 (Kan. Sup. Ct. 1969) (“When we 
pay a double premium we expect double coverage.  This is certainly not 
unreasonable but, to the contrary, is in accord with general principles of indemnity 
that amounts of premiums are based on amounts of liability.”). 
111  Adkins, 220 S.W.3d at 300. 
112  Id. at 299.        
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double that risk to 2R because now both drivers can be on the road at the 
same time, although one would have to see the actual data to know.  
Adding a third car seems unlikely to raise the risk to 3R, however, even if it 
is greater than 2R.  (The third car might be correlated with being a higher 
risk rather than directly causing the risk to increase, for example if those 
who own more than one car per person tend to drive more frequently or 
hastily.)   
Moreover, the reverse implication of the court’s description is that 
the initial per-car premium was not “actuarial.”  No doubt the initial 
premium charged for one car did reflect the amount necessary for UM 
coverage.  The shorthand of multiplying that number by additional cars is 
not as actuarially precise but nor was it pulled from thin air.  Insurers 
presumably found that any more elaborate calculation of the risk per added 
car was not worth the candle. 
This “stacking” question is the one most consistently being 
answered with reference to actuarial data.  In two exceptionally rare 
circumstances, insurance policies refer directly to actuarial data.  First, 
courts have no choice but to accept actuarial data if the policy is one with a 
retrospective premium.  “A retrospective premium has two components: a 
basic premium and a conversion loss factor to adjust the premium by 
consideration of the insured's actual losses during the policy period.”113   
Second, in unusual circumstances, actuarial data is incorporated 
into the contract.114  Even then, courts will not allow themselves to be 
forced to consider data in a policy; courts have shown their willingness to 
ignore portions or entire policies that they conclude policyholders could not 
                                                                                                                 
113  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Terra Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.01-5961, 2004 WL 
1770298 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2. 2004).  “An insurance policy with retrospectively-
rated premium is sometimes referred to as a form of ‘self-insurance’ because the 
policy covers only claims exceeding the maximum premium under the policy.”  Id.  
See also Douglas R. Richmond, Issues and Problems in “Other Insurance,” 
Multiple Insurance, and Self-Insurance, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1373, 1450 (2002). 
114  See, e.g., Conrad v. Ace Property & Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV-05-5117-FVS, 
2006 WL 1582376, at *1 (E.D. Wash. 2006) (“The Policy contains the following 
definition of ‘Policy’:  The agreement between you and us consisting of the 
accepted application, these provisions, Special Provisions, actuarial documents, 
and the applicable regulations published in 7 C.F.R. chapter IV.”) (emphasis 
added)). 
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understand.  But these examples suggest that judges are able to handle 
actuarial data.115 
As one of the largest insurance markets in the country (and the 
world), California may be a good place to begin the actuarial data 
experiment.116  California’s courts often provide a prototype of legal 
evolution for other jurisdictions.  “Other states may or may not choose to 
follow California’s example on a particular issue or principle, but they 
certainly note and examine what California does.”117   
On the actuarial data front, the California Supreme Court has 
repeatedly stated that it will look to “the reasonable expectations of the 
insurer and the insured . . . as manifested in the distribution of risks, the 
proportionate premiums charged and the coverage for all risks except those 
specifically excluded.”118  In a recent decision, a court of appeals held: 
No rational insurer would wish to undertake such an insuring 
obligation.  It would be literally impossible, from an actuarial standpoint, 
to set appropriate premiums to guard against the risk that an association 
would enter into multimillion-dollar construction contracts, and then not 
pay for the construction work.  That type of risk would be virtually 
impossible to underwrite.119 
                                                                                                                 
115  These examples show courts have the ability to handle the data on some 
level but in these last three examples, the data are represented in part in the policy 
itself.  Therefore, these examples are not meant to strongly show that courts are 
necessarily inclined to use data more broadly. 
116  In California, a search to capture every case that includes the word 
“insurance” and some form or either “underwriting” or “actuarial” resulted in close 
to 2000 cases.  (Westlaw search for “insurance & (underwr! actuar!)”.)  More 
specific searches were used as well but one extremely broad search proved useful 
in locating categories of use.)  The majority of these were not relevant to the 
question of whether or how California courts currently use the data.  Many were 
not insurance cases and many simply had citations to common party names that 
included the word “underwriters,” such as “Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.” or 
“Certain Underwriters of Lloyd’s London.”  Some involve the underwriting of 
pension plans or other funds that do not involve application of an insurance policy.   
117  H. Walter Croskey, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in 
California: A Judge’s View, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 451, 452 n.1 (1998) (“California 
insurance jurisprudence has considerable influence on that of other jurisdictions.”).   
118  Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 711 (Cal. 1989) 
(emphasis added). 
119  Oak Park Calabasas Condominium. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 40 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 263, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis added).  This approach was 
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Although the California courts do not now entertain the data in the 
way encouraged here, its use is compatible with the general approach taken 
because “[t]he goal is to give effect to the reasonable expectations of both 
the insured and the insurer.”120   
 
IV. CONCLUSION: RESISTANCE AND REAL WORLD 
OBSERVATIONS 
 
This article introduces the possibility of improving the 
interpretation and construction of insurance contracts through actuarial 
data.  As with any innovation, one must ask if there is a barrier beyond 
simple lack of creativity or inertia to explain its current absence.  Each of 
the main players offers their own potential resistance.  
 
A. INSURERS 
 
Insurers have voted with their briefs, so to speak, in that they have 
access to data and rarely seek to introduce it in court.  As I have argued 
elsewhere, there is some reason to believe that insurers are resistant to 
change.121  Insurers also may assume that courts would not welcome this 
development or, and only some will find this plausible, it may be that it has 
simply not occurred to insurers to routinely use this type of data in court.122 
Based on casual interviews with insurer counsel, I have collected 
explanations for why insurers resist the advice of their own counsel that the 
use of actuarial data would support an important position.  In interviewing 
outside counsel I was most interested in cases where the firm lawyer 
instigated the idea of using actuarial data and was rebuffed by inside 
counsel.123   
                                                                                                                          
specifically followed in August Entm’t, Inc. v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins Co., 52 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 908, 914-16 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
120  August Entm’t, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 913 (emphasis added).  As with 
almost all jurisdictions, the opening move in California is to determine the intent 
from the language if possible.  California courts are not reticent to move on to 
additional inputs, however.  
121  See Boardman, supra note 2, at 1116-17.   
122  As a lawyer, I would occasionally suggest to in-house insurer counsel that 
actuarial data be used to prove a particular point.  The resistance I encountered 
rested upon some of the reasons discussed below.  
123  In a future project I may ask insurers directly, although I would expect to 
receive vetted public relations answers. 
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Most of the reasons given are not general objections but reasons to 
resist the use of actuarial data in certain cases.  The approach appears to be 
piecemeal rather than a considered policy of always resisting actuarial data.  
An insurer who has concluded, on net, that the general use of actuarial data 
is not in their interest may of course object to all policyholder attempts to 
discover or use it, even in cases where the data could be beneficial.   
As expected, sometimes there is no data on point.  An outside 
counsel suggested backing up an insurer’s claim about an “additional 
insured” provision with reference to the data.  The insurer response: “There 
is no data.  We sometimes add ‘additional insureds’ without changing the 
premium or putting aside additional reserves;” a fact the insurer did not 
want to advertise.124  This does not seem to be an uncommon practice with 
additional insured provisions.125   
Similarly, there are circumstances where the data would not be 
useful because the premium charged does not directly reflect the cost of the 
risk but instead reflects interest rates, price competition, (past expected but 
not yet incurred losses from past calculations that turned out to be 
insufficient), etc.  Of course, there are other times when the available 
actuarial data just does not speak to the question at hand.  In these cases 
insurers may not be resistant to the court reading it, if its production were 
costless, but they would not seek to introduce it themselves.  Given that 
production is never costless, an insurer may still object to discovery.   
Another common response: “We just don’t refer to actuarial data in 
our pleadings and briefs.  We never have and nor do our competitors.”126  A 
taller objection than inertia: Courts will reject the data but we will be worse 
off for having offered it; it creates the impression that in order to 
understand our policies a policyholder would need to be an actuary. 
Finally, certain applications of actuarial data in the underwriting 
process are proprietary.  Insurers have moved to quash subpoenas on the 
grounds that “materials contain[ing] reserving information and actuarial 
                                                                                                                 
124  As with all of these illustrations, this is a paraphrase of the insurer 
counsel’s response, not a direct quotation. 
125  “In practice, [additional insured] endorsements that are issued 
automatically or without charge are usually limited to vicarious liability by express 
statement.”  James E. Joseph, Indemnification and Insurance: The Risk Shifting 
Tools (Part II), PA. B. ASS’N Q. 1, 16 (2009).  For a collection of cases in which 
courts note that no or little additional premium had been charged for additional 
insured coverage, see Note, Recognizing the Unique Status of Additional Names 
Insured, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 117, 120 and n.12 (1984).  
126  Again, this is a paraphrase. 
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formulas or analysis particular to [that insurer]” are proprietary, in part 
because in some segments “it is industry standard for each company to 
develop its own product forms and underwriting systems.”127  Similarly, 
insurers may fear that opening their books will open them to charges of 
misbehavior, such as price-fixing or redlining by racial data.   
 
B. POLICYHOLDERS  
 
In many cases policyholders benefit from moving away from the 
“contract context,” and away from what the insurer expected, so that 
actuarial data might be viewed as a step in the wrong direction.  
Policyholders have discovered or sought to discover actuarial data in 
limited cases.128  Perhaps the data would open a Pandora’s box that 
policyholders and their counsel are afraid to open because they are unsure 
what waits inside.   
The small sample of cases shows that policyholders are more likely 
to seek to discover the data in class actions.  The starting assumption is that 
policyholders seek out the data when they predict or know (from others’ 
litigation or regulatory history) that it will support their preferred 
interpretation and seek to exclude it when it will not.  Another simplifying 
but plausible assumption is that policyholders in litigation are pursuing an 
interpretation of a policy or a clause that provides or extends coverage and 
the insurer is pursuing an interpretation that excludes or limits coverage.129  
                                                                                                                 
127  Richter v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., No. 06-Misc.-011, No. CV 05-498 
ABC (PJWX), 2006 WL 1277906 at *1 (E.D. Wis. May 5, 2006) (assertion of 
privilege deemed waived).   
128  See, e.g., Vos v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 667 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Iowa 
2003) (discovery in class action against life insurer for breach of contract and 
various fraud claims included “actuarial material regarding the policies in 
question”); Frye v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 915 So. 2d 486, 490-91 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2005) (denying a policyholder’s motion for discovery of actuarial 
information); Robinson v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 915 So. 2d 516, 520 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2005) (denying a claim by policyholder plaintiffs that “alleged in their 
motion for continuance that [the insurer] Southern Farm failed to respond to 
written discovery concerning the historical makeup and actuarial composition of 
the disability income coverage.”); Beller v. William Penn Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 
828 N.Y.S.2d 869, 875 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (actuarial data about life insurance 
plan sought and obtained in class action). 
129  Note that in considering the benign or evil motives of each player, this last 
does not require a dark view.  There are policyholders who would prefer their 
 
200 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
 
 
Apart from wanting to use specific data that support their view and 
exclude data that do not, the increased use of actuarial data should help 
policyholders in general across time.  Start with the arguable but 
contentious assumption that insurers tend to offer the coverage the market 
demands.  This does not mean that insurance coverage is a wonderland for 
consumers.  Some coverage that policyholders would like to purchase is 
not sold because policyholders are not willing to pay the minimum price 
insurers demand.  Some coverage is not sold because insurers are not 
willing to insure the type of event.  To maintain risk distribution in the risk 
pool, insurers do not want to sell coverage for correlated large losses, such 
as flood coverage in a flood plain.  For reasons of public policy, moral 
hazard, and adverse selection, insurers limit other options that individual 
policyholders desire.   
If there are sound actuarial reasons to limit coverage, the limitation 
is generally to the benefit of insurers and policyholders.  Courts can make a 
mistake when they interfere with these types of insurer choices.  They do 
make a mistake when they choose the needs of one plaintiff policyholder 
over all other policyholders.  Actuarial data can improve the decision-
making of courts inclined to regulate. 
 
C. COURTS 
 
Are courts willing to entertain actuarial data more regularly?  The 
recitations of canons of insurance interpretation supply conflicting 
statements.  These are sometimes one on top of another, as though the 
proximity of delivery will blind the reader to the inconsistency.  Take a 
representative summary from the Wisconsin Supreme Court: 
The goal of construction is to ascertain the true intentions of the 
parties to an insurance contract.  In the case of an insurance contract, the 
words are to be construed in accordance with the principle that the test is 
not what the insurer intended the words to mean but what a reasonable 
                                                                                                                          
insurance to cover a loss but who read the policy to exclude it and who thus do not 
sue.  A particularly rosy view would be required to assume that every policyholder 
in court firmly believes in the accuracy of their interpretation, but many no doubt 
do.  Likewise, insurers pursuing no or low coverage positions in court is not proof 
that all insurers deny all claims all the time; if the insurer pays what the 
policyholder expects, or close to it, there is no need for court.   
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person in the position of an insured would have understood the words to 
mean.130   
Translation of the interpretive goal: 
 
(1)  to find the “true,” i.e. subjective, intent of both the 
policyholder and the insurer 
(2)  to not find the intent of the insurer 
(3)  to find the objective understanding of a reasonable 
policyholder, which may or may not equate with  
(a)  the intent of this policyholder, or 
(b)  the understanding of this policyholder 
 
Given these goals, actuarial data have a role to play.  If, 
contradiction accepted, a court is interested in knowing the insurer’s intent, 
the court would be interested in actuarial intent.  If a court is interested 
neither in the policyholder’s intent (as it may not have one) nor the 
insurer’s intent, it will pursue goal three.   
Under this goal, the court will pursue the policyholder’s original 
understanding, not the original intent.  The goal is to decipher what the 
policyholder would have understood the words to mean.  With this 
aspiration, often there is no answer to the question or there are several 
answers; the language is ambiguous.  Courts are then open to explanations 
of: 
 
(1) why one of several interpretations is reasonable (actuarial 
purpose),  
(2) what one party thought or did (actuarial intent),131 
(3) whether the insurer acted in bad faith (consistent intent), to 
decide how far to construe against the drafter, and  
(4) the future drafting and premium consequences of reading the 
language a particular way (actuarial purpose).132   
                                                                                                                 
130  Wood v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 436 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Wis. 1989) 
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added) (partially overruled on grounds not 
relevant here). 
131  Wisconsin courts have taken the position that “the policy should not be 
rewritten by construction to cover matters not contemplated by the insurer nor paid 
for by the insured.”  Vidmar v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 312 N.W.2d 129, 131 
(Wis. 1981).   
132  “[W]ere insurers not able to enforce reasonable conditions upon their 
liability, in accordance with actuarial standards and projections, their industry 
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As with other types of evidence, there will be debate about whether 
most judges are qualified to evaluate actuarial data.  Aspects of actuarial 
calculation obviously require higher math skills and training.  But one does 
not need to be an actuary to understand the pricing mechanism or to see 
that a certain risk was included in a calculation and therefore that the risk 
should be covered.  The relevant “pricing principles were in operational use 
14 years before the publication of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations 
and considerably before the nineteenth century classical economists had 
turned their attention to a general theory of prices.”133   
Of course, the ability to use data is not sufficient; courts have to be 
willing to use it.  The limited judicial use of the data now shows both 
ability and willingness to handle the evidence when it is part of set 
interpretative routine.134  Those places where it has arisen in recent years 
suggest that courts use the data when a framework for its use is obvious or 
available.   
 
 
Whether particular players in the insurance interpretation game 
will support the introduction of actuarial data into the process is an 
empirical question.  To the extent the data can accurately reveal consistent 
(or inconsistent) pricing and paying behavior, it will supplant what is now 
mere assumption.  This will decrease swindling insurer behavior by 
increasing the chance of getting caught.  It will also free honest insurers 
from excessive court interference. 
Where the data reveal insurer intent, hewing closer to that intent 
will increase contract certainty, decrease cost, and reduce litigation.  With 
an understanding of actuarial purpose, the many courts engaged in the 
regulation of insurance contracts can avoid current mistakes that harm 
insurers and policyholders.  Rather than regulate blindly, based on the 
current needs of the one policyholder before it, proof of actuarial purpose 
will allow a court take account of all the absence policyholders and the 
health of the industry. 
                                                                                                                          
would be hindered in its ability to serve the important function it does in our 
society.”  Hartzo v. American Nat. Property. & Cas. Ins. Co., 951 So. 2d 1120, 
1124 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
133  James C. Hickman & Robert B. Miller, Insurance Premiums and Decision 
Analysis, 37 J. OF RISK AND INS. 567, 568 (1970). 
134  See supra Section III. 
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*** 
States differ in the legal avenues available to policyholders to pursue 
actions against their insurers for bad faith in claims settlement.  This 
article discusses the various approaches to first-party insurance bad faith 
law that have been taken by the states, and discusses the potential benefits 
and costs of different approaches.  Regimes that are likely to grant large 
damages awards to aggrieved policyholders provide the greatest deterrent 
to insurer bad faith; but such regimes may also create incentives for 
fraudulent insurance claiming and disincentives for rigorous claims 
investigations by insurers.  This article evaluates the empirical relevance of 
these potential incentive distortions through an analysis of automobile 
insurance claim settlement data in states with different bad faith regimes.  
The data show that claim characteristics and claim investigations differ 
significantly in states which permit tort-based bad faith from those in other 
states, in ways consistent with the hypothesized effects. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The idea that insurers should be penalized for unfair claim 
settlement practices involving first-party insurance coverage is a relatively 
recent development in the long history of insurance law.  Historically, 
insurers were not penalized for unfair claim settlement practices involving 
first-party insurance coverage.  Pursuant to the nineteenth-century English 
common law rule articulated in Hadley v. Baxendale,1 the policyholder was 
allowed to recover only those damages that were in the contemplation of 
the parties to the contract at the time the policy was purchased.2  This rule 
meant that damage awards could not exceed the amount specified in the 
insurance policy, even if the breach of contract was intentional on the part 
of the insurer. 
Beginning in the early 20th century, this rule was modified through 
enactment of a progression of state statutes including model legislation on 
unfair trade practices developed by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) in 1959 and amended in 1972.3  The model Unfair 
Trade Practices Act prohibits specified acts by an insurer when “committed 
flagrantly and in conscious disregard of” the statute, or “with such 
frequency as to indicate a general business practice.”4  The 1971 model 
legislation and many of the “statutes originally adopted by the states” were 
silent as to whether it created a private cause of action.5  This silence meant 
the insured’s only recourse was to file a complaint with the state insurance 
department.6  
                                                                                                                 
            1  See Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.). 
 2  See id. 
 3  4 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND 
GUIDELINES: UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT (2008). 
 4  Id.  See also Laureen Regan & Paul M. Rettinger, Private Rights of Action 
Under State Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Acts: A Review, J. INS. REG. 
(1998) (identifies all 14 of the prohibited acts). This model legislation, or some 
variant of it, has been adopted by all U.S. states.  Efforts to expand first-party bad 
faith liability continue today.  In Connecticut, for example, a proposal has been 
made to delete the requirement that violations occur with such frequency as to 
indicate a general business practice.  If this proposal is adopted, a single violation 
would be sufficient to constitute bad faith. 
 5  Regan & Rettinger, supra note 4, at 298. 
 6  See Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227 (S.D. 
Ala. 1999) (“[P]laintiffs should follow the procedure for review required by the 
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In the landmark case Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company7 the 
California Supreme Court extended the tort of bad faith to include first-
party insurance coverage disputes.8  In the wake of this decision, courts and 
state legislatures across the country began to recognize the right to file 
private causes of action against insurers alleging unfair claim settlement 
practices in first-party insurance coverage disputes.9  Three different 
avenues have been taken by state courts and legislatures in recognizing this 
right to file a private cause of action: tort action based solely on bad faith; 
contract action with broad definition of damages; and statutes.10 
Tort Action Based Solely on Bad Faith: Tort action based solely on 
bad faith relies exclusively on breach of the implied covenant of utmost 
good faith.11 “Policyholders are not required to allege an independent tort 
such as fraud or intentional infliction of emotional distress in order to 
recover under the tort laws.”12  The general rule of damages in tort is that 
the injured party may recover for all harm or injuries sustained (including 
legal expenses, and damages for economic loss and mental distress), 
regardless of whether these damages could have been anticipated.13  
Punitive damages may be awarded if the conduct giving rise to liability was 
particularly egregious.14   
Contract Action with Broad Definition of Damages:  A contract 
action with broad definition of damages involves a good faith and bad faith 
inquiry confined to the realm of contract15 where damages are broadly 
defined to include both general damages (i.e., those following naturally 
from the breach)16 and consequential, or incidental, damages (i.e., those 
reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the 
                                                                                                                          
insurance code and first seek relief from the insurance department and the 
insurance commissioner.”). 
 7  510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). 
 8  See id. 
              9  See SHARON TENNYSON & WILLIAM J. WARFEL, NAT’L ASS’N OF MUT. INS. 
COS., ISSUE ANALYSIS: FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE BAD FAITH LIABILITY: LAW, 
THEORY, AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 3 (Sept. 2008) available at 
www.namic.org/insbriefs/080926BadFaith.pdf. 
 10  Id. at 3. 
 11  Id. 
 12  Id. 
 13  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 901, 903 (1979).  
 14  Id. § 908. 
 15  See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801-02 (Utah 1985). 
 16  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 416 (8th ed. 2004). 
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parties at the time the contract was made).17  “Consequential damages may 
reach beyond the strict contract terms and include prejudgment interest and 
legal expenses, and damages for economic loss and mental distress.”18  
However, “an independent tort such as fraud or intentional infliction of 
emotional distress must be alleged in order to make a claim for punitive 
damages.”19  
Statute: The right to file a private cause of action alleging bad faith 
is based on statute and judicial recognition of an implied, private cause of 
action under an Unfair Trade Practices Act that includes an unfair claim 
settlement practices provision.20  Damages may include prejudgment 
interest and legal expenses, consequential, or incidental, damages for 
economic loss and mental distress.  With a few notable exceptions,21 in 
states that have adopted a statutory approach to first-party insurance bad 
faith, punitive damages are not permitted.22  Or, if punitive damages are 
permitted, a cap is placed on such damages and/or the standard of conduct 
for awarding such damages is very stringent and thus the exposure to 
punitive damages is minimal.23 
A majority of states that recognize first-party insurance bad faith 
allow actions under tort law.  The tort of bad faith is a unique application of 
tort law because it applies despite the existence of a contract, and does not 
require the policyholder to allege a traditional tort such as fraud or 
intentional infliction of emotional distress in order to recover punitive 
damages.  Relative to other bad faith liability regimes, the tort of bad faith 
increases both the potential damages and the uncertainty of judgments for 
insurance companies.  Thus, the legal basis for a first-party insurance bad 
faith allegation determines the realistic potential for a punitive damages 
                                                                                                                 
 17  Id. at 417.  
 18  Tennyson & Warfel, supra note 9, at 3. 
 19  Id. 
 20  See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38a-816, 42-110q (West 1995).  
 21  Pennsylvania statutory law recognizes private actions for first-party 
insurance bad faith, and authorizes punitive damages. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 
8371 (West 2006). The state of Washington recently adopted a bad faith statute that 
allows punitive damages awards under a standard similar to that in many tort-based 
regimes. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.30.010 (West 1998). 
 22  See generally Mark J. Browne, et. al., The Effect of Bad Faith Laws on 
First-Party Insurance Claims Decisions, 33 J. LEGAL STUDIES 355, 355-390 
(2004).  
 23  Id.   
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award, dramatically altering the “stakes” of first-party insurance bad faith 
litigation. 
 In theory, allowing policyholders to easily recover damages in 
excess of the insurance benefit owed will provide insurers with added 
incentives to engage in fair and efficient claims settlement practices.  
Policyholders are provided assurance that an insurer will not unreasonably 
withhold payment of a rightful policy benefit, or otherwise engage in 
conduct that is designed to withhold such payment.  However, tort liability 
may also affect the claim settlement process in ways that are not socially 
beneficial.  For example, high and uncertain penalties for insurer bad faith 
may create potential gains to policyholders from initiating bad faith actions 
based on questionable or fraudulent claims.  High penalties may also 
reduce the willingness of insurers to vigorously challenge questionable 
claims.  
This article provides a discussion and analysis of first-party 
insurance bad faith liability.  It traces the evolution of first-party insurance 
bad faith law, and identifies and discusses the various approaches that have 
been taken by the courts and state legislatures.  The economic rationale for 
allowing bad faith actions in first-party insurance cases is developed, and 
the potential gains to insurance market participants are considered.  This 
article also considers potential adverse effects of excessive or uncertain 
first-party bad faith liability for the insurance claim settlement process, in 
terms of creating incentives for policyholders to file fraudulent claims and 
creating disincentives for insurers to investigate potentially fraudulent 
claims.  Automobile insurance claims data are analyzed to investigate the 
empirical importance of these effects. 
 
II. LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
A. LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF TORT ACTION BASED SOLELY ON 
BAD FAITH 
 
Among jurisdictions that permit a tort action based solely on bad 
faith, a large minority have adopted a “negligence” standard for 
determining whether an insurer has acted in bad faith;24 the most common 
                                                                                                                 
 24  At least eleven states have embraced the negligence standard for first-party 
bad faith claims.  These states include Alaska (State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152 (Alaska 1989)); California (Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. 
Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973)); Connecticut (Grand Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v. 
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standard among tort jurisdictions is an “intentional tort” standard;25 and one 
jurisdiction has adopted a “quasi-criminal” standard.26  We discuss each of 
these standards as they relate to first-party bad faith claims. 
 
1. Negligence Standard  
 
The “negligence” standard was first adopted in a third-party 
liability insurance case in California.27  Courts following this approach in 
                                                                                                                          
Protective Mut. Ins. Co., 375 A.2d 428 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977)); Hawaii (Best 
Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334 (Haw. 1996)); Nevada (Hart v. 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 848 F. Supp. 900 (D. Nev. 1994)); North Dakota 
(Seifert v. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 497 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1993)); Ohio 
(Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315 (Ohio 1983)); Oklahoma 
(Christian v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977)); South Carolina 
(Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.E.2d 616 (S.C. 1983)); Texas 
(Arando v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988)); and Washington 
(Griffin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 29 P.3d 777 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001), review denied, 45 
P.3d 551 (Wash. 2002)). 
 25  At least fourteen states have embraced the intentional tort standard for 
first-party bad faith claims.  These states include Alabama (Chavers v. Nat'l Sec. 
Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1981)); Colorado (Herod v. Colo. Farm Bureau 
Mut. Ins. Co., 928 P.2d 834 (Colo. App. 1996)); Idaho (Robinson v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 45 P.3d 829 (Idaho 2002)); Indiana (Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman, 
622 N.E.2d 515 (Ind. 1993)); Iowa (Dolan v. Aid Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 
1993)); Kentucky (Wittmer v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. 1993)); Mississippi 
(Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Veasley, 610 So. 2d 290 (Miss. 1992)); Nebraska 
(Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769 (Neb. 1991)); New Mexico (Chavez 
v. Chenoweth, 553 P.2d 703 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976)); Rhode Island (Zarrella v. 
Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 824 A.2d 1249 (R.I. 2003)); South Dakota (Stene v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 N.W.2d 399 (S.D. 1998)); Vermont (Bushey 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 670 A.2d 807 (Vt. 1995)); Wisconsin (Anderson v. Cont'l Ins. 
Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978)); and Wyoming (Hulse v. First Am. Title Co., 
33 P.3d 122 (Wyo. 2001)). 
 26  Aetna Cas. & Sur. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d 463 (Ark. 1984).  
See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INS. CONTRACTS 10-87 (3d ed. 2009) 
(1994). According to Stempel, “[t]o appreciate the differences across the states 
concerning insurer bad faith, one must pay attention to the nuances of precedent 
and doctrine, which tend to be glossed over in any classification….” Id. For this 
reason, legal scholars often disagree on occasion over whether a particular state has 
adopted the “negligence” standard or the “intentional tort” standard in first-party 
cases. 
 27  See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958). 
2009] FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE BAD FAITH LIABILITY 209 
 
third-party cases have reasoned that insurers must be held to a stringent 
standard because of their disproportionate ability to influence the 
acceptance or rejection of a settlement offer made by a claimant.28  In 
particular, the standard demands that an insurer consider the insured’s 
interest in addition to its own in deciding whether to accept or reject the 
settlement offer.29  
Claim-handling practices that are arguably unreasonable can 
extend beyond third-party claims to include first-party claims; therefore, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys soon asserted that first-party insureds also should be 
permitted to file a tort action based solely on bad faith.30  Insurers 
countered that breach of contract should be the exclusive cause of action 
for first-party insurance bad faith actions because the relationship between 
an insurer and a policyholder in a first-party context differs from that in a 
third-party context.31  In a first-party context, the relationship might lead to 
a dispute that could be characterized as “adversarial” (i.e., first-party cases 
involve disputes over the terms of coverage, whether a loss occurred, or the 
value of the loss).32  The relationship between an insurer and a policyholder 
in a third-party context could be characterized as “fiduciary” (i.e., the 
policy agreement transfers from the insured to the insurer the authority to 
accept or reject on behalf of the insured a settlement offer presented by a 
claimant).33  
In the landmark Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company 
decision,34 the California Supreme Court rejected an insurer’s argument 
that third-party cases are different from first-party cases, extending the tort 
of bad faith to include first-party insurance coverage disputes.35  In 
Gruenberg, the policyholder’s business was destroyed in a fire.36  The 
claim representative informed the fire department investigator that the 
                                                                                                                 
 28  See id.  
 29  Id. at 200-201 (citing Ivy v. Pac. Auto. Ins. Co., 320 P.2d 140 (Cal. 
1958)).  
 30  See Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1032; Margaret Cronin Fisk, Looking for a 
New Cause of Action?, NAT'L L. J., May 19, 1997, at A1. 
 31  See Brief for Am. Ins. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Onvia, Inc., 196 P.3d 664 (Wash. 2008) (No. 
80359-5), 2009 WL 907292. 
 32  Tennyson & Warfel, supra note 9, at 4. 
 33  See id.; see STEMPEL, supra note 26, at 10-38. 
 34  510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). 
 35  Id. at 1038. 
 36  Id. at 1034. 
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policy limit in place was excessive, suggesting that the policyholder 
intentionally caused the loss.37  Shortly thereafter, the policyholder was 
charged with arson.38 Based on the advice of criminal defense counsel, the 
policyholder initially declined to submit to an examination under oath, 
which was requested by the insurer shortly after the fire pursuant to the 
“Your Duties After Loss” provision contained in the policy.39  The charges 
were subsequently dismissed at a preliminary hearing for lack of probable 
cause.40  Shortly after disposal of the criminal matter, the policyholder 
informed the insurer that he was now prepared to submit to an examination 
under oath.41  The insurer declined to depose the policyholder based on its 
contention that the coverage was void because the policyholder had 
previously breached a condition in the policy requiring the insured to 
submit to an examination under oath at the insurer’s request. 42 
Arguing that the insurer had unreasonably suggested that he 
intentionally caused the loss, the policyholder sought both compensatory 
and punitive damages.43  In adopting the negligence standard in this first-
party case, the California Supreme Court reasoned that the third-party 
context cannot be distinguished from the first-party context.44  In third-
party claims, the insurer has a “duty to accept reasonable settlements,” 
whereas in a first-party claim, the insurer has a “duty not to withhold 
unreasonably payments due under a policy.” 45 The court observed that 
“these are merely two different aspects of the same duty.”46  When an 
insurer “[refuses], without proper cause, to compensate its insured for a 
loss covered by the policy, such conduct may give rise to a cause of action 
in tort for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”47  
                                                                                                                 
37  Id. 
 38  Id.  
 39  Id. at 1035. 
 40  See Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1035. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. 
44  Id. at 1036. 
 45  Id. at 1037. 
 46  Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1037. 
 47  Id. The California court did address the issue pertaining to recovery for 
mental distress. Given that the policyholder alleged substantial economic losses 
(e.g., loss of earnings, loss associated with bankruptcy) apart from damages for 
mental distress, the policyholder was entitled to make a claim for mental distress. 
Generally, when a policyholder substantially prevails in a first-party claim against 
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2. Intentional Tort Standard   
 
An “intentional tort” standard was first adopted in Anderson v. 
Continental Insurance Co., a first-party homeowner’s insurance case in 
Wisconsin in 1978.48  Like the California Supreme Court in Gruenberg, the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled that the theoretical underpinnings of the 
bad faith tort in the third-party claim context apply equally in the first-party 
claim context.49  Importantly, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
departed from the California legal precedent, ruling that “the tort of bad 
faith is not a tortious breach of contract. It is a separate intentional wrong, 
which results from a breach of duty imposed as a consequence of the 
relationship established by contract.”50  
This dichotomy is the foundation of the intentional tort standard; 
the denial of a claim may constitute a breach of contract, but it does not 
constitute bad faith.  In other words, an insurer is entitled to contest a claim 
so long as it has a reasonable basis grounded in law or fact.  Whether the 
insurer ultimately is correct in its position is of no consequence in resolving 
the bad faith issue.  Denying a claim whose validity is “fairly debatable” 
does not necessarily constitute bad faith, even if the insurer ultimately is 
incorrect in its position.51 Rather, the issue is first, whether the insurer 
undertook a proper investigation, and second, whether the results of the 
investigation were subjected to a reasonable evaluation and review.52  If 
these conditions are met, the insurer will have established that its denial of 
the claim was reasonably grounded in law or fact.  
Because the intentional tort standard is more stringent than the 
negligence standard, insurers are more likely to be successful in pretrial 
pleadings.  Judges are more likely to dismiss as a matter of law an 
allegation of bad faith that involves nothing more than an insurance 
coverage dispute.  Specifically, the Wisconsin court ruled that “there must 
be a showing of an evil intent deserving of punishment or of something in 
the nature of special ill-will or wanton disregard of duty or gross or 
                                                                                                                          
an insurer, the policyholder is entitled to damages for aggravation and 
inconvenience.  See, e.g., Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 352 
S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1986). 
 48  See Anderson v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).   
 49  Id. at 374. 
 50  Id. 
 51  Id. at 375-76. 
 52  Id. at 377. 
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outrageous conduct” in order to recover punitive damages.53  The court 
added, “[An insurer] must not only intentionally have breached [its] duty of 
good faith, but in addition must have been guilty of oppression, fraud, or 
malice ….”54  This heightened standard means that only a small subset of 
bad faith claims will warrant punitive damages.  Direct proof must be 
presented establishing either that the misconduct was extreme, or that the 
misconduct was the result of a deliberate, company-wide practice of 
underpaying claims.  
 
3. Quasi-Criminal Standard  
 
In 1984 the Arkansas Supreme Court overturned a jury verdict that, 
in the view of the Court, did not require sufficiently stringent standards of 
conduct and proof to support an award of punitive damages in a first-party 
bad faith case.55  In Aetna Casualty and Surety v. Broadway Arms, the 
policyholder alleged bad faith in the handling of a fire insurance claim.56  
The evidence presented to the jury to support a finding of intentional 
oppressive conduct was the claim representative’s statement to the 
policyholder that he might be asked by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
to explain why the insurance carrier would pay $75,000 for loss of 
inventory when the policyholder’s financial statement showed an inventory 
valued at only $23,000.57  Apparently convinced that the claim 
representative had made a thinly veiled threat to report the policyholder to 
the IRS if the policyholder refused a reduced settlement offer, the jury 
awarded the policyholder $5 million in punitive damages.58  The judgment 
was reversed on appeal, and the case was remanded for a new trial based on 
a “quasi-criminal” standard of conduct.59 
                                                                                                                 
 53  Id. at 379. 
 54  Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 379. 
 55  See Aetna Cas. & Sur. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d 463 (Ark. 
1984).  Arkansas is the only state that has embraced the quasi-criminal standard.  
This standard was upheld in Columbia Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 64 S.W.3d 720 
(Ark. 2002).  In this particular case, which involved a property insurer, the court 
held that the conduct of the insurer must be carried out with a state of mind 
characterized by hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge. 
 56  Broadway Arms, 664 S.W.2d at 464. 
 57  Id. at 469. 
 58  Id. at 465-66. 
 59  Id. at 470. 
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In adopting this standard, the court declared that “evidence of bad 
faith must be sufficient to show affirmative misconduct of a nature which is 
malicious, dishonest, or oppressive.”60  As articulated by the court, the 
quasi-criminal standard has three elements. First, the court noted that a 
single violation of the Arkansas Trade Practices Act does not necessarily 
constitute bad faith.61  At minimum, there must be multiple violations in the 
handling of the claim.  Alternatively, a pattern of institutional misconduct 
(e.g., a company-wide practice of deliberately underpaying claims) would 
constitute bad faith.62  Assuming multiple violations in the handling of the 
claim, or institutional misconduct, an inference can be made that the 
evidence is “sufficient to show affirmative misconduct of a nature which is 
malicious, dishonest, or oppressive.”63  Second, the court ruled that the 
purpose of the tort of bad faith is not to address the situation where the 
insurance carrier simply refuses or fails, through nonfeasance, to pay an 
insurance claim.64  In cases of this sort, an adequate remedy already exists 
under Arkansas law (See Arkansas Stat. Ann. Section 66-3001 et seq. 
(Repl. 1980)).65  Third, the court reasoned that the public interest demands 
that the tort of bad faith, which includes a substantial punitive damages 
exposure, be carefully confined to extreme cases of misconduct.66  
Otherwise, insurers will be inappropriately discouraged from questioning 
false, suspicious, or inflated claims – a result that will increase insurers’ 
claim costs and raise policyholders’ premiums.  The court suggested that 
alternative remedies should be used to assure that policyholders are 
appropriately compensated in those cases where an insurer simply refuses 
or fails to pay a valid insurance claim.67 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
60  Id. at 467. 
 61  Id. at 466. 
 62  Broadway Arms, 664 S.W.2d at 466 (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3005(9) 
(current version at ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-66-206(13) (2009))). 
 63  Id. at 467. 
 64  Id. at 468. 
 65  ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3001–3014 (current version at ARK. CODE ANN. 
§§ 23-66-201–215 (2009)). 
 66  Broadway Arms, 664 S.W.2d at 469. 
 67  Id. at 468. 
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B. LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRACT ACTION WITH A BROAD 
DEFINITION OF DAMAGES 
 
The contract standard was embraced in the landmark Beck v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange decision,68 a case in Utah in which the 
insurer rejected the insured’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits without 
explanation and without conducting an investigation to determine the 
validity of the insured’s claim.69  In this particular case, the court reasoned 
that “[a]lthough the policy limits define the amount for which the insurer 
may be held responsible in performing the contract, they do not define the 
amount for which it may be liable upon a breach.”70  Confinement of the 
good faith/bad faith inquiry to the realm of contract assures compensation 
in the situation where the insurer fails to (1) diligently investigate the facts 
to enable it to determine whether a claim is valid, (2) fairly evaluate the 
claim, or (3) act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the 
claim.71 However, the contract standard forecloses the possibility of a 
punitive damages award in the absence of proof that an independent tort 
such as fraud or intentional infliction of emotional distress occurred.72  
Indeed, in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, the court reasoned that 
“the practical end of providing a strong incentive for insurers to fulfill their 
contractual obligations can be accomplished … through a contract cause of 
action, without the analytical straining necessitated by the tort approach 
and with far less potential for unforeseen consequences to the law of 
contracts.”73  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 68  Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).  At least six states 
have embraced the contract standard for first-party bad faith claims.  These states 
include Maine (Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644 (Me. 1993)); 
Maryland (Johnson v. Fed. Kemper Ins. Co., 536 A.2d 1211 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1987)); New York (Bi-Econ. Mkt., Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 886 N.E.2d 127 
(N.Y. 2008)); Oregon (Nw. Pump & Equip. Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 
1241 (Or. 1996)) and Virginia (A & E Supply Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., 798 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1986) (interpreting Virginia law), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 1091 (1987)). 
 69  Beck, 701 P.2d at 796-97. 
 70  Id. at 801. 
 71  Id.  
 72  Id. at 800-801. 
 73  Id. at 799. 
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C. LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION BASED 
ON STATUTE 
 
In a majority of states, a private cause of action is not statutorily or 
judicially permitted under the state’s Unfair Trade Practices Act.  In a small 
number of states, however, either the state legislature has written the law to 
permit a private cause of action or a court has recognized an implied 
private cause of action under the law.  For example, the Connecticut statute 
identifies specific types of conduct that constitute bad faith, sets forth the 
burden of proof, and specifies the damages that can be recovered.74  
Furthermore, in many states where the courts have failed to recognize a 
common law cause of action for first-party bad faith, the state legislatures 
have responded by enacting a statute that permits a private cause of action 
for the first-party bad faith.  Typically, these statutes identify the standard 
of conduct, the burden of proof, and the damages that can be recovered in a 
first-party bad faith action.75  
There is considerable variation among state bad-faith statutes with 
respect to the standard of conduct, burden of proof, and damages that can 
be recovered.  Some statutes, for example, only allow for limited recovery 
of damages (e.g., prejudgment interest and attorney fees).76  Other statutes 
contain language that has been broadly construed by at least one court to 
permit unlimited punitive damages in those cases where the insurer has 
engaged in more than one listed prohibited practice with respect to the 
processing of a single claim.77   
The statutory basis for first party insurance bad faith is still 
evolving.  In recent years, a number of states have enacted new legislation 
creating or modifying the first-party bad faith liability exposure for 
insurers.  For example, Minnesota passed legislation in 200878 that creates 
a new private cause of action for first-party insurance bad faith where one 
previously did not exist.  The statute codifies the intentional tort standard, 
providing for damages if the insured can show (1) the absence of a 
reasonable basis for denying the benefits of the insurance policy, and (2) 
that the insurer knew or acted in reckless disregard of the lack of a 
                                                                                                                 
 74  See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38a-816, 42-110q (2009). 
 75  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.155(1)(b)(1) (West 2004). 
 76  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 500.3148(1) (LexisNexis 2001). 
 77  See, e.g., Maher v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 76 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying 
West Virginia law). 
 78  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.18 (West 2008). 
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reasonable basis for denying the benefits of the insurance policy.79  The law 
allows policyholders to be awarded up to $250,000 in “taxable costs” if an 
insurer is found to be acting in bad faith and up to $100,000 in attorney's 
fees, but specifically precludes punitive damages in the absence of an 
independent tort such as fraud or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.80  
Recent Colorado legislation lowered the legal standard for 
asserting a first-party bad faith claim and increased the penalties levied 
against an insurer, relative to existing common law.81  The new legislation 
adopts the negligence standard, whereas the intentional tort standard 
applies under common law.82  In addition, under common law, 
consequential, or incidental, damages for economic loss and mental distress 
can be recovered, but the cost of litigation cannot be recovered.83  The new 
legislation allows for the recovery of the cost of litigation and caps the 
damages award at two times the policy benefit that was unreasonably 
denied.84  
Recent first-party insurance bad-faith legislation in Maryland85 
applies exclusively to property/casualty insurance policies and allows 
policyholders to initiate bad-faith claims through the Maryland Insurance 
Administration (MIA), the state agency responsible for enforcing 
Maryland’s insurance laws.86  The new law adopts the negligence standard 
and caps damages the insured can recover at the policy limit.87  In addition, 
it provides for recovery of pre-judgment interest and allows recovery of 
attorney’s fees, but limits the recoverable amount to one third of the actual 
                                                                                                                 
 79  § 604.18(2)-(3). 
 80  § 604.18(3) 
 81  COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1113 (2008). 
 82  Id. 
 83  See Am. Family. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 102 P.3d 333, 342 (Colo. 2004) 
(applying Colorado common law). 
 84  COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-3-1116 & 10-16-106.5. Moreover, the new 
legislation imposes a special penalty on health insurers that unreasonably delay the 
payment of the policy benefit (i.e., the penalty is 20 percent of the policy benefit, 
the payment of which was delayed 90 days or longer past the submission of the 
claim). 
 85  MD. CODE ANN., [INS.] § 27-1001(e)(2)(i) – (ii) (West 2006). 
 86  The law does not apply to claims that fall under the small-claims 
jurisdiction of district courts or to commercial insurance policies with policy limits 
exceeding $1 million. 
 87  §§ 27-303(9) & 27-305(c)(2). 
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damages.88 Previously, an insured could recover only the amount of actual 
damages, subject to the policy’s limits.  Such actions could be pursued 
either through the MIA or as a civil action for breach of contract, but 
neither avenue allowed recovery of litigation expenses.89   
Legislation adopted in Washington90 expands the definition of first-
party insurance bad faith and increases the damages awards available to 
policyholders in cases alleging insurer bad faith.  The remedies specified in 
the act are separate and distinct from the remedies provided under common 
law as well as those prescribed in the state’s Consumer Protection Act.91  
The new legislation provides for a private cause of action in the event an 
insurer “unreasonably” denies or delays payment of a policy benefit or 
commits a specified unfair claims settlement practice, recovery of “actual 
damages sustained,” recovery of the cost of reasonable attorney’s fees, and 
treble actual damages sustained, at the discretion of the trial judge.92  This 
legislation represents a significant departure from most other states’ 
statutory approaches to first-party insurance bad faith, because it permits 
both unlimited punitive damages and does not contain a stringent standard 
of conduct for the awarding of such damages. 
 
III. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 
 
A. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR TORT LIABILITY 
 
Applying economic analysis to first-party bad faith insurance law 
leads to important insights regarding the purpose of first-party bad faith 
actions.  A key concept is that allowing the courts to impose extra 
contractual liability on insurers in cases of intentional or unintentional bad 
faith denial of claims serves the obvious purpose of compensating 
                                                                                                                 
 88  § 27-305(4). 
 89  § 27-305(3)(1)-(2). 
 90  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.30.010. 
 91  § 19.86.090 Washington common law provides for the tort of bad faith 
with a negligence standard, and the Consumer Protection Act provides for recovery 
of actual damages sustained, the cost of litigation, and treble damages, subject to a 
cap of $10,000 in the event the insurer violates a claims handling regulation. 
 92  Id. The specific unfair claims settlement practices covered by the 
legislation include misrepresentation of policy provisions, failure to acknowledge 
pertinent communications, failure to meet standards for prompt investigation of 
claims, and failure to meet standards for prompt, fair, and equitable settlements 
applicable to all insurers. 
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policyholders for their unwarranted losses; but it may also serve the 
broader economic purpose of enhancing the efficiency of insurance 
contracting.  In competitive insurance markets, systematic bad faith in 
claim settlement practices will reduce demand for insurance from a 
company that engages in such practices.  However, reputation penalties 
may not be sufficient to guarantee that an insurer will never have an 
incentive to engage in intentional bad faith claim settlement practices.  Nor 
can reputation penalties guarantee that an insurer will never engage in 
behaviors that lead to unintentional bad faith denial of a claim settlement.93 
An isolated example of intentional bad faith would include, for 
example, if an insurer strategically denies or delays the settlement of a 
particularly large insurance claim for the purpose of coercing the 
policyholder to accept a reduced claim settlement.94  Market sanctions 
alone may not deter this kind of behavior, because the potential cost 
savings on the claim could outweigh the cost of reputation penalties meted 
out in the market in the form of reduced demand for insurance.  In such 
cases, the potential for tort litigation creates an incentive for an insurer to 
avoid unwarranted strategic denial or delay of a claim settlement, by 
imposing a potentially large financial penalty for such conduct.95  Indeed, 
the mere threat of substantial extra contractual liability will reduce the 
incentive for an insurer to strategically deny or delay a claim settlement.  
Most importantly, because a practical mechanism does not exist for an 
                                                                                                                 
 93  See Joseph M. Belth, Two Recent Court Decisions Critical of UNUM’s 
Disability Insurance Claims Practices, THE INS. FORUM, Mar. 2009, at 161. 
Perhaps the classic case that demonstrates this point concerns disability insurance 
claim settlement practices implemented by several operating companies of the 
UNUM Group.  These companies implemented a “claims management 
philosophy” in 1993; previously these companies had a “claims payment 
philosophy.”  Various claim settlement practices used to deny, terminate, and settle 
disability insurance claims resulted in numerous lawsuits alleging bad faith.  The 
volume of lawsuits was such that they resulted in widespread media attention, two 
far-reaching regulatory probes, and eventual settlements with regulatory authorities 
under which UNUM agreed to reassess some denied claims and improve claim 
procedures.  While the settlements did not include an admission to the effect that a 
statute or regulation had been violated, UNUM did agree to pay a $15 million fine 
divided among 49 jurisdictions that had signed on to the settlements.  Id. 
           94  Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Breach of Contract by First-Party Insurers, 
25 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 405, 412-13 (1996). 
 95  Id.  See also KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, 
LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 183-85 (1986). 
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insurer to provide a credible and binding contractual commitment not to 
deny or delay payment of a legitimate claim, the threat of substantial extra 
contractual liability for intentional bad faith may reassure policyholders 
that a valid claim will be paid in a timely manner.  This assurance may 
improve the insurance contracting environment, thereby benefiting both 
policyholders and insurers. 
Because insurance contracts do not contain a binding contractual 
commitment not to deny payment of a valid insurance claim, and because 
insurance claims may be complex and policy language cannot fully 
anticipate all of the details or nuances of a loss, coverage disputes are 
inevitable.96 Some coverage disputes involve differing interpretations of the 
policy language by the insurer and the policyholder, leading to different 
conclusions about whether a loss is covered.  For example, under a 
builder’s risk policy, the reporting form may instruct the policyholder to 
deduct the value of land when reporting the estimated completed value of 
structures.  The insurer may interpret “land” to include just the value of the 
land itself; the policyholder may interpret “land” to include not only the 
value of the land but also the value of land improvements including paving, 
gutters, and curbs, for example.  Assuming a loss caused by the collapse of 
paving, gutters or curbs,97 the insurer may deny the claim because the 
policyholder did not report the completed value of these items and thus did 
not pay a premium for coverage on them.  The policyholder may insist that 
coverage exists for these items based on the instruction contained in the 
reporting form to the effect that land should be deducted from total 
estimated completed value of structures, which presumably would include 
land improvements as well as the value of land itself.   
A particularly interesting special case is the potentially fraudulent 
claim, in which the insurer believes that the policyholder may have 
“manufactured” false information about the loss event or the amount of 
loss.98  One such case is when an insurer may incorrectly but reasonably 
believe that the policyholder intentionally caused a loss.99  For example, if 
a summary judgment concerning a mortgage default was issued by a court 
the day preceding a fire, an insurer may have reasonably believed that the 
                                                                                                                 
 96  Sykes, supra note 94, at 429. 
 97  For example, the soil was improperly compacted when the sewer lines 
were laid. 
 98  Sykes, supra note 94, at 425-26. 
 99  Id. at 426. 
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policyholder conspired with a friend to set the fire, notwithstanding the fact 
that a jury ultimately ruled that the friend acted alone in setting the fire.   
With respect to some coverage disputes, further claim investigation 
can be helpful in enabling the insurer to reach the correct conclusion 
concerning the existence or non-existence of coverage.  With respect to 
other coverage disputes, however, further claim investigation is not viable 
because of cost considerations or factual issues that simply cannot be 
resolved.100  In these cases, the discovery process attendant to litigation 
may be the best mechanism for bringing a claim to resolution.101  For 
example, if an insurer reaches the conclusion that further claim 
investigation is not viable, the insurer may offer a nuisance settlement even 
though it believes that coverage does not exist. 
In the case of suspected fraud, if we assume that it is more costly 
for a policyholder to pursue a fraudulent claim than a valid claim, a 
policyholder with a fraudulent claim will be less likely to persist in the face 
of a claim denial than a policyholder with a valid claim.102 This fact implies 
that costly litigation may be used as a screening device by insurers for the 
purpose of sorting valid claims from fraudulent ones.  For this reason, even 
though the denial of a claim may lead to litigation, an insurer may find that 
the denial of some fraction of suspicious claims is efficient.103  The benefit 
of this approach for the insurer is that a policyholder pursuing a fraudulent 
claim may drop it rather than engage in costly litigation; policyholders with 
legitimate claims will be more likely to pursue the litigation.104  While 
some policyholders needlessly suffer because they are forced to litigate 
legitimate claims, policyholders as a group benefit from this approach 
because it minimizes unwarranted claim costs and results in reduced 
insurance premiums.105  In specifying a claims denial fraction, the insurer 
will balance the expected reduction in claims fraud with the expected costs 
of litigating denied claims. 
A similar claims settlement dynamic may occur if we consider the 
insurer’s decision regarding the amount of payment, rather than the 
decision regarding claim denial.  Again, in cases where establishing the 
complete truth through investigation is not practical, and assuming that the 
                                                                                                                 
100  Id. 
 101  Id. at 425-29. 
 102  Id. at 428. 
 103  Id.  
 104  Sykes, supra note 94, at 428. 
 105  Id. at 426-27. 
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“manufacture” of documentation to support an overstated claim is costly 
for a policyholder, underpayment of suspicious claims may be an optimal 
fraud-deterrent strategy for an insurer.106  The benefit of this approach for 
the insurer is that underpaying suspicious claims reduces policyholders’ 
incentives to exaggerate the claimed amount.107  While some policyholders 
are forced to litigate in order to collect the full amount of a valid claim, the 
benefit of this approach for policyholders as a group is reduced fraud and 
reduced insurance premiums.  The cost to the insurer is the potential for 
litigation due to underpayment.  Thus, the insurer must balance the amount 
of claim underpayment against the expected costs of dispute resolution and 
litigation when specifying a claims payment strategy for suspicious claims. 
These perspectives on insurers’ claims payment strategies for 
responding to suspicious claims provide an economic rationale for 
permitting first-party private actions for insurer bad faith failure to settle, 
and for allowing extra contractual damages in these cases.  First, the threat 
of bad faith litigation serves to mitigate insurers’ incentives to strategically 
deny or delay the payment of valid claims.108  Second, the threat of bad 
faith litigation places an appropriate limit on insurers’ use of claim denial 
or underpayment as a fraud-deterrent strategy.109  In the absence of 
potential extra contractual liability, an insurer will consider only the 
benefits of this strategy to its claims operation, ignoring the costs imposed 
on policyholders who have legitimate claims that were denied or underpaid.  
If an insurer faces the possibility of a damage award in excess of the 
benefit specified in the policy, the insurer is given an incentive to take into 
account the costs imposed on a policyholder when a legitimate claim is 
denied, delayed or underpaid.  The result is an efficient balance (of costs 
and benefits) – i.e., between the costs associated with unwarranted claims 
denial, delay or underpayment,110 and the benefits of reduced insurance 
claim fraud, and thus the avoidance of excessive costs in the insurance 
system.111 
 
                                                                                                                 
 106  Keith J. Crocker & Sharon Tennyson, Insurance Fraud and Optimal 
Claims Settlement Strategies, 45 J.L. & ECON. 469, 470 (2002). 
 107  Id. at 504. 
 108  Id. at 472-73. 
 109  Id. at 475. 
 110  Similar arguments can be made regarding insurers’ claim settlement 
strategies for claims disputes centering on contractual language or factual disputes 
not involving suspected fraud.   
 111  Crocker & Tennyson, supra note 106, at 504-505. 
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B. POTENTIAL UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF TORT LIABILITY 
 
Although allowing tort actions for the purpose of addressing 
insurer bad faith in claims settlement may be efficient in theory, practical 
considerations concerning implementation of tort law have important 
implications for whether the tort system is in fact efficiency-enhancing.  If 
the standard applied by the court for a finding of insurer bad faith is too 
lax, and/or if the damages award is too high relative to the actual damages 
sustained by a policyholder whose claim was denied or underpaid, 
substantial incentive distortions may arise.  If first-party bad faith laws 
create substantial incentive distortions, the benefits of these laws will be 
lessened because of increases in insurance costs due to fraud.  Because it is 
the possibility (more specifically, the expected value) of damages from bad 
faith actions that affects insurer and policyholder decisions, interactions 
between insurers and policyholders may be distorted irrespective of 
whether an injured policyholder actually files a suit.112 
A major concern is the increased pressure on insurers to pay 
reasonably disputable claims.113  Insurers balance the benefits of reduced 
fraud costs with the expected costs of litigation.114  If the expected costs of 
litigation to insurers are sufficiently high that they exceed the expected 
cost-savings from reduced fraud costs, insurers will have less incentive to 
employ fraud reduction strategies.115  Specifically, claim investigations 
may lead to insurer actions that bring accusations of bad faith, and thus an 
excessive threat of bad faith liability may reduce the number and scope of 
claim investigations below what they should be.116 
This effect on insurer incentives will raise the costs of fraud in both 
the immediate term because fewer fraudulent claims will be detected, and 
over the longer term because of reduced fraud deterrence.  This latter point 
is particularly important.  A key insight gleaned from economic theory is 
that the largest savings to an insurer from investigating claims fraud may 
stem from the deterrence of fraudulent claiming, rather than from cost 
                                                                                                                 
 112  See Sykes, supra note 94. 
 113  ABRAHAM, supra note 95, at 184. 
 114  Id. 
 115  Id.  
 116  Id.  
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savings associated with the detection of fraudulent claims.117  By reducing 
insurer resistance to potentially fraudulent claims and thus increasing the 
expected payoff to policyholders from filing fraudulent claims, excessive 
liability for insurer bad faith may increase policyholders’ incentives to 
engage in claims fraud or exaggeration.118 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
A. RELATIONSHIP TO PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
While the impact of first-party bad faith law on insurer claims 
settlement behavior has not been extensively studied, anecdotal evidence 
exists from case law to the effect that in some cases tort liability standards 
have been too lax and/or damages awards have been too high.  Based on an 
examination of a variety of cases involving application of first-party bad 
faith law, Sykes reached the conclusion that the courts have made 
substantial errors in applying the law.119  Specifically, in some of these 
cases, the court found insurer bad faith even though the dispute arose as a 
result of the insurer’s reasonable suspicion of claims fraud;120 in other 
cases, the intentional tort standard was misapplied by the court, with the 
result being a finding of insurer bad faith even though the claim was 
reasonably debatable;121 in still other cases, the size of a punitive damages 
award appeared to be disproportionately high in comparison to the offense 
of the insurer.122  Of all the cases examined by Sykes, perhaps the most 
perplexing were those cases in which the court found bad faith based on an 
insurers’ strict reading of the policy language.123  Sykes concluded that “the 
remedy may be worse than the problem, as the courts seem to find bad faith 
on the part of insurers who have genuine and reasonable disputes with their 
                                                                                                                 
 117  Picard provides an excellent discussion of the theoretical literature on 
insurance fraud. See Pierre Picard, Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud, in 
HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 337, 339 (Georges Dionne ed., 2000). 
 118  See id. at 337. 
 119  Sykes, supra note 94, at 407-408.   
 120  See T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1527-29 (11th 
Cir. 1985); Capstick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 998 F.2d 810, 815-16 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 121  See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavioe, 475 U.S. 813, 823 (1986). 
 122  See id. and Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clay, 525 So. 2d 1339, 1342, 
1344 (Ala. 1989).  
 123  See Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1112 (Cal. 1974); Sparks 
v. Republic Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d 1127, 1137 (Ariz. 1982). 
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policyholders,”124 and that “the ability of the courts to identify 
opportunistic behavior…is very much in doubt.”125  
In addition, empirical analysis of insurance claims data reveals that 
tort liability for first-party insurer bad faith is associated with higher claim 
payments.  Browne, Pryor and Puelz analyze a large dataset of first-party 
automobile insurance claims settled in 38 different states in 1992.126  They 
find that, even after controlling for a wide array of claim characteristics and 
for other features of states’ legal and claims environments, claim payments 
are significantly higher in states that allow tort actions for insurer bad faith 
compared to states that do not.127   
A Rand Institute study of the impact of the Royal Globe case (the 
case that allowed third-party bad faith tort liability claims in California) on 
insurance claim payments found similar effects.128  This study found that 
when third-party bad faith tort liability claims were allowed, claim 
payments for automobile bodily injury liability (BIL) claims in California 
were 25 percent higher than similar claims in other states and that this trend 
was reversed after the Royal Globe ruling was overturned.129  The Rand 
study also found that the number of BIL claims was higher in California 
when third-party bad faith tort liability claims were allowed, and this 
frequency declined when the Royal Globe ruling was overturned.130 
Of course, higher claim payments or claim filing rates should not 
be construed negatively if, in the absence of bad faith liability, a tendency 
                                                                                                                 
 124  Sykes, supra note 94, at 405.   
 125  Id. at 443. 
 126  Mark J. Browne et al., The Effect of Bad-Faith Laws on First-Party 
Insurance Claims Decisions, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 355, 357 (2004). These authors 
study uninsured and underinsured motorist claims using data compiled by the 
Insurance Research Council from a survey of closed claims obtained from 
insurance companies. 
 127  Id. at 386. 
 128  ANGELA HAWKEN ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PUB. NO. MR-
1199-ICJ, THE EFFECTS OF THIRD-PARTY, BAD FAITH DOCTRINE ON AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COSTS AND COMPENSATION 49-53 (2001) (analyzing the impact of 
Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979)). In this landmark 
case, the California Supreme Court held that third-party claimants may sue insurers 
for violating the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act. Id. Ultimately, this 
decision was overruled in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 58 
(Cal. 1988). 
 129  HAWKEN, supra note 128, at 49-50. 
 130  Id. at 49. 
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exists for insurers to underpay or to wrongfully deny claims.  Indeed, in 
this circumstance, bad faith liability would be performing its intended 
function.  However, if higher payments or claim filings are occurring 
because insurers are less inclined to investigate potential fraud (that is, 
unwarranted amounts are paid in order to avoid potential bad faith 
liability), this phenomenon should be a source of concern for policymakers.  
In order to explore the relevance of this concern, we undertake an 
analysis of the relationship between a state’s first-party bad faith regime 
and the settlement of insurance claims.  We focus on the legal regime 
because this affects the expected value of potential damages faced by an 
insurer, by affecting both the likelihood of a finding of bad faith and the 
damages awarded in the event of such a finding.  Tort-based bad faith – 
especially using the California rule – generally leads to higher expected 
damages for an insurer than contract-based or statutory-based laws, due to 
the expanded possibility for a punitive damages award.  States in which bad 
faith actions are not permitted, or states in which the law is silent on such 
actions, will impose lower expected penalties on insurers than other states. 
We examine two aspects of insurance claims that may be affected 
by bad faith liability: the characteristics of claims (specifically the accident, 
injury and medical treatments), and the claim settlement behavior of 
insurers (specifically the claim investigations).  Consistent with the 
economic analysis above, we hypothesize that claims will be more likely to 
exhibit characteristics consistent with (possible) fraud in states where 
insurers face greater potential liability for bad faith in claims settlement.  
We further hypothesize that insurers will be less likely to engage in 
vigorous investigation of claims in those states.  
We utilize a large database of paid automobile insurance claims to 
test these hypotheses.  Because the database that we use includes only 
claims that are closed with some payment by the insurer, a higher 
prevalence of fraud suspicion indicators and a lower prevalence of insurer 
investigations among the claims may indicate that insurer claim settlement 
behavior is different in states that impose liability for bad faith as compared 
to other states.  
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B. THE DATA 
 
1.  Insurance Claims Data 
 
Individual claim data pertaining to uninsured motorist (UM) claims 
collected by the Insurance Research Council (IRC) are analyzed.131  UM 
coverage is an element of the private passenger automobile insurance 
policy, and it provides coverage for bodily injury to the policyholder with 
respect to an accident in which the other driver was at fault, but the other 
driver was the owner or operator of an “uninsured motor vehicle” (as 
defined in the policy).  Under this scenario, the injured policyholder files a 
UM claim with his own insurer and receives compensation for both 
economic and non-economic damages.  UM insurance is considered a first-
party insurance contract and, consequently, courts in a number of states 
have specifically upheld the applicability of first-party bad faith remedies 
in the UM context.132   
The data are obtained from a national sampling of claims from a 
large number of insurance companies.  The original dataset includes nearly 
6,000 UM claims closed in 1997 (the latest year data are available to us), 
from accidents occurring throughout the entire United States.  Most claims 
arise from accidents occurring in 1996 or 1997, but accident dates extend 
back to 1986.133  The closed claim survey provides a wealth of information 
for each claim, including claim characteristics, insurer investigations of the 
claim, the claimed amount and the paid amount. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 131  See Insurance Research Council Home Page, http://www.ircweb.org. The 
IRC is an independent, not-for-profit organization founded in 1977, and it is 
supported by leading property-casualty insurance organizations, including 
property-casualty insurance carriers and trade associations that represent property-
casualty insurance carriers.  Its purpose is to provide timely and reliable 
information that examines public policy issues affecting property-casualty insurers, 
their customers and the general public.  The IRC is devoted solely to research and 
the communication of its research findings to interested parties; it does not 
advocate for property-casualty insurers on public policy issues as such.   
 132  Browne, supra note 126, at 360-61. 
 133  Overall, 76.3 percent of accidents in the dataset occur in 1996-1997, 21.9 
percent of accidents occur in 1993-1995 and 1.8 percent of accidents in the dataset 
occur prior to 1993.  
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2.  Claim Characteristics 
 
Studies of automobile insurance fraud have developed a catalog of 
fraud suspicion indicators or “red flags” that most claim professionals find 
to indicate potential fraud.134  The claim characteristics identified as 
suspicion indicators encompass a variety of characteristics of the insured, 
the accident, the injury and the injury treatment.  One fraud suspicion 
indicator is the lack of a police report for the accident that produced the 
claim.135  The rationale is that in the normal course of an accident, the 
police will be called and a report will be filed.  If there is no police report, 
it is more likely that the accident (and hence the injury) is fictitious.  
Another fraud suspicion indicator is the lack of a visible injury at the scene 
of the accident.136  While it is possible that a policyholder could realize his 
or her injuries only with some delay, if no injury was apparent at the scene 
of the accident, the likelihood that the injury is fictitious or exaggerated is 
enhanced. 
Soft tissue injuries such as sprains and strains are difficult to 
medically verify and, therefore, fall into the category of claims that may 
not lend themselves to discovery through investigation.137  As a result, this 
sort of injury is notorious for being prone to falsification and exaggeration, 
and a claim involving only or primarily a sprain injury is a fraud suspicion 
indicator for insurers.138  Appropriate treatment of sprain injuries is also 
difficult to determine, providing an additional avenue for a policyholder to 
falsify the treatment or to exaggerate the amount of treatment.  Thus, a 
large number of visits to a chiropractor for treatment of injuries allegedly 
sustained in an accident is another fraud suspicion indicator or “red 
flag.”139  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 134  See Herbert I. Weisberg & Richard A. Derrig, Fraud and Automobile 
Insurance: A Report on Bodily Injury Claims in Massachusetts, 9 J. INS. REG. 523, 
534 (1991); Herbert I. Weisberg & Richard A. Derrig, Detection de la Fraude: 
Methodes Quantitatives, 35 RISQUES  75-99 (1998) (in English translation).    
 135  See, e.g., Weisberg & Derrig, supra note 134, at 523. 
 136  Id. at 534. 
 137  See Georges Dionne & Pierre St-Michel, Workers' Compensation and 
Moral Hazard, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 236, 238-39 (1991).  
 138  See, e.g., Weisberg & Derrig, supra note 134, at 534, 537. 
 139  Id. at 534, 536. 
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3.  Claim Investigations 
 
Insurers have several methods at their disposal to investigate the 
validity of medical claims.  One method is a medical audit, which entails 
having a medical professional (usually a nurse) review the medical 
treatment and bills submitted.140  This review will provide information from 
a medical perspective on whether the treatment and billed amounts are 
appropriate.  Another, more costly and detailed, investigative method is an 
independent medical exam (IME).141  An IME is an examination of the 
injured policyholder by a medical professional (usually a doctor) chosen by 
the insurance company.  An IME provides a second medical opinion 
concerning the nature and severity of the injuries to the policyholder.  An 
IME is more expensive than a medical audit and necessitates the 
cooperation and involvement of the policyholder. 
 
1. State Bad Faith Liability Regimes 
 
We combine the data on UM claims with data on each state’s legal 
regime for first-party insurance bad faith to facilitate a comparison of 
outcomes across states with different bad faith regimes.  For each claim, we 
identify the bad faith regime in effect in the state and year that the accident 
occurred.  After omitting claims for which the bad faith legal regime cannot 
be determined, our sample for analysis contains 5,338 claims from 48 states 
and the District of Columbia.142 
State bad faith laws are compiled from Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Stempel on Ins. Contracts 10-87 (Aspen Publ’s 3d ed. 2009) (1994).143  The 
Appendix table displays the bad faith regimes in effect in each state during 
the sample period for the study. Twenty-four states permitted tort-based 
bad faith actions during the entire sample period,144 and 4 states permitted 
                                                                                                                 
 140  Weisberg & Derrig, supra note 134, at III.1. 
 141  Id.  
 142  We omit claims for which the accident state or the accident date is 
missing. We also omit claims that arise in Pennsylvania, Montana, Puerto Rico and 
the Virgin Islands because of ambiguities surrounding the treatment of first part 
bad faith claims in these states and territories.   
 143  STEMPEL, supra note 26, at 10-3 to 10-20; BARRY R. OSTRAGER & 
THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 990-1012 
(14th ed. 2008) (1988); GENRE & EDWARDS ANGELL PALMER & DODGE LLP, BAD 
FAITH LAWS FOR PROPERTY/CASUALTY CLAIMS (2008). 
 144   Id. 
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tort-based bad faith actions for a portion of the sample period.145  Seven 
states permitted contract-based bad faith actions during the entire sample 
period,146 and 2 states permitted contract-based bad faith actions for a 
portion of the sample period.147  First-party bad faith actions were 
permitted by statute in 5 states during the entire sample period;148 first-
party bad faith actions were not permitted in 4 states during the entire 
sample period;149 and first-party bad faith actions were not authorized by 
either statute or legal precedent in 4 states during the entire sample 
period.150  
Table 1 displayed below indicates the number of claims in the 
dataset that were filed under each of the bad faith regimes.  The majority of 
claims in the dataset stem from accidents in states that permit tort actions 
for first-party bad faith.   
 
Table 1: Distribution of Claims by Bad Faith Regime 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 145  Id. 
 146  Id. 
 147  Id. 
 148  Id. 
 149  STEMPEL, supra note 26, at 10-3 to 10-20; OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra 
note 143, at 990-1012; GENRE & EDWARDS ANGELL PALMER & DODGE LLP, supra 
note 143. 
 150  Id. 
Law Regime
Number of 
Claims
Percent of 
Claims
No Private Actions Allowed 182 3.4%
No Private Actions Defined 164 3.1%
Contract Law Actions 592 11.1%
Statutory Actions 930 17.4%
Tort Actions, Intentional Standard 832 15.6%
Tort Actions, Negligence Standard 2,638 49.4%
Total Claims 5,338 100.0%
N ote: Arkansas is included in the intentional tort category.
Source: Authors' calculations from IR C survey data.
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Specifically, 3,470 claims (65.0% of the sample) arise in states that 
permit tort-based bad faith actions, under either a negligence or an 
intentional tort standard.  A large minority of claims arise in states that 
permit contract-based bad faith actions (592 claims or 11.1% of the 
sample) or statute-based bad faith actions (930 claims or 17.4% of the 
sample).  A small minority of claims arise in states that either specifically 
do not permit bad faith actions (182 claims or 3.4% of the sample) or are 
silent with respect to whether a bad faith action is permitted (164 claims or 
3.1% of the sample). 
 
C. ANALYSIS OF CLAIM CHARACTERISTICS AND CLAIM 
INVESTIGATIONS 
 
We investigate the effects of first-party bad faith liability on claim 
characteristics and claim investigations by conducting t-tests of differences 
in mean values of relevant variables across states with different bad faith 
regimes.  We first compare the states that recognize bad faith actions 
(through tort, contract or statute) to the states, which do not recognize 
(either do not permit or have not specifically authorized) bad faith actions.  
The results of the comparisons are reported in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Comparison of Bad Faith versus No Bad Faith 
 
 
The first two columns of the table report mean values of variables 
in states that permit bad-faith actions and states that do not, respectively.  
The third column of the table reports t-statistics and significance levels for 
comparisons of the means across the two sets of states.  The t-statistics 
provide a test of whether the differences in means across these groups of 
states are significantly different from zero at the one percent (***), five 
percent (**) or ten percent (*) confidence level. 
The comparisons reveal significant differences in claim 
characteristics in states that permit bad faith actions.  We observe that 
police verification of accidents is less prevalent for claims in states that 
permit bad faith actions; police are less likely to be at the scene of the 
accident, and accidents are less likely to be the subject of a police report, as 
compared to other states.  Specifically, 80.9 percent of claims paid have a 
police report from the scene of the accident in states that permit bad faith 
while this is true for 85.5 percent of claims paid in states that do not permit 
T -T est Statistics
A B A  vs B
  
States that 
A llow  B ad 
Faith A ctions
States that do 
not A llow  B ad 
Faith A ctions
B ad Faith vs N o 
B ad Faith
Police at the scene 0.833 0.895 -2.98***
A ny police report 0.879 0.958  -4.32***
O n scene police report 0.809 0.855 -2.14**
N o visible injury at scene 0.681 0.556 4.79***
A ny sprain injury 0.833 0.769 3.07***
W orst injury is sprain 0.666 0.586 3.04***
A ny chiropractor visits 0.355 0.364 -0.34
N umber chiropractor visits 25.440 26.300 -0.42
C hiropractor cost/total cost 0.235 0.160 3.22***
A ny medical audit 0.367 0.261 3.95***
External medical audit 0.064 0.086  -1.61
Independent medical exam 0.066 0.263 -13.01***
Source: Autho rs' calculations from IRC  survey data.
N o te: *** ind icates statistically d ifferent from zero  at the 1  percent confidence level; ** ind icates 
statistically d ifferent from zero  at the 5  percent confidence level; * indicates statistically d ifferent from 
zero  at the 10  percent confidence level. All are two-sided  tests.  The number of observations with non-
missing data d iffers by variab le.
M eans
232 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
 
bad faith actions.  The right hand columns of the table confirm that the 
differences are statistically significant.  
Claims that involve no visible injury at the scene of the accident 
are more prevalent in bad-faith states (68.1 percent) than in states with no 
bad faith (55.6 percent). Claims in bad-faith states are more likely to 
involve a sprain injury (by a margin of 83.3 percent to 76.9 percent).  
Similarly, sprain injuries are more likely to be the most severe injury 
experienced in bad-faith states (66.6 percent in bad-faith states compared to 
58.6 percent in states with no bad faith).  All of these differences are 
statistically significant, as indicated in the right hand column of the table. 
The use of chiropractors by injured policyholders is about the same 
across the two sets of states, as is the number of chiropractor visits, and the 
differences are not statistically significant.  However, the proportion of the 
total claimed amount that arises from chiropractor care is larger in bad-faith 
states (23.5 percent) compared to states with no bad faith (16.0 percent), 
and this difference is statistically significant. 
The data also suggest differences in insurer investments in claim 
investigation in states that permit bad-faith actions relative to investigations 
in other states.  Insurers faced with potential bad-faith actions are more 
likely to conduct a medical audit (36.7 percent of claims versus 26.1 
percent of claims in states with no bad faith actions), and this difference is 
statistically significant.  However, this result is entirely due to a greater 
propensity to conduct in-house medical audits. Insurers in bad-faith states 
are slightly less likely to invest in external medical audits than in other 
states (although the difference is not statistically significant).  This greater 
use of in-house medical audits may indicate greater investments in claim 
processing bureaucracy so that a defense can be mounted in the event of a 
bad-faith lawsuit.  
The above interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the potential 
for a bad faith claim has the opposite effect on insurers’ IME use; the 
proportion of claims for which insurers request an IME is only 6.6 percent 
in states that permit bad faith actions, while it is 26.3 percent in states with 
no bad faith.  This difference is both large and statistically significant.  
Because an IME requires the notification and cooperation of the 
policyholder, insurers may be particularly reluctant to undertake this type 
of investigation when faced with the potential for bad-faith lawsuits.  Such 
is the case because an IME may lead to an allegation that the insurer 
unnecessarily engaged in delay tactics with respect to resolution of the 
claim so as to coerce a reduced claim settlement. 
Because there are important differences in legal standards and 
potential damage awards across different legal regimes for insurance bad 
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faith, we also separately compare claims filed under tort-based bad faith 
regimes to those filed under non-tort-based regimes (contract-based or 
statute-based), and to those filed in states that do not recognize first-party 
bad faith.  Table 3 presents the results of these comparisons.   
 
Table 3: Comparison of Bad Faith Regimes 
 
 
The three left-hand columns of the table report mean values of 
variables in states that permit tort-based bad-faith actions, states that permit 
contract-based or statute-based actions, and states that do not recognize bad 
faith actions, respectively.  The three right-hand side columns of the table 
report t-statistics and significance levels for comparisons of mean values 
across these sets of states.  As in the previous table, the t-statistics provide 
a test of whether the differences in means across these groups of states are 
significantly different from zero at the one percent (***), five percent (**) 
or ten percent (*) confidence level. 
The comparisons are striking, and are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the impact of permitting tort-based bad faith actions is 
greatest.  Claims in tort-based states are notably different from claims in 
the other two sets of states.  These differences are in the hypothesized 
directions and are statistically significant. 
A B C A vs B A vs C B vs C
  
States with 
Tort-based 
Bad Faith
States with 
Contract or 
Statute
States with 
No Private 
Actions
Tort vs 
Contract 
or Statute
Tort vs No 
Actions
Contract or 
Statute vs 
No Actions
Police at the scene 0.814 0.875 0.895 -5.31*** -3.69*** -1.01
Any police report 0.865 0.911 0.958 -4.53*** -4.84*** -2.82***
On scene police report 0.794 0.843 0.855 -4.12*** -2.73*** -0.56
No visible injury at scene 0.699 0.641 0.556 4.08*** 5.48*** 2.94***
Any sprain injury 0.846 0.804 0.769 3.61*** 3.71*** 1.49
Worst injury is sprain 0.690 0.612 0.586 5.43*** 3.96*** 0.89
Any chiropractor visits 0.359 0.346 0.364 0.87 -0.19 -0.63
Number chiropractor visits 23.390 30.230 26.300 -6.59*** -1.59 -1.56
Chiropractor cost/total cost 0.246 0.211 0.160 2.66*** 3.87*** 1.89*
Any medical audit 0.395 0.305 0.261 6.06*** 4.85*** 1.59
External medical audit 0.064 0.063 0.086 0.16 -1.55 -1.54
Independent medical exam 0.043 0.120 0.263 -10.04*** -16.33*** -6.72***
Means T-Test Statistics
Source: Authors' calculations from IRC survey data.
Note: *** indicates statistically different from zero at the 1 percent confidence level; ** indicates statistically different from zero 
at the 5 percent confidence level; * indicates statistically different from zero at the 10 percent confidence level.  All are two-sided 
tests. The number of observations with non-missing data differs by variable.
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Relative to states that permit contract or statute-based actions, 
insurance claims in states that permit tort-based bad-faith actions are 
significantly more likely to include fraud suspicion indicators (i.e. “red 
flags”), including, less prevalence of police verification of accidents, 
greater prevalence of claims that involve no visible injury at the scene of 
the accident, greater prevalence of claims that involve only sprain injuries, 
and greater proportion of treatment costs from chiropractors.  The second 
of the right hand columns of the table confirms that these differences 
between tort-based states and contract or statute-based states are 
statistically significant at better than the 1 percent confidence level.  Insurer 
investigation patterns in states that permit tort-based faith actions also 
differ from those in states with contract or statute-based actions.  Insurers 
faced with potential tort-based bad faith are more likely to conduct medical 
audits but are less likely to conduct IME’s than insurers in states with 
contract or statutory bad faith regimes, and these differences are 
statistically significant. Insurers in tort-based bad-faith states are no more 
likely to undertake external medical audits than insurers in states with 
contract or statute-based bad faith. 
The differences between states that allow tort-based bad faith 
actions and states that allow contract or statute-based actions are generally 
smaller than those between tort-based states and states that do not 
recognize bad faith actions.  For example, claims that involve no visible 
injury at the scene of the accident are more prevalent in tort-based states 
(69.9 percent) than in contract-based or statute-based states (64.1 percent) 
or states with no bad faith (55.6 percent).  Similarly, sprain injuries are 
more likely to be the most severe injury experienced in tort-based states 
(69.0 percent in tort-based states, 61.2 percent in contract-based or statute-
based states and 58.6 percent in states with no bad faith).  The proportion 
of the total claimed amount that arises from chiropractor care is 
significantly larger in tort-based states (24.6 percent) compared to contract-
based or statute-based states (21.1 percent) or states with no bad faith (16.0 
percent).  There is also a large difference in the propensity of insurers to 
use IME’s across the different bad faith regimes.  The proportion of claims 
for which insurers request an IME is only 4.3 percent in states that permit 
tort-based bad faith actions, while it is 12.0 percent in states that permit 
contract or statute-based claims and 26.3 percent in states with no bad faith.  
Furthermore, there are fewer significant differences between states 
that permit contract-based or statute-based bad faith and states that do not 
recognize bad faith actions.  These patterns are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the expected value of potential damages faced by an insurer 
is an important influence in the claim settlement process, and that the 
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prospect of punitive damages is of particular importance.  In states where 
insurers face a greater potential for punitive damages in bad faith actions, 
“red flags” are more prevalent in paid claims and insurers are less likely to 
employ certain claim investigation techniques. 
To further investigate the role of potential punitive damages, we 
compare UM claims in states that permit tort-based bad faith actions under 
a “negligence” standard to states that permit bad faith actions but require 
more stringent standards of proof for punitive damages (i.e., intentional 
tort, contract law or statutory law).  The results of this comparison, 
displayed in Table 4, yield conclusions that are identical to those obtained 
from the previous comparisons.  This suggests that differences in the 
standards required for a finding of bad faith, and the attendant penalties 
arising from such a finding, play a significant role in the claim settlement 
process. 
 
1.  Robustness Checks 
 
One caveat to the previous analysis is that characteristics of 
automobile accidents may differ across the states.  If accidents tend to be 
less severe in states that permit tort-based bad faith actions, this factor 
could partially explain the differences in claim characteristics and insurers’ 
use of investigative techniques.  For example, less severe accidents may be 
more likely to result in sprain injuries (or only sprain injuries).  Or, with 
respect to a small claim, an investigation may be cost-prohibitive even if 
the claim has “red flags.”  Having acknowledged this, observing a larger 
proportion of small claims (as opposed to large claims) filed and paid in 
states that permit bad faith actions may itself constitute evidence of 
incentive distortions induced by bad faith laws. That is, policyholders may 
file small, illegitimate claims knowing that the insurer will not fight the 
claim because of the exposure to a bad faith lawsuit.  On the other hand, in 
states that permit contract-based bad faith actions, or no bad faith actions, 
insurers may “nickel and dime” small claims because they know that an 
insufficient incentive exists for a policyholder to sue for bad faith.  
However, these hypotheses cannot be tested because our data do not report 
accident or claim frequency by state.   
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Table 4: Comparison of Negligence Standard and Other Standards
 
  
We are nonetheless able to examine whether the differences in 
claim characteristics and insurer investigations remain statistically 
significant for claims that are of equivalent size in the different states.  We 
compare claim characteristics and insurer investigations for claims in the 
third quarter (the quarter in which claim amounts fall above the median 
claim amount) and the second quarter (the quarter in which claim amounts 
fall below the median claim amount) of the distribution of claimed amounts 
in our database, respectively.  The benefit of this approach is that it controls 
for claimed loss amount and focuses attention on the “typical” claim by 
removing both very small claims and very large claims from the 
comparisons.  One drawback of this approach is that it reduces the sample 
sizes for our statistical tests.  
Table 5 reports the results of the comparison of claims of similar 
size in states with different bad faith regimes.  Because all of our previous 
T-Test Statistics
A B A  vs B
  
States w ith 
N egligence-
based T ort 
A ctions
States w ith 
O ther Basis for 
Bad Faith 
A ctions
N egligence Tort 
vs O ther Bad 
Faith
Police at the scene 0.779 0.894 -10.93***
A ny police report 0.836 0.927 -9.82***
O n scene police report 0.757 0.867 -9.93***
N o visible injury at scene 0.720 0.638 6.22***
A ny sprain injury 0.866 0.796 6.62***
W orst injury is sprain 0.712 0.614 7.36***
A ny chiropractor visits 0.397 0.309 6.49***
N umber chiropractor visits 23.553 28.183 -4.70***
C hiropractor cost/total cost 0.274 0.191 6.92***
A ny medical audit 0.416 0.313 7.55***
External medical audit 0.068 0.058 1.42
Independent medical exam 0.045 0.091 -6.33***
Source: Authors' calculations from IR C survey data.
N ote: *** ind icates statistically d ifferent from zero  at the 1  percent confidence level; ** ind icates 
statistically d ifferent from zero  at the 5  percent co nfidence level; * ind icates statistically d ifferent from 
zero  at the 10  percent confidence level. All are two-sided  tests.  The number o f observations with no n-
missing data d iffers across variables.
M eans
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results are consistent across the various alternative methods of categorizing 
states by bad faith regime, we report only the comparison of states with 
tort-based bad faith regimes to all other states.  The left-hand columns of 
the table report mean values and t-test statistics for characteristics of claims 
in the second quarter of the claim size distribution, and the right-hand 
columns report means and t-test statistics for claims in the third quarter. 
 
Table 5: Comparison of Claims by Quarter 
 
 
The table shows the same general results as the comparisons based 
on all claims in the database.  Indeed, the comparisons of claims in the 
third quarter follow the exact patterns of signs and statistical significance as 
those for the full sample of claims.  For the smaller claims (those in the 
second quarter) there are some differences from the full sample.  Most 
notable is that there are no significant differences in injury characteristics 
(visible injuries, prevalence of sprain) across states with tort-based bad 
faith and other states.  This suggests that the relevant difference in claim 
characteristics is the greater prevalence of large-valued claims that involve 
sprain injuries in states with tort-based bad faith, consistent with the 
hypothesis that claim exaggeration may be more prevalent in those states.  
Overall, it appears from the table that differences in claim size across states 
with different bad faith regimes is not the determining factor in explaining 
  T-tests T-tests
States with 
Tort-based 
Bad Faith
All Other 
States
Tort vs All 
Other
States with 
Tort-based 
Bad Faith
All Other 
States
Tort vs All 
Other
Police at the scene 0.805 0.880 -3.50*** 0.745 0.874 -4.82***
Any police report 0.850 0.932 -3.82*** 0.808 0.912 -4.35***
On scene police report 0.783 0.868 -3.36*** 0.727 0.84 -4.12***
 
No visible injury at scene 0.723 0.679 1.50 0.739 0.659 2.74***
Any sprain injury 0.908 0.885 1.20 0.949 0.915 2.14**
Worst injury is sprain 0.758 0.764 0.21 0.797 0.706 3.38***
Any chiropractor visits 0.456 0.399 1.73* 0.616 0.519 3.06***
Number chiropractor visits 15.657 15.539 0.13 27.468 27.349 0.09
Chiropractor cost/total cost 0.356 0.306 1.75* 0.470 0.336 4.80***
Any medical audit 0.445 0.317 4.04*** 0.575 0.361 6.67***
External medical audit 0.069 0.067 0.11 0.104 0.084 1.03
Independent medical exam 0.019 0.073 -4.60*** 0.043 0.117 -4.57***
Claims in 2nd Quarter Claims in 3rd Quarter
S o urce : A utho rs' c a lcula tio ns fro m  IR C  surve y d a ta .
N o te : *** ind ica tes sta tistic a lly d iffe rent fro m  z ero  a t the  1  p er cent co nfid e nce  leve l; ** ind ica te s sta tistica lly d iffe rent fro m  zero  a t 
the  5  p ercent c o nfid e nce  le ve l; * ind ica te s sta tistica lly d iffe rent fro m  zero  a t the  1 0  p erc ent co nfid enc e  leve l.   A ll a re  tw o -sid ed  te sts. 
T he  num b er  o f o b se rva tio ns w ith no n-m issing d a ta d iffe r s b y var iab le .
Means Means
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differences in claim characteristics and claim investigations, although 
results for claim characteristics may be somewhat less robust. 
A second caveat to the preceding analysis is that results are based 
on the pooling of claims from different states into categories based solely 
on first-party insurance bad faith regime.151  One concern is that there may 
be other important sources of heterogeneity across states; a second concern 
is the potential for a large state to dominate the comparisons.  A specific 
issue that has been considered in other studies is that the compensation 
system for automobile accident claims may affect the claim settlement 
process.152  To explore whether claim and investigation characteristics 
differ across bad faith legal regimes when the accident compensation 
regime is held constant, we modify our sample to exclude claims that were 
settled under an automobile no-fault compensation system.  Additionally, 
we investigate the influence of a large state on our previous results by 
excluding claims from California (a state with tort-based bad faith) from 
the sample.  This is done because claims from this state make up a nearly 
one-quarter of the sample and thus may be influential on the results.   
The results of comparisons of claim characteristics and claim 
investigations in states with tort-based bad faith to all other states, for both 
of these alternative samples of claims, are displayed in Table 6.  The left-
hand columns display means and t-test statistics for the sample that omits 
claims settled under no-fault insurance; the right-hand columns display 
means and t-test statistics for the sample that omits California.  
                                                                                                                 
 151 To more fully account for this issue, additional investigations were 
undertaken using a logistic regression approach that can account for the clustering 
of claims by state. Like the t-tests, this approach analyzes whether different bad 
faith regimes are associated with significantly different mean values of each 
relevant claim characteristic, but takes into account that claims occur within a state 
and the bad faith regime varies only by state and not for each claim. Thus, 
clustering by state reduces the likelihood that differences across bad faith regimes 
are statistically significant, by allowing for the possibility that variable values are 
correlated across claims within each state.  Nonetheless, the results of this analysis 
remain generally consistent with the t-test results, and are most similar to the t-test 
results for the sample omitting the state of California. Claim injury characteristics 
remain statistically significant and higher in tort-based states, and insurer 
investigations also remain statistically significant and of the same signs as in the t-
test analysis.  Police presence and police reports and use of chiropractic treatments 
become statistically insignificant in the logistic regression analysis.   
 152  Browne, supra note 126, at 360-61; HAWKEN, supra note 128. 
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The results for the sample which omits claims settled under a no-
fault regime are extremely similar to results obtained from the full sample 
of states: the signs and statistical significance of all variables remain the 
same.  This confirms that the automobile accident compensation regime is 
not the determining factor in explaining differences in claim characteristics 
and claim investigations.   
 
Table 6: Comparison of Alternative Samples 
 
  
In contrast, results for the sample from which California claims are 
omitted differ from previous comparisons in several ways.  Most notable 
are the changes in sign for the police report and chiropractor use variables.  
In the sample without California, police are more likely to be at the 
accident scene and to submit a report of the accident in states with tort-
based bad faith than in other states.  The percent of claim costs stemming 
from chiropractor use is also smaller in tort-based bad faith states than in 
other states, once California is omitted from the sample.  Thus it appears 
that these claim characteristics may be prevalent in California rather than in 
states with tort-based bad faith more generally.  On the other hand, several 
of the comparisons without California remain statistically significant and 
consistent with the findings for the full sample of states.  Claims with no 
visible injury at the accident scene and claims in which the worst injury is a 
sprain remain significantly more prevalent in states with tort-based bad 
  T-tests T-tests
States with 
Tort-based 
Bad Faith
All Other 
States
Tort vs All 
Other
States with 
Tort-based 
Bad Faith
All Other 
States
Tort vs All 
Other
Police at the scene 0.813 0.868 -4.55*** 0.901 0.879 2.01**
Any police report 0.864 0.908 -4.122*** 0.942 0.919 2.72***
On scene police report 0.793 0.833 -3.20*** 0.879 0.846 3.04***
No visible injury at scene 0.701 0.633 4.54*** 0.664 0.625 2.53**
Any sprain injury 0.847 0.799 3.96*** 0.802 0.798 0.32
W orst injury is sprain 0.693 0.645 3.15*** 0.641 0.607 2.15**
Any chiropractor visits 0.360 0.300 3.94*** 0.275 0.35 -5.05***
Number chiropractor visits 23.412 23.272 0.13 22.318 29.636 -5.58***
Chiropractor cost/total cost 0.247 0.192 3.96*** 0.174 0.201 -2.08**
Any medical audit 0.396 0.280 7.46*** 0.343 0.27 3.02***
External medical audit 0.063 0.054 1.20 0.059 0.067 1.08
Independent medical exam 0.040 0.069 -4.10*** 0.048 0.146 -10.31***
Sample omitting Nofault States Sample omitting California
S o urc e : A utho rs' c a lc ula tio ns fro m  I RC survey d ata .
N o te : *** ind ica te s sta tistic a lly d iffe re nt fr o m  z e ro  a t  the  1  p e rc e nt c o nfid e nc e  level; ** ind ica tes sta tistic a lly d iffe re nt fr o m  z e ro  a t 
the  5  p erc e nt c o nfid e nc e  le vel; * ind ic a tes sta tistic a lly d iffe rent fro m  z ero  a t the  1 0  p e rce nt co nfid ence  le ve l.   A ll a re  tw o -sid e d  tests.  
T he  num b e r  o f o b ser va tio ns w ith no n-m issing d ata d iffe rs b y var iab le .
Means Means
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faith than in other states.  Moreover, the pattern of insurer claim 
investigation activities remains the same in this sample as in the full 
sample; insurers in states with tort-based bad faith are more likely to invest 
in internal routine medical audits and less likely to invest in independent 
medical examinations.  Thus, there remain important differences in claim 
“red flags” and insurer investigations between states with tort-based bad 
faith and other states, even after the influence of California is removed 
from the sample.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has examined first-party insurance bad faith remedies 
under common law and the recent legislative expansion of such remedies.  
Theory predicts that allowing policyholders to recover damages over and 
above the value of the insurance benefit owed will provide insurers with 
added incentives to engage in fair claim settlement practices, with the result 
being an enhancement in the efficiency of insurance market contracting. 
However, theory also predicts that uncertain bad faith standards for insurers 
and excessive punitive damages awards for policyholders will undermine 
the benefits of the bad faith remedy by distorting insurers’ claim settlement 
practices and policyholders’ claim filing incentives, in ways that will lead 
to more borderline (or even fraudulent and exaggerated) claims and 
unwarranted increases in insurance premiums.  
Previous empirical studies have found that tort-based standards for 
insurer bad faith are associated with higher insurance claim payments.  
This article notes that higher claim payments may be evidence of beneficial 
effects of bad faith liability, if in its absence insurers would underpay 
claims.  A more pertinent concern is whether tort liability for insurer bad 
faith deters insurers from appropriately challenging potentially fraudulent 
or otherwise invalid claims, leading to greater amounts of fraud and to 
unwarranted costs and higher insurance premiums.  The article provides 
new evidence that tort liability for first-party bad faith may reduce insurers’ 
incentives to monitor for claim fraud, leading to less intensive use of 
investigative techniques and to more paid claims that contain 
characteristics often associated with fraud.  Although constructing a 
baseline comparison for determining the appropriateness of claim 
investigations is difficult, these findings are consistent with the predictions 
of theory when bad faith liability is uncertain and/or excessive.  This raises 
questions about whether tort liability facilitates efficient claim settlement 
practices in insurance markets.  Additional empirical study of the 
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relationship between bad faith liability standards and the insurance claim 
settlement process would be useful. 
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Appendix Table 
State First-Party Bad Faith Regimes for Sample Period of Claims Data  
 
 
  
 
 
State First Party Bad Faith Law State First Party Bad Faith Law
Alaska Tort Actions Mississippi Tort Actions
Alabama Tort Actions Nebraska Tort Actions
Arkansas Tort Actions New Hampshire Contract Law Actions
Arizona Tort Actions New Jersey Tort Actions (until 1993)
California Tort Actions Contract Law Actions (since 1993)
Colorado Tort Actions New Mexico Tort Actions
Connecticut Tort Actions Nevada Tort Actions
District of Columbia No Private Actions Defined New York No Private Actions Allowed
Delaware Tort Actions (until 1995); North Carolina Tort Actions
Contract Law Actions (since 1995) North Dakota Tort Actions
Florida Statutory Actions Ohio Tort Actions
Georgia Statutory Actions Oklahoma Tort Actions
Hawaii No Private Actions Defined Oregon Contract Law Actions
Iowa Tort Actions Rhode Island Tort Actions
Idaho Tort Actions South Carolina Tort Actions
Illinois Tort Actions South Dakota No Private Actions Defined
Indiana Tort Actions (since 1993) Tennessee Statutory Actions
Kansas No Private Actions Allowed Texas Tort Actions
Kentucky Tort Actions Utah Contract Law Actions
Louisiana Statutory Actions Virginia Contract Law Actions
Massachusetts Statutory Actions Vermont Tort Actions
Maryland Contract Law Actions Washington Tort Actions (since 1992)
Maine Contract Law Actions Wisconsin Tort Actions
Michigan No Private Actions Allowed West Virginia Contract Law Actions
Minnesota No Private Actions Allowed Wyoming Tort Actions (since 1990)
Missouri No Private Actions Defined
Source: Authors' calculations from GenRe (2008), Stempel (2006) and Ostrager and Newman (2008).
Note: The sample period includes years 1986 through 1997.
  
REGULATION OF LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:  
LESSONS FROM CORPORATE FINANCE THEORY 
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*** 
This article applies a model of firm capital structure to the current 
financial crisis and summarizes the insights the model provides regarding 
the regulation of large financial institutions in a post-crisis world.  Firm 
capital structure is evaluated by studying how firms finance their activities 
using debt and equity, which in turn captures an important element of firm 
risk taking.  First, the simple model is briefly summarized.  Second, the 
model’s results are used in order to interpret the evolution of the current 
financial crisis and to put it into perspective.  Finally, the article presents 
forward-looking observations and suggestions for future regulation.  The 
article concludes that an essential element of a new regulatory framework 
must include an effective method for dealing with the extension of the “Too 
Big to Fail” umbrella, which has extended the risk of moral hazard beyond 
depository institutions.  It asserts that a successful new framework must 
include stringent capital standards for financial institutions combined with 
regulators that have the authority and commitment to enforce those 
standards putting owners and managers at risk when capital standards are 
violated, even during financial crises when there are strong incentives for 
regulator accommodation to preserve asset value. The new framework 
must be flexible in order to adapt to changing financial conditions 
especially developments that affect franchise value, and contain provisions 
that expose uninsured debtors to risk when capital standards are violated 
so that debt holders have an incentive to monitor the activities of very large 
financial firms.   
*** 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Equity capital is the shock absorber for our financial system and 
the current financial crisis, like a bumpy road for an auto designer, provides 
a unique opportunity for financial regulators to evaluate the predictions of 
theory and improve the design of the regulatory system.  The purpose of 
this paper is to apply a simple model of firm capital structure to the current 
situation and summarize the insights it provides regarding the regulation of 
large financial institutions in a post-crisis world.  The paper begins with a 
brief summary of the model and uses the results of that model to place the 
evolution of the current crisis into perspective.  The paper concludes with 
forward-looking observations and suggestions for future regulation. 
 
II. A SIMPLE MODEL OF FIRM CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
 
The study of firm capital structure is basically the analysis of how 
firms finance their economic activities – in particular, the allocation of 
funding between equity and debt or firm leverage (the ratio of debt to 
equity).  In much of the literature, the fundamental risk of the firm’s assets 
is taken as given by economic forces outside the control of the firm and the 
choice of leverage can be viewed as allocating that risk between different 
providers of capital.  In general, the use of debt financing results in creating 
a lower risk/lower return investment opportunity for debt providers and a 
higher risk/higher return investment for equity providers.   
Leland develops a simple model of the choice of firm capital 
structure that has proven to provide valuable insights into important 
questions.1  In Leland’s model, a private firm in a given industry must fund 
its initial investment in productive assets with a combination of debt and 
equity.  The return on the firm’s assets evolves stochastically, but the firm 
has limited ability to adjust its capital structure in response to the actual 
asset outcomes.2  As a result, the firm’s managers must choose their initial 
leverage to maximize the expected present value of the firm’s future 
operations in the presence of taxes, bankruptcy costs and tax-deductible 
                                                                                                                 
1  Hayne E. Leland, Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal 
Capital Structure, 49 J. OF FIN. 1213 (1994). 
2  Id. at 1248. While such a restriction may seem unrealistic, the recent crisis 
has demonstrated that firms experiencing financial difficulties often have no access 
to additional equity capital at the time of distress.  This fact places more 
importance on the forward-looking choice of initial leverage.  Id. 
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interest payments on the debt.  In this model, firms rationally choose to 
fund themselves with some debt and some equity as they trade-off expected 
bankruptcy costs that could be avoided if the firm chose all equity and the 
tax advantage of debt, which is maximized by choosing all debt. 
A key lesson of this paper arises from the author’s consideration of 
the firm’s choice of a bankruptcy threshold – the level of asset value at 
which the firm’s owners voluntarily  turn over the assets to the debt holders 
for liquidation.  In financial terms, the firm’s owners have a call option on 
the assets with a strike price equal to the debt payoff.  Because an option 
can never have a negative value, ignoring the periodic debt service 
payment, firm equity could never be negative and the owners would never 
choose bankruptcy.3  However, to keep their option alive, the owners must 
make the periodic debt service payments and thus choose bankruptcy when 
the cost of the required debt service payment exceeds the current call 
option value.  Two important insights from Leland’s analysis are that for 
reasonable parameter assumptions owners will choose to continue to 
operate the firm (maintain their option value) until the market value of 
assets falls well below the face value of debt and the key factor that limits 
this behavior of owners is the required debt service to bond holders.   
Because equity holders can choose the best time (from their 
perspective) to turn over the firm to debt holders, the bond holders are 
exposed to greater risk by the continued operation of an insolvent firm.  
Once declines in asset values have made a firm insolvent, the equity 
holder’s decision whether to continue operating the firm only depends upon 
the subset of outcomes where asset values recover sufficiently for the firm 
value to exceed debt obligations.  The return to equity holders is zero in all 
other scenarios, no matter how bad the outcome.  However, debt holders 
care about the expected future value of assets over all states of the world, 
but are especially concerned about situations where asset values continue to 
erode because they will be the owner of the assets in those states of the 
world.  Furthermore, insolvency is likely to affect the equity holders’ 
choice of investment risk because, from their perspective, they still benefit 
from exceptionally good outcomes and do not bear increased losses if the 
                                                                                                                 
3  A call option provides the holder the right, but not the obligation, to 
purchase a security or asset at a fixed price. Such an option always has a positive 
value regardless of the current value of the asset as long as there is some chance 
that the value of the asset may rise above the strike price. For a complete 
introduction to options and their valuation see JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, 
AND OTHER DERIVATIVES (Prentice-Hall) (2008). 
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bad outcomes become worse.  Such increased investment risk exposes debt 
holders to substantially more risk than the likely investment decisions of a 
solvent firm.4 
The providers of debt capital can anticipate this behavior on the 
part of owners and demand fair compensation for bearing the risk of 
significant losses from asset declines by increasing the required coupon 
rate on the debt.  However, this creates “risky” debt and limits the ability to 
allocate risk that was one of the original motivations for leverage.5  A 
common solution to this problem is for equity and debt providers to 
negotiate bond covenants whereby owners contract to transfer control of 
the firm to debt holders at a higher threshold value of assets. For example, 
a positive net worth covenant would transfer control when the market value 
of assets first falls below the face value of debt.6  
A final important result from Leland’s model is that whether or not 
the debt is protected by bond covenants, the optimal choice of initial 
leverage provides a substantial equity “cushion” above the bankruptcy 
threshold.  Leverage levels near the bankruptcy threshold raise the risk of 
incurring the transactions costs associated with bankruptcy.  Since debt 
holders will bear those costs in bankruptcy, firm owners must pay for those 
costs with higher interest rates and so have an incentive to hold additional 
equity in order to lower the interest rate on debt. 
                                                                                                                 
4  This behavior arises from the limited liability exposure of equity holders, so 
that owners of an insolvent firm face no downside risk and benefit from large risks 
that have a low probability of success, but, if successful, create the potential for 
future positive net worth of the firm. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 49-50 (1996). 
5  To see the intuition underlying this claim, envision a continuum of risk 
measured along a straight line where the firm’s assets are located in the middle of 
the line.  Adding leverage to the firm creates one security with less risk (debt) and 
another with more risk (leveraged equity) – splitting the single center point into 
two, one to the safer side of center and one to the riskier side.  To the extent that 
more of the risk of future outcomes falls on the debt holders, the two new points 
must remain closer to the original center point. 
6  There are many possible variations of this basic idea.  For example, some 
covenants might limit the managers’ ability to finance new growth or sell assets in 
lieu of transferring total control to debt holders.  Another variation might provide 
debt holders representation on the board when certain financial thresholds are 
crossed. Clifford W. Smith & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An 
Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. OF FIN. ECON. 117 (1979). 
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Regulated depository institutions have two significant differences 
from the firms Leland studies:  they are able to issue debt at the riskless 
rate without regard to their individual financial condition or the selected 
leverage, and they are subject to binding capital regulation.  These capital 
regulations can be viewed in Leland’s terms as an exogenously determined 
bankruptcy threshold at which level the debt holders are paid in full and the 
assets turned over to the regulator for liquidation.  As a result of the 
reduced market discipline via debt cost, many scholars have discussed the 
concern that deposit insurance creates a moral hazard that encourages 
owners of insured depositories to select very high levels of leverage, i.e., 
hold the minimum capital allowed by the capital regulations.7  On the other 
hand, Buser, Chen and Kane (1981) point out that banks incur significant 
costs that are not explicitly priced attributable to regulations, investment 
restrictions and monitoring.8  Merton (1978) and Markus (1984) argue that 
these costs increase when banks have weak capital positions creating an 
equity favoring factor that offsets the incentives created by deposit 
insurance and could lead to banks choosing to hold high levels of equity 
and so provide very limited deposit services.9   
Ideally, regulation should preserve incentives for owners to operate 
as deposit issuing banks, while selecting a prudent level of leverage 
tailored to the riskiness of their asset strategy – voluntarily holding capital 
in excess of the specified minimum. It is unreasonable and impractical to 
expect regulators to be able to establish capital standards tailored to an 
individual bank’s operating strategy and asset risk.  Similarly, regulators 
cannot monitor the portfolios of all financial institutions closely enough to 
accurately classify banks by the riskinesss of their assets.  Consequently, it 
is important that the capital regulation framework provides owners and 
managers sufficient incentives to provide a capital cushion that reflects the 
                                                                                                                 
7  See Jean-Pierre Gueyie & Van Son Lai, Bank Moral Hazard and the 
Introduction of Official Deposit Insurance in Canada, 12 INT’L REV. OF ECON. & 
FIN. 247 (2003); Michael C. Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power 
in Banking, 80 THE AM. ECON. REV. 1183 (1990); and David A. Marshall & 
Edward S. Prescott, Bank Capital Regulation With and Without State-Contingent 
Penalties (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper No. 2000-10, 2000). 
8  Stephen A. Buser, Andrew H. Chen & Edward J. Kane, Federal Deposit 
Insurance, Regulatory Policy and Optimal Bank Capital, 36 J. OF FIN. 51, 56 
(1981). 
9  Alan J. Marcus, Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy, 8 J. OF BANKING 
AND FIN. 51, 59 (1984); Robert C. Merton, On the Cost of Deposit Insurance When 
There are Surveillance Costs, 51 J. OF BUS. 439, 448 (1984). 
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operating strategy of the bank and appropriately reduces the risk of 
violating the standards in adverse times. 
Harding, Liang, and Ross (2008) (HLR) extend Leland’s model to 
incorporate the additional factors influencing bank capital choices.10  They 
find that capital regulation alone is not effective for establishing an 
incentive for banks to hold capital reserves in excess of the minimum 
capital standards.  Bankruptcy costs and insurance benefits both vary with 
capital structure in such a way that banks would rationally choose to 
operate with the minimum capital allowed or forego being a bank entirely 
(i.e., choose all equity financing), depending upon the strictness of capital 
regulation.  A bank will only choose to hold capital reserves in excess of 
minimum capital requirements if there is some additional firm franchise 
value that is placed at risk by the capital regulation.   
HLR find that tax-advantaged debt as parameterized by Leland 
(1994), or any franchise value that depends upon the total amount of an 
institution’s deposits, creates such a franchise value and, when this 
franchise value is considered, banks will hold excess capital without 
shifting to the extreme of foregoing issuing deposits.  Counter-intuitively, 
the tax benefits of debt or the franchise benefits of the deposit base lead to 
lower leverage which is quite striking given that tax-advantaged debt 
traditionally is viewed as increasing the incentive for firms to take on more 
debt.  The result is explained by the fact that a firm’s franchise value is 
placed at risk by capital standards causing firms to choose lower levels of 
leverage in order to protect this value for equity holders.  Overall, the 
combination of capital standards with the power of the regulator to wipe 
out equity when the standard is violated acts like the bond covenants 
discussed in Leland encouraging managers to operate with a capital 
cushion above the threshold that would trigger takeover.  
HLR demonstrate that it is the regulator’s ability to move swiftly to 
place a firm that violates capital standards into receivership that leads firms 
to hold excess capital.  Alternative structures such as warning thresholds 
that trigger additional regulatory burdens have little effect on leverage.  It is 
the ability to liquidate the firm, placing the franchise value at risk, that 
leads to more conservative choices of leverage.  Consistent with these 
predictions, the authors note that commercial banks, that are subject to 
dissolution if capital standards are violated, hold a substantial capital 
                                                                                                                 
10  John P. Harding, Xiaozhong Liang & Stephen L. Ross, Bank Capital 
Requirements and Capital Structure, 4-6 (Univ. of Conn., Dept. of Econ, Working 
Paper No. 2009-09, 2008). 
2009] REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 249 
 
 
cushion above the minimum capital requirement while the mortgage GSEs, 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, who prior to the summer of 2008 were free 
from the risk of receivership, held little or no capital cushion through the 
same period.11   
 
III. UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT CRISIS 
 
The origins of the current financial crisis are complex and no single 
factor can be singled out as the primary cause.  However, most observers 
believe that increasing use of leverage, broadly defined, was a contributing 
factor.  The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report to 
Congress on the origins of the crisis shows that total debt in the U.S. 
economy rose significantly in the years preceding the crisis.  Measured as a 
ratio to nominal GDP, total debt rose from roughly two times GDP in 2002 
to 2.25 times GDP in 2007.12   
                                                                                                                 
11  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac first began operating under the statutory 
minimum capital requirement in 1993, and in that year they held excess capital of 
roughly $1 billion and $0.7 billion, respectively. These amounts expressed as a 
percentage of assets plus Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) outstanding were 
.14% and .13%, respectively. In most of the eight subsequent years, Fannie Mae 
held excess capital well under $1 billion and in 1998 and 1999 its excess capital 
was 1/100th of a percent of the assets and MBS. Freddie Mac’s excess capital, 
while slightly higher when measured as a percentage of assets and MBS, was 
smaller when measured in dollars and is also consistent with the claim that the firm 
intended to meet, but not exceed its capital standard. On average over the period 
from 1993 through 2001, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held less than 1/10th of a 
percent of excess capital. The period from 2002 through 2007 is distorted by the 
effects of financial restatements arising from accounting problems experienced in 
the period from 2003 through 2005. However, the numbers for 2007 most likely 
reflect the firms’ contemporaneous intentions, and they still suggest that the firms 
were not holding precautionary excess capital.  See FHFA AND OFHEO ANNUAL 
REPORTS TO CONGRESS 1994 - 2008 available at http://www.fhfa.gov/ 
Default.aspx?Page=240.  From 2001 through 2008, commercial banks held total 
capital (Tier I plus Tier II) of 12.3% of risk-based assets.  During this period, a 
bank was deemed to be well-capitalized with a total capital ratio of 10% of risk-
based assets and adequately capitalized with a ratio of 8%.  Data on commercial 
bank capital ratios is available at http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI.   
12  See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL MARKETS 
REGULATION: FINANCIAL CRISIS HIGHLIGHTS NEED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF 
LEVERAGE AT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACROSS SYSTEM, GAO-09-739, p.13, 
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By their nature, financial institutions have always been some of the 
most highly leveraged firms.  The five largest U.S. investment banks 
together had an average leverage ratio of about 30 to 1 during the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997.  While this ratio declined to 22 to 1 in the period 
following 1997, it had risen back to 30 to 1 by 2007. The five largest bank 
holding companies had an average leverage ratio of about 13 to 1 
throughout the same period.13 
However, the effective growth of leverage at financial institutions 
in recent years is difficult to measure precisely because recent 
developments in financial assets and derivatives allow institutions 
numerous opportunities to effectively leverage their risk “off balance 
sheet” while still maintaining excess capital as measured by traditional 
measures of on-balance sheet risks.  For example, before the development 
of credit default swaps, an institution willing to bear the credit risk of an 
industrial firm would make a loan or purchase the debt of that company and 
report the loan as an asset, thereby increasing its required capital.  In recent 
years, institutions could take on that same credit risk without making a loan 
by writing an insurance policy through a credit default swap.   
Leverage in the economy also increased with greater use of hedge 
funds, Special Purpose Entities (SPE) as part of holding company 
structures and the ability to issue structured debt securities.  One sector of 
the economy that made prominent use of structured debt to expand credit 
was the housing sector where subprime mortgages were used to expand the 
population of mortgagors.  The resulting pools of subprime mortgages were 
structured in ways to attract investment from a wide array of non-
traditional investors.  While most large investment banks and bank holding 
company subsidiaries that originated subprime mortgages operated with the 
intent to pool and sell mortgage-backed securities as soon as a sufficient 
number of loans had been originated, at any given time, they nevertheless 
had significant exposure to subprime loans because they were holding 
mortgages as inventory awaiting future sales or holding securities as part of 
their underwriting and trading operations.  In some cases these institutions 
                                                                                                                          
Fig.3 (2009) (hereinafter GAO REPORT) available at www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d09739.pdf.  
13  Id. at 19.  At the time, the five largest investment banks or broker-dealer 
holding companies were Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill 
Lynch, and Morgan Stanley. The five largest bank holding companies were Bank 
of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Wachovia, and Wells Fargo. Id. at 18-19 
figs.4 & 5. 
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also bought mortgage related securities as investments through special 
purpose entities or subsidiaries.14 
The role of SPE’s is especially instructive. If a regulated financial 
institution committed to provide contingent funding for a SPE, such as 
liquidity facilities or credit enhancements, the institution would have been 
required to hold capital against that commitment.  In many cases, however, 
the institutions establishing the SPE’s provided no such guarantees and so 
the business activities of the SPE were not considered in calculating capital 
requirements. Nevertheless, these institutions still faced both reputation and 
legal risks associated with the possibility of an SPE failure. Many of these 
SPE’s increased returns by investing in long-term assets like mortgage-
backed securities and financed these investments with short term 
commercial paper.  As the financial crisis began in 2007, many of these 
SPE’s could not renew their debt financing and the regulated financial 
institutions either extended financing themselves or directly brought the 
SPE’s onto their books in order to avoid the reputation damage associated 
with SPE failure.15 
The first signs of the current crisis arose in the subprime mortgage 
market where delinquencies and defaults began to increase in the first half 
of 2007.  In June, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s began to 
downgrade structured debt backed by subprime mortgage securities.  This, 
in turn, led Bear Stearns to suspend redemptions in certain subprime 
investment funds it was managing, and later in July to liquidate two hedge 
funds that invested in subprime mortgage-backed securities.  By March 
2008, Bear Stearns was taken over by JPMorgan Chase in a deal brokered 
by the U.S. government.16 Throughout this period, subprime mortgage 
securities market values fell sharply as uncertainty increased about the 
ability of the structures to withstand higher levels of delinquency and 
default.17  These concerns were exacerbated when home prices began to fall 
in several major markets.18   
                                                                                                                 
14  Id. at 19-20.  
15  Id. at 56-58.  
16  For a detailed timeline of events, see The Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, The Financial Crisis: A Timeline of Events and Policy Actions, 
http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline. 
17  See, e.g., Roddy Boyd, How the Bear Stearns Deal Got Done, CNN 
MONEY.COM, Mar. 17, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/17/news/companies 
/boyd_bear.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2008031717.  See also, Economic 
Outlook Before the S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th 
Cong.  (2008) (statement of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke)  
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While much of the public attention was focused on “toxic assets”, 
the combination of declining asset values with high leverage and increasing 
uncertainty and risk aversion resulted in a rapid spread of the crisis 
throughout the global financial system.  Asset value declines forced 
institutions to deleverage initially by raising capital,19 but as raising capital 
became more difficult institutions were forced to deleverage by selling 
assets into markets dominated by sellers.20 Brunnermeier and Kashyap, 
Rajan, and Stein21 emphasize the role of deleveraging in asset price 
declines suggesting that deleveraging could trigger downward spirals as 
asset sales depress asset prices requiring further deleveraging. Further, 
Mark-to-Market22 rules could exacerbate a deleveraging based price spiral 
as financial institutions are forced to re-value assets in the face of rapid 
declines in asset prices and then due to Mark-to-Market rules must respond 
to those lower values with further deleveraging.  However, it is important 
to recognize that the falling prices of assets are not simply the result of 
                                                                                                                          
available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files. 
View&FileStore_id=5a34e5df-2de7-4c9b-a5a7-4f0893acd79e. 
18  See, e.g., Lee Christie, Home Prices See Another Record Plunge, CNN 
MONEY.COM, Oct. 28, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/10/28/real_estate/ 
August_Case_Shiller/index.htm.  See also Lee Christie, Home Prices in Record 
Decline, CNN MONEY.COM, Nov. 25, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/25/ 
real_estate/third_quarter_case_shiller/index.htm. 
19  GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 20.  
20  If a firm is levered 30:1 and experiences a 10% decline in value on 10% of 
its assets, its equity base declines by 30% and its leverage increases to more than 
40:1.  In order to return leverage to the original ratio of 30:1, it must sell close to 
one third of its assets.  
21  Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the 2007-08 Liquidity and Credit 
Crunch, 1 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 23, 77-100 (2009); Anil K., Kashyap, 
Raghuram G. Rajan, & Jeremy C. Stein, Rethinking Capital Regulation, Jackson 
Hole Symposium: “Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System” (2008), 
available at http://kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2008/KashyapRajanStein. 
03.12.09.pdf.   
22  Mark-to-Market is a way to measure assets and liabilities that appear on a 
company’s balance sheet and income statement that involves an attempt to measure 
companies’ assets and liabilities at fair or market value. For more detailed 
information, see SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF CHIEF ACCOUNTANT & DIV. 
OF CORP. FIN., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 133 OF 
THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: STUDY ON MARK-TO-
MARKET ACCOUNTING (2008) available at www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/
marktomarket123008.pdf. 
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psychology and forced sales, but also reflect declines in value due to 
greater economic uncertainty in general and/or a higher likelihood of 
extreme or tail events in the fundamental markets on which those assets 
draw their value. Further, even without a deleveraging price spiral, real 
declines in complex asset values such as subprime mortgage-backed 
securities could be exacerbated by a lemons problem where firms have 
private information on the quality of securities and sell the lowest quality 
assets as they deleverage.23     
The initial regulatory reaction focused on the immediate symptom 
– the freezing up of markets – by providing liquidity in the hope of 
stabilizing the markets by stimulating buyers of assets. In August 2007, the 
Federal Reserve publicly emphasized its intention to provide reserves as 
necessary to meet the needs of depository institutions,24 and then lowered 
the federal funds rate throughout the fall of 2007.  In December 2007, the 
Federal Reserve Board announced the creation of a Term Auction Facility 
(TAF) that would auction fixed amounts of term funds to depository 
institutions allowing those institutions to use a wide variety of assets 
including mortgage-backed securities as collateral. This action was 
followed by related efforts throughout the spring and summer of 2008 
including legislative authority to extend credit to the Government 
Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.25  These 
efforts proved to be ineffective in containing the crisis and repeated waves 
                                                                                                                 
23  See GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 15-23 for a general discussion of the 
deleveraging of financial institutions during this period.   
24  The Federal Reserve is often viewed as limiting the use of its discount 
window to meet reserve requirements by requiring detailed explanation for 
substantial requests. ROBERT E. HALL & JOHN B. TAYLOR, MACROECONOMICS: 
THEORY, PERFORMANCE, AND POLICY, 327 (2nd ed., 1988).  Banks usually meet 
this requirement via inter-bank lending. See OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1385.  Accordingly, this statement 
addressed the increasing illiquidity in inter-bank lending markets as indicated by 
an increasing London Inter-Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR).  Asani Sarkar, Liquidity 
Risk, Credit Risk, and the Federal Reserve’s Response to the Crisis. Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org 
/research/staff_reports/sr389.pdf.   
25  Credit was not granted prior to the GSEs being placed in receivership in 
September.  However, the recovery act passed in the summer of 2008 did authorize 
the U.S. Treasury Department to extend credit to the GSEs if necessary and was 
intended to improve the GSEs borrowing ability by increasing investor confidence.  
See Timeline, supra note 17.   
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of deleveraging asset sales simply led to further asset value declines and 
the need for additional deleveraging.  By the end of the summer of 2008, 
U.S. regulators shifted focus from providing liquidity and shoring up 
specific markets to working to preserve the solvency of financial 
institutions through the infusion of capital. Most notably, this shift was 
signaled by the U.S. Treasury Department proposed legislation to purchase 
“troubled assets” of financial institutions that was eventually passed by 
congress in October as the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Soon 
after passage, the plan to purchase “troubled assets” was abandoned and 
replaced by efforts to directly infuse capital into financial institutions 
through the purchase of preferred shares of stock.26     
Clearly leverage was a key element of the financial crisis and 
understanding the drivers that led to the sharp increase in leverage is 
critical for planning the future regulatory regime.27  HLR’s model of bank 
capital regulation provides useful insights.  First, consider entities such as 
investment banks, the two large mortgage GSEs and other non-depository 
financial institutions.  Most of the larger firms in this category had 
significant benefits from relationships with the federal government and 
arguably were protected by the “Too Big to Fail” principle. Such firms 
differ significantly from the purely private firms studied by Leland in that 
they benefit from an implicit government guarantee of liabilities due to the 
risk their failure would pose to the national economy.  This implicit 
guarantee meant that these institutions were similar in some respects to 
depository institutions in that they could issue debt at lower cost and with 
less market scrutiny than private firms. Significantly, however, there was 
                                                                                                                 
26  See id. 
27  As noted earlier, leverage cannot be singled out as the sole or even primary 
contributing factor.  Like a “perfect storm” several factors came together to create 
the financial crisis.  Low interest rates encouraged institutions and investors to seek 
out higher risk/higher return investment opportunities.  Technology enabled 
investment banks to quickly create and sell structured securities.  The global trade 
imbalances led to rapid growth of dollar balances in the portfolios of developing 
nations and as those investors sought out higher return investments they financed 
increased leverage by consumers and institutions in developed countries. Ethan 
Cohen-Cole et al., Looking Behind the Aggregates: A Reply to “Facts and Myths 
about the Financial Crisis of 2008” (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper 
No. QAU08-5, 2008) available at http://www.bos.frb.org/bankinfo/qau/wp/ 
2008/qau0805.pdf; V.V. Chari et al., Facts and Myths about the Financial Crisis 
of 2008 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Working Paper No. 666, 2008) 
available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/WP/WP666.pdf. 
2009] REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 255 
 
 
no direct mechanism for regulatory authorities to take control of these firms 
and wipe-out the equity holders’ claims if the firms’ operations became too 
risky, and therefore these firms did not face the direct threat to franchise 
value that HLR emphasize is essential to motivate maintaining a capital 
cushion.   
As discussed earlier, the two mortgage GSEs operated throughout 
the 2002-2007 period with essentially the minimum capital required by 
their regulator and returned excess capital to equity holders through 
dividends and share repurchases. The largest commercial banks (those with 
assets in excess of $10 billion) maintained an average total capital ratio of 
11.8% from 2001 through 2008 compared to the 12.3% average for all 
commercial banks, which is a substantial difference when compared to the 
10% standard for well-capitalized banks.  Many of the banks in this 
category might have viewed themselves as being too big to fail and were 
therefore willing to carry a smaller capital cushion.28  HLR points out that 
this behavior is entirely rational and predictable for owners of firms in their 
position.  The debt-favoring factors (tax-benefits and implicit insurance 
benefits) significantly outweigh the expected cost of lost franchise value 
when early intervention by a regulator is unlikely.  Thus, the optimal 
leverage for these firms lies above that implied by the capital standard and 
they rationally choose to hold no more capital than required.  In addition, 
these institutions were able to further circumvent regulation by using 
derivatives and special purpose subsidiaries of holding companies to 
undertake additional financial risk in ways that entailed less risk of early 
regulatory takeover and loss of franchise value. Further, while subject to 
capital regulations, neither bank holding companies nor investment banks 
are subject to statutory threat of receivership for violating capital standards 
under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA).29   
During a crisis that involves substantial deleveraging that is 
destabilizing markets, regulators may have an incentive not to enforce 
capital standards. Enforcing capital standards during a period of rapid asset 
price decline and thin securities markets will lead to additional asset sales 
exacerbating asset price declines.  As noted by HLR, it is the threat of 
receivership that causes financial institutions to hold a capital buffer, and 
those institutions will not hold a sufficient buffer if they know that 
                                                                                                                 
28  For data on commercial bank capital ratios, see Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, Statistics on Depository Institutions, http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/ 
index.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2009). 
29  GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 28-42. 
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regulators are unlikely to enforce capital standards during a financial 
crisis.30  PCA might be viewed as a reasonable policy to address this 
problem in that the government has committed to act when banks violate 
capital standards by placing a legislative mandate on bank regulators.31  
Finally, the HLR model suggests that an additional factor 
contributing to the trend toward higher leverage was diminished franchise 
value.  Franchise value has many different sources, but a common source is 
the restriction of competition.  In the last two decades, there has been a 
strong trend toward deregulation and the elimination of barriers to 
competition.  Before 1999, in the U.S. the Glass-Steagall Act limited 
competition between commercial banks and investment banks for the 
provision of certain financial services.  In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act reduced those barriers.  While increased competition may well lead to 
the elimination of excess profits and more competitive pricing of services, 
it also eliminates a factor that contributes to franchise value.32  In saying 
this, we are not attributing blame to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, but 
rather simply pointing out that regulators need to monitor all sources of 
franchise value and react appropriately.  The loss of franchise value due to 
increased competition domestically and globally might help explain the 
increasing levels of leverage and other risk taking behavior of well 
established financial institutions, such as the major investment banks and 
the mortgage GSEs, over the past decade as global competition, in the case 
                                                                                                                 
30  In game theory, this situation is known as a non-credible threat where an 
individual cannot commit to an action in the future (a priori) because all players 
know that the action will be irrational in the future (ex post). A standard solution in 
such situations is a commitment device that the player imposes on themselves 
requiring the action in the future even though irrational ex post. PRAJIT K. 
DUTTA, STRATEGIES AND GAMES: THEORY AND PRACTICE (M.I.T. Press 
1999).   
31  While a minority view, some have argued that the federal government is 
not enforcing PCA in violation of federal law during this crisis.  See Bill Moyer’s 
Journal, William K. Black on the Prompt Corrective Action Law, 
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/blog/2009/04/william_k_black_on_the_prompt
.html (April 6, 2009 8:28 EDT). 
32  For a discussion of how increased competition can reduce franchise value 
and increase risk taking by financial institutions, see Thomas F. Hellmann et al., 
Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital 
Requirements Enough?, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 147 (2000). 
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of investment banks, and an expanding subprime market, in the case of the 
GSEs, eroded the franchise values of those firms.33 
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY REFORM 
 
Recent actions to prevent the failure of many large financial 
institutions have significantly extended the “Too Big to Fail” umbrella and 
suggest an extension of the moral hazard problem well beyond the realm of 
depository institutions.  We believe an essential element of the new 
regulatory framework must include an effective method for dealing with 
this extension.  Based on our work, we believe a critical element of the new 
regulatory framework must be the implementation of substantive capital 
regulation for all large highly-levered financial institutions (i.e., all 
institutions “Too Big to Fail”). The U.S. Treasury Department’s recent 
legislative proposal to create a single regulator responsible for the capital 
regulation of systematically important firms provides a fairly simple and 
straightforward mechanism for accomplishing this goal.34  
Moreover, to achieve the appropriate incentive structure, regulators 
must have the clear authority to move quickly to takeover firms that violate 
those standards and wipe-out the shareholder equity claims.  Only by 
putting significant franchise value at risk will the capital standards provide 
the incentive for owners and managers to maintain excess capital 
appropriate to the unique risks of their firms.  As discussed earlier, we 
believe that it is not feasible to expect regulators to have as much detailed 
knowledge of a financial institution's investment strategies and risk 
exposure as the institution’s employees, and so it is important to have a 
regulatory system that causes the institutions themselves to maintain a 
capital cushion out of self-interest based their own mix of financial assets 
and risk exposure.   
A credible threat of receivership requires that regulators be 
committed to enforcing capital standards for large financial institutions in 
                                                                                                                 
33  See Bharat N. Anand et al., Does Competition Kill Relationships? Inside 
Investment Banking, December 2001, http://www.webmanager.cl/prontus_ 
cea/cea_2002/site/asocfile/ASOCFILE120030327160830.pdf.  
34  For a general outline of this proposal see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, Treasury Outlines Framework for Regulatory Reform (Mar. 26, 2009) 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/tg72.htm.  Also, for a 
discussion of non-legislative actions to tighten regulation of financial institutions, 
see Binyamin Appelbaum, Obama Administration Pushing for Regulatory Reform 
on Many Fronts, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2009, at A25. 
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the midst of serious financial turmoil. If large institutions believe that 
regulators will be unwilling to enforce capital regulations during major 
economic downturns they will not view the threat of receivership as 
credible.  Legislative requirements of Prompt Corrective Action or PCA is 
one possible commitment tool that might be imposed on “Too Big to Fail” 
institutions in order to create the proper incentives for these large financial 
institutions.   
At the same time, regulators must consider the implications of 
enforcing capital standards during economic crises on deleveraging and 
asset prices when designing policies for capital regulation.  During the 
crisis, financial institutions may not be able to raise capital and might be 
forced to sell assets further depressing asset values if capital regulation is 
strictly enforced. One solution to deleveraging is to actually take over the 
failed institution allowing regulators to hold onto assets until the market 
has stabilized much like the Resolution Trust Corporation did during the 
savings and loan crisis.35  Further, it may be very difficult to value assets in 
order to “Mark-to-Market” during these periods as a result of the lemons 
problem and/or very few trades in the asset markets. There are no clear 
solutions to the problem of marking assets to market during periods of 
financial turmoil, but at a minimum we believe that “Mark-to-Market” 
should be based on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).36 
Further, the new regulatory framework must be comprehensive and 
flexible enough to adapt to changing financial instruments.  For example, 
we must avoid the problem of basing capital standards on balance sheet 
assets and liabilities while institutions use off balance sheet derivatives to 
take on equivalent risks.  Compartmentalizing regulatory authority based 
on type of instrument will provide institutions tempting opportunities for 
circumventing the intent of the regulation.  However, recognizing that no 
regulatory scheme can keep ahead of the market in terms of security design 
just re-emphasizes the importance of a regulatory capital scheme that 
                                                                                                                 
35  The Resolution Trust Corporation was created by the federal government 
during the savings and loan crisis in order to hold and dispose of assets of 
insolvent thrifts. Lee Davidson, Politics and Policy: The Creation of the 
Resolution Trust Corporation, 17(2) FDIC BANKING REV. 17 (2005). 
36  During the savings and loan crisis, S&L’s were subject to Regulatory 
Accounting Principles rather than GAAP.  In May 1987, the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board began phasing in the use of GAAP in response to concerns that 
regulatory accounting principles had contributed to the crisis.  See Federal 
Department Insurance Corporation, The S&L Crisis: A Chrono-Bibliography, 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/Historical/s&l/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).  
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provides incentives for firm managers themselves to assess the risk of new 
securities and provide a sufficient capital cushion against future shocks. 
Finally, the new framework should provide that when capital 
standards are violated, unsecured debt holders are not necessarily fully 
protected as they have been in the current crisis.  Properly motivated, 
unsecured, debt holders can provide significant market discipline to an 
institution.  Throughout the public debate over “bailing out” various firms, 
most attention has been given to the fact that in some cases the owners 
have retained a valuable equity stake (e.g., Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, 
Countrywide and AIG) and managers have received significant bonuses 
(famously, AIG).37  However, little attention has been placed on the fact 
that in most cases, debt holders were the major beneficiaries of the bailouts.  
The government intervention and apparent willingness to fund future 
operating losses via further infusions of capital provides assurance of 
payment in full to debt holders.38  Regulators should have powers similar to 
those of a bankruptcy court to impose modifications to unsecured debt 
contracts to avoid such windfalls and in fact to impose a share of the loss 
on unsecured debt holders so that debt holders will have an incentive to 
monitor and assess the investment and financial decisions of large, highly 
levered financial institutions.   
Finally, because franchise value plays such an important role in 
encouraging prudent managerial choices, the new regulatory framework 
must be prepared to react to market developments that affect franchise 
value.  Global competition, domestic and international tax policies, 
technological changes and regulatory changes all have the potential to 
erode franchise value.  Clearly, concerns about financial institution 
franchise value cannot and should not drive policy in these areas.  
However, regulators need to be cognizant that financial institution 
managers will rationally react to declines in franchise value by taking on 
additional risk.  Capital standards and regulatory monitoring activities need 
to reflect this reality. 
                                                                                                                 
37  David Goldman, AIG Bonuses: $235 Million To Go, CNN MONEY.COM, 
July 10, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/10/news/companies/aig_bonuses/ 
index.htm.  
38  For example, the first business day after the mortgage GSEs were placed in 
receivership, the market value of GSE debt and MBS securities jumped 
significantly providing a windfall profit to recent purchasers.   
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PREDATORY LENDING AND ITS INSURANCE 
CONSEQUENCES  
 
Erin O’Leary * 
 
*** 
This note distinguishes predatory from subprime lending, while focusing on 
the insurance consequences of predatory lending.  It considers how single 
premium credit insurance (SPCI) and private mortgage insurance (PMI), 
two mortgage-related insurance products, have affected the current 
predatory lending crisis.  This note argues for reform that eliminates SPCI 
and makes PMI a more feasible option for insureds.  Such reform would 
allow subprime lenders to offer mortgages to qualified borrowers, while 
reducing the amount of predatory lending and foreclosures.  The 
introduction of this note presents some background information regarding 
subprime lending and predatory lending.  The second part examines 
several issues concerning the role of insurance in the subprime mortgage 
market.  Third, reform measures necessary to alleviate the issues with 
mortgage insurance are discussed.  Finally, the fourth section studies 
recent actions by the Federal Reserve Board and analyzes whether they 
can be expected to bring meaningful change.  It concludes that, although 
the Fed’s new regulations are a step in the right direction, there needs to 
be an outright ban of SPCI and predatory must be stopped completely.  
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is no question that a crisis is gripping the subprime market.  
As of January 2009, 1.5 million homes had been lost to subprime 
foreclosure.1  Another two million subprime mortgage holders are currently 
                                                                                                                 
*  University of Connecticut School of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate for the 
Class of 2010.  The author wishes to thank John McGrath for his assistance and 
topical expertise. 
1  SONIA GARRISON ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, CONTINUED 
DECAY AND SHAKY REPAIRS: THE STATE OF SUBPRIME LOANS TODAY 2–3 (2009), 
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-
analysis/continued_decay_and_shaky_repairs.pdf. 
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delinquent.2  The fallout from the crumbling subprime market affects not 
only subprime borrowers but also their communities.3  The crisis has turned 
“subprime” into a dirty word.  Many Americans have heard enough on the 
news to know that this type of lending is largely to blame for the credit 
crisis.  However, the subprime market has valid and socially valuable 
applications; thus, before one can identify the most troubled areas of the 
mortgage industry in order to aim reform measures at these problem spots, 
the critical distinction one must draw is between subprime and predatory 
lending, which represents only a narrow but dangerous sliver of the 
subprime market.   
There is a legitimate need for subprime lending.  Not all borrowers 
can qualify for prime loans, typically because of a negative credit event in 
their history or because they lack the cash for a down payment.4  Loan 
qualification is typically based on credit scores, as calculated by the Fair 
Isaac Credit Organization (FICO).  Some examples of negative credit 
events that would disqualify a borrower from prime-rate loans include a 
history of default, bankruptcy, or low or no credit.  Such borrowers are 
considered to present too great a risk of delinquency, default, or foreclosure 
to justify the prime rate.  Nevertheless, there is a strong policy argument in 
the United States for enabling as many people as possible to become 
homeowners.  Therefore, in order for these somewhat risky borrowers to 
become homeowners, they may need to resort to other types of loans.  
These loans are usually considered subprime.  There is no one accepted 
                                                                                                                 
2  Id.  
3  The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) estimates that because of what 
is known as the “spillover effect,” subprime foreclosures will drain properties 
surrounding foreclosed homes of nearly $352 billion in value from 40 million 
nearby families, averaging out to almost $9,000 per family. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE 
LENDING, UPDATED PROJECTIONS OF SUBPRIME FORECLOSURES IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND THEIR IMPACT ON HOME VALUES AND COMMUNITIES 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-
analysis /updated-foreclosure-and-spillover-brief-8-18.pdf..  These estimates were 
made in August 2008 and update an earlier study made in January 2008 that was 
considered “wildly pessimistic” in its estimate of a $202 billion loss in neighboring 
home values and an average loss of $5,000 for 40 million nearby families.  See 
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SUBPRIME SPILLOVER: FORECLOSURES COST 
NEIGHBORS $202 BILLION; 40.6 MILLION HOMES LOSE $5,000 ON AVERAGE 1 
(2008) available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-
analysis/subprime-spillover.pdf 
4  David Anderson, The Subprime Lending Crisis, 71 TEX. B.J. 20 (2008). 
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definition of subprime, but it is generally thought to encompass this 
category of loans made to borrowers whose backgrounds make them a 
riskier investment for lenders.  
Because these borrowers present an increased risk to the lender, the 
terms of the loans they receive are generally less favorable than those 
offered to prime borrowers.5  For example, 70% of subprime loans come 
with a prepayment penalty, while only 2% of prime loans do.6  Subprime 
loans also tend to have higher fees than their prime counterparts.  Most 
subprime loans have interest rates that change, usually with little 
predictability as to the direction or magnitude of the change.  Additionally, 
prime loans tend to be similar from lender to lender, facilitating 
comparison.  Subprime loans are considered by Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac to be non-conforming loans and tend to vary widely among 
originators.  A higher annual percentage rate (APR) is the price that 
subprime borrowers must pay in order for the lender to take on the risk of 
the borrower defaulting, going into delinquency, or being forced to 
surrender his home to foreclosure.   
Subprime loans have been increasing in popularity at a rapid pace.  
In 2003, just 8% of all mortgage originations were subprime loans.  By 
2006, that figure had jumped to 28%.7  Several factors contributed to this 
rise.  One important example is the recent housing bubble.  Soaring home 
                                                                                                                 
5  See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The 
Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1265–66 (2002). 
(explaining the costs that justify higher rates and fees for subprime loans).  It is 
important to note that many of the costs that justify higher costs and fees, such as a 
more thorough review of a customer’s income and credit, lower loan principal 
amounts that lead to higher origination costs as a percentage of the total loan, and 
higher incidence of prepayment, are much lower in predatory loans, if they exist at 
all.  For example, predatory lenders often fail to verify a customer’s income, debt 
obligations, and assets before making a loan, thereby erasing most of the cost of 
income verification.  See id.   
6  CRL, A SNAPSHOT OF THE SUBPRIME MARKET 1–3 (2007), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/tools-resources/snapshot-of-
the-subprime-market.pdf..  That number is probably low; Professors Engel and 
McCoy estimate that at least 98% of subprime home loans contain “substantial 
prepayment penalties.”  Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1285.   
7  CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 6, at 2.   
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values reassured lenders that if the properties for which they were issuing 
mortgages would at the very least retain their value.8 
Predatory lending, on the other hand, has no legitimate basis.  The 
vast majority of predatory loans occur in mortgages that would otherwise 
be considered subprime.  While subprime lenders have a legitimate 
argument that they must increase the fees and rates associated with their 
products in order to hedge against the increased risk of default presented by 
borrowers with less than ideal credit, predatory lending practices have no 
place in the world of legitimate loans.  They are characterized by practices 
that strip homeowners of the equity they have in their properties extract as 
much in fees, rates, and other charges as possible from the homeowner. 
The subprime lending crisis has had obvious and devastating 
ramifications for millions of subprime borrowers.  There have also been 
less apparent consequences for the insurance industry.  This industry has 
become closely intertwined with the mortgage industry.  As the problems 
in the subprime market have become exacerbated, so too have the problems 
in mortgage-related insurance products.  This paper considers how two 
mortgage-related insurance products, namely, single premium credit 
insurance (SPCI) and private mortgage insurance (PMI), have affected the 
predatory lending crisis.  I contend that through reform measures that 
eliminate SPCI and make PMI a more feasible option, the subprime lending 
market can continue to offer mortgages to qualified subprime borrowers 
while simultaneously reducing the tide of predatory lending and 
foreclosures.9  
In Part II of this Note, I examine two issues concerning the role of 
insurance in the subprime mortgage market.  The first is the declining 
centrality of the role played by providers of private mortgage insurance 
(PMI) to insure many subprime mortgages.  I will explain the effect that 
predatory lending has had on legitimate PMI policy providers.  The second 
issue is the abuse of credit insurance in subprime mortgage loans.  In 
particular, I will focus on how single premium credit insurance functions as 
one of the more abusive terms that predatory lenders employ.  I will also 
explore the related nature of these two problems.  Moreover, I will provide 
a brief synopsis of some of the most common abusive tactics used by 
                                                                                                                 
8  See Christopher Barlow, Developments in Banking & Financial Law, 2006-
2007: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Macroeconomic Implications of the 
Subprime Lending Crisis, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 57, 57–58 (2008).   
9  This paper considers primarily legislation-based reform rather than 
litigation.  
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predatory lenders that have led to the complications that the mortgage 
industry is facing today.  
In Part III, I discuss the reform measures that will be necessary to 
alleviate the problems related to mortgage insurance.  I will also focus on 
two reform measures: first, the Federal Reserve Board’s newly finalized 
amendments to Regulation Z, which implements the Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA) and the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA); and 
second, H.R. 3915, or the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending 
Act of 2007, which was approved by the House but was never voted on by 
the Senate.  Additionally, I suggest that PMI is an important product that 
can be used to stem the tide of foreclosures because of the mutual interests 
shared by borrowers and insurers.  
Part IV examines whether the Fed’s new amendments to 
Regulation Z can be expected to bring meaningful change and explores 
what other measures must be taken in order to stop predatory lending for 
good, including the effect that H.R. 3915 would have if re-introduced in the 
next session of Congress.  
 
II. MORTGAGE-RELATED INSURANCE PROBLEMS IN THE 
SUBPRIME AND PREDATORY LENDING CONTEXT 
 
A. PRIVATE MORTGAGE INSURANCE10  
 
1.  Overview 
 
A private mortgage insurance (PMI) policy is one that protects the 
lender by paying the costs of foreclosing and guaranteeing a certain portion 
of the debt; in most cases, that portion is 20 per cent11.  PMI is the only 
                                                                                                                 
10  There are multiple types of PMI, but the type that is the focus of this article 
is primary PMI, which protects against mortgage default.  PMI in this article is 
used to refer to primary PMI.  Other kinds of PMI not discussed in this article 
include pool insurance, which insures groups of individual mortgages and provides 
100 per cent coverage for any default losses on mortgages in the pool, subject to a 
total loss limit on all mortgages in the pool, and PMI reinsurance. Quinton 
Johnstone, Private Mortgage Insurance, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 783 
(2004). 
11  OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, Answers About Credit 
Insurance, http://www.helpwithmybank.gov/faqs/insurance_credit_life.html.  
Policies that pay 20-30% of the amount of the outstanding debt typically allow 
lenders to retain title to the property after foreclosure.  Mortgage INSURANCE 
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type of mortgage insurance that lenders can require before making a loan.12  
Often, a potential borrower cannot afford a 20 per cent down payment on a 
home mortgage.13  On the other hand, most lenders are hesitant to make 
such a loan because these borrowers tend to have a higher risk of 
defaulting.  PMI has served a conciliatory function and permitted these 
individuals to become homeowners, while alleviating the fears of lenders.14   
Not only is the PMI industry regulated at the state level by laws 
that vary from state to state15, but also in part by the federal Homeowner 
Protection Act of 1998, which took effect on July 29, 1999.16  If PMI is 
required as a condition for a mortgage, this statute protects homeowners by 
requiring both automatic cancellation of the PMI and notice of cancellation 
rights with respect to PMI.17  For borrowers with good payment history 
who are current on their mortgage payments and who can show that the 
property has not declined below its original value, the PMI can be 
cancelled on a predetermined cancellation date.18  This date typically 
occurs when the balance of the mortgage reaches 80 per cent, which occurs 
by the borrower making sufficient payments of principal on the mortgage, 
through appreciation in the value of the property value, or a combination of 
both.19  High risk loans are exceptions, however: lenders must give 
                                                                                                                          
COMPANIES OF AMERICA, FACT BOOK (2008-09), available at 
http://www.privatemi.com/news/factsheets/2008-2009.pdf. 
12  Id.  
13  SAN FRANCISCO FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, PRIVATE MORTGAGE 
INSURANCE (2008).   
14  Id.  
15  Johnstone, supra note 11, at 802-03. Although all states impose their own 
financial requirements on PMI companies doing business within their borders, 
there are several similar requirements: all states have substantial reserve 
requirements, including  contingency reserves, loss reserves, and unearned 
premium reserves.  Id. at 813-14.  Many have paid-in capital and paid-in surplus 
requirements.  Id. at 814.  Some require that the risk to capital ratio does not 
exceed a certain threshold; for example, it must not be greater than 25:1.  Id. at 
815.  Most also restrict the kinds of investments that PMI companies can make and 
require that master policies of PMI companies be filed for approval with the state’s 
regulatory authority.  Id. at 815-16.   
16  12 U.S.C.A. §§ 4902-4903.   
17  47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury § 515 Homeowners Protection Act (2008).  
18  Id.  
19  WILLIAM F. GALVIN, SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASSACHUSETTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON PRIVATE MORTGAGE INSURANCE 
 
2009] PREDATORY LENDING 267 
 
 
borrowers notice of the automatic cancellation provisions, which state that 
while PMI may be cancelled when the borrower has reached 20 per cent 
equity, it must be cancelled by the lender when the loan reaches 22 per cent 
equity or 78 per cent of the loan outstanding.20  The statute also requires 
that, at the time the home is purchased, the lender must give written notice 
of when the borrower may cancel PMI.21 
The impact of the subprime crisis is becoming more apparent, as 
well as the effect on PMI providers.  Most prime lenders require PMI when 
the loan-to-value ratio is 80 per cent.22  This helps to ensure that if the 
borrower is forced into foreclosure, the lender will not lose the difference 
between the selling price and the balance on the loan as well as the 
foreclosure fees.23  If the borrower does default, the insurance policy pays 
out 20 per cent of the loan amount and the bank can recoup the rest through 
the foreclosure sale. PMI insurers are left holding the bag if borrowers 
default early into their mortgages.   
The subprime crisis has caused two central problems for PMI 
providers: loss of market share and significant financial losses.  First, at the 
height of subprime lending in 2005 and 2006, PMI providers lost 
significant market share. With the relatively new risk-spreading maneuver 
known as the 80-10-10 or "piggyback loan", a buyer could finance enough 
of the purchase price such that the first mortgage holder would not require 
PMI, discussed infra. 24  Borrowers sought to avoid PMI for a variety of 
reasons.  Until recently, PMI could not be used as a tax writeoff, but the 
                                                                                                                          
AND THE FEDERAL HOMEOWNER PROTECTION ACT OF 1998, available at 
http://www.sec.state.ma.us/cis/cispmi/pmiidx.htm. 
20  Id. 
21  12 U.S.C.A. § 4902-4903.  
22  SAN FRANCISCO FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, supra note 14. 
23  NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, COMMENTS TO THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE BOARD’S PROPOSED REVISIONS TO REGULATION Z TRUTH IN LENDING 
REGARDING PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS PREDATORY MORTGAGE LENDING (Mar. 9, 
2001). 
24  Patrick Rucker, Subprime crisis will boost mortgage insurers, REUTERS, 
Aug. 23, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/gc06/idUSN226325 
9520070823 (acknowledging the loss in market share experienced by PMI 
companies, but predicting that those mortgage insurers who can “weather” the 
current financial crisis will be in a good position to regain market share).  
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piggyback loan did.25Also, PMI is paid for and maintained by the borrower, 
thus adding an obvious cost to the loan.26  For many borrowers, this cost 
can be especially difficult to swallow because PMI is not first party 
insurance; rather, it is in place to protect the lender.  By contrast, the costs 
of piggyback lending are more subtle, such as higher interest rates. 
Additionally, underwriting standards employed by PMI companies tend to 
be much stricter than those used by piggyback lenders.27 As I will explain, 
this is due in part becausePMI companies and borrowers share a unity of 
interest that simply does not exist between brokers of piggyback loans and 
their borrowers. 
An 80-10-10 loan is actually two loans: one is a first-lien mortgage 
on the property that covers 80 per cent of the purchase price.  The second 
loan is, in most cases, a ten per cent loan that covers part of the remaining 
20 per cent so that the borrower does not have to purchase PMI.28  Thus, 
with the increase in predatory loans in the past five years, the mortgage 
industry has seen a concurrent increase in 80-10-10 loans.  Because the 80-
10-10 loan is a tool invented in part to avoid PMI, it is easy to see how a 
sharp increase in its usage would translate into decreased profits for PMI 
providers.29  As an illustration of this point, piggyback loans were virtually 
nonexistent in 2000, but by 2006 about 22% of owner-occupied houses had 
piggyback subordinate lien mortgages, and the number and dollar volume 
                                                                                                                 
25  See Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort & Glenn B. Canner, The 2006 
HMDA Data, 93 Fed. Reserve Bulletin A73, A84-A85 (2007), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2007/pdf/hmda06final.pdf. 
26  Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law & Economics of 
Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 42 (2009). 
27  Id.  
28  While most prime loans require PMI if the borrower puts less than 20 per 
cent down, many subprime lenders, although they are willing to lend to customers 
who cannot put very much down, will demand either PMI or some other type of 
credit insurance if the borrower is not able to put down 25 or even up to 30 per 
cent.  NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, INC., supra note 24. 
29  Id.  Private mortgage insurers have recognized the threat to their product 
that is posed by this 80-10-10 or “piggyback” loan.  On the website of the 
Mortgage Insurance Companies of America (MICA), an industry organization, 
there is an entire section dedicated to warning consumers of the dangers of this 
type of loan.  See MICA, QUICK FACTS ABOUT 80-10-10 LOANS (2009), 
http://www.privatemi.com/news/factsheets/quickfacts.cfm; see also MICA, 
MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT PIGGYBACK LOANS (2009), 
http://www.privatemi.com/news/factsheets/myths.cfm.   
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of piggyback loans had risen dramatically during that period.30  By 
contrast, the number of homes purchased backed by PMI declined about 
6% from 2005 to 2006 alone.31   
The second major problem that predatory lending has created for 
PMI companies is an unprecedented financial loss.32  Traditionally, PMI 
has been relatively inexpensive,33 for the simple reason that people tend to 
have tremendous incentives and motivation to pay off their home mortgage 
loans.34  However, as predatory lending creates an increasing number of 
dangerous loans whose terms quickly become unaffordable, mortgages are 
entering foreclosure at unprecedented rates.   
It became clear that many subprime loans were dangerous 
investments and carried with them a high risk of borrower default, and 
providers shied away from them.  Insurers who had issued policies for any 
of these predatory loans suddenly found themselves paying claims on the 
policies at rapidly increasing rate.   
Most PMI companies did not want to be associated with predatory 
lending, particularly as it became an increasingly well-known phenomenon.  
Moreover, because predatory lending often leaves a borrower with a loan 
that he or she cannot afford, from a business standpoint, these loans were 
much more likely to result in default and to trigger a payout.  Now, several 
insurers have publicly refused to insure loans with certain characteristics.35  
Many of these are characteristics that often lead commentators to label 
loans as “predatory.”36 
An examination into the evolution of underwriting standards of 
PMI companies reveals their scramble to limit their losses and regain 
financial stability.  For example, Genworth Mortgage Insurance has issued 
statements explaining that, as a response to predatory lending, it will not 
insure loans that have excessive fees and costs, prepayment penalties 
without a correlating borrower benefit, a history of repetitive financing 
                                                                                                                 
30  Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 27.   
31  Id.  
32  Vikas Bajaj, More Lenders Feeling Pain from Defaults, N.Y. TIMES, July 
31, 2007. 
33  Bankrate.com, The Basics of Private Mortgage Insurance (June 1, 2001), 
http://www.bankrate.com /brm/news/mtg/20010601b.asp (last visited July 19, 
2009).  
34  Brian M. Heat, Note, Hoosier Inhospitality: Examining Excessive 
Foreclosure Rates in Indiana, 39 IND. L. REV. 87, 100-01 (2005).   
35  Id.  
36  See § 2.a.ii, infra; see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 6, at 1260. 
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(“flipping”), or SPCI attached to the loan.37  The policy in place at the 
Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation (“MGIC”) is very similar to 
Genworth’s.38  A series of updates and changes to the underwriting policies 
of the Radian Guaranty, Inc. reflect the company’s progression toward 
increasingly strict standards.  The first major change to Radian’s guidelines 
became effective on September 17, 2007 and eliminated some of the more 
obviously dangerous practices, such as the Radian 103% LTV program, 
which presumably insured loans that were made for up to 103% of the 
value of the property.39 Effective February 1, 2008, the maximum LTV 
ratio for subprime loans became 95%.40  Effective March 31, 2008, the 
minimum credit score for a subprime loan was raised to 660, and interest 
only loans as well as cash-out refinances became ineligible for insurance.41  
Radian’s increasingly strict guidelines provides an effective illustration of 
how the fallout from the subprime crisis became slowly apparent to PMI 
companies over a period of time.   
Mortgage-related insurance products and predatory lending are 
inextricably intertwined in that as long as predatory lenders continue to 
make extremely high-cost loans that are likely to cause borrower default, 
PMI providers will continue to be reluctant to insure these policies because 
of the likelihood that they will have to pay out the policy.  PMI providers 
have identified several practices that are associated with predatory lenders 
and, for reasons both practical and ethical, they often refuse to insure any 
loans with some of the following properties.   
 
 
                                                                                                                 
37  See GENWORTH MORTGAGE INSURANCE, POLICY STATEMENT ON 
“PREDATORY” LENDING (2008), http://www.mortgageinsurance.genworth.com/ 
Legal/PredatoryLendingGuidelines.aspx (discussing practices that will cause the 
company to refuse to insure the loan in which the practices are found). 
38  MORTGAGE GUARANTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, ANTI-PREDATORY 
LENDING POLICY (2008), http://www.mgic.com/emergingmkts/antipredatory 
lending.html. 
39 eBulletin from Radian Guaranty, Inc. (Aug. 28, 2007), 
http://www.radian.biz/pdf/EBULLETIN%202007-02%20GUIDELINE%20 
CHANGES%20EFFECTIVE%2009-17-07%20Final.pdf.  Because the program is 
no longer available, Radian does not thoroughly explain it anywhere.   
40 eBulletin from Radian Guaranty, Inc. 2 (Dec. 17, 2007), 
http://www.radian.biz/pdf/ Radian%20eBulletin%202007-03.pdf.  
41 eBulletin from Radian Guaranty, Inc. 2 (Mar. 7, 2008), 
http://www.radian.biz/pdf/ Radian%20eBulletin%202008-02.pdf. 
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2.  Characteristics of Predatory Loans 
 
a. Lack of Verification 
 
No-income, no-asset (NINA) loans have gained notoriety as a 
significant cause of the subprime crisis, and rightfully so.  Brokers were so 
eager to generate loans that they offered mortgages while requiring little to 
no documentation of a borrower’s income, job, assets, or other 
obligations,42 and they did so at a startling rate: it is estimated that as of 
2007, up to half of all subprime mortgages made between 2004 and 2006 
had been made without fully documented income.43  Thus, even if they 
wanted to, brokers could not ensure that these borrowers would be able to 
meet their monthly payments, particularly when the initial low “teaser” rate 
reset to a much higher rate.44 
These practices are all harmful to borrowers but often have almost 
no cost to the brokers and, to a lesser degree, to the lenders.  Once the 
broker sells the mortgage on behalf of the lender, often earning a sizeable 
kickback for doing so, he is no longer responsible for servicing the loan, or 
collecting on the payments each month.  Therefore, a broker has no interest 
in ensuring that a borrower can actually make the loan payments.  Rather, 
the broker’s main interest is in maximizing his own profit, which is best 
accomplished by selling loans at higher rates than the borrower qualifies 
for and by including prepayment penalties.  These are both actions that loan 
originators reward with a kickback.45  Sometimes, brokers are even 
rewarded with a commission if the borrower refinances and incurs the 
prepayment penalty. 
The loan originators themselves often have no more incentive to 
write affordable loans than do the brokers.  Most lenders bundle these loans 
into mortgage-backed securities and sell them on the secondary market.46   
Some retain servicing rights, but others sell these rights, leaving them with 
virtually no exposure if the borrower defaults.  This resale of the mortgage 
                                                                                                                 
42  AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS, AARP COMMENTS TO 
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD ON THE HOME OWNERSHIP AND EQUITY PROTECTION 
ACT (Aug. 15, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS 
/2007/August/20070816/OP-1288/OP-1288_51_1.pdf. 
43  Center for Responsible Lending, supra note 7.  
44  See infra § II.a.ii.2.   
45  See infra § II.a.ii.7 
46  See Engel & McCoy, supra note 6, at 1273-74.  
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bundles serves two crucial functions: it gets the mortgages off of the 
originator’s books and also provides an inflow of capital so the originator 
can continue to make loans.47  Secondary market purchasers of these 
securities were unable to inspect the individual loans underlying the 
securities they were purchasing.  The securities, however, were rated 
investment-grade for the most part by the ratings agencies and were 
thought to be safe investments because they were diverse and because it 
was thought that with their homes at stake, borrowers would generally not 
default.  Even if one or two failed, investors reasoned, the rest of the 
portfolio would be sound.  When they failed in large numbers, the so-called 
“subprime crisis” ensued.   
However, unlike most brokers or lenders, PMI companies have a 
strong interest in their insured’s ability to repay his or her mortgage.  The 
company will have to pay a claim on the policy if the borrower does not 
repay; thus, it is in the company’s best interest to fully investigate a 
borrower's ability to repay the loan.  The requirement that a customer 
document his or her ability to repay is now well-reflected in the 
underwriting standards of PMI companies.48 
 
b.  “Exploding” Adjustable Rate Mortgages 
 
Many predatory loans are advertised at a very low introductory or 
“teaser” rate.49  Frequently, advertisements claim that the loan is at a low 
fixed rate.   What these advertisements do not always disclose, however, is 
that once the introductory period, which typically lasts no more than two to 
three years, is over, an estimated 90% of these mortgages suddenly switch 
to some type of adjustable rate mortgage.50  On a 2/28, which is a 30-year 
mortgage whose rate is fixed only for the first two years and then 
adjustable for the next 28, a borrower’s monthly payments will increase by, 
on average, 30 to 50 percent in the first month of the third year, hence the 
                                                                                                                 
47  See id.  
48  See, e.g., RADIAN GUARANTY, INC., UNDERWRITING GUIDELINES, 6-7, 10-
11 (2009), available at http://www.radian.biz/pdf/Radian_Standard_Guidelines_ 
08_17_09.pdf. 
49  CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 7, at 1-2, 4. 
50  Id. at 1. These adjustable rate mortgages typically float in relation to an 
index like the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), but subprime borrowers 
often pay a premium over the rate that prime borrowers would pay for a similar 
product.  Anderson, supra note 5, at 20.   
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term “exploding.”51  Sometimes, a loan is structured as an optional 
adjustable rate mortgage, which gives a borrower flexibility in the amount 
he wants to pay on his mortgage each month.  These can end up being 
devastating for the borrower, however: at times, a borrower may be 
permitted to pay less than the monthly interest rate each month, thereby 
actually adding to his principal.  This is a process known as negative 
amortization.52   
 
c. Excessive Fees 
 
Predatory loans virtually always come with numerous fees, deftly 
packaged into the loan such that a typical borrower would have a difficult 
time spotting them.53  Up until now HOEPA has structured its definition of 
“high cost mortgages” such that lenders could avoid falling within 
HOEPA’s regulations simply by hiding large fees in their mortgages rather 
than simply increasing the interest rate.54  One of the most onerous and 
frequently used of these fees is the prepayment penalty. 
 
d. Prepayment Penalties   
 
A prepayment penalty is a provision of the mortgage contract that 
states that if the borrower pays off the loan entirely or in part, either 
through payments against the principal or, as is more common, through 
refinancing, the borrower will incur a penalty.  Penalties are usually 
expressed as a percentage of the mortgage balance at the time of 
prepayment or alternatively as a set number of months’ worth of interest, 
                                                                                                                 
51  CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 7, at 2.  While the average 
increase in rate is only 30 to 50 per cent, a loan resetting from 7 to 12 per cent 
would cause the borrower’s payments to increase by 70 per cent.  See Id.  
52  Engel & McCoy, supra note 6, at 1263.  See also Mincey v. World Sav. 
Bank, FSB, 614 F. Supp. 2d 610, 635-638  (D. S.C. 2008) (holding that where a 
lender violated TILA where he failed to disclose that if a borrower chose to pay off 
his mortgage as an option-ARM, it would cause negative amortization).  
53  These fees greatly exceed the amounts justified by the costs of the services 
provided and the credit and interest rate risks involved.  David Reiss, Subprime 
Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish in the 
Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 999 (2006). 
54  See CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 7, at 1-3.  
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and can easily total five percent of the principal balance of the loan.55  The 
penalties usually can only be invoked in the first part of a loan, i.e. within 
the first four or five years.  Brokers defend these particular penalties with 
the argument that by applying a prepayment penalties, lenders are willing 
to lower the interest rate because they are more confident that the borrower 
will not prepay, such as through a cash-out refinance.  Thus, contend 
brokers, because of the lower interest rate, there is a net benefit to 
borrowers.  However, research indicates that even where lenders do lower 
the interest rate on mortgage with prepayment penalties, the difference is 
made up in added fees, evidencing a lack of correlation between the penalty 
and the purported savings to the consumer.  Instead, the cost of the penalty 
to the average borrower is three to four times the average savings in interest 
payments.56 
Prepayment penalties are particularly troublesome for borrowers in 
two situations.  First, if a borrower has successfully improved his credit 
score such that he now qualifies for a better loan at a prime rate, he invokes 
a prepayment penalty.  Those borrowers who cannot afford to pay the 
penalty- and there are many- feel they have no choice but to stay with their 
current mortgages.57  Many subprime lenders market their product as a loan 
that a borrower can use while he or she tries to improve his credit rating 
such that he can qualify for a prime loan.  Given the fact that prepayment 
penalties lock a consumer into the loan, this claim seems ironic at best and 
downright fraudulent at worst.58  If the borrower chooses to refinance, he 
incurs a large penalty for doing so.  In the words of the Center for 
Responsible Lending, the borrower incurs “punishment for obtaining a 
better loan.”59 
The second situation in which prepayment penalties become 
onerous for borrowers occurs when the mortgage “explodes” at the end of 
the introductory period.  The borrower abruptly finds himself owing on 
                                                                                                                 
55  A typical prepayment penalty would be six month’s interest, or about 4.5 
per cent of the initial loan balance.  Supra note 45, at 5.  This translates into 
thousands of additional dollars required for refinancing.  Id.   
56  Id.  
57  DEBBIE GOLDSTEIN & STACY STROHAUER SON, CRL, WHY PREPAYMENT 
PENALTIES ARE ABUSIVE IN SUBPRIME HOME LOANS 1, 4 (2003), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-
analysis/PPP_Policy_Paper2.pdf. 
58  See id.  
59  Id.   
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average 30 to 50 percent more each month than he did previously.60  Faced 
with this financial burden, many borrowers attempt to refinance their loan.  
However, in doing so, they incur the prepayment penalty.  Many can’t 
afford to pay the penalty and so are forced to remain in the mortgage.  For 
others, the original lender offers to reduce the prepayment penalty in 
exchange for an agreement to refinance with the same lender.  The 
prepayment penalty is then added to the principal, along with other fees 
charged by the lender for refinancing, and the borrower’s principal 
increases.   
This tactic is used almost exclusively in subprime loans: 70% of 
subprime loans have prepayment penalties, while less than two per cent of 
prime loans have them.61  This is partially fueled by lenders who pay a 
premium to brokers who can pad a loan with a high prepayment penalty.62 
 
e. Equity Stripping & Loan Flipping  
 
One of the most prevalent practices among predatory lenders is 
equity stripping.  Equity stripping can take many forms, but in the context 
of mortgage lending the method of choice for accomplishing this is known 
as loan flipping.63  When one of these mortgages becomes onerous or 
unaffordable for the borrower, the lender is quick to offer the opportunity 
to refinance repeatedly and at short intervals.64  The borrower incurs a large 
prepayment penalty, described below, as well as other fees in addition to 
the penalty.  These costs usually get added to the principal and the 
borrower begins paying interest on the fees themselves.65  Some lenders 
increase the fees every time they refinance.  With each refinancing, the 
lenders pocket more in fees and the borrower’s equity dwindles.  
                                                                                                                 
60  See Ctr. for Responsible Lending, supra note 6, at 2. 
61  Id.  Prepayment penalties have been limited in the prime market because of 
better competition among lenders.  Id.  But see Engel & McCoy, supra note 6, at 
1285 (estimating that at least 98% of subprime loans contain substantial 
prepayment penalties).   
62  See infra § II.a.6; William F. Bennett, Mortgage Brokers Get Fatter 
Payoffs for Selling Riskier Loans, NORTH COUNTY TIMES, May 5, 2007 
(considering the case of California mortgage brokers who are legally obligated to 
act in the best interest of the borrowers, but who often do not because there is no 
enforcement mechanism).   
63  See Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1263. 
64  Id.   
65  Id.   
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Sometimes the prepayment penalty added to principal  borrower pays for 
every refinancing is less than the cash recieved during that transaction.  
Ultimately, having leveraged it all, homeowners are left with little to no 
equity and owe enormous sums because fees have been folded into the 
principal amount of their loan.66  Thus, the equity has been stripped. 
Most of the wealth of the average American is found in the equity 
of his home.67  To unscrupulous lenders, this represents a veritable jackpot, 
and they attack it as such with aggressive advertising practices, as 
described below.    
 
f. Aggressive Advertising  
 
Some scholars characterize the tactics employed by predatory 
brokers and lenders as one calculated to overcome free will.68  Whereas 
borrowers of prime loans tend to seek out a lender, the opposite is true with 
predatory loans.  Predatory lenders tend to use mass mailings, cold calls, 
and other aggressive advertising techniques to seek out people who often 
are not even in the market for a loan to begin with.69  When seeking out 
these borrowers, brokers and lenders focus on the most vulnerable 
populations.70  They use public records to identify which individuals or 
households may owe back taxes.  Many prey on elderly homeowners who 
have built up significant amounts of equity in their homes.71  The CRL 
estimates that borrowers age 65 and older have five times the odds of 
receiving a subprime loan than borrowers younger than 35.72  Others use 
census data to identify low to moderate-income neighborhoods, typically 
targeting minority groups within those neighborhoods.  In 2006, over 50% 
of loans made to African-Americans were subprime, 40% of loans made to 
people of Hispanic descent were subprime, but only 22% of loans made to 
Caucasians were subprime.73  These populations often feel that the prime 
                                                                                                                 
66  See Goldstein & Son, supra note 57, at 3. 
67  Id at 12..   
68  See Engel & McCoy, supra note 6, at 1346 
69  See id. at 1296. 
70  See id.  
71  AARP, supra note 42. 
72  CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, FACT SHEET: PREDATORY MORTGAGE 
LENDING ROBS HOMEOWNERS & DEVASTATES COMMUNITIES (2006), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/2b003-
mortgage2005.pdf. 
73  Ctr. for Responsible Lending, supra note 6, at 2 
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market is not available to them because of poor credit history or other 
major credit event.  Of course, as discussed above, up to 50% of these 
borrowers may in fact qualify for a prime loan.   
Brokers and lenders rely on high-pressure marketing tactics, and 
may go door to door or cold-call.74  Their target borrowers are often not 
even seeking a loan, but marketers tend to be charming and friendly, 
convincing the target that they are going to help them.  Sometimes, would-
be borrowers, especially elderly ones, have little to no debt on their home.  
For these groups, brokers focus on convincing them that they can “help” 
them by giving them some extra cash.  Of course, the customer is then 
subject to prepayment penalties, exorbitant fees that may get folded into the 
principal itself, and other abusive practices.  For these groups, brokers 
focus on convincing them that they can “help” them by giving them some 
extra cash.  Of course, the customer is then subject to prepayment penalties, 
exorbitant fees that may get folded into the principal itself, and other 
abusive practices.  In the worst scenarios, people who once owned their 
homes free and clear (or close to it) end up the victims of foreclosure.75   
Predatory lenders act quickly once they have identified their 
targets,.  They restrict the amount of information they give out and what 
information borrowers do receive is confusing and hard to read.  Closings 
are often rushed and accompanied by stacks of paperwork that are 
insurmountable to the average borrower.  Sometimes, brokers misrepresent 
what the borrower must do in order to close.  For example, the broker may 
tell the borrower that he has to purchase life insurance in conjunction with 
his loan when that is not the case at all.76   
 
g. Yield-Spread Premiums 
 
Yield-spread premiums are kickbacks paid by lenders or 
originators to brokers if the broker “upsells” a loan. By steering a customer 
who qualifies for a lower cost subprime or even a prime rate into a much 
costlier loan, originators can increase the rates and fees on their loans.  
However, this means that brokers are trying to sell borrowers loans at rates 
much higher than the customer would otherwise qualify for since these 
loans  are more suitable for customers with poorer credit.77 Usually, Fannie 
                                                                                                                 
74  Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1295. 
75  See AARP, supra note 42.  
76  See Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1267. 
77  See id. at 1264-66. 
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Mae and Freddie Mac studies have found that up to about 50% of all 
borrowers steered into subprime loans could have qualified for a prime 
rate.78  This figure is partially a result of brokers working in concert with 
lenders to drive up  mortgage rates.  In addition, many lenders offer these 
kickbacks if a brokers can pad the loans with large prepayment penalties.79  
Lenders are willing to pay a premium for a prepayment penalty that 
functions as a guarantee that the borrower will either stay in the overpriced 
predatory loan or that the lender will make money when the borrower is 
forced to pay the penalty in order to get out of his expensive loan.80 
These kickbacks are dangerous for another reason.  Many 
unscrupulous brokers employ tactics designed to convince the potential 
borrower that they, the brokers, are working on behalf of the borrower to 
obtain the best rate possible.  Borrowers are lulled into a false sense of 
comfort and a belief that the broker is laboring under some sort of fiduciary 
duty.  In reality, exactly the opposite is true: brokers are motivated to sell 
the borrower the most expensive mortgage possible.81  
 
h. Over-appraisal and Overselling 
 
Lenders and brokers often work hand in hand with appraisers: 
when appraisers return favorable, overstated estimates of home values, the 
lenders and brokers continue to use their services.82  Because the cost of 
their home has been overstated, borrowers end up with loans whose 
principal is greater than the true value of their home. 83  This benefits the 
lenders, who make more money from interest, fees, and charges if the 
underlying principal is higher.  Many of these loans were made during the 
housing bubble, when people expected home prices to continue to rise.  
                                                                                                                 
78  See Goldstein and Son, supra note 57, at 1 n.3. 
79  See id. at 1.  
80  For example, a ContiMortgage Corporation rate sheet shows that for loans 
with prepayment penalties, the maximum yield-spread premium is 2.5 per cent.  
For mortgages with prepayment penalties, the maximum premium jumps to 4.25 
per cent.  AARP, supra note 42, at 5-6.  
81  Bennett, supra note 62.   
82  See 73 Fed. Reg. 44522, 44566 (proposed Jul. 30, 2008) (to be codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt. 226).  
83  See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2185, 2223 (2007) (describing a predatory lender who used overstated 
appraisals to justify loans packed with excessive fees and charges).   
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Instead, in 2007, the bubble burst and home prices fell.84  At the same time, 
many rates on subprime loans reset from the introductory “low fixed rates” 
to a higher rate.  Borrowers who relied on increasing home values were 
simultaneously faced with increased mortgage payments, , leading to 
increased foreclosures. 
 
B. THE ABUSE OF CREDIT INSURANCE  
 
Among the many tools in a predatory lender’s arsenal is the use of 
insurance to extract even more money out of subprime borrowers.85  Credit 
insurance is linked to a specific debt or loan and will pay off that debt if the 
borrower becomes unable to do so.86  Although such a policy protects the 
lender, it is paid for by the borrower.  There are various types of insurance 
against the borrower’s failure to pay.  Among others, some examples 
include credit health insurance, which protects the lender in case the 
borrower becomes ill and can no longer make payments on the loan; credit 
life insurance to protect against the risk of the borrower’s death prior to 
repaying the loan; and credit unemployment insurance protects against the 
borrower’s inability to make payments due to job loss.87  Whereas it is not 
uncommon for prime lenders to require private mortgage insurance for 
loans in which the borrower pays less than twenty per cent of the home’s 
value as a down payment, these types of credit insurance are rarely found 
in prime loans, but have been aggressively marketed in the subprime 
market. 
Single premium credit insurance (SPCI) is particularly abusive.  
With this type of insurance, borrowers are forced to pay a one-time 
premium that is very high, tending to cost four to five times as much as 
credit insurance whose premiums are paid on a monthly basis.88  This 
premium is nearly always financed with the mortgage  leaving the borrower 
paying a hefty interest rate in addition to an already enlarged insurance 
premium.89  For these reasons, the Consumer Federation of America has 
                                                                                                                 
84  Anderson, supra note 4, at 20.  
85  For a description of other abusive practices found in predatory loans, see 
supra Part II.a. 
86  ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZERS FOR REFORM NOW,  
PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES, ¶ 15 (2004), http://www.acorn.org/ 
index.php?id=754. 
87  Id.   
88  Id. at ¶ 16. 
89  Id.  at ¶ 17. 
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called SPCI on mortgages “the worst insurance rip-off in the nation,” and 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac refuse to purchase loans that included 
financed credit insurance.90 
While onerous for the borrowers who must pay the premiums, 
mortgage credit insurance is lucrative for the lenders.  Credit insurance 
companies typically sell group insurance products to home mortgage and 
other lenders.91  One author suggests that some lenders make up to 50% of 
their pre-tax income from the sale of credit insurance.92  The Consumer 
Federation of America also found in a 1999 report that the credit insurance 
industry had unusually low loss ratios, with the ratio of claims to premiums 
often no more than 40% for credit life and disability insurance policies.93  
This exceeds the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners’(NAIC)  recommended 60% claims to premiums ratio.94  
The implication from these numbers is that lenders selling credit insurance 
are profiting at the disproportionate expense of the borrowers who are often 
deceived into purchasing the policies.95 
In theory, these products are voluntary.   The only form of 
insurance that a lender may legally require in order to obtain a loan is 
private mortgage insurance, but once a borrower does purchase credit 
insurance, it becomes part of his contract.96  In many cases, the relatively 
meager consumer benefits provided by credit insurance last only a few 
years, while the borrower continues to pay a high interest fee on a large 
premium for years after the benefits have stopped.97  In previous 
                                                                                                                 
90  Id.  See also Broderick Perkins, California Enforcing New Predatory Loan 
Rules, REALTY TIMES, July 10, 2002, available at http://realtytimes.com 
/rtpages/20020710_predatoryloans.htm 
91  Ronald H. Silverman, Toward Curing Predatory Lending, 122 BANKING 
L.J. 483, 504 (2002).   
92  Id. at 504-505 
93  Id. at 505. 
94  Id.   
95  See id.  
96  NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, CREDIT 
INSURANCE: SAFETY NET OR NO NET GAIN? (Nov. 2006), 
http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_alert_credit_insurance.htm; see also 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 11. 
97  Edward M. Gramlich, Governor, Federal Reserve Board, Remarks at the 
Housing Bureau for Seniors Conference (Jan. 18, 2002).   
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amendments made to HOEPA, the Federal Reserve Board has attempted to 
regulate SPCI without prohibiting it altogether, but it persists.98 
At least one appellate-level court has agreed with the proposition 
that SPCI is inherently unfair.  In Richardson v. Bank of America, the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the lender’s illegal sale of SPCI 
was an unlawful and deceptive trade practice under North Carolina law, 
that it was not made in good faith and did not represent fair dealing, and 
that it constituted willful and wanton tortuous activity sufficient to support 
the imposition of punitive damages.99 
 
III.   REGULATIONS AND REFORM MEASURES 
 
A. OBJECTIVES OF REFORM  
 
1. Competing Interests 
 
Any reform measures aimed at the insurance industry in the 
context of predatory lending, whether directly or indirectly, must seek to 
further some important goals.  Many of these goals in fact consist of 
striking a balance between two equally compelling but competing interests.  
The first and perhaps the most frequently cited set of competing interests 
involves the conflict between providing consumers with adequate 
protection against predatory loans and promoting the availability of credit.  
In December, 2007, Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board, referenced the need to balance these interests when introducing a 
proposal to amend existing regulations, stating that the proposed rules were 
crafted with an eye toward deterring improper lending and advertising 
practices without unduly restricting mortgage credit availability.100 
A broad scope of regulations, whether at the federal or state level, 
is appealing to consumer advocacy groups but carries a greater risk of 
encompassing loans and lenders that the drafters of the regulations never 
contemplated.  Stricter regulations tend to cause legitimate subprime 
lenders to restrict credit for fear of falling into regulated categories.  At a 
time when the country desperately needs credit, any reform measures must 
                                                                                                                 
98  See id. 
99  643 S.E.2d 410, 424-425 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).  
100  Ben S. Bernake, Chairman, Federal Reserve, Statement of Jul. 14, 2008,  
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bernankeregz 
20080714.htm  
282 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
 
 
be just as careful to preserve lenders’ willingness to lend as to protect 
consumers. Of course, on the other hand, most regulatory reform measures 
are motivated by a desire to stop the abuses inflicted upon subprime 
borrowers by predatory lenders.  To that end, any measures that did not 
increase protections for consumers would simply be ineffective.  
There is also a conflict between forcing predatory brokers and 
lenders to internalize the harm they cause and requiring borrowers to accept 
greater personal financial responsibility.  On the one hand, when lenders 
make irresponsible loans with abusive terms that cause a consumer to 
default and frequently to lose his home to foreclosure, society often must 
bear the costs.101  On the other hand, the hallmark of responsible borrowing 
is knowing how much one can afford. According to one author, “the social 
and moral question centers around who should determine that a particular 
borrower cannot afford to pay the proposed mortgage.”102 
 Especially in today’s real estate situation, where it is not 
uncommon for a borrower to owe more on his home than it is worth, when 
a home is lost to foreclosure the borrower may be left with nothing and 
suddenly become dependent on social programs such as welfare to provide 
for him and his family.  Strict regulations, such as stringent requirements 
regarding verification of a borrower’s ability to pay or an escrow 
requirement103 would be costly to implement but ultimately would be likely 
to reduce foreclosures.  Since the lender is in the best position to prevent 
the harm caused by predatory mortgage loans and their abusive terms, one 
                                                                                                                 
101  See, e.g. Manny Fernandez, Helping to Keep Homelessness at Bay as 
Foreclosures Hit More Families, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2008, at B6 (discussing a 
program adopted by New York charitable organizations to help homeowners who 
are facing foreclosure avoid eviction by giving them up to $10,000 to pay for the 
costs of moving, the first month’s rent at their new apartments, and other related 
costs).  
102  David Schmudde, Responding to the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory 
Landscape, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 730 (2009). 
103  An escrow requirement like the one proposed in the Fed’s finalized 
amendments to Regulation Z requires lenders to set up an escrow to cover the costs 
of property taxes and insurance. See CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 
PROPOSED RULES REGARDING UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, ABUSIVE LENDING AND 
SERVICING PRACTICES PURSUANT TO HOME OWNERSHIP AND EQUITY PROTECTION 
ACT at 52 (Apr. 8, 2008), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org 
/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/regulators/fed-udap-comments-final-
040808.pdf.   
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side of the policy argument says that any regulation should favor the 
consumer in order to force lenders to internalize the harm they cause.104 
The other side of that same policy argument is the side favored by 
Senator Phil Gramm, among others.  Gramm attributed the increase in 
foreclosures, particularly in the subprime market, to “predatory 
borrowers,” not predatory lenders.105  With the spectrum of available 
subprime products, many borrowers were able to obtain mortgages that 
they ultimately could not afford.106  People such as Senator Gramm favor 
regulations that require the borrower to be responsible for ensuring that he 
only borrows what he can afford.  The problem with this, however, is that 
predatory brokers and lenders often structure their marketing strategies 
around pressure and removing free will.     
 
2.  Policy Goals 
 
The mortgage insurance industry can be reformed by measures 
aimed specifically at SPCI and PMI reform.  However, it is equally if not 
more important that broader reforms encompassing predatory lending 
generally be passed.   
The preferred method for avoiding PMI is the use of the 80-10-10 
loan, which is often a favorite target of predatory lenders.107  The type of 
borrower who seeks out these loans is often one who has very little cash 
and may feel excluded or disenfranchised from the prime market.  There 
may be an element of desperation: often, borrowers want to avoid incurring 
a PMI premium so badly that they accept credit from any lender willing to 
offer it.  Some may feel that because the loan is quite small in comparison 
to the larger 80% loan, it is less risky to accept more onerous terms.  The 
80% loans, particularly when made to subprime borrowers, may also be 
predatory.  Whatever the reason, legislative efforts toward eliminating 
                                                                                                                 
104  See generally Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 197 (2008) at A1 (discussing the interaction of foreclosures and 
societal reaction to the same and positing that regulations are the best way to attack 
foreclosures, which are costly to the borrower and to society).   
105  Eric Lipton & Stephen Labaton, Deregulator Looks Back, Unswayed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2008 (emphasis added) 
106  See Fernandez, supra note 102, at B6 (discussing the example of a woman 
who was able to obtain a $486,000 mortgage with $4,000 monthly payments 
despite the fact that her monthly income was only $2,800).  
107  Johnstone, supra note 10, at 787. 
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predatory lending are a critical first step toward improving the PMI outlook 
and making mortgages safer and more affordable for subprime borrowers.  
PMI providers avoid predatory loans for reasons that are both 
ethical and practical.  From an ethical standpoint, it is likely that these 
providers do not want to be associated with a product that has gained so 
much notoriety as a major cause of rising foreclosure costs and the seizing 
up of the capital markets.  And from a practical point of view, insurance 
companies are loath to insure loans that carry with them a high likelihood 
of a borrower default that would trigger payout on the policy.  As discussed 
above, predatory loans carry with them a higher rate of default.  Therefore, 
curbing predatory lending would make subprime loans safer and less 
expensive for PMI providers to insure.  Although there are a relatively 
small number of PMI providers,108 there is intense competition among this 
limited group of companies.  Therefore, if the costs of PMI can be reduced 
across the board, then costs of PMI policies are likely to fall, making it a 
much more feasible option for borrowers.  This will help drop demand for 
the 80-10-10 loans.  If faced with decreased demand and more of the right 
regulations, along with the increased public awareness, predatory lenders 
would find it much more difficult to find willing victims.   
Perhaps the most appealing aspect of PMI is that it aligns the 
borrower’s interest with the insurer’s interest.  Restrictive or requirement-
based regulations, such as prohibitions on prepayment penalties or 
mandatory disclosures, are often difficult because the brokers and lenders 
targeted by these regulations realize that it is frequently not in their best 
interests.  Brokers in particular have little incentive to ensure that the loans 
they write on behalf of their lenders are sustainable and affordable.109  If 
the borrower defaults, the broker is not implicated: he or she has likely 
already collected his or her yield-spread premium and is unaffected by the 
foreclosure.   
One author has identified the moral hazard faced by brokers and 
explains that at the same time that the law permits and even encourages a 
mortgage broker to bargain for the most advantageous outcome, it also asks 
that broker to serve as the conduit for information that is intended to reduce 
                                                                                                                 
108  Members of MICA, the industry association for mortgage insurers includes 
AIG United Guaranty, Genworth Mortgage Insurance Corporation, Mortgage 
Insurance Guaranty Corporation, PMI Mortgage Insurance Co., Radian Guaranty, 
and Republic Mortgage Insurance Company.  Private MI, ABOUT MICA (2009), 
available at http://www.privatemi.com/about.cfm. 
109  See Bennett, supra note 62.   
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his advantage.  Setting up such a conflict between the duties we expect a 
mortgage broker to discharge and that broker’s self-interest is ill-
conceived.110 
Furthermore, in the age of increasing securitization, fewer lenders 
have kept the mortgage on their books, although some have kept the 
servicing rights. 
 PMI is exactly the opposite: here, there is a unity of interest 
between the borrower and the seller of the product.  If the policy is still in 
effect, a foreclosure triggers a payout.  Indeed, some PMI providers have 
even paid off an insured’s monthly mortgage debt if the insured loses his 
job or is temporarily unable to pay, or have otherwise negotiated or 
mediated between the insured and the lender.111  This is just one example of 
a practice that is mutually beneficial to the insurer and the policyholder: the 
insured avoids a devastating foreclosure while the insurer does not have to 
pay out the policy’s limits. 
For this reason, PMI does not need as much heavy federal 
regulation that is required by loan originators and brokers; regulatory 
efforts should thus remain focused on predatory lending tactics.  PMI 
companies are already extensively regulated as insurance at the state 
levels.112 Furthermore, while the government must implement restrictions 
and requirements to force brokers and lenders to conduct business in a 
manner that is fair for consumers, the common desire to avoid foreclosure 
shared by PMI providers and policyholders ensures that insurers are 
already motivated to act in the interests of the consumer.  In short, if 
reforms to the predatory lending practices are effectuated such that loans 
become more affordable and sustainable, private mortgage insurers can 
once again insure those risks without the fears of foreclosure that have been 
brought on by the subprime crisis.   
                                                                                                                 
110  Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Effecting Responsibility in the Mortgage Broker-
Borrower Relationship: A Role for Agency Principles in Predatory Lending 
Regulation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471, 1500 (2005).   
111  Genworth Financial has stepped in to facilitate mediations and workouts 
that will keep their insureds in their homes and avoid foreclosure and claims.  See 
Shannon Behnken, Insurance Company Helps Homeowner Avoid Foreclosure, 
TAMPA TRIBUNE, Nov. 25, 2008.   
112  Johnstone, supra note 10, at 783.  This is not to say that regulations are 
never needed.  The Homeowners Protection Act is an example of regulations that 
protect consumers by requiring that PMI be cancelable after a certain loan to value 
is reached.  See also 47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury § 515 supra note 17.   
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Turning to the another problem with mortgage-related insurance 
products, reform measures aimed at predatory lending overall should also 
seek to eliminate SPCI rather than just to regulate it.  If this is 
accomplished, then lenders who require an extra measure of security before 
lending to subprime borrowers are much more likely to turn to other 
options.  One such option is likely to be PMI: lenders could, if a borrower 
was paying below 20 per cent down, require PMI.  This would mean that 
instead of disguising SPCI in complicated loan documents to essentially 
dupe borrowers into financing a single large premium, they would need to 
find other options if credit protection was truly important to them.  
Whereas SPCI tends to be deceptive and is a product often offered by 
predatory brokers and lenders, PMI is a highly regulated industry at both 
the federal and usually the state levels.  Furthermore, by reducing predatory 
lending, including the use of SPCI, not only are loans more safe for 
borrowers, they are safer, and by extension cheaper, for policy providers.113   
 
B. PROPOSED PROTECTIONS  
 
1. The Federal Reserve’s Measures 
 
a. Proposed Measures. 
 
Creating effective reform measures is, of course, easier said than 
done.  Competing interests, such as those described above,114 are indicative 
of the wide range of viewpoints about reform.  However, the Federal 
Reserve has made an attempt at effective reform.  On December 18, 2007, 
the Fed proposed and asked for public comment on changes to Regulation 
Z (Truth in Lending), which was to be adopted under HOEPA115.  The 
board used primarily objective-based triggers, but drew largely from 
Federal Trade Commission notions about what is considered “unfair” or 
“deceptive.”  The key points of the proposed reform included: 
 
                                                                                                                 
113  See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall 
Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2041 (2007).  
114  See supra § III.a.i. 
115  Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
(December 18, 2007) (available at http://www.federalreserve.gov 
/newsevents/press/bcreg/20071218a.htm). 
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• Prohibiting a lender from engaging in a pattern or practice of 
lending without considering borrowers’ ability to repay the loans 
from sources other than the home’s value 
 
• Restrictions on prepayment penalties only to loans that met certain 
conditions, including a requirement that the penalty expire at least 
sixty days before any possible payment increase 
 
• Requiring the lender to establish an escrow account for payment of 
property taxes and homeowners’ insurance, with an opt out 
provision available only after one year 
 
• Prohibiting abusive servicing practices, including failing to credit 
payments when the servicer receives it, failure to provide a payoff 
statement within a reasonable period of time, and “pyramiding” 
late fees. 
 
• Prohibiting creditors or brokers from coercing or encouraging an 
appraiser to misrepresent the value of a home 
 
• Prohibiting misleading and deceptive advertising practices for 
closed-end loans.  For example, prohibiting use of the term “fixed” 
to describe a rate that will explode to an ARM within a few years; 
requiring applicable rates and payments to be disclosed in 
advertisements.  
 
• Adjustment to the time frame for disclosures to permit borrowers 
to use the information to make comparisons to other mortgage 
products.116 
 
b. Public Reaction and Comments 
 
During the first part of 2008, various groups, including industry 
interest groups, consumer advocacy groups, local governments and others 
submitted comments about the proposal.  Two of the most significant 
groups to offer comment included the consumer advocates and the industry 
interest groups. 
                                                                                                                 
116  Id.  
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Consumer interest groups offering comment included the American 
Association for Retired Persons (AARP), the National Consumer Law 
Center (NCLC), the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL), National 
Council of La Raza (NCLR), and several smaller, state-level groups.  
Overall, consumer advocates agreed with most of the proposal but felt that 
it did not go too far.  More specifically, they wanted to see the new 
protections extend to all non-traditional loans.  In support of this argument, 
consumer groups pointed to the narrow scope of the existing HOEPA 
regulations, which were only covering about five percent of all subprime 
loans.  
Several of these groups, with the AARP leading the charge, called 
for a return to traditional underwriting standards117 that emphasized the 
three “C’s”: capacity, credit, and collateral.  Capacity is a measure of 
whether the borrower is able to repay; credit is a measure of whether the 
borrower is likely to repay; and collateral requires an assessment of what 
assets the borrower has in case he does not repay.118  Along these lines, 
consumer groups favored requiring more specific standards in assessing 
ability to repay, including requiring the creditor or broker to consider W2 
forms, payroll receipts, and other concrete measures of income verification.   
The consumer groups differed radically from industry insiders on 
their treatment of prepayment penalties.  Not all of the consumer groups 
recommended banning them outright, but most at least favored strict 
restrictions so that lenders could not penalize borrowers who wanted to 
refinance their mortgages once the rates exploded or if they were able to 
obtain a prime loan.   
Among these groups, the escrow requirement was also popular.119  
Many low- to moderate-income families may need cash more than their 
moderate- to high-income counterparts.  This characteristic not only makes 
them more susceptible to advertising from predatory brokers and lenders, 
but it makes them less likely to be able to save for expenses such as 
property taxes and insurance.  However, without paying these costs the 
borrowers are much more likely to fall victim to foreclosure. 
Consumer groups also approved of the scope of the new disclosure 
requirements, although many noted that they, alone, were not sufficient. A 
few saw it as a trap to bait and switch because lenders are not required to 
disclose some applicable points and fees until the closing, at which time 
                                                                                                                 
117  See AARP, supra note 42, at 1, 4, 11. 
118  Id.  
119  Id. at 7-8. 
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many borrowers would be less likely to withdraw their application and 
shop for a new lender.120 
Additionally, in the proposed requirements, the Fed contemplated 
an outright ban on yield-spread premiums, which was applauded by 
consumer groups.121   
These groups also were strongly opposed to the “pattern or 
practice” requirement, which allowed a borrower to pursue legal recourse if 
he could prove a pattern or practice of making loans without verifying 
income or assets.122  The criticism of this requirement was that it would 
essentially preclude borrowers from relief as it was difficult to establish 
this pattern.  Furthermore, the consumer groups argued that it was 
counterintuitive to require would-be plaintiffs to prove a pattern or practice 
because by the time a pattern had been established, many borrowers would 
have been hurt, whereas if borrowers were allowed to sue based only on 
their own injuries from the lender  
Consumer groups, and the NCLC in particular, were wary of a 
loophole that allowed lenders to continue to make no-documentation loans 
without liability as long as the originator’s loan decision would not have 
been different if the proper information had been available.123  The group 
was concerned that this would serve as an incentive for originators to avoid 
proper underwriting techniques. 
The Fed also received comments from industry interest groups, 
including the Mortgage Bankers Association, the American Securitization 
Forum (ASF), the American Community Bankers, and local real estate and 
lending groups.  These groups, of course, viewed the proposed regulations 
differently than did consumer advocacy groups.  They were primarily 
concerned with increased exposure to “extreme civil liability”124 and an 
ensuing reluctance to extend credit to subprime borrowers.125   
                                                                                                                 
120  NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, INC., THE FRB’S FINAL HOEPA 
RULE: A FIRST STEP, BUT REAL REFORMS ARE STILL NEEDED 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.consumerlaw.org/issues/predatory_mortgage/content/FRB-HOEPA-
Rule-NCLCquickanalysis.pdf. 
121  Center For Responsible Lending, supra note 106, at 4, 22. 
122  Id. at 4. 
123  National Consumer Law Center, Inc., supra note 120, at 4.  
124  CONSUMER BANKERS’ ASSOCIATION, FED ISSUES TOUGH FINAL HOEPA 
RULES; DROPS BROKER DISCLOSURE 1 (2008), at 1. http://www.cbanet.org 
/files/GRFiles/HOEpfinal.pdf. 
125  Letter from the American Securitization Forum & Securities Industry & 
Financial Markets Association to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
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Like the consumer groups, industry groups generally offered little 
dissent regarding the disclosure requirements.  This is likely because 
disclosure poses a relatively low burden to the lender, and as such there are 
very few legitimate arguments that brokers and lenders could make in 
opposition to these requirements.   
Another concern was that the proposed regulations were too broad 
and would encompass prime as well as subprime loans, thereby harming an 
already fragile mortgage market by restricting lenders’ willingness to 
lend.126   
Additionally, industry groups did not favor a prohibition on the 
yield-spread premium.  Some defended these kickbacks on the basis that 
they a way for creditors and originators to compete for the best brokers to 
sell their loans.   
Interestingly, from a general standpoint the consumer groups were 
less critical of the proposal than were the consumer advocate groups.127 
 
c. The Fed’s Final Rule 
 
After accepting comments, on July 30, 2008, the Fed published the 
final rule amending Regulation Z implementing HOEPA and TILA.128  
There were some notable changes from the proposed rule.  First, at the 
behest of consumer groups like the CRL, the Fed changed the definition of 
“high-cost” in the context of mortgage loans.129  In the proposed rules, 
whether a loan was defined as “high-cost” was determined by comparing 
that loan’s rate to the yield on Treasury securities of comparable maturity.  
The CRL pointed out that a mortgage-based trigger was more appropriate, 
to account for economy-wide wide credit events.  As a result, under the 
final rules the Fed will publish an “average prime offer rate based on a 
survey currently published by Freddie Mac.  A loan is high-cost if it is a 
first loan and is at a rate that is 1.5 percentage points or more above the 
prime offer rate, or for subordinate-lien mortgages, if it is 3.5 percentage 
points above the prime offer rate.130  
                                                                                                                          
System (Apr. 8, 2008), available at http://www.americansecuritization.com/ 
uploadedfiles/SIFMAASFRegZComments040808.pdf 
126  Id, at 2.  
127  See id.  
128  Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 73 Fed. Reg. 44522 (Jan. 9, 2008) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. 226).   
129  Id. at 44531. 
130  Id.  
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There were key protections passed specifically for higher-priced 
mortgage loans.  The first requires lenders to verify repayment ability 
based on the highest scheduled payment in the first seven years, 
considering income, assets, and other debt obligations in the process.  
Lenders would be required to actually verify these facts as well.  Because 
groups like Radian, Genworth, and MGIC have all been plagued by low- or 
no-documentation loans and have subsequently refused to insure them, the 
requirement that lenders verify a consumer’s ability to repay is likely to 
qualify more subprime borrowers for loans under the new underwriting 
criteria.   
Another protection for high-cost loans, representing a compromise 
between consumer groups and the industry groups, generally permits 
prepayment penalties, but not if the payment could change within the first 
four years.131  For other high-cost loans, the prepayment penalty period 
cannot last longer than two years.132  This also strikes a balance between 
paternalistic measures which would ban them altogether and promoting 
free choice by letting borrowers compare the rates on loans with penalties 
versus the ones on loans without in that it bans the most onerous penalties 
but permits others.  It is however, substantially more restrictive than 
originally proposed.133   
Lastly, for high-cost mortgages the Fed kept the escrow 
requirement from the proposed rules largely intact.  However, 
acknowledging the argument by the mortgage industry about the costs of 
implementation, instead of becoming effective in October 2009 like the rest 
of the provisions, the escrow requirement will take effect in 2010.134 
Provisions were included, such as those recommended by CRL that 
the regulationsgovern all mortgage loans, whether high-cost or not..  The 
Fed left intact the rules as proposed  prohibiting abusive service practices135 
and coercion of appraisers to misstate home values.136 The requirement to 
provide a good faith estimate of loan costs, including a payment schedule, 
within three days of receiving a consumer’s application also remained 
                                                                                                                 
131  Id. at 44551. 
132  Id.  
133  See id.  
134  Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 73 Fed. Reg. 44522, 44523, 44595 (Jan 
9, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 226). 
135  Id. at 44598. 
136  Id. at 44604.  
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intact.137  Consumers can only be charged fees after receiving early 
disclosure.  Furthermore, all mortgages are subject to more stringent 
standards regarding advertising: more information is required on 
advertisements, and lenders cannot advertise a “low fixed rate” if that rate 
in fact may suddenly explode to an adjustable rate after two or three 
years.138   
Notably, the Fed withdrew for further consideration its original 
proposal to prohibit brokers from receiving kickbacks in the form of yield-
spread premiums.  It also withdrew for further consideration more stringent 
disclosure requirements.139However, the Fed left intact a loophole allowing 
for the originators of no-documentation loans to escape liability if their 
decision would not have changed even with proper documentation.140  
 
2. H.R. 3915, or the Mortgage Reform and Anti-
Predatory Lending Act of 2007  
 
H.R. 3915, or the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending 
Act of 2007, would have filled most of the gaps left by the Fed’s proposed 
reform measures.141  However, although passed by the House,  the Senate 
did not pass the Act which was thus cleared from the books at the end of 
110th session of Congress. If t reintroduced and passed, the Act would 
represent a major step toward mortgage reform, even stronger than that 
taken by the Fed.  
H.R. 3915 had a goal similar to that of the Fed’s reform measures, 
but added some key protections.  One of the most important additional 
protections was a new duty of care imposed on all mortgage originators, 
including brokers and lenders.142  This would encompass the subjective 
triggers that were lacking in the Fed’s reform regulations and would help 
add much-needed teeth to reform measures.  A bill like this, with its stricter 
provisions and more adequate remedies, would help ensure that lenders 
cannot avoid penalties for abusive practices by structuring the terms so as 
to fall just outside a definitional trigger.  Furthermore, SPCI would have 
been prohibited on any residential mortgage, a move that acknowledged its 
                                                                                                                 
137  Id. at 44600-01.  
138  See id. at 4457495. 
139  Id. at 44563.  
140  See id. at 44574. 
141  Id. § 129A. 
142  Id. at § 206(g).  
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inherent unfairness.143 The bill would have also prohibited yield-spread 
premiums and other forms of steering incentives,144 as well as unfair 
servicing practices such as refusing to credit a payment the day it was 
received and then applying a late fee.145  Mortgage brokers and lenders 
would have been required to be licensed and registered.146  
The proposal also required creditors to verify ability to repay by 
considering several factors, including credit history, current and expected 
income, The scope of covered mortgages was also increased to cover open-
end loans, whereas the Fed’s regulations cover only closed-end loans.  The 
triggers are based on the yield for Treasury securities of comparable 
maturities. There were special, additional protections for high-cost 
mortgages,147 including a prohibition on balloon payments, recommending 
or encouraging default, excessive late fees, financing any points or fees 
abusive modification and deferral, and other abusive practices.148 The 
borrower of such loans would also have been required to go through pre-
loan counseling to ensure that he can actually understand and interpret all 
of the information that he would receive in required pre-closing 
disclosures.149  
 
IV. CONCLUSION: IS IT ENOUGH? 
 
The recent subprime lending crisis finds its origins in predatory 
lending.  Whereas legitimate subprime lenders help countless Americans 
with less-than-perfect credit get homes, predatory lending serves no 
function other than to pad the pockets of unscrupulous lenders.  As the 
subprime crisis has spiraled out of control, two problems in mortgage 
insurance have emerged: the abuse of single-premium credit insurance and 
the issues plaguing the private mortgage insurance providers as a result of 
                                                                                                                 
143  Id. at § 123(b). 
144  Id. at §§ 601-604.  Steering incentives are defined as originator 
compensation that varies, directly or indirectly, or is based on the terms of any loan 
that is not a qualified mortgage as defined in § 129B(c)(3).  Id.  
145  Id. at §§ 101-113.   
146  Id. at §§ 301(aa)(1).. 
147  Id. at § 303.  “Extremely” high-cost mortgages would be defined as those 
with very high points and fees, exceeding 5% of the total loan amount, using a 
comprehensive definition of points and fees that would include yield-spread 
premiums, and prepayment penalties.  Id. at § 301(aa)(1). 
148  Id. at § 303(t).  
149  Id. at § 303(t).  
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the crisis.  Both of these phenomena have proved a boon for predatory 
lenders.   
Single premium credit insurance gets financed into the principal of 
the loan, which translates into earnings in interest for the loan originator as 
well as a large lump sum.  The borrower’s benefits are not nearly as 
appealing; usually, the insurance policy expires long before the premium is 
paid off.  Any effective reforms must ban the use of this; disclosure alone is 
not enough.150  At the very least, an intermediate step would be to prohibit 
financing the premium; that is, prohibit lenders from charging interest on 
the large premium.  This will also require lenders to turn increasingly to 
PMI if they want extra security for loans on which borrowers are paying 
less than 20 per cent down, thereby shifting borrowers into a the much 
safer and better-regulated world of PMI. 
As predatory lenders became increasingly aggressive, they set their 
sights on borrowers who wanted to avoid purchasing PMI when they had 
less than 20 per cent to put down on a home.  Demand fell for PMI policies 
and as a result, predatory loan solutions for the problem of the borrower 
with little cash to put down rose.  Addressing predatory lending and 
restoring PMI to a legitimate, feasible option for borrowers are symbiotic 
propositions.  The best chance of accomplishing both of these objectives is 
for the federal government to use its authority to effectuate sweeping 
reforms.   
Had the Senate passed H.R. 3915 and the bill had been signed into 
law and enacted, it would have represented a major step against predatory 
lending that encompassed nearly all abusive practices and also provided 
sufficient penalties and remedies to enforce them.  As it is, however, the 
Fed’s regulations alone are not enough to effectuate the changes needed in 
mortgage-related insurance products.  What is needed are not strong 
disclosure requirements, because even if disclosed, the abusive practices 
tend to be complicated and hidden within an even more complicated 
framework of loan terms.151  Whereas disclosure may be sufficient for 
                                                                                                                 
150  See generally Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of 
Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123 at 147, 154 (2007).   
151  See Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole Truth, 
and Nothing But the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. 
ON REG. 181 (2008) (explaining that evaluating the cost of credit and comparison 
shopping is very difficult even for sophisticated shoppers, but as lenders 
increasingly “unbundle the costs of their loans from the interest into an array of 
fees, outsource their overhead to third parties who add to consumers’ costs, and 
unveil amazingly complex loan products that dazzle and confuse borrowers,” even 
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comparison-shopping in the prime market, disclosure is no longer sufficient 
as the primary regulator of the subprime credit marketplace.152  Rather, the 
abusive practices must be banned outright.  This was well-illustrated in 
Cetto v. LaSalle Bank National Association. debt obligations, and assets, 
among others.153  Prepayment penalties would be prohibited on subprime 
loans, but permitted on other mortgages provided they expired three 
months before a loan resets.  They would have been forbidden entirely on 
any subprime loan.154 Because there is no pattern or practice requirement, a 
lender could have become liable based only on one mortgage.  Therefore, 
there was an allowance for bona fide errors within thirty days of the loan 
closing, provided the lender corrected them.   
The scope of covered mortgages was also increased to cover open-
end loans, whereas the Fed’s regulations cover only closed-end loans.  The 
triggers are based on the yield for Treasury securities of comparable 
maturities. There were special, additional protections for high-cost 
mortgages,155 including a prohibition on balloon payments, recommending 
or encouraging default, excessive late fees, financing any points or fees 
abusive modification and deferral, and other abusive practices.156 The 
borrower of such loans would also have been required to go through pre-
loan counseling to ensure that he can actually understand and interpret all 
of the information that he would receive in required pre-closing 
disclosures.157  
  
                                                                                                                          
sophisticated shoppers would be hard-pressed to draw any sort of meaningful 
comparison).  
152  Id.  
153  H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. at § 129B(a) (2007). 
154  Id. at 206(f).  
155  Id. at § 301(aa)(1).  “Extremely” high-cost mortgages would be defined as 
those with very high points and fees, exceeding 5% of the total loan amount, using 
a comprehensive definition of points and fees that would include yield-spread 
premiums, and prepayment penalties.  Id. at § 301(aa)(1). 
156  Id. at § 303.  
157  Id. at § 303(t).  
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THE 2008 MENTAL HEALTH PARITY  
AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT:  
AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW LEGISLATION AND  
WHY AN AMENDMENT SHOULD BE PASSED TO 
SPECIFICALLY DEFINE MENTAL ILLNESS AND  
SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS 
 
Sara Nadim * 
 
*** 
This note examines the 2008 Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity 
Act and argues that even though this Act represents a landmark 
improvement in mental illness parity coverage, an amendment should be 
passed to define what is specifically considered to be a mental illness or 
substance use disorder.  The first part explores the history of federal 
mental parity law along with the efforts made to achieve parity.  The 
second part discusses the specific provisions of the 2008 Act, specifically 
that it does not provide explicit definitions for mental health conditions or 
substance use disorders.  Third, state definitions of mental illness are 
reviewed.  Recent developments supporting the biological basis of mental 
illness are presented in the fourth part.  Finally, the fifth part of the note 
evaluates the diminished societal costs that will come with the addition of 
parity in mental illness insurance coverage.  This note argues that certain 
severe biologically based mental illnesses should be listed under the 
definition of mental illness that at minimum insurers should be required to 
cover.  It supports its proposition by providing evidence that group health 
plan costs for employers will not increase greatly, and that societal costs, 
such as homelessness and loss of productivity in the workplace, will be 
greatly reduced when mental illness and substance use disorders are 
adequately treated.  
*** 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
For decades mental health advocates have fought for insurance 
coverage parity for mental illnesses.  On October 3, 2008 the Paul 
Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity 
Act of 2008 was signed in to law, bringing to fruition decades of advocacy 
work on behalf of the mentally ill.  Over fifty-seven million, or one in four 
Americans, currently suffer from a mental illness.1  In the words of the 
Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi:  
This long-overdue legislation has brought mental illness and 
addiction out of the shadows and to the forefront of our work here in 
Congress.  By requiring that illness in the brain be treated just like illness 
anywhere else in the body for insurance purposes, we are helping to end 
discrimination against those who seek treatment for mental illness and 
saving lives.2 
While this bill provides positive advancement for mental illness 
coverage, the lack of a clear definition for what is considered a mental 
illness or substance use disorder will result in inequitable coverage for 
many individuals.  There are many reasons why mental parity proponents 
were able to finally achieve the passage of this bill.  The reasons have 
ranged from: (1): proof that group health plan costs would not become 
exorbitant; (2) a greater acceptance of and a reduction in stigma 
surrounding mental illness; (3) the recent evidence of a biological basis of 
mental illness; and (4) recognition of the enormous societal costs of not 
treating the mentally ill.   
This note will examine the new bill and argue that while the bill 
provides significant advancements in mental illness parity coverage, an 
amendment should be passed to define what is specifically considered to be 
a mental illness or substance use disorder.  Two reasons why this bill was 
able to garner the support necessary for passage in both the House and 
Senate was that it was proven that the cost of group health plans would not 
increase, as well as evidence that many mental illnesses have a biological 
                                                                                                                 
1   NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, HEALTH & OUTREACH, STATISTICS 
(2009), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/index.shtml. 
2  Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, House of 
Representatives, Pelosi: Passage of Mental Health Parity Bill Gives Hope and Help 
to Millions of American Families (Sept. 23, 2008), http://speaker.house.gov 
/newsroom/pressreleases?id=0831. 
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basis.3  This note suggests that both of these reasons also support the 
advancement of an amendment that would provide a specific list of severe 
mental illnesses to be covered instead of leaving it up to the states and 
group health plans to determine.  
While the House of Representatives and a handful of states have 
advocated or supported a definition of mental illness that includes all of the 
diseases listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM), published by the American Psychiatric Association, this note does 
not advocate for such an approach.  Rather, this note suggests that certain 
severe biologically based mental illnesses, specifically those based on the 
definition advocated by Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenic in 1999, should 
be listed under the definition of mental illness that, at a minimum, insurers 
should be required to cover.  This proposition is supported by evidence that 
group health plan costs for employers will not increase greatly and that 
societal costs, such as homelessness and loss of productivity in the 
workplace, will be greatly reduced when mental illness and substance use 
disorders are adequately treated. 
Part I will discuss the history of federal mental parity law and the 
efforts to achieve parity; Part II will discuss the specific provisions of the 
Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction 
Equity Act of 2008 and the fact that the bill does not provide explicit 
definitions for mental health conditions or substance use disorders; Part III 
will discuss how the states define mental illness; Part IV will cover recent 
developments supporting the biological basis of mental illness; and Part V 
will discuss the diminished societal costs that will come with the addition 
of parity in mental illness insurance coverage.  The argument that coverage 
of specific illnesses will be cost prohibitive is not sound.  Certain illnesses 
have been found to have a biological basis and, at a minimum, a specific 
list of illnesses should be included in the parity legislation in order to 
ensure that individuals throughout the country receive equal treatment and 
coverage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
3 See infra Parts IV, V.  
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II. THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL MENTAL HEALTH PARITY 
LAW 
 
A. EARLY EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PARITY 
 
In the 1990’s, the majority of employer-sponsored health plans that 
did include mental health services placed far greater restrictions on mental 
health services than for other medical services.4  In 1998, sixty-two percent 
of health plans imposed limits on inpatient treatment for mental health 
services and fifty-seven percent imposed limits on outpatient treatment.5  
These limits were imposed purely on mental health services and typically 
were not placed on other medical services.6    
In 1996, Paul Wellstone (D-MN) and Peter Domenici (R-MN) 
introduced the Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA) as an amendment to the 
Kassebaum-Kennedy bill for healthcare portability.7  The Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) established standards 
for the privacy and security of health information, as well as standards for 
electronic data interchange (EDI) of health information.8  The proposed 
MHPA amendment was passed by the Senate; however, it was met with 
objections in the House.9  The concerns raised in the House included 
whether the enactment of such an amendment would result in an increase in 
premiums for private health plans and, if that were the case, whether it 
would be necessary to provide for an amendment which would only 
                                                                                                                 
4  Dana L. Kaplan, Can Legislation Alone Solve America’s Mental Health 
Dilemma? Current State Legislative Schemes Cannot Achieve Mental Health 
Parity, 8 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 325, 329 (2005).  “Ninety-one percent of small 
firms and 99% of large firms offer mental health and substance abuse coverage in 
their most used medical plans.” Id. at n.26.  These medical plans restricted one or 
all of the following for mental illness treatments: inpatient day limitations, office 
visit limitations, annual and/or lifetime maximums, or higher deductibles and co-
payment rates.  Id. 
5  Id. at 329. 
6  See id.  
7  Vallerie Propper & Ginger L. Pomiecko, Parity for Mental Health: History 
and Consequences, in PUBLIC HEALTH MANAGEMENT & POLICY (2009), 
http://www.case.edu/med/epidbio/mphp439 (last visited Nov. 21, 2009). 
8  Univ. of Miami, Miller Sch. of Med. Health Insurance and Portability Act 
of 1996 (HIPAA), http://privacy.med.miami.edu/glossary/xd_hipaa.htm (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2008).  
9  142 CONG. REC. H9473-9564 (1996). 
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increase the coverage of mental health services under health plans without 
increasing such premiums.10  In the end, Senator Kassebaum and Kennedy 
decided to remove the amendment in order to pass their bill more swiftly.11   
Both of these men had personal experiences with mental illness, 
driving them to further advocate for this bill.  Senator Domenici’s daughter 
suffers from schizophrenia and Senator Wellstone’s brother suffers from 
bipolar disease.  Wellstone and Domenici once again attempted to gain the 
passage of the MHPA when they attached the amendment to the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and to the Public Health Services 
Act.12  This time the supporters of the amendment threatened to filibuster if 
the amendment was removed, as it had been in 1996.13    
 
B. THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT OF 1998 
 
The MHPA amendment went into effect on January 1, 1998.14  The 
amendment that was implemented reflected a compromise between the 
proponents and opponents of the bill, with the understanding and 
expectation that Congress would reach a more comprehensive agreement 
within six years.15  The MPHA included a sunset provision stating that 
“this section shall not apply to benefits for services furnished on or after 
September 30, 2001” by group health plans or health insurance coverage 
offered in connection with such a plan.16  However, Congress decided to 
extend the sunset provision every year since 2001, and a more 
comprehensive agreement was not reached until 2008 with the passage of 
the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act.17 
                                                                                                                 
10  Id.  
11  See id.  
12  Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, § 702, 110 Stat. 
2944 (current versions at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006)).  
13  See Propper & Pomiecko, supra note 7.  
14  29 U.S.C. § 1185a (Supp. II 1996) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a 
(2006)).  
15  Glen Cheng, Note, Caring for New Jersey’s Children with Autism: A 
Multifaceted Struggle for Parity, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 997, 1016 (2008).  
16  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5(f) (Supp. II 1996) (repealed 2008).  
17  See Cheng, supra note 15, at 1016 & n.135. “Public Law 107-116, § 701(a) 
extended the sunset to December 31, 2002.  Public Law 107-313, § 2(a) extended 
the sunset to December 31, 2003.  Public Law 108-197, § 2(a) extended the sunset 
to December 31, 2004.  Public Law 108-311, § 302(c) extended the sunset to 
December 31, 2005.” Id. at n.135. 
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The original MHPA legislation mandated generous mental health 
insurance benefits, although unfortunately the final legislation did not 
reflect this mandate.18  This was due to the fact that in order to satisfy the 
opposition groups and achieve some type of parity, several important 
measure that would have ensured comparable coverage between mental and 
health services and other medical services were abandoned.19  Due to the 
need for such compromises, the bill was viewed as only a step toward 
achieving full mental health parity.20  Senator Domenici, a sponsor of the 
bill, stated that the legislation was “a compromise to begin down the path 
of parity and nondiscrimination for mentally ill people in this country who 
have health insurance.”21 
The bill stated that if a group health plan does not include an 
aggregate lifetime limit on all medical and surgical benefits, the plan 
cannot impose any aggregate lifetime limit on mental health benefits.22  
Additionally, if the plan does have an aggregate lifetime limit on medical 
and surgical benefits it must apply the limit to mental health benefits and 
not distinguish between the two.23  The bill also contained provisions 
articulating the same standards for group health plans with regards to 
annual limits.24  If a plan does not include an annual limit on all medical 
and surgical benefits, the plan may not impose any annual limits on mental 
health benefits.25  One positive provision of the bill stated that for insurance 
plans that were subject to state laws, the MHPA did not preempt state laws 
that require more favorable treatment of mental health benefits.26  
However, this bill included many limitations that diminished the scope and 
force of the positive mandates.  
The bill did not require a group health plan to provide any mental 
health benefits.  If a group health plan did provide mental health benefits, 
the provisions of the bill did not affect the terms and conditions of the 
coverage such as limits on outpatient visits, in-patient day limits, days of 
                                                                                                                 
18  See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 330.  
19  Id.  
20  Id. at 342. 
21  Id. 
22  29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(1)(A) (Supp. II 1996) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 
1185a (2006)). 
23  Id. § 1185a(a)(1)(B).  
24  Id. § 1185a(a)(2)(B). 
25  Id. § 1185a(a)(2)(A). 
26  Michael J. Carroll, Note, The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996: Let It 
Sunset if Real Changes Are Not Made, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 553, 557-58 (2004). 
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coverage, deductibles, prior authorization requirements, requirements 
relating to medical necessity, or, in the case of a managed care plan, a 
primary care physician's referral requirement.27  And lastly, if the 
application of the bill to the plan resulted in an increase in cost of at least 
one percent, the group health plan was exempt.28  This last provision was 
included to alleviate fears that the bill would increase costs to a prohibitive 
level.  
 
C. SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS 
 
 The bill also did not include coverage for substance abuse 
treatment.  Many found this to be illogical due to the fact that many people 
who suffer from mental illnesses also experience a co-occurring substance 
abuse problem.29  The co-occurrence or dual diagnosis is often known as 
comorbidity.30  Treatment for substance use disorders is a critical element 
in an individual’s treatment for a mental disorder; similarly, treatment for a 
mental illness is a critical element in the recovery of a person with a 
substance use disorder.31  Often times the two are intertwined and recovery 
from either disorder is dependent upon the other.32  Treatment of each 
disorder separately has proven to be ineffective and research supports 
treatment that addresses both conditions.33  A successful model of such 
treatment includes case management, group interventions, and assertive 
outreach to bring people into treatment.34  
The Journal of the American Medical Association has found that 
roughly fifty percent of individuals with severe mental disorders are 
affected by substance use disorders; thirty-seven percent of alcohol abusers 
and fifty-three percent of drug abusers also have at least one serious mental 
                                                                                                                 
27  Id. at 557.  
28  Id. at 561.  
29 E.g., Charity Felts, Comment, Dealing with a Depressed Workforce: Are 
American Employers Doing Enough to Support the Mental Health Challenges 
Affecting Today’s Employees? 9 SCHOLAR 119, 129 (2006).  
30  Id. at 129-30 & n. 64. 
31  Id. at 129-30.  
32  Id.   
33  See id.  
34  NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, DUAL DIAGNOSIS AND INTEGRATED 
TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE DISORDERS (2009),  
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=By_Illness&Template=/TaggedPage/
TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=54&ContentID=23049.   
304 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
 
 
illness; and of all people diagnosed as mentally ill, twenty-nine percent 
abuse either alcohol or drugs.35  An Epidemiologic Catchment Area Survey 
found that individuals with severe mental disorders were at significant risk 
for developing a substance use disorder during their lifetime.36  The 
research specifically found that forty-seven percent of individuals with 
schizophrenia had a substance use disorder, more than four times greater 
than the general population, and that sixty-one percent of individuals with 
bipolar disorder also had a substance use disorder, which is five times 
greater than the general population.37  
It is clear that in order to provide effective treatment to the 
mentally ill, substance use disorders must also be treated.  However, 
mandated coverage for substance use disorders was not implemented until 
the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction 
Equity Act of 2008 was signed in to law.  
 
D. THE ROAD TO THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION 
EQUITY ACT OF 2008 
 
Due to the compromises that had to be made in the 1998 parity 
legislation, Senators Domenici and Wellstone came back in 2001 with a 
new bill in an effort to achieve full mental health parity.  This time they 
were joined by Patrick Kennedy (R- RI) and Jim Ramstad (R-MN), both of 
whom had struggled with addiction issues.38  The bill had begun to pick up 
momentum when Wellstone was killed in a plane crash in 2002.39  After 
this occurred, his son David began to advocate for the measure.40  The 
accumulation of the effort to pass a comprehensive mental parity bill was 
achieved this past year when the Mental Health Parity and Addiction 
Equity Act was passed under the 2008 economic stimulus package.  One 
reason the bill was able to achieve passage was that just before the start of 
the current Congressional session, several mental health groups won the 
support of employers and health insurers by alleviating concerns over the 
                                                                                                                 
35  Id. 
36  Id.  
37  Id.  
38  Julie Rovner, Mental Health Parity Approved with Bailout Bill, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=95435676. 
39  Id.  
40  Id.  
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cost of mental parity.41  A 2006 study in the New England Journal of 
Medicine found that insurers’ costs rose less than half a percentage point 
when full parity was required for federal workers starting in 2001. 42  The 
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate also stated that if the more 
generous House bill were enacted, the costs for premiums would increase 
for group health insurance by an average of only about 0.4 percent.43   
Two bills were originally formulated in the House and Senate.  
Through a series of compromises, the two sides were able to arrive at an 
agreement.  “A breakthrough occurred when sponsors of the House bill 
agreed to drop a provision that required insurers to cover treatment for any 
condition listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM), published by the American Psychiatric Association.”44  
The Senate also made concessions in the negotiation agreements and 
agreed to adopt some of the language in the House bill that required parity 
for out-of-network coverage.45 
Other reasons that such a comprehensive mental parity bill gained 
widespread support included the fact that new scientific research had 
revealed a biological basis and effective medical treatments for numerous 
mental illnesses, as well as evidence suggesting that providing mental 
health parity coverage will not be cost prohibitive.  Additionally, 
employers have realized that productivity tends to decrease when workers 
are not treated for mental illnesses and substance use disorders, and that if 
they do receive treatment it can reduce the number of lost work days.46  
Furthermore, some argue that the stigma of mental illness may have faded 
as society has seen many members of the armed forces returning from the 
                                                                                                                 
41  Id.  
42  Nancy Shute, Paying a High Price for Mental Health, U.S. NEWS, Oct. 25, 
2007, available at http://health.usnews.com/articles/health/health-plans/2007/10 
/25/paying-a-high-price-for-mental-health.html. 
43  CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE (2007), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8837/hr1424ec.pdf. 
44  Robert Pear, Bailout Provides More Mental Health Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 5, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/06/washington/ 
06mental.html. 
45  Frederic J. Frommer, Wellstone Son Launches Push on Mental Health Bill, 
BOSTON GLOBE, July 9, 2008, available at http://www.boston.com/news/ 
local/rhode_island/articles/2008/07/09/wellstone_son_launches_push_on_mental_
health_bill/. 
46  See Pear, supra note 44.  
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Middle East with serious mental health issues.47  And lastly, the 
experimentation with parity at both the state level and in the health 
insurance program for federal employees, including members of Congress, 
has proved workable.48 
 
III. THE PAUL WELLSTONE AND PETE DOMENICI MENTAL 
HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT OF 2008 
 
The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA) 
was signed into law on October 3, 2008.  The bill is an amendment to 
Section 712 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( 29 
U.S.C. 1185a).49  This bill will provide over one-third of Americans with 
improved mental health insurance coverage.50  It will also eliminate a 
practice that has been in place for decades, where insurers have placed 
much higher co-payments and deductibles on treatment for mental illness.  
The new bill also eradicates the practice of restricting the number of 
inpatient hospital treatment and outpatient visits for mental health 
treatment.51  Federal officials have stated that the new law will improve 
coverage for 113 million people.52  This figure includes 82 million people 
who are in employer-sponsored plans that are not subject to state 
regulations.53  The effective date, for most health plans, will be January 1, 
2010.54  
 
A.  SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE MHPAEA 
 
The new bill provides parity between medical and surgical benefits 
and mental health or substance use disorders for all “deductibles, 
copayments, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket expenses,” specifying that 
there are to be no separate cost sharing requirements that apply only to 
mental health or substance abuse disorder benefits.55  The bill also states 
that there shall be no difference between treatment limitations for mental 
                                                                                                                 
47  Id.  
48  Id. 
49  H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2008).  
50  Pear, supra note 44.  
51  See infra Part II.A.  
52  Pear, supra note 44.  
53  Id. 
54  Id.  
55  42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-5(a)(3) (West Supp. 2009). 
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health or substance use disorder benefits and medical and surgical 
benefits.56  Treatment limitations include “limits on the frequency of 
treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, or other similar limits on the 
scope or duration of treatment.”57  The bill also states that if a plan or 
coverage provides medical or surgical benefits by out-of-network 
providers, the plan must afford the same for mental health or substance use 
disorders.58 
The bill also has a few exceptions, including a cost exemption.  
The bill states that an employer is exempt from the parity requirements if 
the overall implementation of the bill would result in an increased cost of 
two percent or more during the first year after the legislation goes into 
effect and one percent in the following years.59  Furthermore, employers 
with fifty employees or less are exempt from the parity requirements.60  
This affects the almost 113 million American employees who work at 
companies with fewer than fifty employees.61 
The new bill also provides specific guidelines which articulate how 
an employer will qualify for the cost exemption.  To qualify for the 
exemption, the plan must implement the new requirements for at least six 
months.62  If after six months the employer can show that the 
implementation of the bill results in a cost increase of one percent, the plan 
must give notification to the participants and beneficiaries of its decision to 
claim the exemption to the health benefit plan.63  The exemption will not go 
into effect until thirty days after the notice requirements are fulfilled.64  If 
the employer fails to follow these requirements they will be subject to a tax 
penalty and fined $100 per day per individual who is affected by such a 
failure.65   
                                                                                                                 
56  Id. § 300gg-5(a)(3)(A)(ii). 
57  Id. § 300gg-5(a)(3)(B)(iii). 
58  Id. § 300gg-5(a)(5). 
59  Id. § 300gg-5(c)(2)(A)-(B).  
60  H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2008). 
61  LONG-AWAITED BREAKTHROUGH ON FEDERAL MENTAL HEALTH PARITY 
(2007), http://www.mhafc.org/pdf/FedParity2007.pdf. 
62 Peter M. Panken et al., Employment and Labor Relations Law for the 
Corporate Counsel and the General Practitioner, Litigating Claims of Employee 
Benefits, SN020 A.L.I-A.B.A. 169, 179 (2008). 
63  Id.  
64  Id.  
65  Id.   
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It is not clear at this time how many companies will qualify for this 
exemption.  The states that have experimented with parity have found that 
costs often did not rise to the one percent exemption level and frequently 
costs stayed the same or decreased.66  For example, when Texas 
implemented parity for severe mental illnesses and substance use disorders, 
a study found that there was a decrease of fifty percent in per-member, per-
person cost.67  Managed care was also introduced at the same time.68  
Similar results were found in North Carolina, and a study on the impact of 
mental health parity in California revealed that costs did not increase after 
one year.69   
The bill further states that insurers must publish the criteria for 
medical necessity determinations.70  The insurer must also provide an 
explanation for any denial of a claim made for mental health services.71  
However, the bill does not provide an explicit definition for mental health 
conditions or substance use disorders.  The bill states that “the term ‘mental 
health conditions’ and ‘substance use disorders’ are defined under the 
terms of the group plans and in accordance with applicable Federal and 
State law.”72  
The House of Representatives had urged the inclusion of a 
provision that would have required insurers to provide coverage for any 
condition listed in the DSM; however this was met with strong 
opposition.73  Many opposed the use of the DSM due to the fact that it 
contains conditions such as caffeine intoxication, sleep disorders and jetlag.  
In the end, the House dropped its requirement that all DMS-IV disorders be 
covered equitably.  
Without a clear definition of what the federal government 
considers to be a mental health condition or substance use disorder, such 
determinations will vary widely due to the fact that such definitions differ 
greatly from state to state.  This will result in a great variation in individual 
coverage depending on where people reside.  Additionally, with no clear 
                                                                                                                 
66 See Kate Mulligan, More Data Confirm Affordability of Parity, 37 
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 18 (2002), http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full 
/37/12/18.  
67  Id.  
68  Id.  
69  Id.  
70  See Pear, supra note 44.  
71  Id.  
72  42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-5(e)(4) (West Supp. 2009). 
73  See Pear, supra note 44.  
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definitions of what is considered to be a mental illness or substance use 
disorder, the issue of whether something is medically necessary will 
continue to come into debate.  Furthermore, the lack of categorization or 
definitions for mental health conditions and substance use disorders 
potentially leaves the door open for insurance providers to exclude illnesses 
more readily than if there were more stringent guidelines.  
 
IV. HOW STATES DEFINE MENTAL ILLNESS 
 
In the article An Analysis of the Definitions of Mental Illness Used 
in State Parity Laws, Marcia C. Peck, M.D., M.P.H., and Richard M. 
Scheffler,Ph.D. analyzed the mental health parity laws in thirty-four 
states.74  The study analyzed the different definitions used by the states in 
defining mental illness and the effect these variations have on the coverage 
that individuals with a mental illness receive.75  They found that three 
statutory terms were used to define mental illness in state parity legislation: 
(1) “broad-based mental illness,” (2) “serious mental illness,” or (3) 
“biologically based mental illness”.76  They further found that, 
States rarely, if ever, considered disease prevalence, needs-based 
studies, and clinical judgment. In our opinion the definitions that states use 
result from a political and economic process involving mental health 
advocates and providers, pro- and antiparity legislators, insurers, and 
employers.77 
Generally, the majority of states have laws specifically 
enumerating what is a mental illness.  These states base their mental illness 
definitions on “biologically based” mental illnesses  and “serious” mental 
illnesses.78  These definitions are most frequently included in parity 
legislation that outline the specific mental illnesses which must be covered 
by insurers on an equal basis with physical illnesses.  The states that use the 
term “biologically based mental illness” as the statutory term used to define 
mental illness in their parity legislation are: Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, 
                                                                                                                 
74  Marcia C. Peck, M.D., M.P.H. & Richard M. Scheffler, Ph.D., An Analysis 
of the Definitions of Mental Illness Used in State Parity Laws, 53 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVICES 1089, 1089 (2002), http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/ 
cgi/content/full/53/9/1089.  
75  Id.  
76  Id.  
77  Id. at 1091. 
78  Id. at 1089. 
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Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina, 
South Dakota and Virginia.79  The theoretical basis for this type of 
definition is biological psychiatry.80  The mental illnesses that these states 
list have a scientifically demonstrable effect on the brain.81  The argument 
for covering these illnesses is that the brain is being damaged by the mental 
illness and therefore should be treated and covered like any other damaged 
or injured organ.82  
The states that use the term “serious mental illness” as the statutory 
term used to define mental illness in their parity legislation are: California, 
Kansas, West Virginia, Louisiana, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Texas, 
Montana, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Hawaii.83  The 
theoretical basis for this type of definition is public policy, not clinical.84  
The aim of this definition is to identity severe and persistent mental 
illnesses based on “functional disability and duration of [the] illness.”85  
While these states all define mental illness on the same theoretical basis, 
either as “biologically based mental illness” or “serious mental illness,” it 
is important to note that there is still a great variety among what mental 
illnesses are covered.  
The states that define mental illness as “biologically based mental 
illness” all provide coverage for schizophrenia, major depressive disorder, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, and bipolar disorder.86  However, out of the 
ten states that define mental illness in that manner, only two (Virginia and 
New Jersey) define autism as a mental illness.87  Only Massachusetts, 
Missouri, Virginia, and South Carolina define childhood depression as a 
                                                                                                                 
79  JERRY CONNOLLY & JILL STRASSER, PH.D., DEFINING “MENTAL OR 
NERVOUS CONDITIONS,” 1st Sess., at 5 (Feb. 2006), http://www.cbs.state.or.us/ins/ 
public_meetings/sb_minutes/attachments/SB1_defining-presentation.pdf. 
80  Id.  
81  Id.  
82  See id.  
83  See Peck & Scheffler, supra note 74, at 1092 tbl. 2. 
84  CONNOLY, supra note 29, at 5. 
85  Id.   
86  See Peck & Scheffler, supra note 74, at 1093 tbl. 3.  
87  Id.; see also, IOWA CODE ANN. § 514c.22 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
17B:26-2.1s (West 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3412.1:01 (2007).  On July 1, 
2009, Massachusetts began to include autism in its definition of mental illness.  
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176B § 4A (2007). 
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mental illness88 and only Virginia defines attention deficient/hyperactive 
disorder (ADHD) as a mental illness.89  Massachusetts, Missouri and New 
Hampshire are the only states in the group that consider post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) to be a mental illness.90   
Similar to the variation of definitions that exist between states that 
define mental illness as “biologically based,” there is great variation in the 
illnesses covered in states which define it as “serious mental illness.”  For 
example, California’s definition includes five disorders: schizophrenia, 
schizo-affective disorder, bipolar disorders and delusional depressions, and 
pervasive developmental disorder.91  Maine’s definition, on the other hand, 
includes fourteen disorders: psychotic disorders, including schizophrenia, 
dissociative disorders, mood disorders, anxiety disorders, personality 
disorders, paraphilias, attention deficit and disruptive behavior disorders, 
pervasive developmental disorders, tic disorders, eating disorders, 
including bulimia and anorexia, and substance abuse-related disorders.92  
These examples illustrate that simply because states have drafted their 
statutory definitions based on the same theoretical basis, it does not mean 
that the same illnesses will be covered.  
As Doctors. Peck and Scheffler noted, in addition to “biologically 
based” definitions, some states use “broad-based” definitions of mental 
illness in their statutes.93  “Broad-based” definitions are based upon the 
                                                                                                                 
88  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176B, § 4A(a) (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
376.826(4)(b),(d) (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN.  § 38-71-290 (1976); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 38.2-3412.1:01(E) (LexisNexis 2007). 
89  VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3412.1:01(E) (LexisNexis 2007).  See MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 176B, § 4A(c) (West 2009) which states that "[A]ny such 
subscription certificate shall also provide benefits on a non-discriminatory basis for 
children and adolescents under the age of 19 for the diagnosis and treatment of 
non-biologically-based mental, behavioral or emotional disorders, as described in 
the most recent edition of the DSM, which substantially interfere with or 
substantially limit the functioning and social interactions of such a child or 
adolescent." This would include attention deficient/hyperactive disorder; however, 
it is not defined as a "biologically based" mental illness by Massachusetts. 
90  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176B, § 4A(a) (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
376.826(4)(c) (West 2002); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 417-E:1(III)(i) (LexisNexis 
2009).  
91  CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.15 (West 2005). 
92  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 2843(5-C)(A), (5-D)(A) (2000).  
93  See Peck & Scheffler, supra note 74, at 1090, 1091 tbl.1. 
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DSM.94  The use of a “broad-based” definition of mental illness was the 
position advocated by the House of Representatives during the debates over 
the current parity bill.  An example of states that use “broad-based” 
definitions include: Connecticut, Kentucky, Utah, Rhode Island, and 
Washington.95  These states undoubtedly provide greater coverage than do 
states that define mental illness according to a short list of “biologically 
based” or “serious” mental illnesses.  
There are two major mental health advocacy groups in the United 
States, the National Association for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) and the 
National Mental Health Associations (NMHA).  Each of these groups 
define mental illness differently.  NAMI promotes ending discrimination 
and demands fair legislative policies for “priority populations with serious 
mental illness.”  Priority populations include those with schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder, major depressive disorder, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, panic disorder and other severe anxiety disorders, and ADHD.96  
The NMHA defines mental illness broadly, addressing a person's ability to 
function rather than his or her diagnosis.97 
These different definitions can lead to different conclusions about 
what is a mental illness and therefore what is “medically necessary.”  The 
MHPAEA states that the definition of mental disorders and substance use 
disorders should be in accordance with state and federal laws.98  From the 
survey of many state statutes, it is clear that there is not a consensus on the 
state level of what is a mental illness.99  It should be noted that this 
                                                                                                                 
94  Id. at 1090. 
95  JERRY CONNOLLY & JILL STRASSER, DEFINING “MENTAL OR 
NERVOUS CONDITIONS,” Address before the Senate Advisory Committee, 
(Feb. 27, 2006).  
96 NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, PRIORITY AND SPECIAL POPULATION 
(2009), http://www.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Inform_Yourself/About_ 
Public_Policy/NAMI_Policy_Platform/2_Priority_and_Special_Populations.htm 
(last visited January 26, 2009).  
97  Peck & Scheffler, supra note 74, at 1091.  
98  42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-5(e)(4) (West. Supp. 2009). 
99  In addition to a lack of consensus on the state level for mental illness, 
Medicaid coverage that individuals receive also varies greatly from state to state.  
The states have wide latitude within the confines of the federal guidelines and 
therefore the number of people covered and the amounts that each states spends on 
services varies across the states. Similar to this note, this has led to a discussion of 
solutions that would result in more equitable coverage across the states. See John 
Holahan & David Liska, Variations in Medicaid Spending Among States Series A, 
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variation does not appear with regard to what the states view to be a 
physical illness.  In fact the states do not even deem it necessary to 
statutorily define physical illness.  Therefore, with such a wide variation on 
the definition of mental illness in state laws, insurers will likely try to adopt 
the most stringent and narrow definitions of mental illness.  As evidenced 
by the varying state laws, depending on the state in which one resides, the 
illnesses covered vary greatly.  
 
V. BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF MENTAL ILLNESSES 
 
The way society views mental illness has greatly evolved over the 
last two centuries.100  The most recent report from the Surgeon General 
found that the stigma attached to mental illness dates back to the 19th 
century separation between mental health treatment and mainstream 
treatment in the United States.101  National surveys have tracked the 
public’s perception of mental illness since the 1950’s.102  The Surgeon 
General’s Report states that “[i]n the 1950s, the public viewed mental 
illness as a stigmatized condition and displayed an unscientific 
understanding of mental illness.”103  In contrast, a 1996 survey found that 
people had a greater scientific understanding of mental illness; however, 
there was still a large amount of social stigma and people were more 
inclined to consider an individual with schizophrenia to have a mental 
illness in comparison to an individual with depression.104 
Mental illness is not diagnosed in the same way that physical 
illnesses may be diagnosed.  One cannot test for mental illness by doing a 
                                                                                                                          
No. A-3 URB. INST. 1, 1-3 (1997), http://www.urban.org/publications/307035.html; 
Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and 
Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 469-70 (2008) stating 
“Though Medicaid was created to provide a statutory entitlement to states, 
providers, and enrollees, it has failed to ensure that enrollees receive promised 
benefits, both by lack of agency action and lack of statutory enforcement 
provisions.” Id. at 469.  
100  See MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 6-7 (1999),  
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter1/sec1.html#overarchi
ng.  
101  Id. at 6. 
102  Id. at 7.  
103  Id.  
104  Id.  
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blood test, x-rays, or throat swab.105  Mental health professionals often 
meet with their patients to discuss the patients’ symptoms and to have them 
describe how they have been feeling and how these feelings have affected 
their daily lives.106  They may ask the patient about the length of time these 
symptoms have persisted as well as their severity.107  After conducting this 
type of consultation, the mental health professionals will consult the DSM-
IV.108  
In addition to this traditional method of diagnosing mental illness, 
there have been many advances in science that have permitted mental 
health professionals to analyze and diagnose their patients.  For years 
scientists have been trying to investigate the biological and chemical 
processes of the brain.  There have been many technological advances 
since the 1970’s that now permit scientists and researchers to more closely 
examine and study the living brain.109  One such technological advance 
includes magnetic resonance imagining, commonly known as MRI.  This 
technology has allowed researchers to compare normal brain functions with 
those of individuals suffering from mental illness.110 
Today it is clear that many mental disorders have a biological 
basis.111  Mental illness is associated with changes in the brain’s structure, 
chemistry and function.112  Scientists already have the knowledge of how 
the brain typically functions and this new and ongoing research, which has 
revealed how the biological processes change when a person has a mental 
illness, has caused “scientists to minimize the distinctions between mental 
illnesses and these other brain disorders.”113 
                                                                                                                 
105  NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, THE SCIENCE OF MENTAL ILLNESS 23 (2005), 
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(last visited March 5, 2009).  
106  Id.  
107  Id.  
108  Id. at 23-24. 
109  Okianer Christian Dark, Tort Liability and the “Unquiet Mind”: A 
Proposal to Incorporate Mental Disabilities into the Standard of Care, 30 T. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 169, 202 n.176 (2004).  
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111  See MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 
100, at 5, 15.   
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The brain’s basic functional unit is the neuron.114  The neuron 
possesses dendrites which receive signals and an axon that transmits the 
signals to other neurons.115  The area where an axon terminal ends near a 
receiving dendrite is called the synapse.116  In order for a neuron to relay 
information it uses both electrical signals and chemical messages called 
neurotransmission.117  People with mental illness have been found to have 
brain scans that do not reflect a normal functioning brain. 
In the United States over the last five years, research studies 
examining the link between physical brain abnormalities and disorders like 
severe depression and schizophrenia have begun to make a strong case that 
the disorders are not scary tales of minds gone mad but manifestations of 
actual, and often fatal, problems in brain circuitry.118  
In 1990 Congress and the President declared the 1990s to be the 
“Decade of the Brain,”119 and many studies over the last twenty years have 
made the biological connection between mental illness and the brain which 
has helped to reshape the way people look at mental illness.120  This new 
research has refuted “the nineteenth century distinction between the organic 
mental illnesses (dementias and toxic psychoses) and the functional mental 
illnesses (including the neuroses and various affective or depressive 
disorders and the schizophrenic syndromes.)”121  Physical brain 
abnormalities can be viewed as biological instead of “mental” illness.”122  
In addition to being able to view the brain and its neural and electrical 
responses, scientists have found that certain mental illnesses also have a 
genetic basis.  For example, Dr. Steven E. Hyman, a former director of the 
National Institute of Mental Health, has stated that “[g]enetic mutations and 
                                                                                                                 
114  Id. at 24.   
115  Id. at 25. 
116  Id.  
117  Id. at 25-26. 
118  Sarah Kershaw, Insure Me, Please, The Murky Politics of Mind-Body, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2008, at WK, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/30 /weekinreview/30kers.html. 
119  Proclamation No. 6158, 55 Fed. Reg. 29,553-54 (July 20, 1990). 
120  See, e.g., Richard E. Gardner, III, Comment, Mind Over Matter?: The 
Historical Search for Meaningful Parity Between Mental and Physical Health 
Care Coverage, 49 EMORY L.J. 675, 682 (2000); Kershaw, supra note 118. 
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122  Id. at 682-83. 
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unlucky combinations of normal genes contribute to the risk of autism and 
schizophrenia.”123  
Additional research has proven that there is a biological basis for 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and major depression.124  Schizophrenia is 
one of the most debilitating types of mental illness.125  It can often interfere 
with an individual’s ability to think clearly, manage emotions, make 
decisions, interact and relate, and differentiate between reality and 
fantasy.126  Research on the biological basis of schizophrenia has shown 
that there is a possible genetic disposition to the illness.127 
Research has shown that there are possible abnormalities in certain 
genes or in certain areas of the genome at a specific point on a specific 
chromosome.128  Hundreds of studies have also proven that schizophrenic 
patients have less grey matter than non-schizophrenic patients in addition 
to enlarged ventricles and fluid-filled spaces in the brain.129  Additionally, 
electrical transmissions in schizophrenic patients have been found to be 
abnormal.130  This conclusion was reached in a study where electrodes were 
placed on the heads of schizophrenic patients and the electrical events were 
recorded and analyzed.131  A schizophrenic’s brain’s neurons do not 
function normally in the frontal lobe, revealing that a schizophrenic patient 
has fewer neurons than a normal patient, that their neurons are more 
randomly organized, and that their frontal lobes are also smaller.132  “The 
National Institute of Mental Health likens the search for better treatments 
                                                                                                                 
123  See Pear, supra note 44.  
124  See Gardner, supra note 120, at 683-85.  
125  Id. at 683. 
126  NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, SCHIZOPHRENIA (2009), 
http://www.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/Helpline1/Schizophrenia_Fact_Sheet
.htm.  
127  Subhagata Chattopadhyay, Tracking Genetic and Biological Basis of 
Schizophrenia, 2 INTERNET J. MENTAL HEALTH (2004).  
128  See generally, Richard E. Straub & Daniel R. Weinberger, Schizophrenia 
Genes-Famine to Feast, 60 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 81, 82 (2006). 
129  Martha E. Shenton et al., A Review of MRI Findings in Schizophrenia, 49 
SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 1, 23, 34-35 (2001). 
130  See id. at 35.  
131  Jyrki Ahveninen et al., Inherited Auditory-Cortical Dysfunction in Twin 
Pairs Discordant for Schizophrenia, 60 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 612, 613-14 
(2006). 
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for those suffering from schizophrenia . . . to those involving heart disease 
or diabetes.”133 
Research over the last few decades has also revealed a biological 
basis in depression.  The National Alliance on Mental Health has stated that 
scientific research “has firmly established that major depression is a 
biological, medical illness.”134  Major depression is a condition which is 
continually persistent and can drastically interfere with an individual’s 
behavior, mood, level of activity, and physical health.135  Research has 
shown that patients with major depression have a decreased level of neural 
activity in a specific area of the brain.136  Additionally, major depression 
responds well to biologically based therapy which suggests that there is an 
organic nature to the illness.137  Among medical illnesses, depression is the 
leading cause of disability in the United States and many other countries.138 
In addition to schizophrenia and major depression, research has 
shown that there is also a biological basis for bipolar disorder.  Bipolar 
disorder, which is also known as manic depression, causes extreme shifts in 
one’s mood, energy and overall functioning.139  Recurring episodes of 
mania and depression can last from a few days to months and usually begin 
in adolescence or early adulthood.140  Studies have suggested that there 
may be a genetic basis for bipolar disorder due in part to the fact that the 
disorder often runs in families.141  The exact cause of bipolar disorder is 
unknown, although scientists believe that it is caused by multiple factors 
which produce a chemical imbalance in certain areas of the brain.142  While 
schizophrenia, major depression and bipolar disorder are included in most 
state definitions of mental illness, many other severe disorders “for which a 
                                                                                                                 
133  See Dark, supra note 109, at 202. 
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biological basis has emerged through recent research” are excluded from 
the definition of mental illness by many states.143   
The advocates of mental health parity have tried to incorporate 
specific definitions of mental illness in past legislation.  In 1999, Senators 
Domenici and Wellstone introduced the Mental Health Equitable 
Treatment Act of 1999.144  This bill provided for specific illnesses to be 
covered called “severe biologically based mental illness” which included 
“schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major depression, obsessive compulsive 
and panic disorders, posttraumatic stress disorder, autism, and other severe 
and disabling mental disorders such as severe anorexia nervosa and 
attention-deficit/hyper activity disorder.”145  This bill did not pass and three 
years later they introduced the Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 
2002.146  This bill advocated for a broader definition of mental illness and 
stated that mental health benefits should include “all categories of mental 
health conditions listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fourth Edition, or the most recent edition.”147  This was the 
position advocated by the House of Representatives during the debate over 
the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction 
Equity Act of 2008, but it was ultimately rejected.148   
With the growing acceptance of mental illnesses and their 
biological basis, there is no reason not to have a specific list of severe 
mental illness and substance use disorders in mental parity legislation.  The 
new legislation states that mental health conditions or substance use 
disorders can be defined under the terms of the group health plan in 
accordance with applicable federal and state law.149  Certain states do not 
even define mental illness at all and leave it solely to the health plan 
provider to define.150  The evidence that many mental illnesses are 
                                                                                                                 
143  Gardner, supra note 120, at 685. For example, many states exclude 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, eating disorders, and post-traumatic 
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148  See Pear, supra note 44.  
149  Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 
§512, 122 Stat. 3881-3892 (2008). 
150  See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 353. 
2009] MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION 319 
 
 
biologically based and treatable is stronger today than it ever has been.  
Therefore, moving forward, there should be an attempt to pass an 
amendment that would more specifically state which mental illnesses 
should be covered instead of leaving it to the states and group plans, which 
results in a great variation in coverage that individuals may receive.   
A good starting point for defining mental illness in parity 
legislation would be the definition of mental illness advocated for in 1999 
that listed only severe mental illnesses.  This definition was much narrower 
than the position advocated in 2002 and advocated by the House of 
Representatives in 2008, which was to include all illnesses in the DSM.  
While many states provide coverage for schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and 
major depression, many states do not cover obsessive-compulsive and 
panic disorders, PTSD, autism, ADHD and severe eating disorders, all of 
which were included in the list of severe mental illness in 1999.  An 
amendment defining mental illness under these terms151 would provide the 
minimum list of mental illnesses that insurers would be required to cover.  
States should of course be allowed to provide additional coverage at their 
discretion.  
 
VI. THE DIMINISHED SOCIETAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH 
PROVIDING MENTAL HEALTH PARITY COVERAGE 
 
One of the reasons that MHPAEA was able to gain passage is that 
concerns over the cost implications of providing parity for mental health 
coverage were alleviated.  Many feared that the cost of health plans for 
employers and insurers would skyrocket, however that was proven to be an 
unwarranted concern.  As previously mentioned, a 2006 study in the New 
England Journal of Medicine found that insurers' costs rose less than half a 
percentage point when full parity was required for federal workers starting 
in 2001.152  Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, 
prepared in 2007, found that if the more generous House bill were enacted, 
                                                                                                                 
151  The definition would include “severe biologically based mental illness” 
defined as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major depression, obsessive-compulsive 
and panic disorders, posttraumatic stress disorder, autism, the eating disorders 
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152  See Shute, supra note 42.   
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the costs for premiums would increase for group health insurance by an 
average of only about 0.4 percent.153   
In addition to the fact that employer costs regarding health plans 
will not increase, many factors point towards proving that providing mental 
health parity will reduce the costs associated with treating mental illness.154  
For example, many studies have shown that individuals who receive 
psychiatric care incur fewer medical costs over the long term and less 
morbidity than those individuals who do not receive psychiatric 
treatment.155 
Psychiatrist Stephen M. Stahl, Director of the Clinical 
Neuroscience Research Center, has found numerous hidden costs that are 
associated with not treating major depression.  Examples of these hidden 
costs include but are not limited to: fatal accidents resulting from impaired 
concentration; patient morbidity such as suicide attempts, accidents, 
resultant illnesses, lost jobs, failure to advance in career and school; and 
social costs such as dysfunctional families, absenteeism, decreased 
productivity, job-related illnesses, and adverse effects on quality control in 
the workplace.156  Employers have also found that productivity tends to 
increase after workers are treated for mental illnesses and substance abuse 
problems and that such treatments can reduce the number of lost 
workdays.157  The American Psychiatric Association has reported that 
untreated mental illness costs employers $70 billion each year, which is 
primarily due to lost productivity.158 
In addition to the impact that mental illness has on work 
productivity, the mentally ill account for a large portion of both the 
homeless and the incarcerated.  The Federal Task Force on Homelessness 
and Severe Mental Illness found that approximately one-third of the 
                                                                                                                 
153  CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE  (2007) at 4, 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8837/hr1424ec.pdf.  
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estimated 600,000 homeless people suffer from a severe mental illness.159  
Additionally, “[a]mong all jail inmates, twenty-four percent reported at 
least one symptom of psychotic disorder, and sixty-four percent reported 
some degree of mental health problems.”160  The trend in the last several 
decades has been a shift from institutionalization of the mentally ill to the 
incarceration of the mentally ill.161  The reasons for this trend often have to 
do with a lack of funding from both the federal and state level, disallowing 
many mental hospitals and community-based mental health services the 
ability to provide adequate treatment.162  This has lead to an increase, 
among other things, to the already increasing incarceration rate.163  Studies 
have shown that incarcerating one individual costs more than $23,000 per 
year, which is undoubtedly a huge cost on society.164  While it is clear that 
there have been grave concerns over the cost of implementing mental 
health parity in the past,165 numerous studies and data reports have 
alleviated those fears.166  Without a specific definition of mental illness, 
many severe disorders will continue to go untreated and society will 
continue to suffer the consequences of inadequate treatment of the mentally 
ill.   
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008 is a significant advancement in providing 
parity for mental illnesses and substance use disorders in that it finally 
provided complete parity between medical and surgical benefits and mental 
health and substance use disorders.167  Although it is a significant step up 
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from all previous parity bills, the new bill still has a glaring deficiency 
which, in order to be remedied, requires the passage of an amendment 
which would aid in achieving full parity for all citizens across all states.  
The bill currently does not specifically define mental illness or 
substance use disorders.  It states that the definition of mental illness and 
substance use disorders should be in accordance with state and federal 
laws.168  As evidenced by the varying state laws, the illnesses covered, and 
thus how much coverage individuals are afforded, varies greatly depending 
on the state in which one resides.  With the growing acceptance of mental 
illnesses and the evidence that mental illnesses are biologically based, it is 
clear that mental illnesses are serious disorders that can be and must be 
treated.  Monetary costs have been a central part of the parity debates for 
years and have often been a major factor in how states shape their 
definitions of mental illness.  Now that concerns over cost have been 
alleviated, it is no longer a valid argument against a list of specific mental 
illnesses to be covered.  Furthermore, society as a whole will greatly 
benefit from the adequate treatment of the mentally ill.169  
An amendment should be passed in order to provide a specific 
definition of what constitutes a mental illness or substance use disorder so 
that the coverage people receive is not varied.  The amendment should be 
based on the definition that was advocated in the Mental Health Equitable 
Treatment Act of 1999.170  That bill provided for specific illnesses to be 
covered called “severe biologically-based mental illness” and included 
“schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major depression, obsessive compulsive 
and panic disorders, posttraumatic stress disorder, autism” as well as 
“anorexia nervosa and attention-deficit/hyper activity disorder.”171  An 
amendment should be passed based on this previously proposed definition 
and should identify each of the illnesses listed above.  The MHPAEA has 
done a great deal in providing parity between mental illness, substance use 
coverage and physical illness coverage.  However, in order to truly provide 
parity for mental illness and substance use disorders, an amendment should 
be passed so that individuals throughout the country receive the same level 
of coverage and can receive treatment for the most debilitating mental 
disorders.  
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EXAMINING CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR  
INCREASING THE FEDERAL ROLE IN  
DEALING WITH COASTAL HURRICANE RISK 
 
Louis Cruz * 
 
*** 
This note distinguishes predatory from subprime lending, while focusing on 
the insurance consequences of predatory lending.  It considers how single 
premium credit insurance (SPCI) and private mortgage insurance (PMI), 
two mortgage-related insurance products, have affected the current 
predatory lending crisis.  This note argues for reform that eliminates SPCI 
and makes PMI a more feasible option for insureds.  Such reform would 
allow subprime lenders to offer mortgages to qualified borrowers, while 
reducing the amount of predatory lending and foreclosures.  The 
introduction of this note presents some background information regarding 
subprime lending and predatory lending.  The second part examines 
several issues concerning the role of insurance in the subprime mortgage 
market.  Third, reform measures necessary to alleviate the issues with 
mortgage insurance are discussed.  Finally, the fourth section studies 
recent actions by the Federal Reserve Board and analyzes whether they 
can be expected to bring meaningful change.  It concludes that, although 
the Fed’s new regulations are a step in the right direction, there needs to 
be an outright ban of SPCI and predatory must be stopped completely.  
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent flurry of coastal risk proposals vying for federal 
adoption mirrors the sudden onslaught of a severe coastal storm.  The 
clamor to develop a framework to effectively manage coastal risk is 
understandable.  The public and private sector response to Hurricane 
Katrina show that the current system for handling coastal risk is becoming 
less feasible by the day.   Katrina has led leading observers to note that, 
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“[i]nsurers – and society as a whole – need to reconsider the potential for 
mega-catastrophes” and in turn “will need to adjust to this new reality.”1 
Ideally, the proposal that emerges as successful should exhibit 
three characteristics.  First, the plan the federal government ultimately 
adopts should expand the capacity of the existent private market to field 
coastal risk so as to better deal with future storms.  Second, the plan should 
avoid completely crowding out the existent private sector players that 
already seek to insure coastal risk.  Finally, the successful plan should 
minimize the degree to which non-coastal property owners subsidize the 
risk undertaken by those who choose to live in storm-prone coastal areas.   
It may be that no current proposal fully satisfies all three criteria.  
Indeed, upon analysis, none of them seem to.   However, some of the 
current coastal risk plans contain aspects that show promise in light of 
these three criteria.  The proposals that show promise lack federal 
reinsurance mechanisms, thereby not crowding out private market 
reinsurers and sidestepping large scale cross-subsidization.  Additionally, 
the most favorable of the available plans contain coastal risk transferring 
mechanisms designed to increase the use of the private capital market’s 
capacity to deal with future catastrophic coastal risk.   Also, plans that 
contemplate homeowner catastrophe savings accounts may provide a way 
to enable coastal residents to afford actuarially sound private market 
insurance rates.  Finally, plans that envision private insurer catastrophe 
reserving may present ways to increase private market capacity to deal with 
coastal catastrophe risk, thereby keeping private insurers in the business of 
insuring coastal risk.  
The following examination of the current proposals begins with a 
brief survey of the meteorological and geographical settlement trends that 
have worked to necessitate an immediate rethinking of coastal risk policy.   
Next, this study will move into a review of the current coastal risk 
framework.  Following this, the current proposals will each be discussed.  
Finally, each proposal will be evaluated against the capacity, displacement 
and cross-subsidization criteria discussed above. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
 
A. EXTREME WEATHER TRENDS 
 
On a world-wide scale, extreme weather events are on the rise.  
The number of major weather-caused natural catastrophes has increased 
from an average of 1.5 per year since the 1950s to 4.5 in recent years.2  As 
part of this trend, catastrophic storms in the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the 
U.S. have also become more prevalent.3  While climatologists disagree as 
to whether the available data is adequate to determine the magnitude of this 
current extreme weather event uptick,4 what cannot be debated is that the 
number of storms per hurricane season in the Atlantic and Gulf coasts has 
increased since as recently as 1995.5  In comparison to the period of 1970-
1994, the amount of hurricane activity on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts has 
increased by over 60% in the ten years that followed.6  Further examination 
of the historical extreme weather data reveals that compared to an Atlantic 
basin annual average of 1.5 major storms a year in the period from 1970 to 
1994, the region has experienced an average of 3.9 major storms per year 
since 1995.7  When measuring only the subset of storms that actually make 
                                                                                                                 
2  COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DES ASSURANCES, REDUCING THE SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATURAL CATASTROPHES 10 
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landfall the data is just as striking.  From the 1930s to the 1960s, there was 
an average of 1.8 storms per year making landfall, while over the last 
twelve years that figure has risen to 2.2.8    
In spite of the fact that the causes of this trend are beyond the 
scope of this study, what is clear is that there has been a pronounced 
increase in the number of coastal storms in the southeast Atlantic and Gulf 
coasts over the past decade.  While this meteorological trend is startling 
when considered on its own, what makes it all the more attention worthy is 
that it coincides with a trend of increasing coastal populations in the United 
States.   
 
B. COASTAL POPULATION TRENDS 
 
At present, coastal counties comprise 17% of the total land area of 
the United States, but claim 53% of the country’s total population.9  While 
the country’s coastal-to-non-coastal population ratio has remained 
relatively stable over the last forty years, the limited area of coastal 
geography has contributed to significantly higher population densities in 
these coastal areas.10   Data from the 2000 census show that while the 
country at large experienced a density increase in the range of 38% from 
1970 to 2000, the Southeast Atlantic coast area had an increase in 
population density of nearly 66% over the same period.11  This study 
focuses particularly on those coastal regions that have historically been 
most susceptible to coastal storm damage: the Southeast Atlantic and Gulf 
coasts.12 
Currently, 9% of the nation’s coastal population resides in the 
Southeast Atlantic region.13  Florida in particular has most of its total 
                                                                                                                 
8  Manuel Lonfat et al., Atlantic Basin, U.S. and Caribbean Landfall Activity 
Rates over the 2006-2010 Period: An Insurance Industry Perspective, 59A TELLUS 
499, 500 (2007). 
9  KRISTEN M. CROSSETT ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
POPULATION TRENDS ALONG THE COASTAL UNITED STATES: 1980-2008 6 (2004). 
10  Id. 
11  KUNREUTHER, supra note 6, at 1. 
12  See Stanley A. Changnon, Characteristics of Severe Atlantic Hurricanes in 
the United States: 1949-2006, 48 NAT. HAZARDS 329, 333 (2009) (noting that in 
the 57 year period examined, the Southeast and South ranked first and second in 
the United States for the number of losses from storm events). 
13  CROSSETT ET AL., supra note 9, at 16. 
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population distributed throughout its coastal counties.14  Specifically 
noteworthy is the fact that it had been anticipated that the southeast 
Atlantic region’s coastal population would increase by 1.1 million people, 
or 8%, between 2003 and 2008.15  This would be the largest percentage 
increase of all U.S. coastal regions within that five year period.16  
Concomitant with this population growth is an increase in insured coastal 
property.  More than 80% of Florida’s total insured property exposure can 
be classified as coastal.17  The estimated total value of insured coastal 
exposure in Florida is over $2 trillion dollars.18  
Extending from the Florida Keys to southern Texas and including 
the coastline of six states, the Gulf region’s coastal population of 19.1 
million residents claims just over 13% of the nation’s total coastal 
population.19   The majority of the population in both Louisiana and the 
western coast of Florida are in Gulf coastal counties.20   A total of 23% of 
the region’s total land area and 32% of the region’s population are 
distributed throughout the Gulf Region’s 144 coastal counties.21  The 
combined commercial and residential insured exposure in the Gulf region 
is estimated to be over one trillion dollars. 22 
  
C. IMPLICATIONS AND IMPACT 
 
On the whole, the total insured value of property in U.S. coastal 
regions is increasing at an astonishing rate.   Recently it was determined 
that from 2004 through 2007, the insured value of properties in coastal 
areas of the United States grew at a compound annual growth rate of just 
                                                                                                                 
14  Id.  
15  Id. 
16  Id. 
17  Press Release, Prop. Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am., Coastal Insurance 
Concerns Demonstrate Need for New Catastrophe Solutions (Mar. 15, 2007), 
http://www.pciaa.net/ (follow "Media Center: News Releases: By Date" menu; 
then scroll to Mar. 15, 2007). 
18  Id. 
19  CROSSETT ET AL., supra note 9, at 18.    
20  Id.  
21  Id.  
22  See Ieva M. Augustums, Nearly $1T of Insured Property in Ike’s Path, 
USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/ economy/2008-09-
11-2141571223_x.htm. 
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over 7%.23  This annual growth rate will lead to a doubling of the total 
insured coastal value every decade.24  In light of the recent increases in 
extreme weather events in the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, this insured growth 
takes on a number of serious implications.  Due to the increasing frequency 
of coastal storms, the growing size of coastal communities and the rapid 
growth rate of insured exposure concentrated in coastal areas, extreme 
weather related events are becoming increasingly financially destructive.  
Five of the ten most expensive storms in U.S. history have occurred since 
1990.25 Of particular import, the 2004/05 hurricane season was 
unprecedented.  In terms of U.S. insured loss, the six hurricanes that hit the 
southeast Atlantic and Gulf Coasts make up half of the list of the twelve 
largest disasters in the last forty years.26  Katrina alone is the most costly 
event the U.S. insurance industry has ever experienced, resulting in more 
than $61 billion in insured losses and $125 billion in total losses.27   
Another important implication for these current trends in extreme 
weather and coastal population growth is the need for a revaluation of 
current policy.  The federal role in coastal disaster policy has been the 
subject of recent intense debate.  To date, a flurry of legislative and private 
sector proposals have followed in the wake of the 2004/05 hurricane 
season.  Each of these proposals envisions a reoriented role for federal 
government in coastal catastrophe policy in an attempt to overhaul the 
current coastal risk policy framework.   
 
III. CURRENT COASTAL RISK POLICY FRAMEWORK 
 
In the context of coastal hurricanes, the current policy landscape is 
a patchwork of private insurance, government assistance and government 
subsidized insurance programs.  Presently, private insurance plays a 
relatively limited role.  Due to the fact that many private insurers perceive 
the risks associated with coastal catastrophic loss as unacceptably high, 
many have curtailed writing such polices.28  Some major insurers, such as 
                                                                                                                 
23  AIR WORLDWIDE CORP., THE COASTLINE AT RISK: 2008 UPDATE TO THE 
ESTIMATED INSURED VALUE OF U.S. COASTAL PROPERTIES 1 (2008).  
24  Id. 
25  ALEXANDER BOLONKIN, CONTROL OF REGIONAL AND GLOBAL WEATHER 3 
(2007), http://arxiv.org/pdf/physics/0701097.  
26  KUNREUTHER, supra note 6, at 2. 
27  COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DES ASSURANCES, supra note 2, at 10.  
28  See, e.g., Sandra Fleishman, Sea Change in Insurers’ Coastal Coverage; 
Many Firms Opt to End or 
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Allstate, no longer write new policies in Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
parts of New York, and coastal Texas.29  Similarly, State Farm has stopped 
offering insurance that would protect against storm damage within one mile 
of the ocean and announced in 2006 that it would sell no new policies in 
Mississippi.30 Moreover, where available, private coverage often protects 
against wind damage but, excludes flood coverage.31  As a result, property 
owners who want flood coverage must purchase it separately.  This is done 
through either the National Flood Insurance Program or state sponsored 
Fair Access to Insurance Requirement plans.32 
 
A. NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 
 
The National Flood Insurance Program was established by 
Congress in 1968.33  When enacted the goals of the National Flood 
Insurance Program were twofold: minimize flood damage through 
floodplain management, and provide property owners with flood 
insurance.34   Corresponding to these goals are the two main initiatives that 
currently characterize the National Flood Insurance Program.  First, 
National Flood Insurance Program actively generates flood maps indicating 
100-year floodplains.35  These maps anchor the National Flood Insurance 
                                                                                                                          
Limit New Policies, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2006, at F1. 
29  Spencer S. Hsu, Insurers Retreat from Coasts; Katrina Losses May Force 
More Costs on Taxpayers, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2006, at A1; see also Examining 
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 24 (2007) (Statement of J. Robert Hunter, Director of 
Insurance, Consumer Federation of America). 
30  Fleishman, supra note 28; see also An Examination of the Availability and 
Affordability of Property and Casualty Insurance in the Gulf Coast and Other 
Coastal Regions: Hearing  Before the S. Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 7 (2007) (statement of Mel Martinez, Member, S. 
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs). 
31  JUSTIN R. PIDOT, COASTAL DISASTER INSURANCE IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL 
WARMING: THE CASE FOR RELYING ON THE PRIVATE MARKET 37 (Georgetown 
Envtl. Law & Policy Inst., 2007).   
32  Id. at 12, 21. 
33  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-285, CLIMATE CHANGE: 
FINANCIAL RISKS TO FEDERAL AND PRIVATE INSURERS IN COMING DECADES ARE 
POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT 46 (2007). 
34  See PIDOT, supra note 31, at 12-13. 
35  Id. at 13.   
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Program’s premium rates and mitigation requirements.36  Second, the 
program offers up to $250,000 in insurance against flood damage to 
homeowners in communities that have adopted floodplain regulations 
meeting the minimum standards set by the program.37  Although 
participation was initially voluntary the National Flood Insurance Program 
now requires homeowner’s within mapped floodplains who have federally 
insured mortgages to purchase and maintain flood insurance. 38   
Perhaps the most important aspect of the National Flood Insurance 
Program is the Write-Your-Own program.  In 1983 the federal government 
permitted private companies to write National Flood Insurance Program 
coverage under the Write-Your-Own program.39   Under this program 
private insurers wrote policies and handled claims and in exchange 
received roughly a third of the premiums collected as sales commission and 
sustained 3.3% of incurred losses.40  Currently, of the nearly 5.3 million 
policies written by the National Flood Insurance Program, upwards of 95% 
of the policies are written by private companies under the Write-Your-Own 
program.41 
 In spite of its long history, the National Flood Insurance Program 
has significant shortcomings.  Due to the heavy subsidization of the 
premiums by the federal government the program is often criticized as not 
being actuarially sound and therefore ultimately not self-supporting.42  The 
effect of subsidized premiums is two-fold.  First, the program does not 
generate enough reserves to protect against catastrophic loss.43  This can be 
seen by the fact that of the $23 billion in claims paid out by the National 
Flood Insurance Program following Hurricane Katrina much of this money 
                                                                                                                 
36  Id. 
37  42 U.S.C. §§ 4012, 4013 (2006).  
38  42 U.S.C. § 4012a (b)(1) (2006). 
39  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM APPEALS PROCEDURE 2, 5 (2006). 
40  WILLIAM O. JENKINS, JR., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GAO-05-
532T, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: OVERSIGHT OF POLICY ISSUANCE 
AND CLAIMS 8 (2005); Robert J. Rhee, Catastrophic Risk and Governance After 
Hurricane Katrina: A Postscript to Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy, 38 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581, 610 (2006). 
41  JENKINS, supra note 40, at 7. 
42  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GAO-06-119, FEDERAL EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT AGENCY: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO ENHANCE OVERSIGHT AND 
MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 9 (2005). 
43  Id. 
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came from loans taken directly from the federal treasury.44  Second, 
because the premiums are subsidized and therefore artificially low, 
property owners have no incentive to avoid moral hazard in or to invest 
mitigation measures.45  This dynamic is demonstrated by the fact that 
property owners that have repeatedly suffered damage from floods have 
rebuilt their property in the same locations and continue to receive 
subsidized rates.46  This is in stark contrast to the ideally analogous 
scenario in which private insurers have the ability to cancel coverage. 
 
B. STATE DISASTER INSURANCE PLANS 
 
Many states have in operation, Fair Access to Insurance 
Requirement or “FAIR” plans.  Ostensibly, these plans provide coverage to 
property owners unable to secure insurance in the private market.     
Although FAIR plans were not originally designed to cope with coastal 
natural catastrophe loss, these plans have expanded considerably and today 
many states operate plans that primarily provide coastal storm coverage.47  
FAIR plans are state-run insurance pools in which all property insurers 
licensed in a state are required to participate.48  Participating insurers share 
in the profits and losses of the high risk coverage.49  In 2004, a total of 
$400 billion of coastal property was insured by state run FAIR plans.50 
Instead of FAIR plans, other states have enacted Beach and 
Windstorm Insurance Plans that provide coverage to property-owners in 
coastal communities.51  Much like FAIR plans, most states that operate 
Windstorm plans require participation by private property insurance 
carriers in the state.   Again, as in the case of FAIR plans, here the insurers 
                                                                                                                 
44  See RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM: TREASURY BORROWING IN THE AFTERMATH OF HURRICANE 
KATRINA 1, 3-4 (2006). 
45  See PIDOT, supra note 31, at 34. 
46  Id; Spencer M. Taylor, Insuring Against the Natural Catastrophe after 
Hurricane Katrina, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 26, 28 (2006). 
47  See PIDOT, supra note 31, at 21. 
48 See Ins. Info. Inst., Residual Markets, Aug. 2009, http://www.iii.org/ 
media/hottopics/insurance/residual/.  
49  Id. 
50  ROBERT P. HARTWIG & CLAIRE WILKINSON, INS. INFO. INST., 
PUBLIC/PRIVATE MECHANISMS FOR HANDLING CATASTROPHIC RISKS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 33 (2005). 
51  See Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 48. 
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share profits and losses.  In 2004 upwards of $30 million of coastal 
property was insured under some form of state Beach or Windstorm plan.52   
Still other states have crafted even more unique programs.  Florida 
created the “Florida Citizens”, not-for-profit “insurer of last resort.”53   In 
contrast to FAIR and Windstorm plans, Florida Citizens is less an 
insurance pool, than a state run insurer.54  At present, Florida Citizens is the 
largest insurer in the state with more than 1.3 million policyholders.55  
Unfortunately, Florida Citizens’ premium rates are set by statute at levels 
that are not actuarially sound.56  In 2007 Florida Citizens had more than 
$400 billion in exposure, but received only $3 billion in yearly premiums.57  
When Florida Citizens' losses exceed its claims-paying capacity in a single 
year, it is required by statute to post-fund itself by imposing a statewide 
assessment on every other line of insurance sold in the state.58 
 
IV. THE PROPOSED PLANS 
 
A. COALITION OF AMERICANS FOR SMART NATURAL 
CATASTROPHE POLICY: MITIGATION 
 
Formed in late 2005, the Coalition of Americans for Smart Natural 
Catastrophe Policy is a grouping of environmentalists, academics, and 
consumer rights groups.59  At present, the Coalition is one of the most high 
                                                                                                                 
52  HARTWIG & WILKINSON, supra note 50, at 39.   
53  Id. at 32, 34. 
54  Id. at 40. 
55  INS. INFO. INST., AN EXCERPT FROM: RESIDUAL MARKET PROPERTY PLANS 
-- FROM MARKETS OF LAST RESORT TO MARKETS OF FIRST CHOICE 2 (2007). 
56  See PIDOT, supra note 31 at 18. 
57  John W. Rollins, Florida Property Insurance – The “Citizens” View (June 
19, 2007), http://www.casact.org/education/spring/2007/handouts/rollins.pdf. 
58  INS. INFO. INST., supra note 55,  at 4. 
59 Presently the Coalition consists of: Consumer Federation of America, 
Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Defense, Friends of the Earth, National 
Wildlife Federation, Republicans for Environmental Protection, Association of 
State Floodplain Managers, Americans for Prosperity, Council for Citizens Against 
Government Waste, Competitive Enterprise Institute, FreedomWorks, Taxpayers 
for Common Sense, Association of Bermuda Insurers and Reinsurers, Reinsurance 
Association of America, and the National Association of Professional Insurance 
Agents.  See Smarter Safer, About Us, http://www.smartersafer.org/about-us/ (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2009)(for more information on the coalition’s expanding roster). 
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profile groups advocating their own national catastrophe proposal.  Unlike 
many of the other proposals discussed later, the Coalition’s plan focuses on 
policy encouraging homeowner mitigation methods rather than federal 
reinsurance or federal lending to state insurance pools.  According to the 
Coalition’s current mission statement they believe: 
[T]he Federal government has a role in encouraging and helping 
homeowners to undertake mitigation efforts to safeguard their homes 
against hurricanes, [but] ... the coalition oppose proposals being considered 
in Congress that would create moral hazards by providing direct or indirect 
subsidies for coastal homeowners' insurance policies, thereby giving people 
incentives to build homes in hurricane-prone, environmentally sensitive 
areas.60 
Specifically, the Coalition proposes that federal intervention be 
limited to existing programs modified to increase emphasis on 
preparedness and mitigation as opposed to any sort of federally aided 
insurance coverage expansion.61  The full breadth of the Coalition’s 
platform can be seen in its recent promotion of the Flood Insurance Reform 
Modernization Act of 2007 and the Property Mitigation Assistance Act; as 
well as its opposition to the Homeowners Defense Act of 2007.   
The Coalition supported the version of the Flood Insurance Reform 
and Modernization Act of 2007 that appeared before the Senate.62  While 
described by the Coalition as modest legislation reauthorizing the National 
Flood Insurance Program, the Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization 
Act of 2007 would have made fairly significant changes to the program.63  
First, the act would have attempted to make the National Flood Insurance 
Program satisfy traditional criteria for actuarial soundness by phasing out 
discounted premiums previously available for structures built prior to the 
mapping and implementation of the program’s floodplain management 
requirements.64  At present, these prerate map structures pay heavily 
discounted rates on the first $35,000 of their structure’s insured value, and 
full risk-based premium rates for the remaining insured value.65  Currently, 
                                                                                                                 
60  Id. 
61  See id. 
62  Smarter Safer, Senate Legislation, http://www.smartersafer.org/about -the-
legislation/senate-legislation, (last visited Sept. 30, 2009). 
63  Id. 
64  See Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization Act of 2007, S. 2284, 
110th Cong. §§ 8(g), 14 (2007).  
65  An Examination of the National Flood Insurance Program: Hearing Before 
The United States Senate Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th 
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nearly a quarter of all policies written by the National Flood Insurance 
Program are subsidized under this aspect of the program.66    
Further, the Senate version of the Flood Insurance Reform and 
Modernization Act of 2007 would have allowed the increase of National 
Flood Insurance policy rates by 15% a year, up from the previous 10% 
cap.67   The bill’s drafters arrived at this figure because the previous 10% 
ceiling was shown not to be enough to ensure the program would have 
sufficient funds to cover future obligations for policyholder claims, 
operating expenses, and interest on debt stemming from the 2005 hurricane 
season.68    
In addition to supporting the Flood Insurance Reform and 
Modernization Act of 2007 the Coalition also successfully opposed a 
substantial amendment to the bill that would have made wind coverage 
available to National Flood Insurance policyholders.69   In support of their 
opposition to the wind coverage amendment, the Coalition cited estimates 
that such an amendment would result in as much as $161 billion in new 
taxpayer liabilities in 2009 alone if the U.S. Gulf Coast suffered a hurricane 
season comparable to that of 2005.70  Further still, the Coalition urged that 
the expanded program would also threaten public safety by encouraging 
further development in hurricane prone coastal areas.71   In a press release 
lauding the Senate’s subsequent rejection of the amended bill, the Coalition 
suggested that instead of expanding the National Flood Insurance Program, 
Congress should look to, “safety-oriented reform solutions that would help 
homeowners better prepare for storms and reduce destruction caused by 
                                                                                                                          
Cong. 2 (2007) (testimony of David I. Maurstad Assistant Admin. for Mitigation 
and Fed. Ins. Admin. of Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency). 
66  Id. 
67  See Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization Act of 2007, S. 2284, 
110th Cong. § 6(b) (2007).   
68  KING, supra note 44, at 2-3. 
69  Press Release, Americans for Smart Natural Catastrophe Policy, Americans 
for Smart Natural Catastrophe Policy Applauds Congress’ Extension of National 
Flood Program Without Irresponsible Expansion (Sept. 29, 2008), 
www.smartersafer.org/newsroom/press-releases (follow “Americans for Smart 
Natural Catastrophe Policy Applauds Congress’ Extension of National Flood 
Program Without Irresponsible Expansion” hyperlink). 
70  Id. 
71  Id.  
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natural catastrophes.”72  The 2007 Property Mitigation Act is an example of 
a safety-oriented solution can that was supported by the Coalition.  
As part of the Coalition’s overall program, the group championed 
the unsuccessful 2007 Property Mitigation Assistance Act.73  The Act 
sought to “authorize grants and loans to homeowners to harden their homes 
against hurricanes and other disasters.”74  Pursuant to the Act, states that 
met the terms in the bill would have received grants of at least $500,000 to 
be distributed to residents through loan and grant programs to help 
residents take such measures as adding storm shutters, hurricane clips, safe 
rooms or any other activity that would mitigate the risks of future hazards 
and natural disasters.75  The idea was to help at-risk homeowners protect 
their homes from damage instead of expanding federal involvement in 
insurance coverage or aid.76   
Finally, the Coalition’s overall view of national coastal natural 
catastrophe policy can be seen in their opposition to the Senate version of 
the Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2007.  The Coalition described the 
proposed legislation as irresponsible.77  Essentially, the Homeowners’ 
Defense Act of 2007 consisted of three bundled programs designed to work 
with existing state insurance pools.  The first program would have 
established an interstate federal consortium that would have attempted to 
aid multiple states running coastal risk insurance pools in combining and 
transferring this risk to the capital markets.78  The second program was an 
insurance stabilization plan that would have allowed the Federal Treasury 
to make loans to state pools in order to ensure their continued, liquidity in 
the aftermath of a natural catastrophe.79  The third and final component of 
the Act would have established a Federal reinsurance program designed to 
sell reinsurance to state and interstate pools.80   
                                                                                                                 
72  Id. 
73  Smarter Safer, supra note 62. 
74  Id.; Property Mitigation Assistance Act of 2007, S. 2328, 110th Cong. § 
2(m) (2007). 
75  Property Mitigation Assistance Act of 2007, S. 2328, 110th Cong. § 2(m) 
(2007). 
76  See Smarter Safer, The Senate Should Support The Property Mitigation 
Assistance Act of 2007,  http://www.smartersafer.org/uploads/ S2328.pdf (last 
visited Sep.15, 2009).  
77  Smarter Safer, supra note 62.   
78  Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2007, S.2310 §§ 101-108 (2007). 
79  See id. § 201.  
80  See id. § 301. 
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The Coalition’s criticism of the Senate version of the 
Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2007 was that each aspect of the Act would 
simply expand federal liability by introducing a federal role in state 
insurance pools.81 As to the Federal Risk Consortium, the Coalition pointed 
out that the States were already free to associate, and address catastrophe 
risk.82  Therefore a permanent federal role in this process would be 
unnecessary.83  Similarly, in their opposition to the aspects of the Senate 
version of the Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2007 that provided for Federal 
reinsurance and Federal loans to state programs, the Coalition adopted the 
position that the Act would both displace existing private reinsurers and 
promote the continuation of financially unsound state insurance 
programs.84   
 
B. ALLSTATE’S PROPOSAL: FEDERAL REINSURANCE BACKSTOP 
TO STATE POOLS 
 
Supporting a bill that would have created a federal reinsurance 
backstop even prior to the monumental 2005 hurricane season, Allstate was 
among the first private sector supporters of the concept of an increased 
federal role in coastal natural catastrophe insurance coverage.85      As 
Allstate’s was the first of the major insurer backed plans, the proposal was 
vaguer than some subsequent proposals.   However, a more fleshed out 
version of the original Allstate proposal was soon incorporated into the 
stalled Homeowners Insurance Protection Act of 2005.  Allstate 
subsequently endorsed the Act.86  With this in mind, the following 
description of the Allstate proposal includes details from the Homeowners 
Insurance Protection Act of 2005 to fill in some of the gaps that this early 
private sector proposal exhibited.  
                                                                                                                 
81  See Smarter Safer, The Senate Should Not Adopt S. 2310 (2007), 
http://www.abir.bm/downloads/SmartNatCatBriefingPapers.pdf (last visited 
Sep.15, 2009). 
82  See id. 
83  See id. 
84  See id. 
85  R.J. Lehmann, A Catastrophic Battle, BEST’S REVIEW, Oct. 2006, at 38. 
86  Id.; Business Wire, Allstate CEO to Call for National Catastrophe Plan at 
National Press Club on Friday, Jan. 13; Devastation of 2005 Makes Reform an 
Immediate National Priority, Jan. 9, 2006, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2006_Jan_9/ai_n15989710/ (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2009).  
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Allstate’s initial position was to create a federal government 
sponsored catastrophe program that would provide reinsurance to a system 
of state and regional catastrophe funds.87   This required states that did not 
already have them to create catastrophe pools funded by, “all entities that 
benefit from a robust local economy such as the banking and real estate 
sectors.”88  In turn, the Department of the Treasury would make 
reinsurance contracts available to any of the state programs that met 
minimum requirements.89   
As to rates, the text of the Homeowners Insurance Protection Act 
of 2005 required that rates be risk-based.90  States would pay premiums 
directly to the federal government.91  The federal reinsurance would cover 
90% of losses in excess of either the capacity of each state program or the 
projected losses from a 200-year event, whichever is greater.92  This 
translates into the federal reinsurance coverage being triggered by events 
causing roughly $50 billion or more in homeowners’ losses.93      
 
C. TRAVELERS AND NATIONWIDE: FEDERAL REINSURANCE AND 
INCREASED FEDERAL REGULATION 
 
Two other leading property-casualty insurance carriers, Travelers 
and Nationwide, soon followed Allstate in calling for an increased federal 
role in coastal catastrophe policy.  The Travelers/Nationwide proposal had 
two significant aspects.  First, the proposal sought to spread big windstorm 
insurance risk across state borders by having it federally regulated.94  
                                                                                                                 
87  Lehmann, supra note 85. 
88  Press Release, Ins. Info. Inst., Reforms Needed to Prepare for Major 
Catastrophes, Insurance CEOs Tell Forum, http://www.iii.org/media/ 
updates/archive/press.748575/ (Jan.10, 2006). 
89  Homeowners Insurance Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4366, 109th Cong. § 4 
(2005). 
90  Id. § 7(b)(6)(B). 
91  Id. § 7(a). 
92  Id. § 7(b)(3). 
93  David Dankwa, Allstate Takes Hot Seat as Industry Debates Catastrophe-
Fund Options, BESTWIRE  Jan. 16, 2006, available at 
http://www3.ambest.com/Frames/FrameServer.asp?AltSrc=23&Tab=1&Site=news
&refnum=80532. 
94  The Travelers Cos., Insurance Agents, Travelers, Nationwide Urge Coastal 
Wind Policy, INS. J., July 16, 2008, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news 
/national/2008/07/16/91909.html. 
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Second, similar to the Allstate proposal, the Travelers/Nationwide plan 
called for a federal reinsurance mechanism for extreme weather events.95  
The first notable aspect of the Travelers/Nationwide plan was that 
it called for a federal role in promoting a plan to spread coastal windstorm 
risks across state borders.96  As opposed to setting up individual catastrophe 
funds state by state, the Travelers/Nationwide plan encouraged a system of 
inter-state zones: the Gulf, Florida, Southeast and Northeast.97  Pursuant to 
the Travelers/Nationwide plan the federal government would not have a 
financial role in maintaining these pools, but would oversee the wind 
underwriting by private insurers.98  To do this, the Travelers/Nationwide 
plan would require the creation of an independent federal agency to 
regulate rates and set uniform rules from Texas to Maine for the wind 
coverage portion of a homeowner's policy, while the states would continue 
to regulate the other portions of a homeowner's policy.99 
With regard to premiums, the Travelers/Nationwide proposal 
requires setting “risk-based and actuarially sound rates using approved 
standards and certified windstorm risk models approved by the federal 
commission.”100  However, the drafters of the Travelers/Nationwide 
proposal recognized that risk-based premiums may be out of reach for 
many coastal residents.101  In response, the proposal provided for temporary 
transitional subsidies lasting between 10 to 15 years. 102  To this end, 
coastal residents who were unable to afford coverage would receive tax 
credits to help them afford premiums.103  The credits would be funded by 
tax surcharges imposed on those coastal residents able to afford 
coverage.104  
The Travelers/Nationwide federal reinsurance mechanism 
functioned much like the Allstate backstop.  The federal backstop required 
regions set up catastrophe funds and pay premiums to a federal program in 
                                                                                                                 
95  Id. 
96  See id. 
97  THE TRAVELERS INST., TRAVELERS COASTAL WIND ZONE PLAN 5 (2009), 
http://www.travelers.com/iwcm/Trv/docs/TRV_Coastal_Wind_ Zone_Web.pdf. 
98  Id. at 6. 
99  Id. at 5. 
100  Id. 
101  Jay S. Fishman, Before the Next 'Big One' Hits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 
2007, at A10. 
102  Id. 
103  THE TRAVELERS INST., supra note 97, at 6. 
104  Id. 
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return for reinsurance that would be used to support the regional fund.105  
The threshold for the Travelers/Nationwide federal reinsurance mechanism 
has yet to be finalized as it is stated to be for “extreme events (such as 
hurricanes causing losses several times greater than those arising out of 
Hurricane Katrina).”106 
 
D. THE HARTFORD’S PLAN: HOMEOWNER CATASTROPHE 
SAVINGS ACCOUNTS, MANDATORY FLOOD INSURANCE, AND 
FEDERAL BACKSTOPPING 
 
The Hartford announced its public-private natural catastrophe plan 
in the summer of 2008.107  The Hartford’s Coastal Catastrophe Partnership 
Plan was “designed to deal with the looming economic crisis posed by a 
major hurricane.”108  The plan was to occupy a middle ground of 
government involvement.  Hartford CEO, Romani Ayer, said the Coastal 
Catastrophe Plan was designed to navigate between the “‘socialistic’ efforts 
of some in Congress, and reinsurers who believe all catastrophe protection 
should be left to the private market.”109  It was the last of the plans put forth 
by a major private insurer and in many ways it was the most detailed.  The 
plan had three facets that merit discussion.  First, it called for tax-deferred 
catastrophe savings accounts.110  Second, the Hartford proposal required 
                                                                                                                 
105  See supra Part III.B. 
106  The Travelers Cos., supra note 94. 
107  See The Hartford Fin. Serv. Group Inc., The Hartford Unveils National 
Coastal Home Insurance Plan, INS. J., July 31, 2008,  
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2008/07/31/92393.htm (noting 
that the plan will include subsidized premiums for homeowners and a federal 
reinsurance program).  
108  Daniel Hays, Hartford Proposes National Cat Plan Featuring Federal 
Backstop, IRA-Type Fund, NAT’L UNDERWRITER – PROP. & CAS. INS., Aug. 4, 
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 14506223 (quotation omitted).  
109  Id. 
110  See RAMANI AYER, THE HARTFORD FIN. SERV. GROUP, BUILDING A 
NATURAL CATASTROPHE SOLUTION 5 (2007), http://www.coastalpartner 
ship.org/documents/CCP Plan Outline.pdf (noting that the Hartford proposes “the 
creation of IRA-like savings vehicles – perhaps called ‘supplemental catastrophic 
security accounts’”). 
340 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
 
 
mandatory homeowner’s flood insurance.111   Finally, the proposal called 
for a Federal reinsurance backstop.112 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Hartford’s plan was that it 
encouraged the creation of IRA-like savings vehicles dubbed 
“supplemental catastrophic security accounts.”113  The accounts would have 
permitted property owners in coastal regions to establish tax-deferred 
reserves to pay for insurance and other expenses related to disasters.114  
Specifically, the idea is that allowing homeowners to use tax-deferred 
dollars to pay for catastrophe insurance could induce more people to buy 
it.115 
The second aspect of the Hartford plan required coastal 
homeowners to buy flood insurance.116  The Hartford’s plan would achieve 
this by allowing for the alternative policy options of either requiring 
certification of flood insurance coverage through current programs such as 
the National Flood Insurance Program or by inserting flood coverage as 
part of the standard homeowner’s policy.117 
Finally, much like the Allstate and Travelers/Nationwide plans, the 
Hartford proposal also included a federal reinsurance backstop for existing 
state and regional funds.118  The Hartford backstop would be triggered upon 
the occurrence of a 1-in-100 year loss.119  Thus, the key difference between 
the previous proposed federal reinsurance backstops and the Hartford’s 
plan lies in the fact that the latter seems to anticipate the most amount of 
government intervention. 120  
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E. THE HOUSE VERSION OF THE HOMEOWNERS DEFENSE ACT OF 
2007: BONDS, LOANS, REINSURANCE 
 
In response to the 2005 hurricane season U.S. House Reps. Tim 
Mahoney and Ron Klein co-authored a bill designed “to bring relief to 
property owners struggling with the affordability and availability of 
homeowners insurance.”121  The resultant Homeowners' Defense Act of 
2007 sought to, “assist state-sponsored insurance programs on covering 
losses from natural disasters.”122   Essentially, the proposal offered 
by the Homeowners' Defense Act of 2007 had three major features.   
First, the proposal would essentially securitize coastal risk.  This 
aspect of the proposal would have established a federally overseen 
mechanism that permitted multiple states to join together to help pay for 
each others' disaster costs and then transfer those costs to the private 
markets through catastrophe bonds and reinsurance contracts.123  The 
program would have accomplished the private market risk transfer via the 
establishment of a central National Catastrophe Risk Consortium tasked to, 
work with states to create an inventory of catastrophe risk obligations held 
by state reinsurance funds and issue securities linked to the catastrophe risk 
insured in capital markets.124     
Second, the proposal would have created a federal reinsurance 
program similar to the type championed by both the Allstate and 
Travelers/Nationwide plans to backstop existing state insurance pools.125  
The actual reinsurance mechanism would be fiscally backed by the Federal 
Natural Catastrophe Reinsurance Fund.126  This fund would be directed 
towards covering contract payments for losses resulting from the federal 
reinsurance program.127  The fund would be financially supported by, 
amounts received annually from the sale of reinsurance contracts, amounts 
earned on investments, and appropriations.128      
                                                                                                                 
121  See Amie Parnes, Bill Seeks to Provide Homeowners Insurance Relief, 
NAPLES NEWS, Aug. 3, 2007, available at http://www.naplesnews.com/ 
news/2007/aug/03/bill_seeks_provide_homeowners_insurance_relief/. 
122  Id.  
123  See Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2007, H.R. 3355, 110th Cong. §§ 2(b), 
101(d), 102 (2007). 
124  See id. § 102. 
125  See id. §§ 301-303. 
126  Id. § 305. 
127  Id. 
128  H.R. 3355, § 305. 
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Finally, the proposal would have provided loans to state insurance 
programs.129  This aspect of the proposal called for the creation of a 
National Homeowners' Insurance Stabilization Program, which would have 
provided low-interest federal loans directly to qualified state insurance 
programs in order to, “ensure the solvency of such programs, to improve 
the availability and affordability of homeowners' insurance, to incent risk 
transfer to the private capital and reinsurance markets and to spread the risk 
of catastrophic financial loss resulting from natural disasters.”130   
 
F. NAIC’S COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CATASTROPHE PLAN: 
CATASTROPHE RESERVING, ALL PERILS POLICIES AND 
TENTATIVE SUPPORT FOR FEDERAL REINSURANCE 
 
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ 
Catastrophe Insurance Working Group developed its national natural 
disaster plan in 2005.131  The NAIC plan addresses natural catastrophe 
coastal risk in terms of three main “layers.”132  The first layer corresponds 
to private market solutions and calls for a mandatory all-perils residential 
policy and insurance company catastrophe reserving.133  Dealing primarily 
with state level issues, the second “layer” calls for the establishment of a 
uniform system of state catastrophe funds.134  While corresponding to 
federal level policy, the third layer tentatively supports further examination 
of creating a federally overseen catastrophe reinsurance mechanism.135 
Under the all-perils component of the NAIC plan, the idea would 
be to create a homeowner insurance policy that would provide coverage 
against all types of natural catastrophes.136 The NAIC posits that, private 
insurers would provide coverage against all perils in a single standard 
homeowner’s policy that would reflect each property owner’s risk of loss 
                                                                                                                 
129  See id. § 202. 
130  Id. § 201. 
131  NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, NATURAL CATASTROPHE RISK: CREATING 
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due to natural disaster.137   At this point coastal the NAIC plan would not 
require coastal residents purchase an all perils policy, however, the 
availability of such a policy would be mandatory. 138   
Pursuant to the catastrophe reserving aspect of the NAIC plan, 
private insurers would be permitted to establish tax-deferred reserves to 
pay expenses related to natural coastal disasters in order to further expand 
the financial base available for underwriting catastrophe risk.139  The idea 
underlying catastrophe reserving is that with an additional means of 
building cash reserves insurance companies would be more able and 
willing to underwrite policies.  At present, tax-exempt reserves would 
necessarily require amending the US tax code.140   
Within the second layer of the NAIC’s plan, each state would be 
asked to decide whether its exposure to coastal natural catastrophes 
warrants creating a catastrophe fund or whether the private market has the 
capacity to provide adequate coverage without additional funding.141  If 
established the state catastrophe funds would be responsible for creating 
and managing the insurance capacity of their respective regions.142  The 
funds would have the discretion to implement their own operating 
structures to best fit their particular needs.143  This would entail defining 
catastrophic loss thresholds, determining appropriate private insurers/state 
fund retention amounts, and ensuring that premium rates are actuarially 
sound.144   
The third and final layer of the NAIC plan consists of cautious 
support for a federal reinsurance role.145  Although the NAIC acknowledges 
that a federal reinsurance program seems to be a potential solution, the 
Commission also acknowledges that the debate over whether federal 
reinsurance involvement is necessary is still ongoing.146  Beyond this, the 
specific character of the federal reinsurance mechanism the NAIC would 
support is still not clear.    
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V. ANALYSIS: CAPACITY, PRIVATE MARKET 
DISPLACEMENT, CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION 
 
The plans proposed offer a myriad of policy options.  Keeping 
track of them is a task in itself.  One useful way of evaluating these current 
coastal risk proposals is to look at how well they deal with certain of 
evaluative criteria: private insurance industry capacity, private market 
displacement, and cross subsidization. 
Capacity means “the ability of an insurance company… to pay 
claims in the event of a loss.”147  In this context, capacity specifically refers 
to the private insurance industry’s ability to cover the insured costs of 
property damage wrought by a coastal storm.  With respect to capacity, the 
analysis of each plan concerns two issues.  First, the extent each plan 
suggests the private market presently has adequate capacity to handle 
coastal risk. Second, how each plan seeks to expand private market 
capacity to handle growing future coastal risk.  
Similarly, private market displacement refers to the concern that 
federal government activity in coastal natural catastrophe insurance will 
hinder the private market actors already involved.148   The focus of this 
inquiry is on how each plan seeks to minimize the displacement of the 
private coastal risk insurance markets.   That is, whether any of the plans 
utilize policy options or forms of government intervention that will either 
encourage private market participation or, at least, not completely crowd 
out private insurers from covering coastal risk. 
Finally, in this context cross subsidization refers to the situation 
whereby the government covers the exposure property owners who choose 
to live in high risk coastal locations take on by spreading the cost of that 
risk to taxpayers who do not reside in these areas.149  The issue here is 
whether and to what extent each plan contains policy tools that could help 
localize the costs of owning property in storm-prone coastal areas.  
 
                                                                                                                 
147  NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 131, at 11. 
148  See Press Release, Prop. Cas. Insurers of Am., Windstorm Coverage 
Widely Available, Federal Involvement Unnecessary (April 21, 2008) 
(http://www.pciaa.org (follow “MediaCenter: News Releases: By Date:” then 
scroll to “April 21, 2008”)).  
149 See CHARLES PERROW, THE NEXT CATASTROPHE: REDUCING OUR 
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(Princeton 2007). 
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A. CAPACITY 
 
The nation's two largest homeowners’ insurers, State Farm and 
Allstate, argue that some natural disasters are too large for the private 
insurance market to handle.150  State Farm spokesman Jeff McCollum 
argues that “[c]ommercially available insurance is designed for localized 
disasters, not ‘mega-catastrophes’.”151   He goes on to note that, 
“[i]nsurance was never designed to cover a catastrophe as big or bigger 
than Katrina.”152   Similarly, a spokesperson for the Allstate remarked that, 
“[o]ur view is that there are some events that have the potential to be so 
large as to exceed the capabilities of the insurance industry, as well as the 
funding and financing capability of individual states.”153 
Similarly, some state insurance commissioners recognize the 
capacity issue as a potential stumbling block to completely private market 
solutions to coastal risk.   Florida Insurance Commissioner Kevin McCarty 
told the House Financial Services Committee that in his view, "large 
natural catastrophes are a national economic problem, not simply a local 
insurance problem.”154  McCarty went on to argue that, “[b]ecause of the 
absolute size of the economic losses that are possible due to hurricanes in 
Florida, the private market, public mechanisms, and even the states 
themselves simply do not have sufficient capacity to provide recovery from 
a truly mega-catastrophic hurricane event.”155  As a result, McCarty 
concluded that, “Congress and the states need to work together to develop a 
comprehensive plan to better manage and mitigate the natural catastrophic 
events of tomorrow."156 
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1. The Coalition of Americans for Smart Natural 
Catastrophe Policy 
 
Not all think private market capacity is such a problem.  The 
proposal put forth by the Coalition of Americans for Smart Natural 
Catastrophe Policy is concentrated almost entirely on policy options aimed 
at risk mitigation as opposed to augmenting private market capacity.157 At 
base, the Coalition’s position consists of supporting the homeowner 
mitigation grants and the gradual phasing out of subsidized National Flood 
Insurance Program premiums.158  Implicit in this combination of policy 
choices is the assumption that, if implemented, an increased government 
role in coastal catastrophe insurance is unnecessary because the private 
market has the capacity to cope with such risks. 
As a result of this assumption the Coalition’s plan lacks policy 
aimed at expanding private market capacity.  While policy that encourages 
mitigation can be viewed as an indirect means of decreasing coastal risk 
relative to market capacity, it does not directly address the capacity issue.  
At this point the Coalition’s plan offers no policy innovations aimed at 
aiding private insurers increase their own ability to meet the needs of the 
growing coastal catastrophe insurance market.  This sort of position is 
problematic insofar as the underlying assumption that present market 
capacity is sufficient is debatable.159  Further still, with global climate 
changes in mind market capacity will need to keep pace with coastal 
catastrophes of increasing severity.  In this way the Coalition’s plan does 
not offer an adequate response to the private market capacity issue.  
 
2. Allstate, Travelers’, and the Hartford 
 
In contrast to the position taken in the plan put forth by the 
Coalition of Americans for Smart Natural Catastrophe Policy, the stances 
taken by Allstate, Travelers’, and the Hartford all suggest significantly less 
confidence in private industry capacity to handle coastal catastrophic risk.  
Common to each of these three private insurer proposals are federal 
reinsurance programs.160  Acknowledgement that a federal reinsurance 
backstop is necessary clearly serves as an avowal that the private 
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reinsurance industry does not have the capacity to handle major coastal 
catastrophe.   
Similarly, the plans put forth by all three of these private industry 
leaders signal a perceived lack of private market capacity to cover 
catastrophic coastal loss in that all three share common support for a 
continued role for state and regional government overseen insurance 
pools.161 Although insurance pools essentially spread risk, in part, to 
prevent insolvency,162 the history of government organized coastal risk 
insurance pools is such that after a catastrophe has struck they are often 
funded in part by the public sector.163  In this sense, it is important to note 
that each of the private industry backed proposals requires the erection of 
some form of a system of government backed insurance pools. 
Interestingly, because of their reliance on federal reinsurance 
mechanisms, the private industry response to the capacity issue, as seen by 
the proposals put forth by Allstate, Travelers’, The Hartford and State 
Farm, have less to do with growing private industry capacity than enlisting 
the federal government as a reinsurance safety net.  Instead of approaches 
that would augment private industry ability to cover catastrophic risk, such 
as catastrophe reserving, the plans set forth by the three leading insurers 
look to the federal government as a potential backstop as a primary means 
of shifting the exposure of coastal loss.  This approach is undesirable 
because over-reliance on federal support implicates creating large liabilities 
for the federal government and, as will be discussed shortly, unfairly cross-
subsidizing coastal residents at the expense of non-coastal residents. 
 
3. House Version of the Homeowners Defense Act of 
2007 
 
The House version of the Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2007 
proposal evidences significant reservation as to the ability of private 
markets to handle catastrophic coastal risk. The Act would both create a 
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federal reinsurance presence in already established state catastrophe pools 
and provide low-interest federal loans directly to existing state reinsurance 
programs.164  However, through its National Catastrophe Risk Consortium 
program,165 the Act provides a more complicated overall take on the private 
market capacity expansion issue. 
The Homeowners’ Defense Act is the first of the plans examined to 
offer a policy option directly aimed at expanding the private market’s 
ability to handle catastrophic coastal risk. The Consortium component of 
the Act seeks to transfer coastal risk to the private financial market.166  
Through the creation of financial instruments linked to catastrophe risks 
insured or reinsured by members of the Consortium, this aspect of the 
Homeowners’ Defense Act sought to create and encourage a securities 
market linked to coastal risk.167  This approach essentially uses a federally 
overseen mechanism to funnel coastal risk from state and regional pools to 
private securities markets. 168 In theory, by tapping into the private capital 
markets this approach has the potential to drastically increase private sector 
capacity to handle coastal risk.  As a result, this approach offers an 
innovative policy option geared towards expanding private sector capacity.  
 
4. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
 
 Due to its limited tentative support for some sort of federal 
reinsurance mechanism,169 NAIC’s Comprehensive National Catastrophe 
Plan is marked by a relatively limited direct federal intervention that 
assumes the private markets’ have significant ability to handle coastal 
catastrophic storm related loss.   Moreover, the NAIC proposal contains a 
policy tool in catastrophe reserving that may actually expand the private 
market’s capacity to handle coastal risk. 
The catastrophe reserving mechanism contained in the NAIC 
proposal seeks to expand the ability of private market insurers to 
underwrite coastal risk by allowing them to build limited tax-deferred pre-
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catastrophe capital bases.170  This sort of option represents the most direct 
means of increasing private market capacity to deal with coastal storms.    
 
B. PRIVATE MARKET DISPLACEMENT 
 
There is a line of reasoning with considerable traction within the 
coastal insurance industry that the greatest threat to the property insurance 
market, "is not the force of hurricane winds but legislation and regulations 
that displace available private capital or make it economically unfeasible 
for private companies to operate in coastal markets."171  Similarly, there is a 
movement within the industry that would prefer to see a halt to federal 
expansion into the coastal catastrophe market.172  Frank Nutter, president of 
the Reinsurance Association of America argues that expanding the current 
federal role "would displace a vibrant [private] reinsurance market to the 
detriment and cost of the U.S. taxpayers.”173 
 
1. The Coalition of Americans for Smart Natural 
Catastrophe Policy 
 
Clearly, the mitigation based proposal put forth by the Coalition of 
Americans for Smart Natural Catastrophe Policy would require the least 
amount of private market displacement.  Perhaps overestimating the 
capacity of the private market, the Coalition proposal requires no federal 
reinsurance program and does not require any other new federal 
intervention beyond modest homeowner mitigation grants and loans.174    In 
this way, the Coalition plan is at the far end of the spectrum occupied by 
proposals that would cause little private market displacement.  
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2. Allstate, Travelers’, and the Hartford 
 
In contrast to the Coalition plan, the proposals put forth by Allstate, 
Travelers’, and the Hartford would all anticipate significant private market 
displacement.  All three proposals require a federal reinsurance mechanism 
specifically designed to support state insurance pools.175  The displacement 
implications for this type of federal reinsurance mechanism are clear.  If 
even eligible, private reinsurers would be forced to compete with a federal 
reinsurance program in providing reinsurance to the pools.176  This scenario 
has the potential to cause significant private market disruption. 
However, this reinsurance displacement should be viewed in 
broader context. A federal reinsurance option could lead to greater 
participation from private primary insurers.177  In this sense, any 
displacement of private reinsurers may be offset or even surpassed by 
greater primary insurer willingness to underwrite coastal risk.   
 
3. Homeowners Defense Act of 2007 
 
The response to the private market displacement question offered 
by the proposal embodied in the House version of the Homeowners 
Defense Act of 2007 is unique.  Although the plan advocates government-
run insurance pools and a federal reinsurance fund,178 the role of the 
Consortium in transferring risk to the private securities market complicates 
the private market displacement analysis. In the narrow sense, the federal 
reinsurance fund would certainly displace private reinsurers.179  However, 
the net effect of the Consortium’s risk transferring scheme may potentially 
offset some of the private market reinsurance displacement by facilitating 
risk transfer to the private securities market.   
 
4. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
 
The NAIC program, consisting of private industry catastrophe 
reserving and mandatory offer of an all-perils policy180 suggests expanding 
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the role of private insurers as opposed to displacing them.  The catastrophe 
reserving policy option would potentially increase private insurer capacity 
to handle large coastal risk and thereby increase its ability to underwrite 
risk.181  In this way, catastrophe reserving may prevent private market 
displacement by fortifying its ability to handle coastal risk.  Similarly, the 
all-perils portion of the NAIC plan explicitly seeks to have private insurers 
provide comprehensive storm coverage in a single standard homeowners’ 
policy.182  Here, the effort to expand private activity in the context of 
coastal risk is quite clear.  An all-perils policy program such as the one 
endorsed by the NAIC may have the opposite impact of actually further 
entrenching the private market in fielding coastal risk.183 
 
C. SUBSIDIZING COASTAL PROPERTY OWNERS 
  
Federal intervention in coastal risk could result in significant public 
subsidies to property owners who make the choice to construct or maintain 
a home or business in a coastal area.  The current National Flood Insurance 
Program is a prime example of a program that facilitates this dynamic.184   
Ultimately the subsidized rates that many coastal property owners pay are 
made possible by tax dollars of many non-coastal residents.185   The term 
that describes this occurrence is “cross-subsidization.” 
   
1. The Coalition of Americans for Smart Natural 
Catastrophe Policy 
 
As for current proposals that attempt to minimize such 
subsidization, the Coalition of Americans for Smart Natural Catastrophe 
Policy’s mitigation based plan confronts the issue in blunt terms.  In effect, 
the Coalition’s platform is built on the fear that if its policyholders are not 
adopted citizens in regions who face little coastal storm risk, they would be 
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subsidizing residents of areas where hurricanes are a constant threat.186   
The Coalition urges no federal involvement in insuring coastal risk beyond 
the existing National Flood Insurance Program, and even then would have 
the subsidized rates that characterize much of the program phased out 
within a matter of years.187   In addition, the Coalition successfully fought 
adding windstorm coverage to the National Flood Insurance Program 
because it would have the impact of transferring more coastal risk from 
coastal property owners to non-coastal homeowners by way of the federal 
government.188   For these reasons, the Coalition’s plan deals most 
effectively with curbing cross-subsidization. 
 
2. Allstate, Travelers’, and the Hartford 
 
At the other end of the spectrum the Allstate, 
Travelers/Nationwide, and Hartford plans would all have non-coastal 
residents subsidize coastal property owners.  The federal reinsurance 
program that is common to three plans would likely rely on post-funding 
appropriations in the event of a coastal catastrophe.189  In the context of a 
federal reinsurance mechanism, post-funding appropriations would likely 
be drawn from federal tax dollars and would therefore represent a 
significant form of cross-subsidies.190   
In theory, a federal reinsurance mechanism does not necessarily 
have to lead to federal subsidies.  If the proposed federal reinsurance 
programs were operated according to actuarially sound principles it should 
be self-sufficient and not require tax derived post-funding in the event of a 
catastrophe.   However, given the history of programs such as the National 
Flood Insurance Program it is difficult to see a government devised 
insurance scheme not relying on post-funding measures.191   If the National 
Flood Insurance Program is any indication, a federal reinsurance 
mechanism will not be self-sufficient and the program will likely rely on 
the liberal use of cross-subsidized post-event appropriations.192   For this 
                                                                                                                 
186  See Smarter Safer, Statement of Principles, http://www.smartersafer.org/ 
about-us/statement-of-principles (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).  
187  Id.; see supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text. 
188  See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text. 
189  The history of other government managed coastal risk programs supports 
this assertion.  See supra notes 45, 57-58 and accompanying text. 
190  See, e.g., supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
191  See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. 
192  See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. 
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reason the Allstate/Nationwide, Travelers’, and Hartford plans do not 
successfully minimize cross-subsidization. 
 
3. Homeowners Defense Act of 2007 
 
On balance the three prongs of the program offered in the 
Homeowners' Defense Act of 2007 favor significant cross-subsidization.  
Clearly, the plan’s federal reinsurance backstop and related reinsurance 
fund could lead to non-coastal taxpayers subsidizing their coastal 
counterparts.193  Similarly, the federal stabilization program designed to 
provide low-interest federal loans directly to qualified state reinsurance 
programs would also lead to government facilitated cross-subsidization.194  
However, on the other side of the scale, the risk transferring National 
Catastrophe Risk Consortium has the potential to offset some of the other 
two programs insofar as it can tap into private sector capacity to take on 
coastal risk and thereby eliminate some need for utilization of the other two 
programs.195  Since the potential success of the Consortium is difficult to 
gauge it is ultimately hard to tell how effective it will be in curbing the 
need to utilize the proposals other cross-subsidy funded programs.   
 
4. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
 
The NAIC proposal contains policy measures that localize the risk 
of catastrophic coastal storms, but also some that may lead to cross-
subsidization of coastal risk.    By withholding unreserved support for a 
federal reinsurance system, the NAIC plan, in its present form would 
essentially only allow for catastrophe reserving and all-perils homeowners’ 
policies to be provided by private companies.196   These two remaining 
aspects of the NAIC proposal would have very different impacts in terms 
of cross-subsidization.  While catastrophe reserving would allow private 
insurers to build up capital reserves to better deal with future catastrophic 
events, it would not directly involve having noncoastal tax-payers subsidize 
coastal residents. However, the all-perils homeowners’ policy aspect of the 
NAIC program may indirectly lead to moderate cross-subsidization.  While 
                                                                                                                 
193  See supra notes 125-28,189-92 and accompanying text. 
194  See KING, supra note 44 at 5; see also supra notes 129-31 and 
accompanying text. 
195  See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. 
196  See supra notes 139-46 and accompanying text. 
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the NAIC would require these policies be written through private insurers, 
the all-perils option could lead to government subsidies for low-income 
property owners to afford such coverage.197 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Some estimate that the destructive potential of tropical storms in 
the North Atlantic has increased dramatically since the 1970s.198  Alarming 
enough on its own, this weather trend coincides with a time in which many 
parts of the coastal U.S. are becoming more densely populated than ever.199  
Add to this an average annual growth rate that will lead to the doubling of 
the total covered coastal value every decade,200 and it becomes clear that 
the coastal catastrophe policy framework needs reevaluation.   
Even before the wakeup call of the monumental 2005 hurricane 
season policymakers and private industry leaders were beginning to rethink 
the coastal risk landscape.   The proposals examined in this paper represent 
a fairly wide range of thought on the federal role in insuring coastal risk.  
Evaluated by way of the capacity, private market displacement, cross 
subsidization criteria laid out here, none of the plans are perfect.  Instead, 
each proposal is flawed while a few exhibit promising aspects. 
In advocating systems of federally reinsured state run catastrophe 
pools, the proposals made by three of the largest property and casualty 
insurance companies, could result in a considerable expansion of federal 
involvement.  Federal reinsurance would not directly expand private 
market capacity, but would instead shift coastal risk exposure to the federal 
government.  Similarly, this expansion would come at the cost of private 
market displacement and significant cross-subsidization.   
In contrast, the plan put forth by the Coalition of Americans for 
Smart Natural Catastrophe Policy is characterized almost exclusively by 
risk mitigation efforts and would seemingly halt any additional federal 
involvement in managing coastal risk.  While the absence of a federal 
reinsurance scheme is laudable insofar as it would curb private market 
displacement and significant cross-subsidization, the Coalition approach is 
                                                                                                                 
197  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,  supra note 115, at 34-35. 
198  See Kerry Emanuel, Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones Over 
the Past 30 Years, 436 NATURE 686 (2005). 
199  See supra notes 9-22 and accompanying text 
200  See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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problematic because places unwarranted confidence in the capacity of the 
private market and existing coastal risk framework to handle future storms.    
Containing measures aimed at expanding private insurer capacity 
to take on coastal risk and only reserved support for a federal reinsurance 
mechanism, the proposal made by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners offers a possible approach with promise.  The NAIC plan’s 
support of insurance company catastrophe reserving may potentially be 
effective in increasing private market capacity to handle coastal catastrophe 
risk.  This capacity expanding upside might offset the private market 
displacement and cross-subsidization the NAIC plan’s potential reinsurance 
mechanism would cause.   
Finally, the House version of the Homeowners’ Defense Act of 
2007 would have created an innovative mechanism to transfer coastal risk 
to private capital markets, but would also have provided for federal loans to 
state insurance pools and erected a federal reinsurance backstop.   The 
innovative capacity expansion upside that the Defense Act’s risk 
transferring mechanism provides is undercut by the amount of cross-
subsidization and private market displacement the proposal’s federal 
reinsurance and loan programs could lead to. 
In the months ahead other proposals will be made and eventually a 
comprehensive program will be settled upon.  It was the goal of this modest 
examination to add to the discussion that will lead to an ultimate decision 
by examining and comparing some of the high profile options with 
particular attention to certain concerns: private market capacity to field 
catastrophic coastal risk, continuing private market role in coastal 
catastrophic risk, and cross-subsidization of coastal risk.   
 
  
356 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
 
 
 
CONNECTICUT INSURANCE 
LAW JOURNAL 
 
The Connecticut Insurance Law Journal is published at least twice per year.  
Domestic subscriptions are $28.00 per year, international subscriptions are 
$32.00 per year.  Back issues and back volumes are available (for any 
volume up to and including Volume 12) for $15.00 per issue or $25.00 per 
volume; international orders add $3.00 per issue or $5.00 per volume.   
 
Absent timely notice of termination, subscriptions are renewed 
automatically.  To subscribe to the Insurance Journal or order back issues 
online, please visit our website located at www.insurancejournal.org, or 
you may fill out the form below and mail to:  
 
Pat Carbray,  
Connecticut Insurance Law Journal,  
65 Elizabeth Street,  
Hartford, CT 06105;  
subscriptions@insurancejournal.org. 
 
 
Please Print below and complete reverse: 
Contact Name:  _______________________________________ 
Contact Title:  ________________________________________ 
Organization:  ________________________________________ 
Department:  _________________________________________ 
Address:  ____________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________ 
City:  _________________  State:  _____  Zip Code:  ________ 
Phone: __________________  Fax:  ______________________ 
E-Mail:  ____________________________________________ 
Additional Comments:  ________________________________ 
       
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Check all that apply: 
 
 I would like to order (number) __________ subscriptions at $28.00 
per subscription ($32.00 for international orders). 
 
 I would like to order (number) __________ complete set(s) of back 
issues (Volumes 1-12) at $150.00 per set ($165.00 for international 
orders). 
 
 I would like to order the following back volumes or back issues at 
$15.00 per issue, $25.00 per volume (international orders are 
$18.00 per issue and $30.00 per volume).  Please list volume, issue 
and quantity for each. 
 
Examples: 4 copies, Volume 3, Issue 2 
2 copies - Volume 3 
 
_________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
       
